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‘Be sensitive to risk. use a net always’, said the spider. 
 
 
 
 
“Knowledge is limiting. To learn new things, one must escape from what 
was learnt and carefully observe the state of nature around”. 
(Jiddu Krishnamoorthy) 
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Abstract 
 
Continuing airworthiness (CAW) of aircraft is an essential pre-requisite for the safe 
operation of air transport. Human errors that occur in CAW organizations and 
processes could undermine the airworthiness and constitute a risk to flight safety.  
This thesis reports on a generic Bayesian model that has been designed to assess and 
quantify this risk. 
 
The model removes the vagueness inherent in the subjective methods of assessment 
of risk and its qualitative expression.  Instead, relying on a transparent, structured 
mathematical process based on Bayes’ Theorem of conditional probabilities, the 
model yields a quantitative risk output expressed as a probability of error coupled 
with a probability of consequence based on data.  
 
The Bayesian model has 184 nodes and 1138 parameters that define causal factors for 
error against which data is collected as either beliefs or evidence, the latter returning 
more reliable results.  Beliefs could be gradually replaced with evidence as they 
become available, improving fidelity.  The generic model can be modified by adding or 
truncating parameters to suit conditions applicable to specific organizations or similar 
groups. 
 
The model was validated using field data from a cargo operator using large western jet 
freighters, covering 34,338 sectors of which 193 carried human error. Separate tests 
were performed simulating the operator’s belief that it was operating to global 
standards.   
 
The output for belief was consistent with global and UK flat rate safety levels, 
achievable if the operator flew 3M and 6M sectors respectively according to their 
belief.  However, the output from evidence returned a risk level more severe than the 
belief, partly driven by the allowance for unknowns built into the computing 
technique and part by the relatively small number of sectors considered. In “what-if” 
prediction mode the model calculates the change in risk level due to new errors, and 
through sensitivity analysis it can identify and rank performance indicators.  
 
In CAW organizations subjected to Risk Based Oversight (RBO) concept and ICAO 
mandate on Safety Management System (SMS), the model can set risk threshold levels 
for individual organizations, to measure variations, and by continuous updating, to 
monitor safety performance at strategic level.  Sharing data and with agreed 
performance levels, the Regulator and operators should be able negotiate an 
oversight plan.  Using the model pro-actively, the organization could exercise a degree 
of self-regulation, thereby accruing cost benefits through reduced Regulator 
oversights. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Background 
 
1.1.1 Role of human error in accidents 
 
Major aircraft accidents often generate sensational media headlines, creating a 
perception that air transport has high risk and drawing public attention to 
shortcomings in flight safety.  Quite often human error is cited as a causal factor for 
some of the accidents.  Human error is a well known hazard in any industry and air 
transport is no exception1. 
 
Human errors occur in all aspects of aircraft operations, namely, in maintenance and 
ground handling, in flight operations, in air traffic control and in airfield management.  
According to an analysis5 of global air accidents over a period of 50-years, pilot error is 
by far the largest causal factor (50%) for accidents.  At 6% other human errors that 
include maintenance error, shortfalls in continuing airworthiness (CAW) processes 
such as engineering and integrated logistic support rank at 5th place.  Other research 
data6, 7, 8 indicate that between 6 to 15% of all reported incidents in air transport are 
attributed to maintenance errors. If left uncontrolled, human error would lead to loss 
of public confidence in air transport and consequential wide ranging economic losses. 
 
1.1.2 Case studies of human error in CAW 
 
This study investigates human error in CAW process in which maintenance and ground 
handling is one part, and organization and management is the other part.  The total 
loss of Alaskan Airline Flight 261 MD-83 on 31 January 20002, the mid-flight loss of a 
large fuselage panel together with a cabin attendant from Aloha Flight 243 Boeing 737 
on 28 April 19883, and the serious incident to BA G-YMME, Boeing 777, at Heathrow 
airport on 10 June 20044 were typical accidents due to human error in CAW. 
  
The circumstances leading to the G-YMME incident demonstrate the way simple 
mistakes get complicated by a chain of events.  An unidentified engineer had removed 
a purge door to ventilate an aircraft fuel tank that was being prepared for an internal 
structural inspection. The purge door removal was a deviation from the authorized 
procedures for a Boeing 777 aircraft, yet the engineer had failed to document his 
action by raising a supplementary job card and an entry on the aircraft log to alert the 
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task controller, as they were required to do.  Thus, the knowledge of the repair status 
and its control were lost.  Few days later, other engineers recovered the aircraft after 
the tank inspection, unaware that a purge door had been left open. A leak detection 
test of the tank had been completed but it failed to reveal the open door because the 
AMM specified fuel level for the test was, mistakenly, lower than the level of the door. 
 
After releasing the aircraft to service from maintenance, it continued to fly for one 
month on short routes without revealing the open door, until the day when it was 
scheduled to fly a long route carrying a much larger fuel load.  This time, as the aircraft 
was rotating for take-off and climbing, fuel cascaded out of the tank, trailing a long 
fuel stream behind it.  If a stray spark had ignited the fuel vapor, it could have been 
fatal to the occupants and to the people on the ground.  Fortunately, the aircraft was 
safely recovered back to Heathrow.  Accident investigators identified a number of 
individual and organizational errors that contributed to this event, as well as errors 
attributed to the aircraft Design Authority.  
 
Full case studies for the G-YMME incident and four other major accidents are 
described in Appendix 2 to demonstrate different forms of system failure arising from 
combinations of unrelated human errors and missed timely intervention. 
 
1.1.3 Organizational and management errors 
 
Errors are not confined to the in-service phase of an aircraft’s life cycle.  They may 
occur even during design, manufacture, production of aircraft and the planning and 
implementation of post production services such as integrated engineering and 
logistic support.   Often, despite design reviews built into equipment development 
programs, some errors pass undetected and remain dormant in the fabric of the 
aircraft, in its support equipment, or in documentation relating to the product.  
Unfortunately they resurface at a later time leading to an accident when other 
conditions line-up1.  The loss of Concorde Flight at Paris9 and the near loss of BA Flight 
at Heathrow10 were associated with shortcomings in the design and development of 
equipment. With in-service experience, the Concorde’s design shortcomings had been 
recognized, yet the Design Authority had failed to act on them, see Appendix 2.  
 
Away from the critical human-machine interface, occasional inadvertent errors are 
made by managers at all levels of responsibility and authority during decision making 
process relating to organizational and management functions.  Often, the conflict 
between safety and commercial objectives is the root cause, and they have far 
reaching consequences.  When exposed, quite often they are dressed down as errors 
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of judgment or even simply swept under the carpet as inconsequential, much to the 
dismay and derision of work face employees who are affected by management errors.  
“Errors of maintenance technicians are the visible manifestation of problems with 
roots deep in the organization” according to Hobbs11 who reports on human factors 
that lead to accidents. 
 
1.1.4 Role of risk assessment in current industry requirements 
 
Since error occurrence is random in nature and consequences are variable, there 
ought to be a means of discriminating the outcome of an error that could occur in the 
system in a meaningful way.  The concept of “risk” evolves from this need and the 
need for public services such as air transport to be regulated in order to minimize the 
risk.  The UK Air Navigation Order (ANO)12 legally empowers the UK Civil Aviation 
Authority (CAA) to oversee that all approved organizations responsible for the delivery 
of a safe flight comply with appropriate safety regulations, and to assess the risk 
according to the way they conduct their operations. 
 
Hitherto, risk assessment has been based on expert opinion and judgement, on a 
criterion that has been expressed qualitatively and whose rationale remained within 
the knowledge of the subject expert.  In a modern business environment of competing 
priorities and wide range of stakeholder interests, existing risk assessment techniques 
are challenged by other stakeholders.  Therefore there is a perception coming from 
the Central Government, HM Treasury13, that an alternative, quantitative and 
rationalised risk assessment technique that could be easily understood by all 
stakeholders would allow greater transparency and scrutiny of decisions.  
Furthermore, International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has mandated that all 
Approved Organizations should have a formal Safety Management System (SMS) by 
April 201214.  It is recognized that such a SMS should have a capability to assess an 
organization's effectiveness in minimizing risk to safety. 
 
In this backdrop this thesis investigates to what extent the risk from human error in a 
safety critical air transport system could be assessed and quantified to meet industry 
requirements, focusing on CAW as one area of investigation.   
 
1.1.5 Way forward 
 
Independent research studies by Leach (2005)15 and Simmons (2002)16 had attempted 
to quantify risk from maintenance error.  But their methodologies were regarded as 
too detailed and complex to be practicable as high level management tools. A further, 
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more directed study by Marsh (2007)17 offered a methodology to match resources to 
organization’s risk levels, but that too proved limiting in quantification and degree of 
transparency. 
 
Given the limitations of risk assessment techniques currently used in civil aviation, this 
study considered Bayesian Belief Networks (BBN) as a way forward.  The fundamental 
concept of BBN has been much researched, and known to have been applied in some 
sectors such as road traffic management, diagnosis of patients and weapons system 
effectiveness. Little known applications could be found in civil aviation industry except 
some academic level research into its potential, Luxhoj (2003)18.  
  
This thesis will demonstrate a structured path to the design of a risk model starting 
from the fundamentals of BBN concept and then filling the gaps of knowledge in the 
design process.  The main challenge in this study was how to perceive the concept as 
the potential solution to the required industrial application, and then to design the 
model which must capture the complex safety management processes and represent 
them in the model succinctly.  The question of capturing data and validating the 
model in a CAW environment has also been addressed.   
 
In the absence of relevant public domain literature on the inner workings of 
organizations responsible for safety management, the researcher’s experience in the 
relevant areas of the aviation sector has been incorporated into this study. 
 
1.2 Aim and objectives of the research program 
 
1.2.1 Aim   
 
The aim of the research programme was to make a contribution to the safety of large 
commercial air transport through the provision of a novel method of assessing risk 
attributed to human error in continuing airworthiness. 
 
1.2.2 Primary objective  
 
The primary objective of the study was to design and develop a generic Bayesian 
model for strategic level assessment of risk due to human error in approved 
organizations engaged in the continuing airworthiness process of air transport.   
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The generic model was expected to be validated using field data generated in a 
continuing airworthiness environment, i.e. data from either an AOC Holder or a 
Maintenance Repair and Overhaul Organization. 
 
1.2.3 Secondary objectives   
 
Secondary objectives of the research study were to determine:   
 
a. If regulatory oversight of continuing airworthiness organizations could be 
undertaken on the basis of risk. 
 
b. If approved organizations engaged in continuing airworthiness could utilize the 
Bayesian risk assessment model to exercise some degree of self-regulation.  
 
1.3 Research strategy 
 
Two strategy paths were considered, one based on hard analysis and the other on soft 
analysis. 
 
Hard analysis strategy has been recommended where research incorporates 
experimentation related to physical sciences, and when associated variables are 
measurable and data can be defined in physical units and dimensions.  
 
Where investigation involves people in real life situations, hard analysis strategy does 
not work, because it involves people’s attitude that is conditioned by feelings, culture 
and values.  Risk assessment at present is very much based on subjective judgment, 
and expert opinion plays a major role in decision making.  Human attitude and 
mindset are at the very core of the risk assessment process.  
 
This situation initially calls for qualitative methods in order to transit from the existing 
risk assessment methodologies to a desired quantitative method.  How the expression 
of risk could be represented as quantitative values is another matter, which this 
research study has tried to examine.  Depending on this representation, mathematical 
laws may be used to analyze data, but in some circumstances the analytical process 
may have to fall back to qualitative methods and beliefs. 
 
Having considered the two options, it was concluded that the project would follow a 
soft analysis research strategy.  
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1.4 Industry support 
 
It was recognized at the outset that consultation with aviation industry was vital to the 
success of the project.  Thus close liaison was maintained with aviation industry, rule-
making bodies and subject expert organizations, encouraging them to contribute to 
this research study from the planning stage onwards.  There was direct dialogue with 
a few selected operators, complemented by collective discussions at the UK Flight 
Safety Committee meetings and UK FSC Maintenance Sub Committee meetings largely 
made up of operators and maintenance organizations.  Furthermore, the study’s 
progress was reviewed by the primary industrial sponsor and their relevant technical 
experts every 6-months, and later, by the three industry participants that provided 
field data. 
 
Appendix 1 lists the public and private organizations that were consulted at various 
stages of the study, as well as the courses and conferences attended as part of fact 
finding and research.  The field data and supplier information have been desensitized 
according to the confidentiality agreement.  
 
1.5 Definitions 
 
Technical terms used in this thesis have been defined in the context of the report as 
they first appear.   Any remaining terms and abbreviations have been listed in 
Acronyms. 
 
This study will consider the safety of those transport aircraft categorized as “Large” 
whose maximum all up weight at take off (Max AUW at TO) is above 5,700 kg, 
employed for the purpose of conveying fare paying passengers and cargo under 
commercial terms and conditions.  Findings of this study may be applicable to other 
categories of aircraft, even though the scope of this study is limited to large air 
transport. 
 
1.6 Overview of the research study program 
 
The 3-year research programme was conducted in three phases (Figure 1.1) 
 
Phase One.  The research programme commenced on the 9 July 2007. At the outset a 
full time 3-month Industrial Phase was undertaken at the UK CAA.  This phase 
provided an opportunity to understand the objectives, policies and procedures of UK 
CAA and its relationship to other national and international bodies.  The content and 
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timing of the phase played a crucial role in tailoring the research programme to meet 
a topical civil aviation industry requirement.  The industrial phase was followed by the 
preparatory work and project planning, literature research and firming up the concept 
on which the risk model was to be based. 
09/07/2007 15/03/2008
01/10/2007 01/01/2008
Phase One
Industrial attachment to UK CAA Research leading to the selection of a new risk assessment methodology
15/03/2008 20/03/2009
01/04/2008 01/07/2008 01/10/2008 01/01/2009
Phase Two
Design of the new risk assessment model
23/03/2009 31/12/2010
01/04/2009 01/07/2009 01/10/2009 01/01/2010 01/04/2010 01/07/2010 01/10/2010
Phase Three
Testing and industrial validation of the risk assessment model Reporting
 
Figure 1.1 – Program phases and timeline 
Figure 1.2 outlines the topics studied in order to acquire knowledge on current risk 
assessment methods in the context of safety requirements, aviation as a business and 
viewpoints of different stakeholders.  Current risk assessment methods were then 
compared with new assessment methods, identifying gaps and how new methods 
could bridge the gaps.  This process led to the selection of a concept that was taken 
forward and developed. 
 
Phase Two.   The analytical work leading to the design of the model, together with the 
design itself, was undertaken during Phase Two. This was an intense period of 
interaction with an industry participant that helped with data required to perform 
pilot studies on causality, which fed into the risk model. At this stage the program was 
under close scrutiny by industrial sponsor’s technical experts, resulting in continual 
refinements to the model. Methodology for the design of the model is described in 
Chapter Five. 
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Figure 1. 2 – Flow diagram for selection of new risk assessment methodology 
 
Phase Three.  Testing of the model using simulated data was completed during Phase 
Three, and was followed by a validation trial using industry supplied field data.  It was 
a difficult phase, with operators reluctant to provide sensitive data and shying away 
from probing questions at a period when the industry was hit by an economic crisis.  
Nevertheless one operator stayed with the project and provided a full complement of 
data and the validation phase was successfully completed.  Methodology for working 
with data is described in Chapter Seven. 
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Chapter Two 
Flight safety in the context of air transport business 
 
2.1 Air transport business 
 
Commercial air transportation is a global business that provides an essential service to 
the travelling public and air cargo industry, making a significant contribution to world 
economy.  This chapter examines the significance of accidents in the context of air 
transport business, and the way CAW process has evolved to maintain flight safety. 
 
2.1.1 Business turnover 
 
International Air Transport Association (IATA) is an association of traders.  The number 
of its members is fluctuating, but according to data published in the IATA website for 
2010, the association was made up of 234 airlines. IATA claims that its members 
operate around 26,000 aircraft contributing to 94% of the world’s scheduled flights. At 
its peak levels the airlines have been carrying over 2 billion passengers per year, 
increasing at 4% on average and generating US$ 3 trillion of annual business turnover, 
representing  8% of world Gross Domestic Products (GDP)19. 
 
The dedicated air cargo sector in contrast operates around 2,750 air freighters20, and 
together with passenger/ freight combinations, this sector has an estimated business 
turnover of around US$50 billion21.  At its previous peak level, the air cargo business 
was expanding at 7% per annum, with a forecast average growth rate of 6% per 
annum, given stable global economic conditions21. 
 
In UK, at national level, the air transport industry contributes about £10.2 billion per 
year to the UK GDP with a projected average growth in air traffic of 4.25% per annum 
in a steady economic climate as that existed prior to the 2008 downturn.    
 
This magnitude of investment and business turnover could not be sustained unless 
airlines operate their aircraft safely, and public have confidence in them.   
 
2.1.2 IATA safety statistics 
 
Accidents do happen, but it is necessary to view them rationally, mindful that statistics 
for major accidents confirm that accident rates are extremely low. According to IATA 
published data, the lowest ever previously recorded global rate of hull losses for 
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western-built jets was at 0.65 per million flights20 in 2006.  Since then the hull loss rate 
for western-built jets has been fluctuating about 0.7 per million flights, until the rate 
has been further reduced to 0.61 in 2010 according to an IATA Press Release issued on 
23 February 2011114, see Table 2.1. 
 
World Region 
Jet/M sector 
2006 
Jet/M sector 
2010 
Global 0.65 0.61 
Former Soviet Union - CIS 8.60 0.0 
Central & South African states 4.31 7.41 
Latin America/ Caribbean 1.80 1.87 
Asia-Pacific 0.67 0.80 
North America  0.49 0.10 
Western Europe 0.32 0.45 
Mid East & North Africa 0.00 0.72 
North Asia 0.00 0.34 
Table 2.1 – Air transport accidents rates per million sectors - Global and regional 
data (Source: IATA) 
 
2.1.3 Cargo operations 
 
A close scrutiny of accident statistics between passenger and cargo sectors points to 
the air cargo sector as contributing a disproportionate number of accidents to the 
overall score.  For example, during peak operations, of the 28 hull losses recorded 
against the fleet of 22,738 western-built passenger and cargo aircraft, 13 were 
attributable to the cargo aircraft fleet of 2,729 aircraft, i.e. 12% of the total air 
transport fleet20. Taken accident rate per 1,000 aircraft, both jet and turboprop cargo 
aircraft combined have suffered 4.4 times as many hull losses as their passenger 
counterparts, whereas cargo jets alone have suffered 8.8 times as many hull losses as 
passenger jets. Eastern built aircraft and other accidents that caused substantial 
damage to aircraft have been excluded from this statistics in order to simplify this 
rationale, but even if they were included, the fundamental observation on the greater 
susceptibility of the air cargo fleet to accidents would not change. 
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Despite the disproportionate rate of accidents and the slight down turn of the 
business, the size of the air cargo fleet has been increasing steadily, around 5% per 
annum at its peak.  The increasing demand was being met by older passenger aircraft 
that continue to be passed down and converted to the air cargo role.  Although some 
new cargo aircraft are built, and some have been entering service, the average age of 
the cargo fleet of 28-years remained way above that of the passenger fleet of 7-years, 
according to one report22.  Utilization of older aircraft in the air cargo sector is a major 
concern for the integrity of the continuing airworthiness (CAW) process and flight 
safety.  Maintenance and handling operations carried out on these aircraft, 
predominantly in unsocial hours, and work conducted in developing regions of the 
world or other outstations where standards and quality controls may be poor are CAW 
related sub-issues that air cargo fleets experience22, 23.  Exceeding the max take-off 
weight and aircraft CG limits may be sometimes linked to unlicensed cargo loaders, 
irrespective of the operating region. 
 
2.1.4 Risk to communities living near airport 
 
With air cargo operations, there is an added concern to the public and local 
authorities: that is, they are highly sensitive to movement of aircraft at silent hours, to 
collateral damage to public and to properties arising from accidents within their 
conurbations, as well as to the resulting spillage into the environment of dangerous air 
cargo such as NBC material that some aircraft carry. The crash of El Al cargo Flight 
1862 into a residential area near Schipol airport in 1992 and its consequences is a case 
in point24, 25.  Black listing of certain air cargo carriers by EASA and FAA is the usual 
Regulator’s response to serious safety concerns of this nature.  There is increasing 
pressure on the air cargo sector to drastically reduce their accident rate, and to take 
control of potential safety risks unique to air cargo operations in order to make their 
aircraft safe. 
 
2.1.5. Significance of human error in CAW 
 
What is the impact of human error in air transport and its significance?  Plane Crash 
Info5 has logged 1,843 accidents that had occurred over a period from 1950 to 2009, 
whose causations had been identified.  Data from about 50-different sources, e.g. 
NTSB, IATA and Air Claims (a prominent data supplier to insurance underwriters) have 
been included in the database. Table 2.2 drawn from these statistics attributes 50% of 
the accidents to flight crew error, 22% to mechanical failure, 12% to weather, 9% to 
sabotage, 6% to human error and 1% to other causes.  The data base qualifies “other 
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human error" as a mixture of air traffic controller errors, improper loading of aircraft, 
fuel contamination, and improper maintenance procedures. 
 
From the viewpoint of criticality and number of reported occurrences, the most 
obvious area for reducing human error is in flight operations, and indeed much effort 
and resources are invested for this purpose.   Although the maintenance error arising 
rate is relatively low when compared with the rate of error arising in flight operations, 
the absolute number of maintenance errors may be significant.   
 
 
Identified Cause 
Percentage of total for each 10-yr period 
50-59 60-69 70-79 80-89 90-99 00-09 Aver
 
Pilot error 40 32 24 25 27 26 29 
Pilot error (weather related) 11 18 14 17 21 17 16 
Pilot error (mechanical related) 7 5 4 2 4 3 5 
Total pilot error 58 57 42 44 53 46 50 
Other human error 0 8 9 6 8 8 6 
Weather 16 10 13 15 9 9 12 
Mechanical failure 21 20 23 21 21 28 22 
Sabotage 5 5 11 13 10 9 9 
Other causes 0 2 2 1 0 1 1 
Table 2.2 - Air transport accidents causes 1950-2009  
(Source: www.PlaneCrashInfo.com) 
 
The figure 6% and 15% human error attributed maintenance incidents quoted in other 
sources6, 7, 8 cover a range of consequences from major accidents to low intensity 
incidents.  Though the published data lack clarity in detail, they provide a general 
consensus on the extent of maintenance related human error contribution in aircraft 
accidents.  They were the reported errors. 
 
It is generally known that a large number of error incidents go unreported because 
they were regarded as inconsequential. Research into industrial safety has indicated 
that for every one major or fatal injury there had been 10 accidents involving serious 
injury, some 30 incidents involving property damage, and 600 reported occurrences 
with no injury or damage31.   If these minor risks could be eliminated or mitigated 
further, then the industry could avert some potential accidents at their embryonic 
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stage as well as avoiding consequential cost; for example. A return to ramp cost US$ 
16,000, flight cancellation US$ 50,000 and an in-flight engine shut down US$500,00016 
in mid-1990 economic conditions.  It has been reported that as many as 20 per cent of 
all in flight shut downs and up to 50 per cent of all engine related flight delays and 
cancellations could be traced to maintenance errors32.  
 
Maintenance is only one aspect of a much wider and far reaching safety assurance 
process, Continuing Airworthiness (CAW) that extends into the management and 
organizational levels.  CAW is only one element in the overall spectrum of measures 
that assure flight safety in air transport.    
 
In order to understand the way CAW fits into the overall flight safety regime and how 
the process would have to be represented in the model, this chapter will now take an 
overview of the conditionality of flight safety, the hierarchical order of flight safety 
assurance process, and the way CAW is implemented. 
 
2.2 Independent view of accidents in the context of business 
 
Mindful of the inevitable public reaction to the occasional catastrophic air accidents,   
what would the insurance underwriters reaction to accident statistics? 
   
According to Paul Hayes, Director of Air Safety at London-based consultancy firm 
Ascend, industry should not be judged on a spate of tragic accidents during a short 
period of time26. “Today flying is 200 times safer than what it was in the 1950s”.   This 
claim was supported by the statistics for 1950s, when only 31M air travellers flew, 
there were 39 accidents claimed 799 lives.  In comparison in 2008, air passengers 
numbered 2.6 billion, but the accidents were down to 13 crashes resulting with only 
460 casualties.  
Despite this encouraging view, it should be stated that over the years the society’s 
perception on the value of human lives has increased, and in the modern world, even 
one casualty is considered as one accident or a lost life too many.  Therefore, 
whatever the business community thinks, the social and legal obligations of the 
airlines to the travelling public demands that there should be a continuing effort to 
increase the level of flight safety.   
 
2.3 Conditionality of flight safety 
 
Flight safety is a conditional phenomenon that works on a system of checks and 
balances performed on the system by experts. In a system whose stability is 
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dependent on various interdependent conditions, they must act together to maintain 
the balance; if not the system would become unstable.   
  
Flight safety has to be assured in each of the four vital, synergistic, functional 
elements associated with aircraft operations, namely, in the airworthiness of the 
aircraft, integrity of flight operations, and management of airfield and air traffic 
operations.  The latter two elements, in conjunction with flight operations, manage 
the ground and air space in the vicinity of an aircraft ensuring that it has a clear 
passage.  
 
To achieve flight safety in a harmonized manner, everyone who is participating in civil 
aviation undertakes their operations according to an accepted set of regulations, 
sanctioned by the law of the country where the aircraft is either registered or 
operated. 
 
Risk management is implicit in the concept of flight safety assurance, and the system 
of checks and balances performed by experts as well as by management, at local, 
national and international levels.  At national and international level Regulation and 
mandates set out the standards to be achieved and, at national and local level, 
aviation business is regulated by law and compliance with regulation is regularly 
audited. Within an organization, responsibilities for minimizing risk are diffused down 
to personnel at all levels including those at the workface.  The following sections 
provide an overview of the flight safety assurance system and how risk management is 
evolving within the system.  
 
2.4 Flight safety assurance - The hierarchical order 
 
Figure 2.1 is a diagrammatic representation of the top layers of the international and 
national level flight safety organization and how they are inter-related.  It should be 
read in conjunction with the following sections. 
 
2.4.1  ICAO 
 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) is the foremost international advisory 
body that promotes and harmonizes the rules and techniques relating to international 
air navigation and transport operations.  It is important to understand the legal 
significance of ICAO in UK civil aviation bearing in mind that the effectiveness of UK 
Regulator is periodically audited by ICAO.  UK was an original signatory to the 
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Convention on International Civil Aviation (generally known as Chicago Convention) 
signed by 52 nations on 7 December 1944.   
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 - International and national flight safety hierarchical organization 
 
Emerging from this convention, International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) was 
established on 4 April 1947.  At present ICAO is a specialized agency of the United 
Nations linked to Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).  Countries who are members 
of ICAO have voluntarily accepted to be bound by policies of Chicago Convention and 
to implement ICAO recommendations and mandates that it issues from time to time28.  
 
A key strategic objective of ICAO is the development and promotion of aviation safety 
policies28 “in a safe and orderly manner and that international air transport services 
may be established on the basis of equality of opportunity and operated soundly and 
economically”. ICAO Integrated Safety Management System is one implementing arm 
of the high-level safety policy. 
 
In the spirit of this strategic objective, national governments have a responsibility to 
ensure that all aviation activities within their air spaces are properly regulated.  
Essential elements of such a regulatory process are the technical rules and procedures 
that constitute the regulations, the legislation that sets out the law requiring 
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compliance with the regulations, and a Competent Authority to oversee that 
participants in civil aviation activities comply with the regulations, as well as to 
enforce the law as and when appropriate. 
 
As a guide for implementing the internationally recognized objectives, ICAO 
promulgates Standards and Recommended Practices (SARP) as well as various 
guidance notes relating to safety management.  SARP Annexes of specific interest to 
this research study are: 
• Annex 1 – Personnel Licensing. 
• Annex 6 – Operation of Aircraft. 
• Annex 8 – Airworthiness of Aircraft. 
• Annex 13 – Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation. 
 
2.4.2 UK Air Navigation Order (ANO) 
 
UK has adopted relevant ICAO policy recommendations, currently written into the UK 
national legislation enacted by parliament under the UK Air Navigation Order12.  The 
legislation is applicable to all those who are engaged in civil aviation activities within 
the UK national air space, and all those UK registered operators who utilise 
international air space.  The ANO sets out legally binding conditions for those who 
wish to participate in civil aviation activities.  It is obvious from the conditions 
stipulated in ANO that a participant would have to comply with a set of approved 
safety standards acceptable to the Competent Authority. 
 
Formulation of the air transport policies and legislation that falls within UK ANO is the 
responsibility of Department for Transport (DFT).  It is the government department 
responsible for strategic transport related issues.  The legislation is enacted by the 
parliament before it becomes the law. 
 
2.4.3 Competent Authority 
 
In the United Kingdom, the role of Competent Authority has been vested on the UK 
Civil Aviation Authority (UK CAA) generally referred to as the Regulator. UK CAA 
regulates all civil aviation activities within the UK air space, which fall into two distinct 
areas: Economic Regulation and Safety Regulation.  Economic regulation deals with 
the commercial aspect of the aviation business.  Safety regulation deals with the safe 
operation of aviation business within UK airspace without risking accidents. To 
discharge the responsibilities of these two respective roles, UK CAA is organized into 
Economic Regulation Group and Safety Regulation Group.  On behalf of the UK 
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government, UK CAA Safety Regulation Group safeguards the interests of travelling 
and non travelling public as well as national and international interests that UK 
government has agreed to uphold by treaty or by convention. 
 
2.4.4 Safety Standards – The Regulation 
 
As to the safety standards acceptable to the Competent Authority, originally, UK had 
developed and promulgated safety standards applicable to civil aircraft under British 
Civil Aviation Regulations (BCAR).  Later with a desire to standardize on an 
international standard, Joint Airworthiness Regulations (JAR) was developed by a 
number of Western European countries acting together, with JAR gradually replacing 
BCAR.  However with the passage of time and the establishment of European Aviation 
Safety Agency (EASA) in September 2003 under Council Regulation (EC) 1592/2002 the 
role of rule making for aviation safety has been transferred from individual nations to 
EASA. Now UK along with each of the other EU countries takes its share of active 
participation of rule making under EASA.   
     
Since September 2003, the existing safety regulations applicable to UK civil aviation 
were allowed to be gradually superseded by EASA regulations within a 5-year 
transition period completing on 23 September 2008.  Now that the transition period 
has ended, the vast majority of UK civil air transport activities (as well as those in 
other EU States) are currently regulated in accordance with EASA safety regulations.  
To be consistent with this evolved status, the Basic Regulation (EC) 1592/2002 has 
been repealed and replaced by Basic Regulation (EC) 216/2008. EASA regulations now 
apply to all aspects of design and production approval, airworthiness, continuing 
airworthiness and training.  
 
Concurrent with the development of safety regulations in Western Europe, other 
countries outside Western Europe with strong aviation industries have either 
developed their own set of regulation or have participated in the development of 
regulation with another strong group of their choice.  Most notable are the Federal 
Aviation Regulations developed in the United States, this being by far the strongest 
aircraft industry in the Western hemisphere.  All foreign registered aircraft must have 
had the following conditions satisfied before it enters UK air space: 
 
• It should have had prior national level clearance from UK CAA before it enters 
UK air space. 
• Safety regulation under which it usually operates in its home country should be 
acceptable to UK CAA. 
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 Role of Business Entity Applicable Regulation Remarks 
Aircraft or component design  EASA Part 21 DOA 
Design Organization Approval 
issued by EASA 
Aircraft or component 
production 
EASA Part 21 POA 
Production organization approval 
issued by NAA 
Flight operations 
Common EASA regulation 
pending.  Meanwhile EU-Ops 
or JAR-Ops 3 for helicopters 
apply 
Air operator’s certificate (AOC) 
holder certificate issued by NAA of 
country of registration 
Airfield management 
EASA regulations anticipated 
to be promulgated in 2013.  
Meanwhile governed by ANO 
Articles 211 and 212, Guided 
by ICAO Annex 14.   Manual of 
Certification of Aerodromes 
ICAO Doc 9774. Aerodrome 
Manual and CAP 168 Licensing 
of Aerodromes 
Approval issued by NAA. 
Air traffic management  
Pending a common EASA 
regulation (Single European 
Sky initiative) regulated in 
accordance with international 
regulations and standards 
applicable to the provision of 
ATS, including ICAO Standards 
and Recommended Practices 
(SARPs) and European 
Commission legislation. UK 
CAA Air Traffic Standards 
Division and ICAO 
Approval issued by NAA 
Continuing airworthiness 
management 
EASA Part M 
Continuing airworthiness 
management organization (CAMO) 
license issued by NAA 
Aircraft maintenance EASA Part 145 AMO 
Approved maintenance 
organization issued by NAA 
Maintenance Repair and 
Overhaul 
EASA Part 145 MRO 
Approved maintenance repair and 
overhaul organization issued by 
NAA 
Licensed aircraft engineer 
training 
EASA Part 147 
Approved training organization 
issued by NAA 
Table 2.3 – Types of business entities and approved organization 
 
2.4.5 Licensing of organizations 
 
An organization (or business entity) that participates in any form of civil aviation must 
also be legally licensed by UK CAA to take part in aviation activities.  The role of the 
business entities may be varied as shown in Table 2.3.  Each entity has to be 
individually authorized by UK CAA in accordance with the relevant section of EASA 
regulation before it is allowed to participate in the desired activity. 
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As part of licensing process, these organizations must prove to the Authority that they 
are completely fit in their capability and robustness, and that they can fully comply 
with the requirements and conditions set by international standards.  Issuing of a 
license is conditional upon that approved organization maintaining the initial 
conditions under which the license was issued.  However, from time to time, 
variations of conditions take place, and then the onus for maintaining the conditions 
falls upon the organization.  If they fail to do so, the regulator has the legal right to 
intervene and revoke their license to operate. 
 
2.4.6 Licensing of aircraft engineers 
 
Two types of engineers work on aircraft: aircraft mechanics (or fitters) and licensed 
aircraft engineers.   
 
Mechanics undergo basic training at an approved civil aviation training organization or 
they could be ex-military personnel who have had extensive, structured aeronautical 
engineering training in a Service establishment.  They may be highly skilled according 
to their specialization and experience, and are engaged in maintenance, repair and 
overhaul tasks. They work under the supervision of certified engineers.  They can sign 
for their own work, but their work must be countersigned by a supervising engineer. 
 
Only Licensed Aircraft Engineers (LAE) are allowed to self-certify the work that they 
have done on aircraft or the work of others that they have supervised.  Provided that 
they have a company approval, they can also issue a Certificate of Release to Service 
for an aircraft.  Licensed engineers have a basic license and aircraft and/or engine 
Type Rating approved by the National Authority that allows them to exercise these 
privileges. 
 
In order to reach an LAE status, candidates are required to undergo extensive training 
in a EASA Part 147 approved training organization, gain practical experience, 
examined and tested according to the criteria set by EASA Part 66 Regulation.  Those 
who have proved themselves to have acquired the necessary skills and possess good 
health and fitness may then apply to the National Aviation Authority for the basic 
license to operate as an LAE, in Categories A, B1, B2 or C license, in accordance with 
their either mechanical or avionics specialization.  A&C and B1 engineers sign for all 
mechanical tasks on the airframe and engines; B2 engineers sign for avionics tasks.   
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LAE are allowed to sign for work only if they have a Type rating on the types of aircraft 
and engines on which they are working.  Type rating is obtained after undergoing 
further training, gaining necessary knowledge and experience, and proving their skill 
levels to work on the relevant equipment.  Usually this training and experience is 
gained at their employer, an aircraft operator or an MRO, operating a continuing 
training scheme and certified as qualified to work on the respective equipment 
according to company internal procedures. 
 
As to the types of work undertaken, line maintenance engineers prepare aircraft for 
flight using flight servicing schedules such as visual checks of the integrity of the 
aircraft, replenishment of consumable, rectification of defects reported at the end of 
the previous flight and any essential out of phase servicing.  An LAE must sign-off 
aircraft “on line”. 
 
Base maintenance engineers undertake in-depth maintenance tasks that require 
aircraft to be taken off from the flight schedule.  Depending on the type and depth of 
servicing and the time taken to complete the tasks, i.e. A, B or C check and their sub-
categorization, the work may be undertaken in a  hangar at site, or be sent away to an 
MRO. A mechanic or a licensed engineer may undertake the work, but it must be an 
LAE who must certify the work and sign off the CRS.  
 
2.4.7  Part 147 Training organizations 
 
Training organizations for licensed aircraft engineers must be approved under EASA 
Part 147.  Some of these organization may exist as independent business units 
dedicated to industry’s training requirements, or if not they may be a part of an 
existing aircraft operator or an MRO.  In the latter case, the training unit would have 
to be approved by the National Authority under EASA Part 147 for training 
organization approval procedure. 
 
2.5 Airworthiness of aircraft 
 
Airworthiness of the aircraft is a fundamental requirement to assure flight safety.  It is 
a state that defines the fitness of an aircraft to fly safely in all possible environments 
and foreseeable circumstances in the role that it was designed to meet29. 
 
However according to EASA Regulation30 “Continuing Airworthiness means all of the 
processes ensuring that, at any time in its operating life, the aircraft complies with the 
airworthiness requirements in force and is in a condition for safe operation”. 
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Meeting airworthiness criteria starts from the conceptual design phase of an aircraft 
and is carried through all development stages of an aircraft’s life cycle until it enters 
service. Following entry to service, an aircraft’s airworthiness must be maintained 
continuously until its retirement, in order for the aircraft to remain fit for its purpose 
i.e. for carrying fare paying passengers or cargo. 
 
Prior to its entry into service, an aircraft is required to achieve necessary safety in 
accordance with closely regulated design, manufacture, reliability testing and 
production standards. An early development model of a specific type of aircraft that 
satisfactorily meets the design specification is given a Type Certificate (TC) by an 
internationally recognized airworthiness authority.   The certificate is a design 
approval issued by the national aviation authority of the country where the product 
compliance to applicable regulations is demonstrated.   
 
A TC is comprised of the design specification, Type Certificate Data Sheets (TCDS) for 
example relating to stress calculations and safety factors for structural components or 
information on fatigue lives, performance data and conditions, operating limitations 
and numerous other detailed information relating to the performance, integrity, 
safety, reliability and durability of the aircraft.  Usually the TCs are issued for the 
major assemblies of the aircraft, namely, the airframe, engine and propellers in 
accordance with EASA Regulation Part 21. 
 
All civil aircraft designed and produced in the European Community are Type 
Certificated by EASA. A Type Certificate acknowledges that an aircraft has satisfied the 
design requirements, and is issued under EASA Part 21 type approval procedure.   
Commission Regulation (EC) 1702/2003 stipulates implementing rules for the 
airworthiness and environmental certification of aircraft and related products, parts 
and appliances.   EASA Regulation Part 21 provides detail conditions and Acceptable 
Means of Compliance. 
 
A commercial aircraft’s service (or operational life) starts from the point that it is 
legally permitted by the national aviation authority to be utilized for commercial 
purposes of carrying fare-paying passengers or cargo.   A full production model that 
has a Type Certificate may be issued with an airworthiness certificate by the National 
Aviation Authority (NAA) where it is registered.  For example, G-YMME is the 
registration letters of a UK registered aircraft; airworthiness certificate for this aircraft 
has been issued by UK CAA.  
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Exact rules and regulations governing the certification of aircraft are very complex.  
There are many different combinations related to the issue of Type Certificate, issue 
of Airworthiness Certificate, which country issued the certificates, where the aircraft is 
registered and where the aircraft is used.  All these rules cannot be accurately 
reproduced in this thesis; relevant EASA or FAA regulations as well as the NAA must be 
consulted for precise guidance. 
 
Since the process of issuing airworthiness certificate is exercised under the rules and 
regulations stipulated by legislation of the country where the certificate is issued, the 
certificate becomes a legal document.  With the certificate goes the onus of 
maintaining the original conditions under which the certificate has been issued to the 
aircraft operator; this is a legal obligation, such that the operator must not utilize this 
aircraft for public service or even fly it in the air space of the country, if the conditions 
under which the certificate was issued could no longer be met for any reason.   
 
2.6 Continuing airworthiness process 
 
The CAW process starts from the time a type certificated aircraft is given an 
airworthiness certificate to operate in the role for a purpose as declared by the 
operator.  With the passage of time and usage, an aircraft could lose its airworthiness 
due to variations of its actual state relative to the original conditions, such as wear 
and tear, deterioration or system defects, rendering it no longer safe to fly.    
Therefore, one of the many conditions that must be satisfied before an aircraft is 
allowed to carry fare paying passengers is the continuing maintenance of its 
airworthiness, to approved schedules, procedures and best practices. 
 
All aircraft in service must undergo continuing airworthiness (CAW) process 
throughout their service lives to the satisfaction of the regulating authority.  This 
ensures that all airworthiness requirements in force fixed to the issue of the 
Certificate of Airworthiness are being met and that the aircraft is in a condition for 
safe operation29.  It is the responsibility of the authorized operator to ensure that the 
CAW of aircraft is maintained through the implementation of an approved, structured 
maintenance process in accordance with EASA Part M regulations.  The CAW process 
maintains the legal validity of the airworthiness certificate. 
 
CAW can be viewed as a system with 2-complementary parts.  One part of the system 
is the timely maintenance of the integrity of the aircraft, physically.  The other part is 
the concurrent documentation of the maintenance activities and associated 
management decisions, which ensures that maintenance was seen to have been 
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carried out properly and at the right time. The documentation provides the evidence 
of legal validity that the process has been carried out as required by regulation, and 
ultimately, provides the full accountability for the airworthiness of the aircraft before 
it is allowed to fly. It is the accomplishment of both parts satisfactorily that gives the 
national authority full confidence on the declared airworthiness state of an aircraft.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 – Synergy between organizations responsible for airworthiness 
 
Through these two parts of the CAW process runs the thread of management that 
pulls together the physical maintenance and documentation, through a system of 
planning, provisioning of resources, directing and controlling functions. The 
infrastructure contains all the engineering and logistic support service required to 
maintain an aircraft’s continuing airworthiness to an internationally recognized safety 
standard. 
 
2.7 Responsibilities of Approved Organizations 
 
The responsibility of the day to day management of the process is vested upon the 
approved organization that has been licensed to undertake these activities.  The 
Accountable Manager of the AOC Holder is ultimately accountable to the Regulator for 
any shortcomings and failures of the CAW process.   
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The approved organization must recognize the conditionality of the issuance of an 
airworthiness certificate, and then, ensure that the aircraft is maintained to a 
standard agreed by the authorities.  If not the license to operate that aircraft might be 
revoked.  The approved organization must set up a maintenance system and its 
management.   
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Figure 2.3 –Organizational structure of a typical airline top-level management  
(Source: Industry participant) 
 
The management system would have a maintenance operation component, and 
auditing, monitoring and controlling components that provide information to the 
Head of the Organization, usually it’s CEO.  The AM/CEO should have full financial 
powers of resourcing the CAW process that meets the original conditions.  The way 
CEO’s powers are delegated down the management structure is shown in Figure 2.3 
demonstrated here with the use of management infrastructure of a regional air line. 
 
2.8 Implementation of CAW process and synergy between AOs 
 
In the UK any business entity that wishes to operate air transport under commercial 
terms must obtain a license, a legally binding approval from the Competent Authority 
which is the National Aviation Authority.  In the UK this authority is vested on the UK 
Civil Aviation Authority. 
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Establishment and operation of these organizations are regulated by national 
authorities, in accordance with safety regulations formulated and promulgated by 
European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA). 
 
2.8.1 Approved organizations 
 
Regulations are published as reference documents, divided into parts as applicable to 
different approved organizations according to their roles.  Organization licensed to 
operate under relevant parts of EASA Regulation are usually designated by the Part 
Number/ or Letter. Thus: 
 
• EASA Part M – The airworthiness management arm of an Aircraft Operating 
Certificate (AOC) Holder. 
• EASA Part 145 – A provider of aircraft maintenance services under contract to 
a Part M Organization. 
• EASA Part 21 – Aircraft Design Organisation and/or Production Organization 
that continues to provide post design/ production services to AOC Holder. 
 
This study identifies Part M and Part 145 as core organizations because they have the 
greatest influence on the airworthiness of the aircraft on day-to-day operations. 
 
This is a good opportunity to examine the synergistic relationship between various 
organization involved in the CAW process, placing the aircraft operator in focus as the 
principal player. 
  
Commercial flying operation is undertaken by an AOC and Operating License Holder.  
The airworthiness of the aircraft is monitored and assured by a Continuing 
Airworthiness Management Organization (CAMO) in conjunction with a maintenance 
provider. CAMO is a Part M approved organization and the maintenance provider is a 
Part 145 approved organization. Part M and Part 145 organizations may be 
established either as an integral part of the aircraft operator or be contracted out.  
The intended end product of the joint activity between these 3-organizations is the 
provision of a safe flight.  
 
2.8.2 Management and operation of CAW process 
 
Management of continuing airworthiness of the aircraft is done according to an 
Aircraft Maintenance Programme (AMP) agreed between the AOC Holder, being the 
user customer, and the Part 21 DOA/POA who is the supplier of the aircraft and 
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systems. Part 21 DOA/POA is usually identified as the Original Equipment 
Manufacturer (OEM).  AMP must be approved by the Regulator as meeting safety 
requirements, but its implementation and updating according to operational or 
technological changes is the responsibility of the AOC Holder. 
 
The day to day engineering operations are coordinated by a Maintenance Operations 
Control Centre (MOC) that usually functions alongside and in harmony with Flight 
Operations Centre.  Part of the MOC manages all the aircraft on line, either at the 
parent base (or the hub of operations) as well as on-route.  Another part manages 
those aircraft on Base Maintenance either on site or at an MRO.  Priorities in the 
generation of aircraft on line are decided routinely by the Controller of MOC and 
equivalent Flight Operations Controller, and exceptionally by Director of Operations in 
consultation with Director of Engineering. 
 
Engineering operations to prepare aircraft for flight are carried out on the line.  The 
Part M organization coordinates the engineering operations by monitoring the CAW 
status of each aircraft, undertaking advance planning, directing and controlling the 
maintenance tasks through interdepartmental work orders as requirements arise. 
 
The Part 145 organization, i.e. the maintenance provider, undertakes the work 
stipulated by the Part M organization.  If these are separate business entities, the 
information flow process, task loading and other logistic aspects of task requisition 
and implementation are subject to interface contracts between the organizations.  
Quality and Safety of the work is audited by the Quality and Safety Management 
Services of the AOC Holder, whose head reports directly to the CEO of the AOC 
Holder. 
 
Other external organizations provide services to Part M and or Part 145 organizations.  
The most important is the Design Authority (DA) for the type of aircraft operated by 
the AOC Holder.  The DA is invariably the EASA Part 21 DOA for the aircraft, and most 
likely the principal manufacturer of the aircraft as well; in the latter case they are also 
the Part 21 Approved Production Organization for the aircraft, i.e. Part 21 POA. 
 
Further to the provisioning of an AMP, there are numerous other responsibilities 
vested on a Part 21 organization by Regulation, e.g. to provide post design support 
facilities for the product.  Usually known as product support service, AOC Holders 
become fully dependent on Part 21 organizations for design information and 
integrated logistic support, material and information flow.  Examples are: engineering 
skills and training requirements, maintenance spares, ground support equipment, 
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tools and test equipment, ways of dealing with previously unknown defects, their 
investigation and disposal and prevention of recurrence, modifications, impact of 
operating changes on durability and maintenance etc.  In this respect EASA Regulation 
Part 21 lists the responsibilities of Part 21 approved organizations.  The information 
exchange process is written into commercial interface contracts between the Part 21 
organization and the AOC Holder or if not the delegated Part M organization. 
 
 
Figure 2.4 – CAW process at engineering operations level 
 
Heavy maintenance of aircraft, such as C-Checks and modifications, is normally 
undertaken by specialized Part 145 approved Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul 
Organizations (Part 145 MRO).  This work is contracted out by AOC Holders, task 
requirements are defined by work packs raised by Part M AO, and the quality of end 
products is progressively audited by the AOC Holder’s Quality Management System 
(QMS).  The work and information flow and the terms of engagement are controlled 
by interface contracts.  Part 21 support requirements for those aircraft undergoing 
Part 145 MRO maintenance are either referred back to AOC Holders or are facilitated 
through supplementary contracts that enable Part 145 MRO to directly access Part 21 
AO.   
 
Investigation of previously unknown defects that arise in service and recommending 
solutions is an important regulatory and flight safety requirement   The reporting of 
such defects to the Part 21 DOA is the responsibility of the equipment user.  If the  
defect is associated with a Mandatory Reportable Occurrence (MOR) defined under 
UK CAA CAP 382, then the AOC Holder must raise the Occurrence Report and in doing 
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so would bring UK CAA into the investigation.  Defects that have an impact on the 
Type Certificate and configuration of aircraft would invariably be referred by Part 21 
AO to EASA (who normally issues the Type Certificate for aircraft designed and 
manufactured in the European Community) and any solutions would have to be 
approved by them before promulgation, e.g. either as an Airworthiness Notice or an 
Airworthiness Directive.  Long term or permanent solutions to in-service defects might 
be equipment modification, procedural changes or introduction of new maintenance 
activities incorporated into the AMP. 
 
EASA Part 147 Training Organizations (TO) should be mentioned here as they are the 
licensed organizations authorized to train engineers that maintain aircraft.  Certainly 
Part 147 organizations play a key role as they are expected to output good quality 
engineers; the standards set by TO are reflected by the quality of engineers who work 
on aircraft and their standards.  The standards are particularly relevant in the context 
of human factors and the susceptibility of engineers to human error at work place.  
Some AOC Holders have their own integrated training organization that provides 
initial training for in-house trainees and continuation training for engineers already 
employed by their associated Part M and Part 145 organizations; they may be 
authorized to outsource training facilities to other customers. 
 
 
Figure 2.5 – CAW process interaction between Pt 145 Pt M and Pt 21 AO 
 
Figure 2.4 to Figure 2.6 illustrate the synergy between various members of the core 
group and their lines of communication. Note that communication and interaction on 
professional and technical issues between approved organizations are controlled by 
interface contracts.  Although EASA regulation spells out regulatory responsibilities 
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between these organizations, they are implemented as a commercial service with 
both financial and legal implications to parties concerned.  
 
There are other peripheral organizations involved in support of the above mentioned 
approved organizations, such as stand-alone continued airworthiness management 
organizations (CAMO) component overhaul organizations, spare parts suppliers and 
various other logistic support contractors in supply chains.  Some of these are directly 
regulated by CAA under EASA regulations, e.g. CAMO.  Others, e.g. out source for 
technical personnel, may not be directly licensed by CAA, yet still regulated under the 
rules applicable to the parent organization to whom the services are provided. 
 
 
Figure 2.6 – Synergy between AOC Holder Pt 21 AO and Regulator  
 
2.9 Safety Management System 
 
Hitherto, the role of flight safety auditing, monitoring and reporting change had been 
vested on the Quality and Safety Department of an approved organization.  However 
over the recent years ICAO, through amendments to relevant ICAO Annexes, has 
mandated the establishment of a Safety Management System (SMS) in approved 
organizations.   
 
According to UK CAA guidance notes, Safety Management System is described as “an 
organized approach to managing safety, including the necessary organizational 
structures, accountabilities, policies and procedures”, and that it will be based on ICAO 
Document 9859 – Safety Management Manual.  The new concept of SMS would 
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introduce a new tier of flight safety management and make significant structural 
changes to the existing management of an organization’s flight safety assurance 
functions.  Thus an SMS would be introduced to coordinate and integrate safety 
management across all departments that contribute to flight safety.  The existing 
Quality Management System will be retained to monitor compliance with and 
adequacy of procedures required for safe operational practices and airworthiness of 
aircraft. 
 
Safety management systems have already been established in air traffic control and 
airfield management environments as per Annex 11 and Annex 14 respectively.  Flight 
operations (Annex 6) and maintenance (Annex 8) environments are required to be 
fully compliant by April 2012. 
 
EASA implementing Rules for Management Systems and Authority Requirements will 
contain a requirement for an ICAO-compliant SMS. 
 
2.10 Risk to airworthiness  
 
A quality management system working in conjunction within the framework of an SMS 
should detect sources of errors that undermine airworthiness and recommend 
methods of eliminating them.  Observing the distribution of sources across the 
infrastructure of an organization as described below, it becomes clear why it is 
necessary to have an SMS organization that has the power and authority to force 
through safety policies and coordinated interventions that affect the entire 
organization.   
 
The most obvious source is the human-machine interface of engineering operations1.  
Often, errors that occur at the work face have a bearing to time pressures coming 
from flight operations and business managers. Errors also occur in the technical and 
logistic infrastructure (supply, organizational and management) that supports 
engineering operations.  Interface contracts between approved organizations that 
control information flow, work orders, deliverables, and their safety and quality, are 
known to be sources of contributory causal factors that lead to human error. This is 
evident in some of the case histories outlined in Appendix 7 (A/08/001) and Appendix 
13 (ID 27).  
 
Errors at planning, resourcing, directing and controlling of maintenance activities 
could undermine the defence mechanism that prevents the consequence of a prior 
error; see Appendix 7 (A07/025, A07/027).  With cost conscious managers looking for 
30
cost savings, business focussed decision taken by managers are known to have 
progressively undermined existing defence mechanisms9, 10.  In some situations, it has 
been the systematic failure of defence mechanisms that ultimately caused an 
accident, which in some cases ended up as catastrophic102. 
 
An SMS should have a capability to discriminate between the relative importance of 
different types of error, consequences and interventions in order to help AM/CEOs 
prioritize investment decisions.    This is because, not all errors lead to major 
accidents.  They have different consequences, since the magnitude of the errors 
themselves are not necessarily proportional to the consequences.  For example, it is 
quite feasible for a prominent error to cause an insignificant outcome, whilst a small 
error might lead to a big consequence10.  As postulated by Reason1, it is the timely 
defence that would or would not avert the consequence. 
 
In the current economic climate where available funds are limited, safety 
requirements would have to compete with other investment demands that might be 
just as important to the business.  Such competition demands a greater accountability 
and justification for the investment, which an SMS could provide as an impartial 
organic arm. 
  
2.11 Business and Commercial Risk 
 
In addition to safety regulations, the businesses must also comply with finance and 
economic regulations set by the National Authority.  Every business carries a business 
risk, but that aspect is not addressed in this study even though business risk is 
acknowledged.  The study is mindful of the impact of safety on business risk, as well as 
the impact of funding on safety.  This balance between safety and funding is critical to 
the survival of the business as well as to the aircraft and people who fly in them.  
 
One aspect of the national authority overseen economic regulation is the provision of 
insurance to cover third party risks in the event of an accident.  Although this study 
has not addressed insurance issues, it has recognized the importance of insurance as a 
method of underwriting the consequences of incidents and accidents.  For example, a 
CEO with a short range planning horizon might consider that it might make more 
economic sense to him if flight safety risk attributable to human error be covered by 
insurance instead of a long range strategic planning and investment within his 
organization. 
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2.12 Regulatory oversight 
 
In the UK, all organizations that participate in aviation business must be approved by 
UK CAA.  Part of the approval process is an assessment of the capability of the 
organization to comply with the safety regulations.  Furthermore each organization is 
regularly audited by CAA to ensure that they continue to maintain the approval 
conditions. 
 
That aside, there is also an onus on the national Regulator to carry out periodic audits 
and oversight inspections of approved organizations that have been licensed to 
participate in civil aviation activities. This arrangement takes into account the 
variability of an organization’s own responses to any change of state of the 
organization or the airworthiness of aircraft.   For instance the attitude, safety culture 
or economic situation of the organization and its management may indicate the way 
resources are allocated to maintain safety standards. 
 
On its own part, the Competent Authority, through oversight inspections, routinely 
monitors the performance of approved organizations against the regulations to 
ensure that regulatory standards are maintained.  Approved organizations are advised 
of any observed variations that could have an adverse impact on safety, and these 
shortfalls would then have to be corrected in order to maintain the validity of the 
organizations license.  In extreme cases, where corrections were not made after 
repeated warnings by the Competent Authority, it has the power to revoke the license 
from an offending organization according to the technical and legal powers delegated 
to the authority. 
 
Under current CAA SRG procedure all regulatory aspects of an approved organization 
in the UK are subject to oversight inspection over a 24-month period, which is the 
minimum frequency that has been recommended by ICAO.  This process is repeated 
cyclically. 
 
2.13 Linking research studies to industry requirements 
 
Given that there is always some form of risk assessment in use in air transport 
operation and management, the latest drive for an innovative assessment method has 
come from two specific foreseen industry requirements.  These are: 
 
a. The ICAO mandate for Safety Management Systems14.    
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b. Regulatory risk-based oversight (RBO) as recommended in the Hampton 
Report, which is part of HM Treasury initiative into Better Regulation13.  
 
 
2.14 ICAO mandate on Safety Management System 
 
The AOC Holder is responsible for airworthiness and it follows that Part M and Part 
145 approved organizations that fall within an air operator’s area of responsibility 
should comply with the mandated SMS requirement.  
 
The key features of the SMS are that the system must be formal and structured, and 
the principles and method of implementation of SMS must be documented.  SMS 
should contain the elements: Risk Management Process, Safety Case, Hazard 
Identification, Risk Assessment, Risk Reduction and Mitigation. 
 
Thus it is clear that there should be a means of complying with risk management 
process, in which risk assessment forms one element and for which assessment tools 
may be required. 
 
 2.15 Risk Based Oversight Concept 
 
Risk based oversight (RBO) concept is a key recommendation in a report produced by 
Philip Hampton13, Head of a UK HM Treasury appointed committee tasked with 
findings ways to reduce the administrative burden experienced by regulated 
industries by promoting more efficient approaches to regulatory inspection and 
enforcement. The committee, set up in 2004, was required to examine the practices 
of a wide swath of UK Industries and regulators, including UK civil aviation industry 
and CAA. 
 
In his report published in 2005, Philip Hampton made a number of recommendations, 
all of which have been fully accepted by HM Treasury33.  It is understood that the 
recommendations would be passed down to the relevant Industries and Regulators 
for compliance after they have gone through a legislative process.  Formulation stages 
of legislation will include a process of consultation with the stake holders of the 
industry and seeking consensus through negotiation, for which HM Treasury’s Better 
Regulation Executive (BRE) has the administrative responsibility. 
 
Whatever the regulation that will stem from legislation based on Philip Hampton 
recommendations could then form a strategic requirement on the way regulatory 
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oversight would be undertaken.  If that were to be so, then UK CAA should be 
prepared to meet this challenge by developing a capability to assess and quantify the 
risk levels in the industry that it regulates. 
 
2.16 Desirable criteria for a risk model 
 
Given these two formal and hierarchical needs, together with an organization’s desire 
to prioritize investment on flight safety, this research study starts with the premise 
that one single risk assessment methodology based on quantitative techniques could 
serve both purposes.   
 
Although there was no formal specification for an assessment method, the study was 
able to focus on a wish-list of criteria suggested in Philip Hampton Report13.  It 
envisaged that a new methodology for risk assessment should: 
 
• Be open to scrutiny. 
• Be balanced to include past performance & future potential risk. 
• Use all good quality data. 
• Be implemented uniformly & impartially. 
• Express simply, preferably mathematically. 
• Be dynamic and not static. 
• Be carried through to funding decisions. 
• Incorporate deterrent effects. 
• Include an element of random inspection. 
 
According to the initial remit from the sponsor a model incorporating a top down 
analysis was the management’s preferred solution to risk assessment.  Nevertheless, a 
bottom up process-review may be necessary to ensure that any remaining gaps in the 
defences missed during the top down process are detected and dealt with.   
 
The quantitative risk assessment method ought to be simple and practical, its 
functionality transparent and, in order to economize, preferably based on the sort of 
input data that is usually collected in current error management processes. 
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Chapter Three 
Literature research - Risk assessment practices in civil aviation 
3.1  Introduction 
This chapter will examine in depth the concept of risk in general and how it is applied 
to civil aviation, as well as reviewing current risk assessment practices in UK civil 
aviation. 
3.2 Risk assessment in the face of conflicting needs 
 
Hitherto, the air transport industry was guided by the ICAO definition of risk given in 
SMM.  This states that risk is the assessment expressed in terms of predicted 
probability and severity, of the consequence(s) of a hazard, taking as reference the 
worst foreseeable situation38.  It qualifies the definition by providing a conditional 
reference point, i.e. “worst foreseeable situation” from which risk ought to be 
assessed. 
 
The “worst possible situation” is difficult to define. It depends on the collective 
historic knowledge.  An individual engineer or surveyor would have only a small 
fraction of that knowledge and his own experience.  Safety engineers are required to 
utilize the ICAO definition but the feedback that the study received from them was 
that if they strictly apply this definition, then the assessment could be too severe and 
they would get into conflict with the operator’s business managers.  This brings this 
study face to face with the main issue that need to be addressed, i.e. a way of 
determining risk that is acceptable to both safety experts and those who are 
interested in the commercial aspect of the air transport business.  
 
 The conflicting demands faced by the State, the Regulator and the aircraft operator in 
determining if risk is acceptable has been succinctly put in Figure 3.1. Increasingly 
under pressure to generate more revenue, the State might view the merits of 
increasing  air traffic and activities of associated aerospace industries and support 
industries such as maintenance, logistic, training, , and hospitality. 
 
At the same time the State may be concerned by the need to ensure public safety, as 
well as to minimize the negative impact on the environment caused by increasing air 
activity.  Therefore the government may have to increase regulation in some areas 
such as environmental pollution, whilst de-regulating in others, for example relating to 
Open Sky policies. The aircraft operators would like to increase its turnover, to 
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maximize profit and minimize costs. They would like to see existing regulation 
minimized, and certainly costs associated with them curtailed.  
 
 
Figure 3.1 – Conflicting demands between the State, Regulator and Operator 
 
 It is in this context that the operators are looking for some relaxation of existing 
regulation, especially in the way the regulation is administered, with an eye for cost 
saving.   Caught between the government and the operator, the national Regulator 
has been forced to find the right compromise between safety needs and cost needs, 
while burdened with the responsibility of generating the income necessary to 
maintain its capability, i.e. to discharge the duties that the government has delegated 
to it.  It is the government policy that the cost of managing and maintaining CAA’s 
services must be paid for by the users of such services. 
 
Despite their widely differing business objectives, they all agree on the need for flight 
safety as a common denominator.  Therefore a possible way forward is by developing 
a capability to assess risk that is not sensitive to personal interpretation and judgment.  
Quantitative assessment of risk provides an opportunity to assimilate the state of 
flight safety from another perspective and then to apply this knowledge to sensible 
management decision making process. 
 
It should be said at the outset that the availability of a quantitative risk assessment 
technique in itself would not eliminate flight safety risk.  It is the decisions made by 
top level managers that will increase or decrease the flight safety risk from a strategic 
point of view, because they are the ones who have the capability to either resource or 
introduce far reaching policy decisions that affect the entire organization.  
Quantitative information on risk helps to make better decisions in so far as critical 
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input risk data is concerned; however at the end, management decisions may be 
taken, having given due regard to all other conflicting demands. 
 
3.3 Conditionality of the outcome and risk - Data 
 
To what extent the risk due to human error could be tolerated in a safety critical air 
transport system?  To answer this question, it is necessary to have better intelligence 
on the degree of uncertainty of the outcome, where the outcome itself is conditional.  
Then it might be possible to control the uncertainty.  Most people forget the 
conditionality of “outcome” and in turn of “risk”.   Therefore, first, conditionality of 
the outcome should be examined, i.e. the circumstances under which an outcome 
occurs.  More information on the conditions for different outcomes may be necessary, 
such as hazards that prevent the achievement of objectives, how often they manifest 
themselves, what were the human errors if they were the threats, and if they were 
primary or secondary causal factors etc. Quite simply, associated with each outcome, 
there should be a comprehensive set of data detailing the environment and 
circumstances in which the outcome occurred. 
 
3.4 Mechanism to assimilate the conditions - Method 
 
Once conditions are known, then there ought to be a mechanism to assimilate the net 
effect of multiple, variable information. The natural process of assimilation takes place 
in the brain and in the mind of those who face these conditions. Unfortunately, the 
complex thinking process of risk assessment is not fully transparent to others, even 
though an expert or a careful observer could detect some outward symptoms of the 
person’s thinking and impending decision.  Given this limitation, there is a social 
demand for greater transparency of the decision process relating to risk taking, 
because everyone wants others to be accountable for their decisions and actions.  
Accountability is very much in the forefront when it comes to any accident, large or 
small, where the legal liability for the outcome, payment of compensation and 
corrective actions, has to be determined. The mechanism for assimilation of 
information on conditions is the key to determining accountability for risk, and is a 
very important element in risk assessment.  
 
3.5 Expression of risk - Output 
 
Finally, there is the question of the output from the risk assessment methodology and 
the way it is to be expressed so that everybody can have a meaningful, common 
understanding of what the result conveys.  Most risk assessment methods output the 
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result in qualitative form, such as risk being High, Medium or Low. Sometimes the 
same result may be given with a better resolution such as the chance of a certain 
hazard occurring leading to a catastrophic failure as extremely low, or very high. Again 
these qualitative words convey different meaning to different recipients of 
information according to their experience and imaginations.   
 
Converting a qualitative measure to a quantitative has always being the general 
convention and, wherever this is possible and practical, the society has adopted such 
convention because they are more meaningful to them especially when used for 
comparison.  Units and dimensions, used in daily life or in scientific work are prime 
examples.  Similarly, it is desirable to express risk on a numeric scale.  However the 
current methods of converting qualitative expression of risk to quantitative form are 
themselves subjective and therefore the exchange rate may be variable between 
different risk experts.  This is an undesirable state.  What is required is a more rational 
and unbiased system of conversion that does not rely on individual experience and 
fear. 
 
3.6 Definition of risk 
 
It follows from the foregoing analysis that a risk assessment method requires 
information on the probability of the hazard occurring, a measure of the consequence, 
and a method of combining these variables. 
The most universally accepted mathematical formula that combines loss or severity of 
consequence with the probability of its occurrence is:         Ri = Li . p (Li)                                                         3.1 
 
This formula is valid for one known consequence, where Li is the severity of 
consequence, and p (Li) is the probability of consequence. 
 
For a series of events from i = 1 to n, the expression for the total risk could be 
rewritten as, 
 
                  n Rtotal =   ∑Li . p (Li)                                                3.2                         i=1  
This is the summation of risks for independent events. 
38
In most safety sensitive industries such as nuclear, rail and air transport, where the 
usual measure of safety is through risk assessment, the same equations as above 
apply.  However Li would be read as the severity of consequence and p (Li) as the 
probability of the hazard occurring that leads to the consequence. 
 
Where the events are not independent, p (Li) becomes more complicated as it would 
be necessary to establish conditional probabilities.  Then this simple formula would 
not apply.  This is the situation with complex processes such as continuing 
airworthiness, where steps of a process system are numerous and interdependent on 
what happens elsewhere in the system.  This research study will especially address 
this type of complexity.  
 
It is axiomatic that the methods of measuring the consequences and the probability of 
occurrence form the key to the way risk is expressed. Obviously both these quantities 
could be expressed in quantitative terms as well as qualitative terms, depending on 
what is at stake.  For example if a person’s life or someone else’s reputation is at 
stake, it may be difficult to put a value to it, though more often than not law courts 
end up with putting an agreed monetary value to it during compensation claims.  Loss 
of impersonal assets such as aircraft or property on the ground, or loss of earnings 
could of course be easily quantified. 
 
Similarly, the probability of an event occurring could be quantified if there is sufficient 
amount of data that represent the past experience.  However if data is not available, 
then the probability of occurrence would have to be estimated or if not best guessed 
using expert opinion.  Often the expert acts without sufficient data at hand, and his 
experience may be based on either hearsay or the personal experience of a very few 
similar events.  Thus judgment may be clouded, and at best be expressed qualitatively. 
 
3.7 Quantitative risk assessment 
It follows from the foregoing discussion that risk assessment is the determination of 
the qualitative or quantitative value of the risk associated with a measurable threat or 
hazard that could arise at a specific situation.  If risk is to be assessed quantitatively, 
then it is necessary to calculate the two components that form risk, namely the 
probability of the threat (or hazard) and the magnitude of the potential loss or 
consequence. 
3.8 Current risk assessment methods in civil aviation 
This chapter from here onwards will examine the way risk assessment is implemented 
in civil aviation at present.  Table 3.1 identifies some of the risk assessment 
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opportunities and methods encountered in UK civil aviation. Some of them are 
discussed under this literature survey. 
Method Role Application Objective 
ICAO 
Audits 
ICAO conducted audits of 
national civil aviation policy 
and safety  regulation 
infrastructure 
International level 
audits of each ICAO 
member nation 
To monitor effectiveness of national 
infrastructure’s compliance with ICAO 
international standards. 
IOSA 
IATA conducted operational 
safety audit 
Flight operations 
An IATA managed commercial audit 
service chargeable to customer (air 
operator). It covers the audit of 
maintenance operations and 
organizations that come under ICAO 
Annex 6. 
Regulation Oversight inspection and audit 
Conducted by NAA 
on all approved 
organizations 
Mandatory compliance with regulation. 
Legally binding 
SMS In house safety management All operations 
ICAO mandate current, but not a legal 
requirement in UK 
QMS 
Administrative process to 
international standards ISO 
9001/9002, TQM or six-sigma  
All operations 
Quality audits assure infrastructure, rules 
and procedures are in position and being 
complied with by lower formations. 
 
Quality control – routine audit of quality 
of work at work face done locally 
MOR 
Mandatory Occurrence 
Reporting system.  
All operations 
Monitoring performance. MOR rate is 
currently used as a KPI for measuring 
effectiveness of flight safety 
management. 
MEDA 
Analytical tool to manage HF 
based reported errors. 
Maintenance 
operation 
Classify reported errors, to identify  and 
determine corrective actions 
MEMS 
Formal HF based error 
reporting  
Maintenance 
operation 
Data collection and analysis. To monitor 
in house performance and prevention of 
future incidents. 
CHIRP 
Confidential reporting outside 
established MOR and MEMS  
procedure 
All operations 
Data collection and analysis to identify 
sensitive causal factors that prevent or 
suppress normal reporting 
FMEA Analytical technique 
System or product 
design 
Increase system reliability, reduce life 
cycle costs minimize risk to ALARP.  
MSG-3 Analytical technique 
Designing  
maintenance 
systems 
Increase system reliability, reduce life 
cycle costs and aircraft downtime, and 
minimize risk to ALARP. 
SHEL 
Generic analytical model for 
human factor base error 
incidence 
System design or 
operation  
To identify sources of error leading to HF 
based failures. 
Table 3.1 – Risk assessment - circumstances, systems and techniques 
3.9 Circumstances for risk assessment 
Risk assessment may be undertaken at different circumstances: 
a. Tactical planning as part of day to day operations, as situations arise.   
b. Meeting regulatory requirements as undertaken by the Regulator.  
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c. Strategic planning as a part of safety management and better resourcing, 
usually undertaken by an organization’s higher level management. 
Tactical risk assessment methodology involves the analysis of a given situation to 
identify the hazards, consider the potential consequences and severity as well as if the 
hazard is likely to materialize and lead to an incident, and then make a judgment if a 
significant risk exists or not. Conversion of feelings, opinions and judgments is based 
on a definition that outputs a number.  It could be said with certainty that nobody 
resorts to a calculator or a computer to make an on the spot tactical risk assessment 
and decision in the middle of an engineering or flight operation.  Decisions are taken 
on the basis of the best experience of the people involved.  More often than not, time 
pressure is involved in tactical risk assessment. 
In contrast, risk assessment for strategic planning is done under more relaxed working 
conditions. There are more opportunities to exercise a higher degree of resolution of 
hazards, consequences and their severities and probabilities.  Even so, assessment 
technique is largely subjective in the current state of the art.  Conversion of subjective 
judgment to numerical values may be using simple linear scales and pre-defined 
criteria, as explained further on this chapter. 
 
Assessing risk for regulatory purposes is quite different. Here it is a question of how 
well and closely an organization complies with prescribed rules and regulations.  If 
there is a failure to comply, or if the rules are breached that becomes a fault.  The 
fidelity of the individual or the organization is in doubt, and the risk arises from this 
uncertainty over the organization’s reliability and the trustworthiness rather than 
from the fact if the situation really posed a risk to flight safety.  The gravity of the fault 
may affect the penalties and corrective actions.  
 
3.10 Risk assessment in tactical planning and operations 
Risk assessments in tactical planning and operations are undertaken by air operator or 
its maintenance organization. These opportunities arise very frequently.  Assessments 
are done by specialists of the organization such as flight crews, engineers and their 
line managers. Their work may be assisted by diagnostic software for the aircraft 
systems involved. If the decision process is error free or not, is left entirely to the 
integrity and fidelity of the individual decision makers. 
Ideally the need to assess risk by specialists should not arise, if prior integrated logistic 
support planning has been undertaken perfectly, if all the necessary resources have 
been provisioned and if personnel follow correct procedures promulgated under 
safety regulation.  But in life, nothing is perfect and often new unknowns, in the form 
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of shortcomings, come into light, which need addressing.  Then, specialists involved 
might have to make an assessment of safety risk on which a decision has to be taken.  
Here is an example of such a situation. 
3.10.1 Case study in tactical risk assessment – safety vs cost 
A defect in the form of a smouldering cable was discovered on an aircraft that was en-
route, which rendered part of a system inoperative.  Rectification of the defect was 
outside the capability of pre-planned en-route engineering and logistic support 
arrangements.  The captain of the aircraft reported to the home support base that the 
affected part of the system was not in the aircraft’s Minimum Equipment List (MEL) 
and could be disabled.  But he suspected that disintegrating insulation might be the 
cause, and even if the circuit was disabled, a very small fire risk could exist from the 
adjacent cables of the loom through which other essential systems were powered 
during flight.  A decision had to be made on how best to recover the aircraft back to 
home base.  Two options were available, i.e. to fly in the defective condition with the 
system disabled or if not to call for a rectification team to the location where the 
aircraft had been stranded.   
The need for risk assessment arose because of safety consideration, i.e. the 
consequences of an in-flight fire if the aircraft flew with a disabled system, and even 
the loss of an aircraft, but the judgment could have been clouded by commercial 
considerations, i.e. lost revenue, earning time plus cost of dispatching a recovery 
team.   
This is a real life situation of a specific case where the flight crew, engineers and their 
managers would have to assess the risk and take a decision, based on evidence, their 
previous experience and knowledge of the system, and best subjective judgment.  
When costs are involved, and time is measured in terms of cost, an invisible business 
pressure is automatically placed on the specialists to take a decision quickly and to act 
upon it.  A CEO might say that no one is putting commercial pressure on the 
specialists, but it is fact that specialists are aware that they would have to answer to 
the CEO or delegated authority, if their decision had a negative impact on the 
commercial aspect of the operation. 
Either through correct rationalization or luck these decisions often end up with a 
positive outcome.  Occasionally however decisions taken in haste due to commercial 
reasons could turn up to be drastically wrong with a tragic ending.  Spanair Boeing 
MD-82 EC-HFP, Flight 5022, which crashed during takeoff at Madrid airport on the 20 
August 2008 killing 154 of the 172 occupants is a case in point. See Appendix 2 for a 
brief outline of likely causal factors according to the interim investigation report40. 
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3.10.2 Record keeping of decisions 
 Such, case by case risk assessment may be undertaken by engineers and managers in 
an organization many times as part of their mode of operation. Usually no records are 
kept on the way risk is assessed or what decision has been taken.  The only 
information that could be seen is probably a record of the situation and the final 
action taken.  Any intermediate records would be kept only if any other formal 
administrative actions had to be taken as a part of the management or decision 
process.   
Ironically there is a dearth of management tools available to the specialists.  Following 
industry best practices some organizations are known to have created and maintained 
decision flow diagrams or such diagnostic tools. In a report produced by Leach15 on 
the aftermath of another investigation into a maintenance error induced flight 
incident, as reviewed in Section 4.2, he concedes that it is humanly impractical to 
provide this type of diagnostic and decision tools for thousands of different situations 
that could arise in a maintenance environment or any specific aircraft type.   
 3.11 Regulatory requirement 
Employing risk management strategies to assist in the effective use of resources is one 
characteristic of an effective State controlled safety management system that is 
generally known as the regulatory framework.   This is the recommended balanced 
approach to control and supervision of civil aviation industry according to ICAO Safety 
Management Manual41.  Putting this recommendation into practice, safety risk 
assessment is undertaken by the Regulator as a part of the process leading to the 
initial issue of a Type Certificate, Airworthiness Certificate or an operating license that 
identifies a business entity as an approved organization.  Risk is reviewed by the 
issuing authority whenever either these approvals fall due for periodic reviews, on 
license holder’s request to make changes or during routine surveillance and safety 
audits of organization and its aircraft. 
3.11.1 Aircraft - Risk at Type Certification and Airworthiness Certification  
It was already stated that continuing airworthiness process starts from the time an 
aircraft enters operational service, first having registered the aircraft and obtained an 
Airworthiness Certificate, see Section 2.5 – 2.6.  Having a valid Type Certificate is one 
pre-requisite for an Airworthiness Certificate.   
The TC confirms that the aircraft has been designed produced and tested to exacting 
standards that is already laid down elsewhere in regulation, e.g. EASA CS-25, and that 
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the applicant organization has fully complied with the relevant regulation in 
accordance with EASA Part 21 DOA/ POA.  
One set of information of particular interest to this research study is the design risk 
level of an aircraft that initially enters service.  The regulations state42, 43 that the 
probability of a catastrophic failure of the aircraft must not be worse than 1 x 10E-07 
flight hours; this probability is qualitatively defined as extremely remote.  The 
probability value is considered as a threshold design safety level for a civil transport 
aircraft, due to likely hazards from all systems collectively.   
In practice it is not possible to determine if this target threshold has been achieved 
without numerically analyzing the effect of all systems together collectively.  
Therefore, the target rate has been equally apportioned amongst arbitrary 100 
potential failure conditions that could lead to a catastrophic accident, each receiving 
risk rating of 1 x 10E-09 flight hours (extremely improbable)42, 43 .  Naturally, there 
could be conditions that would lead to less severe consequences and therefore a 
higher frequency of occurrence is admissible for them. 
Usually the declared risk levels contain safety factors to cover threat to safety from 
unknown and imponderable conditions.  A safety factor 3.33 is used if the result is 
based on testing, or factor 5 or more if on calculations44.  Factor 3.33 is the linear 
scaling factor between the mean value of test results and a point that is 3-standard 
deviations to the left of the mean value in a log-normal probability distribution curve 
of a large number of test results; this point gives approximately 1 in 1,000 chance of a 
test failing in a series of similar tests that go to make up the distribution curve.  The 
mean value is considered as the 50% chance of the test specimen failing at that test 
duration, measured in the log of the number of test cycles, which is equivalent to the 
probability of a component failing at the end of its service life that has no safety factor 
incorporated.  By factoring down the test result, a safety factor is incorporated.   
This method of setting the fatigue life of aircraft structural components is based on 
safe life design and a fatigue test. Confidence in the safe, factored-down life is further 
increased by monitoring the fatigue life usage in service, which incorporates the 
recording of loading cycles and magnitudes of loading encountered by the aircraft in 
service. Loads monitoring is intended to provide a comparison of the test loading 
conditions with in-service loading and thereby to account for significant deviations, if 
any. 
If there is no specimen test, the calculated value is factored down by 3.33 similar to a 
test result; then to make up for unknowns about how a test specimen might have 
behaved under test, the result is further reduced by a factor 1.5; it gives the Factor 5 = 
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3.33 x 1.5, an acceptable level of confidence.  In alternative damage tolerance design, 
safe inspection intervals, instead of safe life, are based on a calculation and Factor 5. 
 The current practice to determine the collective effects of all known critical hazards is 
to physically test the aircraft for static strength, for fatigue strength, as well as for 
reliability and durability under extreme environment conditions that the aircraft is 
expected to encounter during its operational life. Unfortunately, only one full scale 
aircraft is usually tested because of the high costs involved, but the test result is 
considered as a mean value.  The underpinning proof of concept has been 
demonstrated by past experimental research work on specimen structural joints.  
3.11.2 Organizations - Risk assessment during initial certification and/or licensing 
When business entities who wish to participate in relevant aviation activities apply to 
the national Authority for licenses to operate, the Authority would ascertain the 
competency of the organizations to perform the intended activities in a safe manner 
according to the regulation in force (Section 2.4.5).  In this process, the Authority 
would assess if the applicant organization constitutes a flight safety risk, or if they are 
capable of reducing risk level to as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP). 
Risk assessment is usually done on the basis of evaluating the subject, be that an 
aircraft or an organization, against a list of criteria set by the Regulator in accordance 
with the relevant regulation.  Some of the criteria might have minimum allowable 
threshold limits that the applicant should pass, and some criteria might be weighted 
according to their importance for safety.  The Authority determines the method of 
assessment, for example through a paper study, followed by interviews with the 
applicant and final physical verification by physical on-site inspection of the evidence 
presented.  The organization infrastructure and facilities would be subjected to an 
oversight inspection until the assessor is satisfied that the risk level is negligible. 
If this verification process reveals any shortcomings relative to the expected 
standards, the surveyor will record the shortcoming as a Finding against the relevant 
criteria.  He will convey this inform to the organization’s Accountable Manager by 
raising appropriate documentation and interview.  A Finding may be at Level 1 or 
Level 2, the former requiring urgent remedial measure, whereas the latter a less 
serious, but nevertheless requiring remedy within a reasonable period.  The 
documentation on Findings will stipulate the timescale for remedial measures to be 
applied, as agreed between the organization and the surveyor. 
On initial licensing, an applicant is expected to meet all the criteria specified by 
regulatory requirements.  If there are any shortcomings, they would be given more 
time within an agreed timescale to remedy it, before a license could be issued. Final 
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decision is taken on the basis if the organization poses a risk to flight safety and if it 
can be passed as competent to operate safely. 
3.11.3 Risk assessment at change of condition 
Since the initial certification of an aircraft or licensing of an organization is conditional, 
any change of condition such as varying operational scenario deems to require a 
review of the risk.  The regulation identifies important criteria that may have a high 
sensitivity on risk.  Significant changes to these criteria would call for a reassessment 
of the risk.  The onus for initiating a request for reassessment lay with the operator or 
organization responsible.  The Regulator would apply the same methodology of 
evaluating criteria against a known standard.  However, in this instance, the track 
record of the safety performance of the aircraft or the organization would be 
examined and taken into account before determining the risk. The standards 
applicable are based on the knowledge and experience of the assessors, the minimum 
levels of which are specified as part of their job specification45. 
3.11.4 Risk assessment at planned oversight inspections 
Even if an approved organization had no reason to initiate a request, e.g., there was 
no change in condition, the Regulator could initiate an oversight inspection program 
as part of its surveillance and auditing of standards.  This comes under one of the 
State’s responsibilities45 as previously described in Section 2.11.   
ICAO guidelines recommend that all the relevant factors of an organization or an 
aircraft should be inspected in one 2-yr cycle.  This periodicity may vary according to 
the historic safety performance of the organization or operator, subject to Authority’s 
discretion. The surveyor responsible for oversight inspections would prepare an 
inspection schedule covering a period of 2-years, during which he would inspect the 
entire organization and its aircraft progressively, part by part, until the full 100% is 
completed during the inspection cycle.  
The methodology for oversight inspection, assessment and decision making process is 
the same as before, i.e. by evaluating the organization and its change of conditions 
against a set of criteria defined by the Regulation.  See Appendix 13 for a specimen 
EASA Part 145 Approval Surveillance Record of Findings. 
A Finding, especially at Level 1, that has not been remedied within the agreed 
timescale could lead to a warning.  A repeated failure to comply with the undertaking 
would lead to the revoking of the license to operate, that could affect the 
organization’s trading position.  Likewise, the airworthiness certificate of an aircraft 
could be revoked if it was found that no remedial action has been taken on a Finding 
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even after repeated warnings.  In this case, the Approved Organization or the aircraft 
associated with the Finding is deemed unsafe.   
3.11.5  Routine time-based review airworthiness certificates 
To prevent unobserved deterioration of conditions of an aircraft’s airworthiness, there 
is a requirement to review the Airworthiness Certificate at periodic intervals as per 
EASA Part M MA901, usually annually.  If the review is satisfactory, then an 
Airworthiness Review Certificate (ARC) is issued either by a Continuing Airworthiness 
Management Organization (CAMO) or the Authority.  If the aircraft has been operating 
in a controlled continuing airworthiness environment a CAMO could issue an ARC at 2-
consecutive years, but on the 3rd year, the review would have to be undertaken by the 
Authority.  If the aircraft had been operating in a non-controlled environment, the 
CAMO could undertake the review but only recommend to the Authority that an ARC 
could be issued.  The Authority would then issue the ARC.  If not the review could be 
done by the Authority itself and if satisfied, the ARC may be issued.  In all these 
circumstances, implicit with the review is a risk assessment process, but it is effected 
by evaluating the aircraft against the criteria set by the regulation. 
3.12 Risk assessment as part of strategic planning and resourcing 
Independent from the regulatory processes and tactical planning under operational 
conditions, risk assessment may be undertaken as part of an organization’s strategic 
planning.  This type of assessment may be done as part of setting up a safety 
management system, or if an SMS is already in position, then as a part of a long term 
program under SMS to improve the organizations safety profile.  For example, a CEO 
might decide that there ought to be a vigorous campaign to reduce incidents by 20% 
over a 12-month period.  A good starting point is to draw up a baseline of risk 
contribution from each department of his organization, and to use this as a reference 
line from which progress could be monitored.   The reference line could be extended 
to cover important, high profile processes within an organization where accidents are 
known to happen, or for groups of employees that are more prone to accidents than 
others.  Reduction of accidents due to human error falls into this category of risk 
assessment for strategic planning. 
3.13 SMM guidelines on risk assessment methodology 
 
On the method of risk assessment, Safety Management Manual (SMM)38 provides 
guidance.  According to SMM, an organization and its operation should be analyzed 
to: 
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a.  Determine unsafe situations or conditions that could lead to accidents (usually 
fatal or catastrophic). 
b. Identify hazards associated with the unsafe situation. 
c. Assess risk. 
d. Mitigate and reduce the risk, and finally 
e. Communicate findings to all concerned.  
 
 
Figure 3.2 - Safety risk management process  
(Source: ICAO Doc 9859 2nd Ed) 
 
Figure 3.2 demonstrates the flow diagram of activities covering safety risk 
management as part of the SMS design (i.e. planning phase) followed by SMS 
operation where safety is assured.  Risk assessment is part of the planning phase. 
Assessment of risk requires prior knowledge of the probability of the hazard 
precipitating an unsafe event, and the severity of the adverse consequence.  This is in 
fact represented in the formula: 
                   n Rtotal =   ∑Li . p (Li)                                                3.3                      i=1 
 
3.14 Severity of consequences and probability of occurrence 
Traditionally the types of consequences and their severity have been defined 
qualitatively, based on experience.  Probability of consequence of a given severity 
arising is also expressed qualitatively, mainly because of lack of sufficient hard 
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evidence.  If a numereical outpt from risk assessment is required, the qualitative 
definitions of severity of consequences could  be converted to a numerical liner scale 
as presented in Table 3.2.  The way cost of accidents escalate, it is debatable if this 
type of linear scaling is valid or not. 
Current definitions of consequences have evolved as a result of observing accidents 
and contributory conditions, i.e. hazards.  However when assessing a situation that 
could end up with an accident, where evidence may not be glaringly obvious, an 
assessor may find it diffcult to allocate a likely consequence. Guidance from ICAO 
definition of risk is to consider the outcome of a worst foreseeable situation given the 
hazard exists; it is common knowledge in civil aviation industry, that the interpretation 
of this definition is difficult and if people always go strictly by the book in practical 
situations then nothing would get done. 
Severity of Consequence 
Aviation 
definition 
Meaning Alpha-numeric value 
Catastrophic Equipment destroyed. Multiple deaths. 5 A 
Hazardous 
A large reduction in safety margins, physical distress or a 
workload such that the operators cannot be relied upon to 
perform their tasks accurately or completely.  Serious injury or 
death to a number of people. Major equipment damage. 
4 B 
Major 
A significant reduction in safety margins, a reduction in the 
ability of the operators to cope with adverse operating 
conditions as a result of an increase in workload, or as a result of 
conditions impairing their efficiency.  Serious incident. Injury to 
persons. 
3 C 
Minor 
Nuisance.  Operating limitations.  Use of emergency procedures. 
Minor incident. 
2 D 
Negligible Little consequence. 1 E 
Table 3.2 - Severity of consequences – Definitions (Source: ICAO SMM) 
 
For example, if a fuselage panel of a pressurized aircraft has a large fracture line 
running along it, one would not release that aircraft to fly.  If it flew, the consequences 
could be catastrophic.  However if an airfield manager had to delay the runway 
sweeping by few hours to allow a training exercise to take place, thereby missing a 
routine sweep, how would he judge the potential consequence and risk. In this latter 
case the whole range of consequences may be valid, or equally possible.  In the case 
of Air France Concorde accident, the manager of the airport had opted to delay the 
runway sweep probably assuming no significant consequence and low risk. But the 
actual outcome was the loss of a Concorde with 109 occupants9 aboard, that might 
have partially contributed to the decision to retire the Concorde fleet, see Appendix 2. 
In most situations encountered in real life, more than one consequence may be 
possible. The specialist may have to select one, and it is likely that he would be 
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swayed by fear and uncertainty as well as self protection, whereas the managers who 
are responsible for the revenue generation and commercial utilization of aircraft may 
urge the specialist to dilute his judgment on the grounds of uncertainty and business 
objectives. Whilst there is some leeway to discuss and compromise at times of 
strategic and planning situation, there is little time at tactical situations when a urgent 
decision has to be taken in the face of various odds. 
3.14.1 Applying subjective judgment under stressful conditions  
It was mentioned by one CEO that commented on the study, that businesses never 
apply pressure on flight crew when to take off or where to land if there are adverse 
conditions, as it is the captain who decides and voluntarily takes the risk.  Factually 
that may be correct on the basis of the terms of reference for a captain, but it is at 
best naive to pretend to ignore the captain’s relationship to the purpose for which the 
aircraft is flown.  If the aircraft is lost due to a wrong decision, the psychology behind a 
captain’s decision and action is invariably lost with his death and investigators end up 
with having to determine if a flight crew was put under pressure or not.  The recent 
loss of the Polish Air Force TU-154 carrying the Polish President on 10 April 2010 
vividly demonstrated this phenomenon as reported in the media the possibility of the 
captain coming under pressure from his political superiors onboard46.  
It is quite normal to experience a certain amount of stress in every business 
organization, and occasionally to exceed it beyond the norm. Whilst that may be a 
reasonable starting point, this study was receiving information that norms are 
occasionally stretched beyond tolerable levels, as business managers sweep out 
reason in the name of cost savings and business expediency. When it comes to safety, 
one has to remember that safety does not come at no cost and, therefore, the cost 
threshold used in exercising ALARP philosophy remains a moot point . 
Discussions with some members of the Association of Licensed Aircraft Engineers 
(ALAE) have alerted this research study that engineers who are at the sharp end of 
delivering an airworthy aircraft for flight are under constant business pressures thrust 
upon them.  Ironically they are often the very last but one defence against errors that 
the continuing airworthiness process might have carried forward.  Existence of such 
pressures are substantiated by various related reports received by CHIRP, an 
organization set up to receive confidential reports from aviation industry47  . 
Although the foregoing commentary appears be a diversion from the topic in hand, it 
is related here in order to demonstrate the difficulties and uncertainties of applying a 
subjective judgment on the potential consequences when considering safety cases. 
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Also,  it is debatable if someone is mentally capable of assimilating all hundreds or 
even thousands of combinations of diferent situations rationally, and then to take a 
judgment on how frequently it could happen.  It is no better than making a statement 
or a prediction about something that cannot be verified in one’s lifetime, because 
there is no way that sufficient evidence could be gathered to prove or disprove the 
prediction or estimate.  Despite this severe limitation, this type of qualitative 
definition is used in risk assessment.   
Table 3.3 presents the categorization and frequencies converted to a linear numeric 
scale.  Alongside the numeric values, the Table presents the EASA CS -25 definitions of 
the probabilities converted to numeric values. 
Likelihood of Occurrence 
Qualitative 
definition 
Meaning 
Numeric 
value 
EASA CS -25 rating 
Failure probability per FH 
Extremely 
improbable 
Almost inconceivable that the event will 
occur 
1 10E-9 
Improbable Very unlikely to occur 2 10E-7 
Remote Unlikely, but possible to occur 3 10E-5 
Occasional Likely to occur sometimes 4 10E-3 
Frequent Likely to occur many times 5 10E-2 
Table 3.3 - Probability of occurrence of consequences - Definition 
 
3.15 Rate of exposure 
SMM also introduces another variable, namely the rate of exposure to the hazard.  
This term in fact needs a closer scrutiny.  If p (Li) is the general probability of a certain 
type of consequence occurring, say at global level, then the rate of exposure is related 
to a specific organization which might have an exposure rate to the same potential 
consequence that may be at a higher or lower than the global rate.  For example, 
assume that the global rate of accidents during short runway takeoffs is 10 per year.  
However if an airline has a home base with only a short runway, and all its outbound 
flights have to takeoff from this airport and all inbound flights have to land there, then 
the exposure rate to the hazards of a short runway may be higher than that for the 
flights considered under global case.  That means, exposure rate depends upon the 
size of the population considered, which encounters a specific hazard from which the 
frequency of exposure has to be determined.  It is an important parameter to be used 
when interpreting a result of risk analysis, and in determining how confident one 
could be in using the result.  
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3.16 Data availability 
The scarcity of data may dictate the risk assessment methodology.  Civil aviation is 
already operating to a very high level of safety despite the occasional catastrophic 
accident. This means that there is a dearth of data in different combinations of 
“conditions-consequences”, i.e. the number of potential combinations may run into 
millions, whereas the number of accidents and recorded conditions may be relatively 
small. Recognizing this impasse, paragraph 6.3.4 of SMM38 (First Edition) states: 
“There are many ways – some more formal than others – to approach the analytical 
aspects of risk assessment.  For some risks, the number of variables and the availability 
of both suitable data and mathematical models may lead to credible results with 
quantitative methods (requiring mathematical analysis of specific data).  However, few 
hazards in aviation lend themselves to credible analysis solely through numerical 
methods. Typically, these analyses are supplemented qualitatively through critical and 
logical analysis of the known facts and their relationships.” 
The most widely known and universally accepted risk assessment model is based on 
this principle of mixing qualitative definitions converted to a numerical scale: this 
gives a 2-dimensional matrix, on one axis the likelihood of occurrence ranked along 
frequency, and on the other axis,  the types of consequences ranked in levels of 
severity. 
3.17 Traditional risk matrix 
Table 3.4 presents a traditional risk matrix used for assessing risk in civil aviation. 
  Risk probability 
Risk severity 
Catastrophic 
A 
Hazardous 
B 
Major 
C 
Minor 
D 
Negligible 
E 
Frequent                         5 5A 5B 5C 5D 5E 
Occasional                      4 4A 4B 4C 4D 4E 
Remote                           3 3A 3B 3C 3D 3E 
Improbable                    2 2A 2B 2C 2D 2E 
Extremely improbable 1 1A 1B 1C 1D 1E 
Table 3.4 - Safety risk assessment matrix (Source: ICAO Doc 9859 2nd Ed) 
The variables on the 2-axes have been graded by a either a numerical value or a letter 
that simply defines its hierarchical order, and NOT because they have a mathematical 
or a physical relationship.  For example, a consequence considered to occur at a very 
low frequency and allocated a value 2 is not physically related to another one, e.g., a 
frequent event that has been allocated a value 5, by a factor 2.5.  The numbers simply 
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signify their importance.  A catastrophic accident might cost 300 lives and an 
insurance claim of £1 billion, whereas a minor accident might result in relatively 
benign injuries and damage to assets of the order of £5,000.  CAP 642 Airside Safety 
Management48 offers some examples of the way this type of risk matrix is used. 
The closer analysis of the matrix might be seen as trivial, but it is an important point in 
determining how good the matrix is for assessing risk, and if the output truly 
represents prevailing risk.   
Nevertheless, using the simple formula a linear risk scale has emerged from this 
matrix.   
R = Probability of consequence x Severity                                     3.4 
The most important feature of the matrix is its capability to represent risk level 
graphically, which allows the user of the model to gain a sense of proportion 
qualitatively rather than as a physical value to it.  The convention, practiced by 
successive generations of assessors, determines if the risk level is acceptable or not, 
but this depends very much on the experience and subjective judgment of the 
assessor (best described as his feel) rather than on evidence of sufficient outcomes.  
Table 3.5 represents the assessor’s thinking on what combination of severity of 
consequences and probability of occurrence could be acceptable, be rejected and if 
uncertain could be negotiated or rationalized before a decision is taken. These are 
subjective, because in this system, even with prior definitions of categories, 
interpretation of the thresholds could be subjective, and variable between different 
assessors.  In the circumstances to the Air France Concorde accident9 a tolerable 3B 
level risk index turned up to be a 3A, demonstrating that conditionally other factors 
could come into play , despite they were beyond the assessor’s imagination. 
It may be possible to reduce this uncertainty of thresholds by placing true values for 
the severity of consequences, and by substituting true, numeric probability values.   
 
Risk management 
Assessment  
risk index 
Suggested criteria 
Intolerable region 
5A, 5B, 5C, 
4A, 4B, 3A 
Unacceptable under the 
existing circumstances 
Tolerable region 
5D, 5E, 4C, 4D, 4E, 
3B, 3C, 3D,2A, 2B, 2C 
Acceptable based on risk 
mitigation. It might require 
management decision 
Acceptable region 
3E, 2D, 2E, 
1A, 1B, 1C, 1D, 1E 
Acceptable 
Table 3.5 - Safety risk tolerability matrix (source: ICAO SMM Doc 9859 2nd Ed) 
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Table 3.6 was generated by this study to present risk as a financial risk, where the 
severity of consequence is represented as a monetary value. The probabilities used 
are numerical values extracted from EASA CS-25 definitions for Design Requirements 
of civil aircraft.  Discriminating between risks, i.e. acceptable, unacceptable, and 
acceptable after mitigation is much clearer here as it is backed by a quantitative 
parameter that is more meaningful than a just a number, in this case financial risk per 
flight hour against a possible maximum cost if accident did take place. 
 
Severity of 
Consequence 
Cost of 
accident (£) 
Risk (monetary value) 
Catastrophic 
10E9 1 100 10000 1000000 10000000 
0.1 10 1000 100000 1000000 
Hazardous 
10E7 0.01 1 100 10000 100000 
0.001 0.1 10 1000 10000 
Major 
10E5 0.0001 0.01 1 100 1000 
0.00001 0.001 0.1 10 100 
Minor 
10E4 0.000001 0.0001 0.01 1 10 
0.0000001 0.00001 0.001 0.1 1 
Negligible 
10E3 0.00000001 0.000001 0.0001 0.01 0.1 
Events per 
hour 
10E-9 10E-7 10E-5 10E-3 10E-2 
Probability of Occurrence 
Extremely 
Improbable 
Improbable Remote Occasional Frequent 
Table 3.6 – Risk matrix presented in monetary terms 
 
In this matrix the cost bands do not have any known previous precedent but a range 
estimated by the researcher to demonstrate the concept of a risk matrix based on 
cost.  For example, an upper limit of £1B was set against catastrophic accidents. This 
figure was based on figure of £600M estimated by a panel of lawyers and 
underwriters as the full cost of settling claims, in a simulated damage assessment 
exercise relating to a fatal accident to an aircraft of the Boeing 737 class.  It was 
assumed that the aircraft was totally destroyed and all occupants died49.  The costs 
included payments to victims, liabilities to the operators and manufacturers, cost of 
investigations and all round legal fees.  There were no victims on the ground. 
 
£1B is not necessarily the upper limit of this Band, as it could be extended according 
to the type of aircraft, number of victims and the extent of claims due to both direct 
and collateral damage, and what a court may set.   
 
The £100M lower limit represents a change over point from the upper limit of a 
hazardous accident where there were no fatalities, and the hull might be salvaged. 
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Thus, £100M to £1B may be a reasonable range for a typical aircraft accident at the 
2008 economic conditions.   
 
Once the uppermost band was set, the lower bands were scaled down using a log 
scale putting the limit of minor costs around £1,000.  This is roughly the cost of 
handling a reported error incident, involving one-week of work for an investigator.  
Any smaller costs may be negligible. 
 
3.18 Extent of usage of traditional risk matrix 
The extent of usage of the traditional risk matrix within the civil aviation industry is 
not clear.  Over a period of 3-years this research study observed opinions expressed 
by subject experts attending routine, national level flight safety meetings at which 
nation-wide air operators and maintenance providers were represented.  Everyone 
was aware of the guidance on the use of risk matrix, and many have used it 
occasionally to assess risk at specific situation involving identified safety cases.  
However there was no uniformity of its use and certainly as SMM guidance is advisory, 
approved organizations applied the technique on an ad-hoc basis.  Considering the 
industry as a whole, use of the risk matrix is widely known, but the number of 
occasions that it is used by any one approved organization may be very few. 
Part of the difficulty in the use of risk matrix is the dearth of data that is necessary to 
substantiate intermediate decisions, such as the probability of occurrence of hazards 
not previously encountered.  
3.19 Data gathering practices in industry 
Given these limitations on risk assessment, industry-wide, much effort in risk 
management activities is spent on data gathering, categorization and analyzing trends.  
This is done under error reporting and investigation process that has been formalized 
by regulation and in UK promulgated by UK CAA under CAP 382 Mandatory 
Occurrence Reporting System (MOR)50 and under CAP 562 Leaflet 11-5051 (formerly UK 
CAA Airworthiness Notice 71 on Maintenance Error Management System (MEMS)52.  
These together with other air and ground incidents contribute to error data banks that 
help to understand trends, and correlation between errors, consequences and their 
causal factors.  
3.19.1 Incident reports 
 
Air and ground incidence reports relating to maintenance error, or human error at 
design, production and integrated logistic support planning and implementation were 
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of interest to this study.  Equipment shortcomings and their unreliability due to 
limitations of design, production and testing standards were not within the scope of 
this study. Some of the reports are described below. 
 
3.19.2 Mandatory Occurrence Reports (MOR) 
 
Incidents that damage an aircraft or injure a passenger, or have potential 
airworthiness or safety implications are reportable to the National Airworthiness 
Authority under the CAP 382 Mandatory Occurrence Reporting system.  Air operators 
usually retained detailed results of their investigation, and a summary report is 
forwarded to the Regulator.   Reports sent to UK CAA are retained under 
confidentiality agreement.   
 
CAA Paper 2007/04 Aircraft Maintenance Incident Analysis53 which examined about 
3000 MOR reports sent over a period of 10-years, had reported that very little details 
of company investigations had been reported in MOR submissions. 
 
Given that MOR route was going to be unsuccessful in determining causal chains, 
attention shifted to the possible use of approved organizations’ proprietary data, 
retained by them under the Maintenance Error Management System.   
 
3.19.3 Maintenance Error Management System (MEMS) 
 
MEMS were initially brought into use under UK CAA Airworthiness Notice 71 (2000)52, 
now Leaflet 11-50 of CAP 56251, as part of the Human Factors education and 
promotion programme, the purpose of which was to prevent the recurrence of 
maintenance error.   The concept behind MEMS is that it is prudent to catch and 
eliminate errors that lay at the bottom of the “error-iceberg” as early as possible in 
order to eliminate the possibility of their becoming serious problems later on. 
 
Approved organizations are expected to report, record and investigate maintenance 
error, and to take follow up action to prevent the recurrence of similar errors. 
Demonstration of compliance with CAP 562 Leaflet 11-50 is currently part of the 
routine Regulator’s oversight inspections. 
 
Usually MEMS is managed by the organization’s Safety and Quality Department. 
Under good safety culture, personnel are encouraged to report error incidences 
without the fear of being victimised for their voluntary action.   
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This is part of the progressive campaign within an organization to minimise human 
error related incidents.  Incidences are dealt with within the organization, investigated 
and records are retained in a databank.  Usually reported incidents are investigated 
using MEDA format as the route map for analysis, and medium of communication.    
 
3.19.4 Maintenance Error Decision Aid (MEDA) 
 
MEDA stands for Maintenance Error Decision Aid, a management tool in the style of a 
formatted document (when completed) that could be used to record details about the 
error incident.  Its completion is done by a trained investigator, concurrently with the 
investigation, in which the reporter assists by way of a dialogue with the investigator.  
 
MEDA taxonomy has been initially designed, developed and recommended to the 
global aviation industry by Boeing Aircraft Company, and was initially published in a 
paper by Rankin (2000)54.  At present MEDA had been accepted as an investigation 
and classification tool to determine causal factors of an error incident, and an input 
tool to a larger MEMS database.  The error type and causal factor taxonomy used in 
MEDA is fairly comprehensive, but as more and more experience is gained, there have 
been gradual improvements to the MEDA form.  MEDA Form Issue H is the current 
version, but continuation improvements are on-going. 
 
A User Guide to MEDA could be obtained from Boeing (2010)55.  As for MEDA 
applications, an overview of a maintenance error management system by BF Goodrich 
using MEDA has been described by Bongard (2001)56. 
 
3.19.5 Company proprietary databases 
 
It is known that some approved organizations maintain company proprietary data 
bases using commercially available, web-based software tools.  Vistair’s Safety Net57 
and AQD Superstructure Group’s Integrated Safety and Risk Management58 are two 
typical packages, both web-based.  The respective commercial organizations maintain 
the database and facilities, and air operators or maintenance organizations could 
become users by purchasing an on-line access to use their system.   
 
Most of the web-based databases generally available to civil aviation industry are 
principally depositories for incident reports, MEMS reports and any other similar data.  
They provide facilities for categorization and analysis of trends, but do not go as far as 
applying these data to determine the risk for the organization or flight safety.  That 
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aspect remains the prerogative of the assessors that would use the data from the 
database.    
AQD for instance claims that it offers, “tools for creating internal audit programs, 
assisting with audits for all departments, tracking corrective and preventive actions, 
integrating external audit requirements and analyzing and reporting trends in quality 
indicators”.  
AQD Software in contrast to most others offer a facility for recording results of risk 
analysis process, i.e. identifying hazards, potential consequences, and available 
evidence from which probabilities could be determined,  against each safety case.  It 
also has facilities to register risk level before and after a risk is mitigated.  However the 
mechanism for analysis is subjective and left to the assessor, outside the software 
package. AQD software does not have a module for risk assessment. 
 
3.20 Analysis of Data 
 
3.20.1 MOR data 
UK CAA collects MOR data under commercial confidentiality, and along with accident 
data they may be of benefit to UK CAA as indicators of the general state of safety 
within the industry.  For the benefit of participants, UK CAA produces a monthly list of 
MOR submissions, giving essential data and a brief narrative of events.   On request, 
CAA provides ad-hoc reports and analysis of dis-identified data back to participants of 
the scheme.  MOR data are not used for assessing risk either at individual 
organizations or industry as a whole. 
Using MOR data collected over 10-years, CAP Paper 2007/0453 reported on the 
incidence of human error in maintenance.  There had been 2924 low risk maintenance 
errors and 21 high risk errors during the period studied. A large proportion of MOR 
was attributed to role equipment and furnishings (19.2% of the low risk errors and 
9.5% of high risk errors). However on high risk errors, combination of propulsion 
related systems (15.0% low risk, 23.8% high risk) and landing gear (11.0% low, 23.8% 
high) were leading with flight controls ranking third (9% low, 19.0% high) respectively.  
CAP 2007/204 made no attempt to assess the level of risk in industry using MOR data. 
 
3.20.2 CHIRP/MEMS 
CHIRP is an acronym for Confidential Human Factors Incident Reporting Programme. It 
has been set up to receive confidential reports from those involved in aviation 
activities, who feel that they are unable to report incidents under the existing MOR 
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scheme for fear of pressures and intimidation from their superiors or peers.  It is 
however complementary to MOR scheme, and data is analyzed and fed back into the 
main system first having investigated the matter and ensured that the identity of the 
originator has been removed.   CHIRP has been established as a charitable company, 
ensuring that the confidentiality of the information it receives is legally protected47. 
Since the original formation of CHIRP, its  activities have been extended.  Now there is 
much more open discussion between CHIRP and civil aviation industry as a whole.  
Within CHIRP is the UK-MEMS Group, composed of 25 member organizations with 
interest in air operations, maintenance, training and defence, which regularly meets 
every 2-month to discuss issues and share information pertinent to flight safety and 
error management.  While still receiving confidential reports as originally intended, 
CHIRP MEMS now receive both MEMS data directly from industry and MOR data from 
UK CAA.  These are desensitized and analyzed, and outputs are published in the 
CHIRP/MEMS web-site 47 as well as desensitized narratives of confidential reports and 
investigations.   
 
Figure 3.3 – Sample 1 of MOR/MEMS data analysis published by CHIRP  
(Source: CHIRP/MEMS) Number of hits and percentages rounded to nearest decimal place 
 
 
Approved data not 
followed, 28, 14.7%
Damage, 2, 1%
Installation error, 
100, 52.6%
Misinterpretation of 
approved data, 5, 
2.6%
Poor inspection 
standards, 25, 13.2%
Poor maintenance 
practices, 3, 1.6%
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troubleshooting 
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Servicing error, 
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before operation of 
aircraft, 1, 0.5%
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Figure 3.4 – Sample 2 of MOR/MEMS data analysis published by CHIRP  
(Source: CHIRP/MEMS) 
 
As with many other database systems, CHIRP MEMS is still a depository for data.  
Analysis is limited that they are confined to designing different taxonomies and trend 
analysis.  Trend analysis is important because it provides relationships between types 
of errors and their causal factors, as well as if the occurrence rates are increasing or 
decreasing.  However when faced with multiple types of errors and multiple causal 
factors interacting within the same process system, a manager would like to know 
their net effect as an overall risk to the end product, and its sensitivity to contributing 
errors.  That way, the manager would gain a better comprehension of the significance 
of errors and the knowledge and confidence to control them in an order of priority.   
Although MEMS are interested in a means of pulling together all available MEMS data 
to provide an industry wide risk assessment methodology, it has yet to be realized. 
3.21 Other countries 
As part of this research study, methodologies adopted by two other foreign 
regulators, US Federal Aviation Agency and Civil Aviation Authority of the Netherlands 
(NL-CAA) were briefly studied.  Both countries had put in place very similar practices 
to those employed by UK CAA in initial licensing of approved organizations, and 
subsequent regulatory oversight inspections, as well as determining priorities 
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regarding the organizations that needed more attention.  However in the more recent 
times both Regulators have adopted more cost-effective methods.  For example, FAA 
has opted for a system called Safety Performance Analysis System (SPAS), whereas NL 
-CAA has introduced a more sophisticated method based on Multi Criteria Decision 
Analysis.  
 
3.22 Safety Performance Analysis System (SPAS) of the US 
 
SPAS is an IT management tool developed for FAA by US Department of Transport’s 
Volpe Research Centre, in collaboration with Computer Sciences Corporation59.   It is a 
highly complex system of risk assessment program that feeds on several hundred 
parametric data lines on specific aircraft, engines, organizations and personnel, held in 
almost 40 separate State owned databases60.   
 
SPAS program enable its operators to access such data and then integrate and 
synthesize them according to predetermined subroutines that could be called up as 
required.  All personnel involved in oversight activities in FAA (i.e. all at Flight 
Standards Services (FSS) who are equivalent to UK CAA SRG surveyors) are required to 
utilize this management aid, to integrate and analyze critical safety information 
available to them so that they could quickly identify risks and focus on inspection 
resources on areas of greatest priority 61. 
 
The inception of SPAS that initially cost US$35M can be traced back to 1991. The 
system was fully operational by 1995.  Despite high level of investment, SPAS has had 
its problems with data quality and integrity, but through further development and 
remedial measures they have been overcome and SPAS is continuing in service.  Since 
SPAS is a secure system available to FAA and Department of Defense, information on 
software and algorithms are not available to public.   
 
3.23 Risk assessment method by CAA of the Netherlands (NL-CAA) 
 
Civil Aviation Authority of the Netherlands currently use a risk assessment model 
based on the concept of Multi Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA)62. Here each 
approved organization is assessed against each of 3 broad areas, namely, 
Organizational Risks and Quality Risks, the latter encompassing both Regulatory 
requirements and Quality requirements focussed on the tasks. The model follows a 
fishbone architecture, identifying numerous parameters (or criteria) assessed by 
oversight inspectors.  Evaluation of each organization against the criteria is done 
objectively since criteria have been well defined.  However, the definitions are 
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qualitative.  Built into the evaluation part of the software is a means of providing 
numerical scoring.  The final output is a numerical value of risk that can be used to 
compare one organization with another.  
 
The model is used to prioritize approved organizations according to risk level they 
posed, and to manage NL-CAA inspector resources.   The methodology is effective and 
has been well recognized by airworthiness authorities and civil aviation industry.  It 
serves the purpose of managing resources according to risk based oversight concept.  
However one weakness is that the risk obtained this way is not a true risk based on 
actual number of errors or failures, but an assessor’s sense of risk or subjective 
judgment.   The numbers simply convert the judgment to a numerical value. 
 
3.24 Taxonomy research 
 
Taxonomy is the structured way that human errors, their consequences and causal 
factors are broken down and categorised, and usually organized into a hierarchical 
order.  Taxonomy research in human error management is driven by the idea that, if 
causal factors were identified and prioritized, then it would help determine where 
investments ought to be made for their elimination most cost-effectively.  Since this 
area has been much researched and several projects are on-going in different 
countries, this study will not digress into that arena.  Suffice it to say that there are 
several reputed taxonomies in current use; the well known are the Human Factors 
Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) and Maintenance Error Decision Aid 
(MEDA).  MEDA was described in Section 3.21.4.   
 
Quite often individual research groups tend to design their own taxonomy to suit local 
conditions, which makes it impossible to amalgamate results from 2 groups into one 
without reanalyzing at least one of the groups’ data.  The need for an international 
standard for HF taxonomy is essential if good progress is to be made into human error 
research.  EASA will use ADREP 2000 standard, see Section 3.26.3. 
 
3.24.1 HFACS 
 
Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) is the most widely known 
system of taxonomy.  It has been developed by 2 behavioural scientists of the US 
Navy, Dr Wiegmann and Dr Shappell based on Dr James Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model 
of accident causation.  Shappell and Wiegmann (2000)63 provide details of the HFACS 
system, which has been originally developed for the US Air Force and since then much 
widely used in civil and military aviation .  HFACS is based on Reason Model and 
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focuses on the “holes” of the Swiss Cheese Model to understand their types, 
groupings and patterns of behaviour in their contribution to accidents.   
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Figure 3.5 - The HFACS framework (Source: Weigmann & Shappell) 
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Figure 3.5 represents the basic HFACS framework they have developed.  Using the 
framework as a guide, safety engineers and accident investigators can systematically 
identify and classify actual or potential failure causes in a human in the loop system. 
The objective of HFACS is to identify the causations of error and avert accidents 
through prior planning of defence mechanism, and not to blame any individual.  
However, HFACS does not provide and integrating mechanism to calculate the risk 
levels.  HFACS  has been designed principally for flight operations, but there is an 
airworthiness subset published by US Naval Safety Centre, a Student Guide sponsored 
by Watson and Kanki (2000)64.  This maintenance engineering extension has the 
acronym HFACS (ME).  HFACS (ME) categorization of human error in maintenance is 
given in Table 3.7. 
  
First Order Second Order Third Order 
Management 
Conditions 
Organizational 
 
Inappropriate Processes 
Inadequate Documentation 
Inadequate Design 
Inadequate Resources 
Supervisory Inadequate Supervision 
Inappropriate Operations 
Uncorrected Problem 
Supervisory Misconduct 
Maintainer 
Conditions 
Medical Adverse Mental State 
Adverse Physical State 
Physical/Mental Limitation 
Crew Coordination Inadequate Communication 
Inadequate Assertiveness 
Inadequate Adapt/Flexibility 
Readiness Training/Preparation 
Certification/Qualification 
Infringement 
Working 
Conditions 
Environment 
 
Inadequate Lighting/Light 
Unsafe Weather/Exposure 
Unsafe Environmental Hazards 
Equipment 
 
Damaged/Unserviceable 
Unavailable/Inappropriate 
Dated/Uncertified 
Workspace Confining 
Obstructed 
Inaccessible 
Maintainer 
Acts 
Error Attention/Memory 
Knowledge/Rule Based 
Skill/Technique Based 
Judgment/Decision-making 
Violation Routine 
Infraction 
Exceptional 
Flagrant 
Table 3.7 - Error categories of HFACS-ME framework 
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3.24.2 HILAS 
 
Human Integration into the Lifecycle of Aviation Systems (HILAS) is a European 
Commission funded international research project based at Dublin University, Ireland.  
About 40 partners from aviation industry and academic institutes across European 
Union and beyond are collaborating in the project. 
 
HILAS internet website states the objective of the project, which is “to develop a 
model of good practice for the integration of human factors across the full-life cycle of 
aviation systems”.  Four parallel lines of research have been planned: 
  
• Integration and management of human factors knowledge. 
• Flight operations and environment and performance. 
• Evaluation of new flight deck technologies. 
• Monitoring and assessment of maintenance operations. 
 
The last line of research is of relevance to this study.  It is understood that part of the 
research relating to maintenance operating is geared to setting up common human 
factors taxonomy. 
 
3.24.3 ECCAIRS 
ECCAIRS is an acronym for European Co-ordination Centre for Aircraft Incident 
Reporting System.  It is an EASA initiative for the collection, analysis, dissemination 
and storage of data from civil transport aircraft registered in or operated by European 
Union countries; as such all EC countries are participants to the ECCAIRS programme. 
ECCAIRS is operated by an EASA organization based in Italy and further information 
could be found on the EASA website65.  ECCAIRS implements ICAO ADREP 200066 
taxonomy and input data would have to be that standard65. 
Despite participation by all EU countries, in practice their actual data contributions 
have not been strong nor consistent due to various national issues, some political or 
commercial and others technical, such as differences in taxonomies used.   
This research study has investigated the possibility of using ECCAIRS data, although it 
was known that ADREP 2000 taxonomy is more focussed on flight operation aspects of 
an accident rather than CAW matters.  Unfortunately it was established that, at the 
time, insufficient progress had been made to supply and uptake UK civil aviation 
incident data, in the form of converted MOR data.  It was understood that other data 
in ECCAIRS database, which France and Germany had already supplied to ECCAIRS, 
65
were not relevant to commercial fleets.  Thus EASA/ECCAIRS was unable to assist   this 
research program with relevant data. 
3.25 Risk posed by aircraft to population near airports 
Hale (2000)67 has studied the risk posed by aircraft to people living close to busy 
airports in the context of the El Al cargo aircraft accident in the vicinity of Schipol 
aircraft (see Appendix 2)24.  Cargo aircraft consider to be posing a significant risk 
because they are usually relatively aged aircraft of average age of 28-years relative to 
the average age of 7-years for passenger aircraft. Passenger aircraft too pose a similar 
threat because the number of passenger flights is more numerous compared to cargo 
flights.  In a study of risk to airworthiness, older cargo aircraft draw special attention 
even though in this study cargo aircraft are considered in the same context as 
passenger aircraft regarding their operating to international safety regulation.   
That said, in the context of aircraft operations, risk to conurbations of population is 
considered as a third party risk.  Ale (2002)68 defines three key factors that affect third 
party risk: the individual risk, the societal risk and the risk of potentially losing life in a 
given year.  To combine this with living close to an airport, other factors have to be 
taken into account. According to a methodology developed by the Netherland’s 
National Aerospace Laboratory (NLR) (Ale et al 2000)69, the probability of an aircraft 
crashing in the environment close to an airport is influenced by: 
• Probability of an accident per aircraft movement, i.e. either a landing or a 
takeoff. 
 
• Volume of airport traffic, i.e. aircraft movements, per year. 
 
• Accident location probability, i.e. the probability of a given location becoming a 
scene of accident.  This depends on its position in relation to the runway and 
aircraft flight paths. 
 
• Accident effect model, which combines the effects of probability of an accident 
at each location in the area surrounding the airport.  Accident effect takes into 
account the type and characteristics of the aircraft, the material carried in it, 
the size and terrain of the accident location. 
Combined with this calculation are the individual risk factors that determines the 
probability of an individual living close to an airport, societal risk factors such as the 
density of population in the likely location of accident, and timing of the accident. 
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Finally, before leaving this area of investigation into risk to the people on the ground,  
it should be stated that the UK has a policy of public safety zones (PSZ) in areas 
surrounding airports beneath the flight paths, especially those aligned with the 
runways.  The risk levels are defined by risk contour-lines that define the probability of 
a single fatality per year due to an aircraft movement.  The established tolerable risk, 
or threshold, is defined as a probability of a fatality of 10E-04 per year; if the 
probability exceeds this value then the risk is considered to be unacceptable.  
Habitation and new buildings are not permitted within the area covered by the 
threshold risk contour.  This criterion is consistent with the tolerable risk from other 
high risk industrial installations such as nuclear or chemical plants69. 
It is interesting to note that the tolerable threshold risk level for population, as 
accepted by civil authority, is much higher than the design risk level of catastrophic 
failure for civil aircraft of 1 in 10E07 flight hours (see Section 3.13.1).  Obviously, a 
question follows from there: to what extent human error in continuing airworthiness 
might be undermining the design risk level of an aircraft? 
3.26 Aircraft’s contribution to the level of risk at ground 
It was stated in the previous section that the type and role of the aircraft and its 
characteristics influenced the calculation of risk to the population living in the 
surrounding area of an airport. But there was no mention in the cited references the 
significance of the state of airworthiness of the aircraft.  Therefore the presumption 
seems to be that if an aircraft has been certified as fit to fly, then it must have been 
airworthy according to regulation.   
As to the reasons why aircraft have accidents near airports or anywhere else, suffice it 
to mention here that one reason is an airworthiness issue, despite that the aircraft has 
been certified as continuingly airworthy.  Despite the fact that the aircraft has been 
released to service according to the regulation, yet it could be carrying an incipient, 
dormant hazard in the form of a human error or a mechanical unreliability such as a 
structural fatigue crack that manifested itself during the flight.  That puts the onus on 
the aircraft operator to ensure that the aircraft’s continuing airworthiness is 
maintained as required by regulation, and that human error does not undermine its 
airworthiness.  This study is of course addressing the capability to assess the risk from 
human error in continuing airworthiness process that might help to mitigate the risk. 
Other causal factors for accidents are attributed to flight operations, air traffic control, 
air field conditions, some of which are associated with human error in those 
operations.  Moreover, there are other natural hazards in the vicinity of airports that 
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cause accidents such as freak local weather conditions, bird strikes and lightning 
strikes. These are topics outside the scope of this research thesis.   
Amongst the factors that Roelen et al (2000)23 have identified as contributing to cargo 
aircraft accidents are: 
• Night flying. 
 
• Operating in extreme cold weather, particularly in North America. 
 
• Flying into non-scheduled operating bases by ad-hoc cargo operators. 
 
• Operating into and from developing countries in Asia, Africa and South 
America, where airport facilities and processes may be non-compliant at 
times. 
 
• Operating either western built old aircraft or those manufactured by the 
former Soviet Union, the reliability of which is poor and maintenance 
spares are not readily available. 
 
Some of these factors have a flight operations bias, whereas others are particularly 
relevant to maintain continuing airworthiness of the aircraft.  Factors such as night 
flying, cold weather, unfamiliar aircraft types, and unreliability in the quality of 
maintenance received in certain geographical regions have elements of human factors 
that affect the achieved level of safety from CAW process. Therefore these issues 
would have to be taken into account in assessing risk in CAW attributed to human 
error.  Relevant parameters will be introduced to the risk model that would take into 
account these issues, and naturally data collected for the risk model will help to 
identify the condition under which aircraft are operated and as part of the process of 
mitigating the risk. 
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 Chapter Four 
 
Literature research - Theoretical risk assessment methods 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Continuing the literature survey, this chapter will now examine alternative approaches 
to risk assessment, progressing from those based on qualitative methods and 
subjective judgment to more objective, quantitative techniques.  The aim of this 
chapter is to narrow down those quantitative risk assessment methods to select one 
that might be promising and have the potential to be developed as a risk assessment 
model that could meet the research objectives. 
4.2 Maintenance Error Prediction Model (MEPM) 
In the back drop of quite confusing mixture of risk assessment practices adopted by 
civil aviation, it is apt to mention some research and development work done by 
Howard Leach on a Maintenance Error Prediction Model15. His research followed in 
the aftermath of the serious flight incident to British Airways Boeing 777 G-YMME on 
10 June 2004, 1907H, at Heathrow airport4 described in Appendix 2.   
The Leach study had been undertaken to determine how such system failures arising 
could be averted in future, given that the limitations of current human error 
management systems had failed in preventing system failure in this instance. 
 
He observed that human emotions such as fear and apathy, as well as commercial 
sensitivity of operators that prevail in the culture aviation industry, and poor 
communication and lack of feedback undermined confidence in the existing systems. 
MEDA too was considered ineffective because the analysis was retrospective and 
failed to act on the specific maintenance task; MEDA tool also mainly recommended 
complexity changes within a system that relied too much on unreliable top 
management patronage15. In this background, the proposed MEPM attempts to 
eliminate recognized inadequacies of the present error management system. 
  
The application of the model that comes into operation in real-time on reporting an 
actual or potential human error situation, works as a three-stage process, operated by 
an informed Expert System (ES):  
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a. Timely analysis of a reported occurrence or suspect maintenance task using the 
analytical tool, coined Maintenance Error Prediction Model (MEPM), to determine 
the level of risk from potential maintenance error. 
b. Determining a solution to overcome or alleviate the risk, this being the defence 
mechanism. 
c. Communicating the solution effectively to all interested parties. 
 
An evaluation will be triggered by one of three alternative mechanisms, i.e. following 
an investigation of an occurrence, an engineer disclosure of a potential errant task or 
near miss, or routine MEDA evaluation highlighting an area of concern. 
 
The core of the proposed system is the MEPM; it has a three-phase algorithm, against 
which the ES would evaluate a report of an actual error or a situation where there is a 
possibility of an error occurring.  Each phase returns a simple numerical score from an 
intrinsic rating system, namely Likelihood of Occurrence of a Maintenance Error, 
Severity of Consequences, and Possibility of Detection of the Error. 
 
The product of the 3-individual scores multiplied together is the overall Risk Factor 
attributed to the potential maintenance error, and that criterion will determine the 
defensive mechanism to be adopted and the urgency of action.  Defensive 
Mechanisms are chosen analytically with another algorithm operated by ES, into 
which a range of defensive mechanism has been built-in. 
 
This prediction model follows the general concept of algorithms routines used in 2 
other prediction tools widely used in aviation industry: FEMA and MSG-3. Neither 
routine satisfactorily addresses maintenance error issues.  Therefore it is envisaged 
that the proposed MEPM would operate alongside FEMA and MSG-3, or even as a 
subset of MSG-3 as this is the principal guide to maintenance requirements on civil 
aircraft. 
 
The model has been validated using a sample of reported incidents. However in his 
conclusion Leach recommends that the model should be validated against a wider 
range of air transport and operating environments. He further recommends that 
research be undertaken to address the methods of quantification of risk as well as a 
number of other issues on human interface and industry culture, Regulations, 
Composition and Role of ES, and Company Hierarchy and Lines of Responsibilities. 
 
The proposal has much merit in averting potential accidents by timely interaction with 
reported human error situations.  It predicts the risk to flight safety if the situation 
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persists on which the urgency of action could be determined. Its limitation is that it 
relies on an individual or an event to discover the error initially and then to trigger the 
system.  The model is ideal for application in near workface environment, somewhere 
between the tactical risk assessment level at the sharp end of operations and strategic 
risk assessment level at higher management. 
 
4.3 Error Criticality Index (ECI) 
 
Another attempt to predict risk associated with human error in maintenance has been 
embedded in a model researched by Simmons (2002)16.  His proposal was to use an 
entity called Error Criticality Index for engineering or process tasks to determine the 
urgency of action if an error had occurred and left in the aircraft or its supporting 
documentation during the performance of the task.  In fact ECI could be visualized as 
one of the parameters in a MSG-3 type maintenance decision matrix, with ECI bringing 
in another active dimension to the matrix.  Note that the originator’s research thesis 
had considered it only as a stand-alone tool with no reference to MSG-3decision 
matrix. 
 
Derivation of the ECI is through a numerical process.  In this, an engineering task is 
decomposed into small elements, and each element is then assessed against a 
number of criteria, on the assumption that a human error had occurred whilst 
performing that element.  The criteria are: the effect of the error if left uncorrected at 
aircraft release to service, the severity of that effect, if the aircraft could physically 
return to service with error present, if the error would be detected by a forcing 
function such as a pre-take off cockpit check, where in the maintenance sequence the 
error occurs, and if adverse outcome has already been anticipated in the design.  
Assessment for each element is consolidated into the overall task through an 
accumulation process, and at the end of the analytical process an ECI is output. 
 
ECI was envisaged as a value, expressed on a two-dimensional linear plot of 
probability of error (X-axis) and ECI (Y-axis) ranging from zero to 1.0.  The number 
represents the importance of the plausible consequence of an event or condition.  
Decisions on the significance of the error can then be taken on the basis of ECI value 
and a threshold that might be established. 
 
Providing some worked examples, Simmons has demonstrated the way the process 
works.  However the proposal is fraught with some practical difficulties.   Simmons 
recognizes that one of the limitations of the process is the dearth of data on 
probability of humans making mistakes in specific engineering tasks at elemental 
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level. For the demonstrations he uses some information output from US nuclear 
industry and he believes that more such data is available to the researchers.  In the 
absence of quantitative data, he would resort to expert judgment or if not intuition. 
 
The process is highly analytical and it is doubtful if this is at all practically applicable to 
a maintenance scenario, where for example a Base maintenance such as a C Check 
would involve thousands of engineering tasks.  The problem is multiplied if an MRO 
handles several types of aircraft.  In his research paper Leach commented on the 
impracticality of advance analysis of each engineering task purely on account of the 
vast number.  It is therefore not a suitable tool for use within the maintenance 
organization if it involves analysis of tasks. 
 
However, it may be a technically feasible task for the Integrated Logistic Support (ILS) 
Department of an equipment manufacturer or a Design Authority.  As part of their 
normal remit ILS is responsible for the drawing up of the maintenance requirements, 
procedures and maintenance manuals.  As such they have the responsibility to 
examine each engineering task critically.   The calculation of ECI and how the value 
affects airworthiness decision would have to be taken at the development phase of 
the aircraft and results offered to the operators as part of Post Development Services.  
Obviously, the extensive analysis of engineering tasks to determine ECI would be 
highly labour intensive, and therefore there would be significant cost attached to a 
Design Authority data set that would be output. 
 
Provided that the analytical process has been delegated to the Design Authority, the 
application of the model seems to be appropriate at the workface for assessment of 
risk due to error at tactical level.  If such a system could be produced for engineering 
tasks, then logically it follows that a similar system could be devised for associated 
administrative tasks in the CAW process.  Again, the limitation might be the 
availability of reliable data about human behaviour, and how to set up standards and 
threshold values.  It needs further research to validate its practicability and cost. 
 
4.4  Regulatory Oversight Weighting Index (ROWI) 
 
ROWI model has been designed as an administrative tool to determine how best the 
oversight workload of the regional offices of UK CAA (the Regulator) could be best 
distributed amongst its inspectors in the most equitable and cost-effective manner.  
The model was designed by David Marsh, Deputy Manager of the UKCAA Southern 
Regional Office in 2006 as a private research project. 
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 Although, his work has not been published, sufficient information was obtained 
during this research study in order to assess the concept.  ROWI was a well-structured 
and documented assessment method, a positive step in the right direction. The 
concept of expert opinion and individual preference has been retained within the 
methodology. 
 
Nevertheless, recognizing its merit, the idea of assessing an organization for its size of 
operation and its capability, together with some of the parameters used, has been 
adopted in the design of part of the CAW risk model.  Thus, in the CAW risk model that 
will be described later, the subsystem “Size of Operation and Capability” has its roots 
in David Marsh’s ROWI model, though conceptually the two models are entirely 
different. 
 
ROWI model is in fact an EXCEL type spreadsheet composed of identified approved 
organizations (AOC Holders, Part M and Part 145 etc) in rows, and an array of 
parameters that define the size and capability of their operations in columns.  The 
types of parameters recorded are: 
 
For AOC Holders: 
 
• Capability: Size of the operation, numbers of A1 and A2/3 aircraft operated, 
number of QA staff, tech planning staff, approved maintenance programs, 
approval of ETOPS, RVSM, AWOPS, MNPS (Aircraft categories. A1 > 5700kg 
AUW or above, i.e. large aircraft.  A2 = or < 5700kg.  A3 aircraft are helicopters, 
A4 = aircraft other than A1, A2 or A3) 
 
• Safety Issues: Number of types of helicopters or fixed wing aircraft, number of 
aircraft in each fleet, number of MOR submitted, number of Level 1 Findings 
and Level 2 Findings issued over the previous year, average age of aircraft,  
number of operation resource variations issued over the previous year,  
average hours flown per month. 
 
For Part 145 and Part M Organizations: 
 
• Capability: Number of A1, Line maintenance types, A1 Base maintenance 
types, A2/A3 Line types and A2/A3 Base types on approval, number of B 
ratings on approval, number C ratings on approval, number specialized service 
(e.g. NDT, component maintenance etc) certifying staff employed to support 
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approval, number of C of A recommendations made previous year, number of 
AOC supported, number of QA staff. 
 
• Safety Issues: Number of Form 1 (EASA – Release to service Certificate) issued 
over previous year, number of aircraft maintained, number of Part 145 related 
MOR submitted  during the previous year, number of Level 1 Findings, number 
of Level 2 Findings issued during previous year, average age of aircraft being 
maintained, number of maintenance resource variations issued over previous 
year. 
 
Past performance.  The model takes account of the past performance as it is a good 
indicator of the trend of the company and its safety culture.  A good return gives 
confidence.   
 
Current state.  Whilst considering past performance, the model takes on board any 
real time changes that could affect the airworthiness of the fleet or the fidelity on the 
organization.   The latest flight or ground incidence and its root causes, error 
observations, their magnitudes and implications, presence of structural defects that 
might affect the whole fleet.  These are good examples of sense of risk, despite past 
good performance                 
 
State of the Organization.  Other organizational issues considered are: Has the AO’s 
exposition changed, change of method of operation, equipment, CEO or even labour 
relationships, role of aircraft, technology etc.  All these could significantly impact on 
the current performance regardless of the past. 
 
Capability / Safety Issues.  The spreadsheet calculates safety performance indicators 
for each approved organization, i.e. a Capability figure, a Safety Issues figure, and a 
Capability / Safety Issues ratio (e.g. 1:4.68).    This represents a risk level that enables 
the manager to take appropriate decision on the urgency and priority for exercising 
oversight audits and the number of surveyors to be allocated to the task.   Higher the 
denominator of the ratio 1: N, then the greater the importance of assigning oversight 
visits. 
 
Calculation. ROWI model’s internal calculation method is not visible and this research 
study did not have access to information on the concept used.  However, its general 
approach, i.e. the format of spreadsheet, attributes against which an organization's 
performance is measured, and how data is assimilated, seems to be consistent with 
Multi Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) technique that has been described in Section 
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4.7.  Expert judgment is exercised when the analyst interacts with the spreadsheet, 
but this interactive process is not available to this study.  It does not matter as long as 
the same scale of measurement is used for each condition, and that judgment is 
exercised by equally experienced surveyors. 
   
Workload Spread.  Following analysis, the workload is spread out per surveyor on the 
basis of the summation of capability figure and safety figure of AO that is allocated to 
him.  Naturally, some trade- off may be done between surveyors to make sure that 
they all get equal shares, and that the amount of travelling distance and time spent in 
travelling is roughly balanced out between the surveyors. The distance to the AO from 
the Regional Office, and the time for travel is also taken into account to determine an 
equitable workload between the surveyors. 
 
Strength. The main strength of the model is that the spreadsheet takes out the largely 
invisible subjective judgment based on the managers or individual surveyors 
experience and personal knowledge of the organization.  It is known that in the 
traditional subjective assessment techniques, the individual surveyors’ personal 
knowledge of the system plays a major role in their assessment technique.  But this 
knowledge is not transparent to others. However, in ROWI, such personal knowledge 
and information is recorded on the spreadsheet, thereby removing the variability of 
subjective judgment based on memory.  
 
Thus ROWI is a management tool for the cost-effective allocation of local surveyor 
resources to oversight tasks. It uses the analyzed risk level of organizations 
represented as a Capability / Safety Issues ratio. The methodology is compatible with 
the requirement to implement RBO concept, even though the formula used for 
assessing the risk is non conventional.  
 
4.5 Other analytical methods 
Progressing from subjective judgment methods to more objective and quantitative 
methods, it is necessary to mention some generally known risk assessment techniques 
used in industry by design authorities though not seen much in practice in AOC 
Holder, Part M and Part 145 environment.  They are certainly available in theory, 
often presented and discussed at conventions; they are little used by aircraft 
operators even though they are often used by Design Authorities. 
4.5.1 FMEA/FMECA 
In reliability, maintainability and testability analysis a well known technique called 
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is used to determine the consequences of 
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the failure of a system, equipment, component or a process resulting from different 
modes of failure at lower level components.  In aviation entire or parts of systems are 
either multiplicated or multiplexed.  Therefore not all component failures lead to a 
system failure.  However there may be certain components that could not be 
multiplexed for whatever reason and may remain in a critical path.  FMEA facilitates 
the identification of such components.   
Failure Mode Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) which is an extension of FMEA is 
particularly intended to determine the criticality of such components or weak links so 
that they could be designed out or strengthened during the design process.   FMEA/ 
FMECA technique usually starts as a qualitative analysis process, and once critical 
failure modes begin to emerge their level of resolution is increased through 
quantitative analysis.  Where reliability data is available they could be used together 
with statistical methods to arrive at true probability of failures and severity of 
consequences converted to monetary terms, loss of business or prestige, if not to 
casualties.  As a risk assessment tool FMEA/FMECA techniques are incorporated into 
the design of system diagnostic tools.  This is in fact a good example of risk assessment 
in tactical situations; risk is already assessed within the software used in the diagnostic 
equipment before providing information on the details of the system error or defect.  
Netjasov et al (2008)70 discusses several other techniques utilized by Design 
Authorities, as summarized below.  All these techniques follow the generic FMECA 
principles. 
 
4.5.2 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)  
 
This method is used to analyzing events or combinations of events that might lead to a 
hazard or an event which has the potential for a serious consequence. The starting 
points of the tree (principal nodes) are the events in consideration.  The end point is 
the identification of the hazard that may lead to a consequence. There may be 
alternative logical paths through which implications of an error in an event might 
propagate according to rules of combinations, “and” and “or”, through sequential 
stages of the business process under investigation.   The probability of hazard 
occurring is the sum of probabilities of independent paths.   
 
4.5.3 Common Cause Analysis (CCA) 
 
In CCA, a sequence of events that gives rise to an accident is identified.  Major 
equipment or a complex process is divided into zones and components (or individual 
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process activities) and treated independently to determine what common influencing 
factors or causes lead to its failure. 
 
4.5.4 Event Tree Analysis (ETA) 
 
Unlike FTA, where the event is analyzed to detect the hazard, here the sequences of 
events arising from a hazard are traced to determine the critical path that leads to the 
eventual consequence.   
 
4.5.5 Bow Tie Analysis (BTA) 
 
Bow-Tie analysis is a combination of Fault tree Analysis and Event Tree Analysis. One 
half of the "bow” represents FTA; several potential faults might converge into one 
significant hazard at the middle of the bow. This hazard then becomes the origin of 
several potential failure paths that diverge out from the hazard.  One of the paths may 
be more important than the others, either because it brings out final failure during an 
operation, say, in a fewer number of (process) steps, or more rapidly or under lower 
stress conditions.  This then becomes the critical path to final failure.  
 
4.5.6 Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOPS)   
 
This is commercial software that is used for analyzing equipment, plant or a process to 
identify potential hazards and operability problems caused by deviations from its 
original design intent. The deviations arise from equipment malfunctions or operator 
human errors, or any other condition under which the design was based, for example 
extreme hot or extremely cold conditions from what the design was based.  It follows 
FMEA principles, converts subjective judgment to simple linear numeric values, and 
come up with risk factors. 
 
Except the Common Cause Analysis, all other analytical techniques can be quantified, 
provided data is available.  Where data is not available assessment may be based on 
expert opinion (qualitative judgment) which then is quantified using an arbitrary scale 
and look up tables. 
 
Numerous other specialized risk assessment models are available or have been 
published in research papers, most of which use one or more of these techniques in 
combination.   
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Generally all these analytical techniques are used for the prediction of significant 
failures, such as a catastrophic failure of a system such as a chemical plant, refinery, 
nuclear power station, transportation system, or an aircraft.  Naturally, the analytical 
process for the whole system is very protracted, costly, and one needs to know a lot of 
input data on the behaviour of the system, and their failure modes and experimental 
test results.  This type of exercise would be very costly, and is not catered for in this 
study.  However, the availability of techniques has been mentioned as a research 
point to demonstrate different approaches to risk assessment. 
 
4.6 Methods that quantify expert opinion or belief 
 
The remainder of this chapter will now focus on alternative modelling techniques that 
might be capable of redressing weaknesses of conventional risk assessment methods 
and returning a realistic, quantitative output of risk. 
 
Methodologies for risk assessment involving a human element fall into the general 
domain of operational analysis, and more explicitly to decision analysis.   A risk model 
is a tool to help making decisions, and relevant modelling concepts exist in the domain 
of decision theory.  Decision theory is a study of discrete mathematics that models 
human decision making and how real or ideal decision maker makes or if not should 
make decisions.  A risk model that is likely to be accepted by stakeholders of civil 
aviation should be conceptually simple, practical and its methodology transparent. 
 
There are three standard modelling techniques that can convert subjective judgment 
to a quantitative output, as required in this case of risk assessment in continuing 
airworthiness60.  The techniques are: 
 
• Multivariate Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA). 
• Bayesian Belief Networks (BBN). 
• Fuzzy Logic (FL). 
 
Literature survey on safety assessment in civil aviation and other industries, notably 
nuclear and rail also confirm that there are three strong veins running through most of 
the research papers; they too converge on these three modelling techniques.  
 
4.7 Multivariate Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA) 
 
MCDA approach seeks to take explicit account of numerous conflicting criteria that 
affect a situation in aiding decision making.  The principle aims of the technique are to 
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help decision maker explore the problem situation, learn about their own and others 
values and judgments and identify a preferred course of action. 
 
MCDA technique has a number of key elements. First the problem should be 
identified. More often than not it is a decision problem, e.g. to select one course of 
action out of several possible options.  Then the decision maker should be identified, 
together with the alternatives from which one has to be selected. The attributes of 
each option should be identified together with the objectives as well as threshold 
values of the requirement that each option must meet in order to pass. If there are no 
such thresholds, there must be rules for evaluating the performance against attributes 
(or criteria) so that it is possible to discriminate between possible options, e.g. select 
the method that is the simplest to operate and demands the least labour. 
 
The process of applying the technique involves the setting up of a spreadsheet or a 
matrix (Table) of alternatives in columns, and attributes in rows, see Table 4.1.  
Attributes that are essential to the solution are placed at the top half of the matrix 
irrespective of the rank, and other desirable criteria in the bottom half in order of 
importance.  In addition to ranking the desirable attributes, they may be weighted 
according to their importance to the purpose for which a selection is made. 
 
Using the matrix and available information, each alternative’s performance is then 
assessed against each attribute. The performance may be numerically scored 
according to a pre determined scale and weighted.  If there are more than one 
decision maker, then it is normal to seek consensus because the evaluation of 
performance could well have a degree of subjective judgment.  Similarly there should 
be consensus amongst the decision makers about the rules for weighting. 
 
By combining the attribute weights with the scores for each alternative, it is possible 
to produce an overall weighted sum or an average for each alternative.  Obviously any 
alternative that does not meet essential objectives or thresholds are eliminated.  A 
decision may be made by selecting one option from the remainder, which offers the 
best alternative according to the weighted scores. 
 
This technique could be used to assess the relative risk level of a number of approved 
organizations and to rank them, this being the desired solution to the decision 
problem. The alternatives are the approved organizations, and the attributes are the 
criteria on which risk level is evaluated.  In the ROWI model described in Section 4.4 
the attributes are the features that define the size of the operation, capability and 
safety issues.   
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 Alternatives 
Weighting 
AO 
1 Weighted  
Score 
AO 
2 Weighted  
Score 
AO 
3 Weighted  
Score 
AO4 Weight
ed  
Score Attributes Info Info Info Info 
Size of operation  
          
Type of aircraft          
No in fleet          
Role          
No of B1LAE          
No of B2 LAE          
Sectors flown/ yr          
Sectors/ac/day          
Etc ………          
          
          
 
No L1 findings          
No L2 Findings          
ETOPS          
RVSM          
Ac average age          
LAE/ac ratio          
LAE/Managers           
Num MOR           
MOR cleared           
Num MEMS 
recorded  
         
MEMS 
recorded/MEMS 
not cleared 
         
          
          
Etc…          
          
          
          
          
          
Score          
Table 4.1 – Specimen MCDA matrix 
 
In this exercise, if the criteria are well defined and a value can be attributed to it, the 
scoring process becomes easy.  But if some or all of the criteria are unclear and 
attributes could have more than one possibility, or more than one person express 
opinions on what is the correct value to use, then this type of problem solving 
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becomes harder.  Invariably, to handle such situations, MCDA technique has evolved 
into more complex versions incorporating various refinements.   
 
For example, where opinions of more than one expert have to be considered, Delphi 
Technique71, developed by the Rand Corporation in the 1950s, is used to eliciting 
information from a group of people and refining the opinions iteratively until a 
consensus is reached.  Anonymity between participants must be maintained to 
eliminate bias.  If the group is large, statistical measures may be used to assimilate 
and analyze the responses to iterations. Unfortunately this need for opinions from a 
larger group of people makes MCDA somewhat difficult to implement in an industrial 
set up where labour is a premium asset. 
 
 
Table 4.2 – Portion of specimen AHP matrix used to assess Part 147 TO (Source: CAA-NL) 
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A further version incorporating Shang Enquiry72 enables an individual expert to 
express his opinion but relaxes the way he could answer, say with a discrete or 
variable range with a min and a maximum value.  
 
Analytical Hierarchical Process (AHP) or Saaty Technique73, as it is alternatively known, 
allows canvassing opinions from several assessors, weighting of criteria, and pair-wise 
comparison of criteria as a means of eliciting information on the way assessors pace 
importance on the criteria that defines the organization’s behaviour.  A particularly 
good example of MCDA/ AHP technique application can be found in the risk 
assessment method used by NL-CAA. AHP is much more complex process. Table 4.2 
demonstrates part of a specimen matrix used to assess risk of a number of Part 147 
Training Organizations. 
 
MCDA, together with its different advanced versions, is the most popular method 
because people can easily relate to the technique without the necessity for a deep 
theoretical understanding of the subject; it is practical and allows subjective judgment 
to be exercised.  However the drawback is there is a degree of subjectivity when 
assessing performance against those criteria that cannot be defined with numeric 
precision and in determining the weighting to be applied to certain criteria. 
 
4.8 Fuzzy Logic (FL) 
 
Decision making in real life has a degree of vagueness because not all input 
information that contribute to the decision making are precise.  Even though some 
information appears to be precise, they too are subject to continual change.  This 
dynamic nature of states of affairs in the real world, together with the inability to 
know all the conditions that influence the decision, brings about an uncertainty to the 
decision making process.  Therefore it is very common for the decision maker to 
express his decision with an expression of vagueness. Thus on a decision on risk, he 
might say that “given certain conditions, releasing an aircraft to service is unlikely to 
be at risk”.  
 
Mukaidono (2001)74 provides a simple introduction to Fuzzy Logic without formulae.  
Examples of Fuzzy Logic are the people’s behaviour to normally immeasurable physical 
conditions, such as coldness, because it depends on the feeling of the one who 
expresses it. One person’s coldness may be another person’s hotness.  Similarly, a 
person’s sense of bad risk is another person’s good risk and opportunity to make a 
profit.   Judgments expressed in terms of, “unlikely”, “fairly possible”, “highly 
plausible” are ambivalent and indicate mental conflict of uncertainty. In fact, the logic 
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of Fuzzy behaviour can be organized as Fuzzy Logic and represented as a mathematical 
way of handling imprecise concepts involved in subjective judgment and abstract 
expressions of this nature75.   
 
It can be seen that Fuzzy Logic deals with possibility rather than probability, and uses 
approximate reasoning rather than precise, leading to the use of imprecise concepts 
and linguistic expression like, “slightly”, “quite” and “very”.  Coincidentally, the 
qualitative definitions concept used in the risk matrix (see Chapter 3) as 
recommended in ICAO SMS, has many expressions that are in common with those 
convertible to numeric values with fuzzy logic.  
 
In the workings of FL model, for example in a risk model, the imprecise information 
expressed as expert opinion of risk may be converted to mathematical expressions 
and operators (e.g. Boolean logic)76. The conversion is done through a graphical 
representation of the fuzziness (vagueness or imprecision) between the two extremes 
values as a sloping line, whose gradually varying points are read across to a scale 
between 0 and 1, see Figure 4.1.  The varying points represent different degrees of 
vagueness according to the person who is making the judgment.  Thus in a risk 
assessment situation, the subjective judgment could vary from one extreme to having 
“No Risk” to the other extreme “Definite Risk”, and in the intermediate range low risk, 
medium risk or high risk.  The boundaries between low risk and medium risk, or 
between medium and high risk are not clearly defined, as they depend on the 
viewpoint of the decision maker.  
 
Risk
No Risk
Risk 
unlikely
Risk highly 
likely
Moderate 
risk
1.0
0.5
0.0
No Risk
Risk 
unlikely
Risk highly 
likely
 
Figure 4.1 – Representation of vagueness with Fuzzy Numbers 
 
In a process involving a series of engineering task, for instance, the process would 
have to be analyzed task by task to determine each task’s risk contribution, using a 
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standard risk assessment matrix.  If FL is used in that situation, the parameters 
probability of a hazard and severity of consequences that are usually defined 
subjectively in vague terms would have to be converted to Fuzzy numbers. If MCDA or 
AHP technique is used for assessment, then evaluating performance of the 
alternatives against attributes would need Fuzzy numbers if these attributes are 
defined subjectively and with imprecision.  
 
Thus FL requires an entire new range of words and expressions used to define 
measurement of performance against attributes, or to define conditions and 
objectives, all written in Fuzzy Language and their conversion to Fuzzy Numbers.  The 
language has expressions in the Boolean of Logic, e.g. IF X AND Y THEN Z.  The full 
rationale for the derivation of Fuzzy Language and the mathematical analysis of the 
conversion to Fuzzy Numbers is outside the remit of this study but they could be 
studied in standard text books on FL75. 
 
McCarthy et al (1999)77reports on an internationally known research program Flight 
Operations Risk Analysis System (FORAS) in which both AHP and FL concepts have 
been utilized. The objective of FORAS was “to generate a risk model which produces a 
relative, quantitative measurement of a specific risk exposure in flight operations”. 
“The model represents risk factors and their inter-relationships, and to risk.  The 
generic model may be applicable to all situations of flight operations that lead to 
accident, e.g. mid–air collision, CFIT and runway incursion etc.  The method is a 
structured approach to eliciting and representing domain experts' knowledge, and 
then converting it to produce numeric risk outputs, where FL concept comes into play.  
FORAS is a decision support tool to measure and reduce risk exposure”. 
 
In the field of maintenance Hamad (2010)78 has reported on an Aviation Maintenance 
Monitoring Process (AMMP) which models risk associated with helicopter 
maintenance activities in the field.  FL concept has been utilized in the mathematical 
analysis of the model that returns a numeric value of risk, converting subjective 
judgment of domain experts. 
 
4.9 Bayesian Belief Networks (BBN) 
 
Where there is a degree of uncertainty, belief networks enable reasoning to arrive at a 
decision and to solve a real-life problem.  When a belief network utilizes Bayesian 
statistics on mathematical probabilities of events happening or not happening in a 
given population, it is called a Bayesian Belief Network (BBN).   
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BBN is a utility, a statistical tool, which estimates the state of nature of an event when 
the true state of nature is hard to know in the face of uncertainty.  The tool helps a 
manager with decision making, the way it should be done, even though the BBN itself 
will not take the decision for him.  It is the responsibility of the manager to take the 
appropriate decision, first having weighed up the indicator from BBN against all other 
factors, such as financial information, if they are not incorporated into the BBN 
because he wishes to keep them information separately. 
 
The basic concept behind BBN is rooted in Bayesian Statistics, originating from Bayes’ 
Theorem of conditional probability, which was attributed to Reverend Thomas Bayes 
(1702-1761AD). The theorem explains the probability of an event taking place when 
quite separate contributory factors to the event that occur independently turn out to 
have a dependency because they are related through the event.  In this circumstance 
the two factors have a D-Separation, or Dependent Separation, as their relationship is 
defined. D-Separation is explained at Section 4.9.1.  BBN works on this principle. 
 
In modern times, the revival and development of Bayes’ Theorem as a practical tool 
for applications in complex systems has been led by Judea Pearl in the 1970s in his 
research work into artificial intelligence79  A helpful introduction to the topic has been 
made by Jensen (1996)80.  
 
BBN appeals to the realists, because its key feature is that it models cause and effect, 
and it represents a part of the world that exists around us. Since real life events occur 
as part of a chain of events, the downstream events are conditional upon what has 
happened at the preceding upstream point or some other points before that, or 
combinations of them. Therefore there is a conditional probability of the event 
happening, depending on prior probabilities of other events happening elsewhere in 
its causal chain. 
 
In BBN events leading to decisions are initially presented as an Influence Diagrams (ID) 
as they are commonly called, which are in fact a form of causal chains.  These causal 
chains are similar to Event Trees or Fault Trees introduced in Section 4.5.  An ID 
resembles a neural network, where nodes incorporate the states of an outcome that 
was dependent on upstream causes.  A very basic network is at Figure 4.2. Each node 
represents all the states that can exist of the event and their probabilities of 
occurrence.   
 
Nodes are connected by links in a rational manner, according to their relationship in 
the process or system that they represent forming causal chains of events.  The links 
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are called “arcs”, and indicate the dependency between variables, with the arrows 
indicating the direction; the upstream node is the “parent” and the downstream, the 
“child” .  Thus, a causal chain has a direction; nodes have a sequence, and a relevance 
or relationship according to their functionality.  Such a network is called a Directed 
Acyclic Graph (DAG); directed meaning the flow has a specific direction. Being 
“Acyclic” a DAG has no feedback loops, although they allow shunt lines, according to 
the rules of the BBN concept80. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 – A basic Bayesian network 
 
 
The nodes are called the variables in the process system. Embedded within the nodes 
are descriptive and statistical information on the event and its states of nature.  
 
There are two types of nodes: random or chance, and deterministic. For a random 
variable, the probability distribution of output is known for a fixed set of inputs.  A 
deterministic variable (DV) is one which has the same output value for a fixed set of 
input.  DVs are less common than RV. 
 
Most BBNs that provide information to managers may contain only chance or 
deterministic nodes.  Some networks may contain a utility node , or utility node as 
well as a decision node; these are called influence diagrams (ID). 
 
With the mathematical manipulation of information contained in these networks, it 
may be possible to infer other “what-if” information on the behaviour of the overall 
process, or to interrogate what would happen at other nodes that represent upstream 
or downstream events. 
C 
D 
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 F 
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A 
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4.9.1 D-Separation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3 – D-Separation of contributory factors to repair 
 
If two or more naturally independent nodes are connected to an apex (child) node, 
then the parent nodes are considered D-separated if they have a dependence on one 
another on account of the fact that they have a relationship through the child.  
 
For example, consider the situation depicted by Figure 4.3 where a repair has been 
undertaken and that the state of the outcome of the repair has been influenced by the 
state of information presented in the Aircraft Maintenance Manual (AMM), the 
serviceability state of Tools and Test Equipment (TTE) and the state of Knowledge and 
Skills (K&S) of the engineer.  This relationship is represented by the network, where 
the child node represents the state of repair, and the parent nodes represent: 
 
• State of Aircraft Maintenance Schedule  
• State of Tools and Test Equipment, and  
• State of Knowledge and Skills of the engineer. 
 
Each of the 3 parents can have the states, “satisfactory” or “unsatisfactory” 
independent from any of the other two parent states. Each parent contributes to the 
State of Repair, and the only reason they are inter-related is through their 
involvement in the repair process. 
 
Now, assume that initially only two of the three parents are contributing to the repair, 
and  the repair was “unsatisfactory”;  if it was known that AMM’s state was 
“satisfactory”, then that information alone gives us information on the state of Parent 
2 (TTE), that being “most likely, unsatisfactory” in order to give an “unsatisfactory” 
state to the Repair.   Thus, though the two parents were independent and separated 
in their own existence, in this situation they have become dependent; therefore D-
Separation rule applies here.  
 
AMM 
TTE 
K & S 
Repair 
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If the third parent “Knowledge and Skill of the engineer” is now linked to the child, 
then knowledge on one parent leaves 2-possibilities of states on each of the other two 
parents.  And a further knowledge of one of them would enable the 3rd parent’s state 
to be determined. 
 
This dependence separation of parent nodes is an important concept when 
determining causal chains. 
 
4.9.2 Conditional probability 
 
In BBN, computation gives a quantified statistical probability.  Probability may be 
based on statistical data on measurements, observations of actual events taking place, 
or if not on estimations made by experts based on their opinion or judgment.  
 
If the probability so obtained is the “absolute truth” about its probability of happening 
or not happening, is a moot point.  This is because software programs written for 
handling data may have certain techniques incorporated into them so that “zero data” 
could be handled according to the way nature expected. More about this will be said 
later, when it comes to handling data and discussing results.  
 
The other issue that influences “absolute truth” is this: the truth of a situation might 
not be ascertained until all the conditions or prior events have been audited for their 
effect on the situation.  This is correct; but then one might question, how one could be 
sure if all the conditions had been taken into account?   
 
There is in fact no way one could be absolutely sure that all conditions have been 
taken into account.  One could take into account only those in one’s informed 
knowledge, and knowledge is limiting.  To be realistic, one should in fact admit that 
there are more things that one does not know about the world around, than what one 
knows about it.  New information might come to light, later on, but it is not possible or 
practical to wait for the new information to arrive.  Meanwhile one should make the 
best estimate based on information available, and readjust the result once new 
information is known.  BBN allows this flexibility; it calculates for present known 
conditions and allows new data to be input at a later stage when that is known. If 
necessary the BBN structure may have to be modified in response, or leave an 
allowance in the calculation as a safety factor to allow for the unknowns.  
 
To make probability calculations, information about the events that constitute the 
causal chain, which is now the ID, would have to be embodied into the ID.  This 
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embodiment is done at the nodal points of the ID.  There are two types of data 
embodied there.  One is the natural state of the outcome of an event, and the other is 
the probability of that outcome. 
 
As explained before, states of nature at the nodes and probability data may be based 
on observations and measurement of actual events, or judicious estimates based on 
knowledge about the processes.  It might be possible that data for all nodal points 
might not necessarily be available.  In that case, as much nodal points as possible 
should be populated, and the network should then be able to calculate the missing 
information.  But it would work only if the correct logical outcome of events at the 
nodal positions were known and inserted; that is why the fidelity of this operation is 
expert dependent.  
 
Once this embodiment was done, and the missing data were calculated, then the ID 
would have been converted to a BBN, as well as it had been primed with prior 
probabilities of the states of nature at nodal points.  Calculations on the BBN are done 
either manually or digitally on a computer using appropriate software.   
 
4.10 Advantage of BBN over other techniques 
 
The way BBN has been applied in risk assessment attributed to human error will be 
described in detail in the next two chapters.  Here some qualitative statements are 
made by way of an introduction.   
 
BBN was originally intended for use with information on individual beliefs.  But it has a 
unique quality that actual real life data on error observations can be used in the 
model.  Where data is not available, individual beliefs could be substituted to start 
with, but as data begin to arrive, they could be used to replace beliefs.  BBN 
encourages evidence to be recorded in future, to replace subjective assessment with 
evidence, and so to improve the fidelity of the assessment process.   
 
Since BBN technique incorporates proper statistical calculation to determine 
probabilities, it provides a capability to move away from qualitative expression of risk 
and put actual numbers.  This is irrespective of the fact that the probability 
distribution of states of nature at nodes is based on evidence or if not on expert 
opinion. 
 
In fairness, it should be stated that some other techniques such as Fault Tree Analysis 
(FTA) are also amenable to statistical analysis, outputting quantitative values. 
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Unfortunately, in FTA, a complex process such as continuing airworthiness could result 
with a huge table of all probabilities and combinations. In contrast BBN takes only 
those probabilities which are causally dependent, hence enormously reducing the 
computing power requirements.  Any one node will work only with related family, 
“parent-child” nodes. 
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Figure 4.4 – Representation of Conditional Probability Tables for nodes in Figure 4.2 
 
One of the main advantages of BBN over other similar graphical presentations (e.g. a 
decision tree, an event tree or fault tree) is this simplicity.  For example, if each of the 
variables in the above network at Figure 4.2  has four states, then 47 (=16,384) 
probabilities would have to be specified for a fully connected dependent structure, 
whereas only 172 would have to be specified given the conditional independence.  
Figure 4.4 represents the layout of the elements in a Conditional Probability Table 
(CPT) for each node, i.e. A = 4, B=4, C=16, D=16, E=4, F=64, G=64, giving a total 172. 
 
Networks are also adaptable and modified to suit the occasion.  For example, initially 
the net work may be small to cover the known processes and information, but later 
the network can be expanded as experience is gained.  There is also no need to have 
all the knowledge about the process system, as BBN can calculate for nodes where 
data is missing. 
 
The capability to transit from qualitative expression to quantitative is an essential 
research objective for a risk model.  It also encourages stakeholders of civil aviation to 
shift from existing known risk assessment methods to something they were, hitherto, 
less familiar with.   
 
In a people orientated phenomenon such as risk assessment, new methods should be 
introduced with caution.  It is hoped that BBN techniques that provide the gradual 
transition from qualitative to quantitative methods can impart confidence in the 
stakeholder, as the technique is transparent and they can judge if the results are 
meaningful.   
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Given these considerable advantages of BBN over other techniques reviewed in this 
survey, BBN is the obvious choice for the way forward. Vagueness is replaced by 
actual events, error incidents, consequences and their impact; as such there is no 
need to express uncertainty with words; there is a precise statistical probability.  
Therefore BBN surpasses FL or MCDA in providing a more realistic representation of 
the state of uncertainty at any application.  
 
4.11 BBN applications 
 
Artificial intelligence, robotic controllers, medical diagnosis and prediction, and 
control of eco-systems are some domains where BBN are widely used.  In aerospace 
and defence sector, BBN is known to be used in sensor and data fusion, weapons 
effective assessment, defence aids and countermeasures to name a few.   Most 
general research papers that mentioned these applications were prescriptive; they 
were not informative about the way a concept could be converted to a working 
model. 
Those few research papers that predict the possibility of Bayesian techniques in action 
in aviation largely focussed on the application of Bayesian statistics to engineering 
problem solving, which is different from the application of Bayesian Networks. 
 
4.11.1 Un-airworthy despatch   
 
For example, reviewing the causal factors leading to unairworthy despatch of aircraft 
after maintenance, Patankar et al (2003)81 had utilized Bayesian statistics to determine 
the relationship between consequences, types of error and causal factors.  
 
He has looked into some 937 incidents on aircraft from US civil aviation, reported to 
FAA during the period from 1996 to 2000, of which approximately 40% fell into the 
category of maintenance error incidents.  His analysis brought out 11 different 
categories of consequences, 11 maintenance error types and 25 potential causal 
factors.  Prior probabilities were calculated, and then, the bias of causal factors was 
determined given that a specific consequence has occurred.  
 
 In this Patankar et al was using Bayesian Techniques as a diagnostic tool for the 
prediction of most likely causal factors, given that a certain flight consequence has 
occurred.  For example, the lack of awareness was 22 per cent of documentation 
errors, whereas documentation errors were 33 per cent of all non-airworthy 
dispatches.  Similarly poor procedures contributed to 4.1 per cent.  Patankar used 
straightforward Bayes’ Theorem and a basic custom design computer program to 
91
speed up calculations. There was no indication as to why more sophisticated BBN 
software was not used, as they were available in the market during that period.   
 
Again Patankar’s study was based on incidents reported by different airlines in 
isolation, and in relation to the overall incidents that occurred in the civil aircraft 
operators throughout the US.  For this reason, they cannot be used to measure the 
integrity of any one airline, and hence is not practicable as a management tool though 
it gives an indication of the general state of health in US civil aviation regarding 
dispatch of aircraft considered unairworthy due to the presence of maintenance 
errors. 
 
4.11.2 Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) 
 
Another application, this time of BBN rather than Bayesian statistics, has been cited in 
a paper by Sahin et al (2007)82. This is a highly analytical paper describing a tailor-
made, specialized Bayesian Network called distributed Particle Swarm Optimization 
(PSO) that utilizes performance data from an airplane engine to determine the 
incidence of error in its performance.  Thus, PSO is a diagnostic tool that can be used 
to predict engine faults.  Part sponsored by Honeywell Inc, Minneapolis, USA, a 
reputed Design Authority for aircraft and engine instrumentation systems; this 
research may be in support of a future engine real time health monitoring. Engine 
fault diagnosis equipment such as those used on Digital Engine Control Unit (DECU) for 
application in a maintenance environment is an alternative application. 
 
The key issue discussed in the paper is learning the structure of the network from 
multitudes of sensor data coming from the engine. It is a highly academic paper that 
dwells on programming of software, data handling and in depth structural learning 
from data issues.  The authors claim that, within the remit of their research study, 
they have successfully implemented a fault diagnosis technique for airplane engines. A 
network with the best inference BN generated by their PSO software has been 
presented in the paper.   
 
4.11.3 Aviation System Risk Model (ASRM) 
 
A more relevant application of BBN to forecast error probability in maintenance has 
been developed by Luxhoj (2002)83.  He demonstrates an Aviation System Risk Model 
(ASRM) based on a BBN at its root level. 
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The scenario set for this paper is aircraft maintenance.  The network at the heart of 
the ASRM represents the key influencing factors for a repair process of a maintenance 
organization and its outcome. The BBN maps the Reason Model1, identifying factors 
that are attributable to the organization, task and its environment, individuals at 
workface and finally to the final outcome of the process and consequence of error, if 
any.  It is a simple model with only 14 nodes, whose architecture is based on learning 
specific accident case histories and the reversed engineering of causal chains.   
 
Thus, in generic form, ASRM represents the interrelationship between errors, 
consequences and causal factors, which has been matched to a Bayesian Belief 
Network.   Causal chains indicate that root causes may lie, not necessarily at the 
individual work face alone, but equally on errors in task definition, in organization or 
in combinations i.e. obeying the concept of Reason Model. 
 
ASRM can be used to quantify the risk level existing at various nodal point of the 
network in response to a variable input.  The risk level is the probability of the 
intended resulting consequence.  Provided that some of the probabilities of such 
upstream states or events could be estimated for some of the constituent Nodes (or 
states) of the model, then the final outcome of the consequences could be computed.   
In this model risk is defined in terms of the probability that a certain failure could 
happen (this being the consequence) if upstream airworthiness activities or network 
elements were found to be faulty or erroneous. 
 
The model has been validated using data collected from a repair/production facility 
for a major component of the aircraft empennage structure.   He has used data from 
16 case studies of the same type of components, undergone repairs in the production 
line of a repair organization. 
 
Other papers by Luxhoj84 covered the same principle and were further illustrations of 
relationship between various causal factors, sources and risks  
 
The principal strength of Luxhoj’s technique is that it demonstrates a possible 
methodology for quantifying and computing causal factors and consequences in 
aviation applications.   Once a network was set up it can be used repetitively and with 
ease. 
 
Luxhoj sets a good precedence to follow in relation to BBN as a powerful risk analysis 
technique.  However details of the rationale for the design of the model, the design, 
construction, data collection and data handling aspects of the model were missing 
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from his research papers, making this line of enquiry an interesting research 
challenge. 
 
4.12 Preferred modelling concept 
 
This study has considered circumstances under which risk is assessed in CAW of air 
transport, i.e. tactical level, strategic level and at regulatory oversights.  It has also 
examined risk assessment techniques ranging from the traditional subjective methods 
to various theoretical concepts. 
 
The study found that the variability of conditions at workface, unexpected or 
unplanned situations, time pressure together with business objectives make the 
expert human operator the best medium for assessing risk at tactical level. They may 
be supported with pertinent information from system diagnostic tools, into which real 
time equipment reliability and risk models have been integrated.   
 
Assessing risk as part of CAW management process, a model might be of help if it has 
already been either programmed to cover all known conditions or has flexibility to 
adopt to change.  Moreover, reviewing the two industrial requirements, i.e. 
implementation of SMS and application of RBO of Regulatory compliance, it is clear 
that a model designed for strategic level applications would best serve both 
requirements. 
 
Each of the three modelling methods from Decision Theory, i.e. MCDA, FL and BBN, 
could give quantitative outputs, but it is only BBN that could return a statistical 
probability.  Other two methods return quantities that are simply yardsticks for 
measuring risk; they may be useful for making comparisons as relative numbers, but 
they do not convey the true meaning of risk as a statistical probability of a 
consequence.   
 
Risk values returned by BBN are absolute values and have a practical significance, and 
should be more meaningful to an Accountable Manager. That, together with the 
greater accountability and transparency of the logic, the way risk level decisions are 
arrived, and above all the simplicity of technique above FL, makes BBN the preferred 
concept for the risk model. 
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Chapter Five 
Methodology 
 
5.1 General outline 
 
Despite conceptual research studies by Luxhoj83, 84 BBN appeared to have made little 
progress into aviation applications. It seems that not enough has been done to 
convince the safety experts of high level organizations such as ICAO that set the 
direction of international civil aviation safety policies on the merits of BBN as a risk 
assessment modelling concept. The industry’s reticence to acknowledge BBN might 
have been partly due to the lack of research data bridging the gap between a pure 
concept and a practical application, and partly due to the natural doubts and 
objections to new ideas coming from the traditionalists.   
 
In this backdrop, the research work described in this thesis serves as the bridging link 
between the concept and an industrial application. Table 5.1 highlights the principal 
differences between ASRM and CAW Risk Model. 
  
ASRM CAW Risk Model 
Conceptual and academic, 
exploring the potential for BBN, 
thus subjective.  Papers devoid of 
methodology. 
Adaptation of the concept for an industrial application, thus objective.  
Methodology derived from first principles.  Provides a fully traceable 
methodology, design algorithms and a progressive guide. 
Scope of the model limited to one 
specific engineering task.  Tested 
and validated using few human 
error cases on the same 
component. 
Scope much wider scale.  Model covers an extensive CAW process involving 
multitude of tasks, different aircraft, personnel and a range of CAW related 
organizations, error sources ranging from the workface to global influences.  
Heuristic approach.  Tested, and validated using field data representing a 
wider population of error sources. 
Fixed form architecture 
Generic in order to make the model and technique suitable for universal 
application, yet flexible enough to adapt it to specific organizations.  
Modular construction to enable add-on or truncation.  
Low resolution dictated by small 
number of nodes and causal 
factors. Simple model. 
High resolution. Large number of nodes and causal factors. Complex model. 
No information on data 
requirement and handling 
Investigated data requirements, collecting data and data handling. 
Applicability left open. 
More appropriate for risk assessment at strategic level. 
Potential for adaption in other specialist areas of civil aviation: flight 
operations, airfield management and ATM 
Table 5.1 – Comparing ASRM and CAW Risk Model 
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The CAW Risk Model’s strengths, limitations and the research study’s contribution to 
knowledge are described in Section 10.6 to Section 10.9. 
 
5.2 Methodology overview 
 
The methodology adopted can be perceived from two aspects.  
 
• First, the high level perception that dealt with the general approach to the 
problem solving and how to reach the project objectives.   
 
• The second is a closer perception with better resolution, of the detailed 
methodology employed in the design of the model.  This is the core task.  It has 
been further explained in a subset. 
 
There is a much deeper third-level to the methodology but it will be discussed in 
Chapter Six in the design of the model, where it is more appropriate when handling 
detailed modelling issues.   
 
5.3 High level perception 
 
In the high level perception, the project objective was considered along with potential 
technical solutions to determine if a solution is feasible from existing knowledge, 
expertise, precedence and resources.  If not what other new directions are available 
and ought to be explored. 
 
Identify the decision 
situation and understand 
objectives
Identify alternatives
Decompose and model the problem
•Model of problem structure
•Model of uncertainty
•Model of preferences
Choose the best alternative
Sensitivity analysis
Is further analysis needed
Implement the chosen alternative
No
Yes
 
Figure 5.1 – General problem solving methodology 
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This preliminary research phase identified air transport industry requirements as well 
as potential risk assessment concepts, matching one of the concepts against one of 
the requirements from which an application was found. This phase was undertaken 
through literature research, studying the practical and political aspects of the 
industrial scenario whilst undergoing the industrial attachment. 
 
This phase followed the general problem solving method outlined in Figure 5.1, as per 
Clemen85, and slightly modified.  The flow diagram was a good guide  
 
Figure 5.2 represents the overview of the project by the time the study has progressed 
up to the point of selecting a modelling concept. Section 1.6 and Figure 1.2 outlined 
the activities and methodology for arriving at this point.  
 
 
Figure 5.2 - General approach to the selection of a modelling concept 
Key: AHP Analytical Hierarchical  Process, BBN Bayesian Belief Networks FL Fuzzy Logic, 
FO Flight Operations, ATC Air Traffic Control, CAW Continuing Airworthiness, AF Air 
Field Management AT Air Transport 
 
In Figure 5.2, CAW is recognized as one of four essential operations that uphold flight 
safety, the others being high integrity of Flight Operations (FO), Air Traffic Control 
(ATC) and Air Field (AF) environments. Full flight safety could be assured only if risk is 
either eliminated or reduced to a tolerable level in all four areas. 
 
In this study the CAW aspect has been singled out for investigation, to determine how 
its contribution to the total risk could be assessed.  The initial design, a generic model, 
was expected to demonstrate the validity of the application of the model in a CAW 
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environment.  With this objective uppermost, the model was tailored to accept CAW 
process related error data without sacrificing its generic nature of the structure.   
 
Having surveyed relevant literature, current risk assessment practices and alternative 
methods, the field of potential concepts has been narrowed down to three, namely: 
MCD/AHP, FL or BBN.  Their analysis and evaluation against industry requirement has 
led to the selection of BBN as the concept that best fits industry’s foreseen risk 
assessment needs, as perceived by this study. 
 
In high level perception, as represented in Figure 5.3, it was envisaged that the 
concept proven model in CAW environment could be used as a guide to developing 
risk models in other areas.  It was assumed that: 
 
• The nature of people employed in flight operations, ATC and air field services 
management is no different to those handling CAW processes when it comes 
to making errors in industrial settings. 
 
• The relevant specialist processes could be decomposed to events and states of 
nature, similar to the way they were decomposed in CAW processes.  BBN 
theory already acknowledges this possibility for any process.   
 
 
Figure 5.3 – Evolution of variations from a generic model 
This extended research for the evolution of variations was not undertaken within the 
remit of this research program, but left as a topic for future research. 
 
In the high level perception, once a concept was selected, detailed analytical work 
followed into model design phase.  The end of Chapter Four defines this demarcation 
98
line. The preceding high level perception of the methodology is given by way of 
orientating the reader into the overall plan. 
 
The next major task from this point onwards was to develop the generic risk model 
and then to take the model forward through testing and then validating in the field.  
All this work was implemented though several distinct work packages, i.e. design 
analysis, model design, testing the model and validation, undertaken in Year 2 and 
Year 3 respectively (Figure 5.4). 
 
 
Figure 5.4 – Work packages and flow process to validation  
 
5.4 Intermediate level perception for model design 
The model design was a very complex process; an intermediate level overview of the 
methodology adopted is shown in Figure 5.6.  It is one way to get to the objective.  
There may be other ways and future researchers need not necessarily follow this 
method every time.  
 
The analysis phase constituted establishing the relationships between Bayesian 
concepts, CAW process activities and defences against malpractices of operation 
enforced by Regulation.  The phase involved Bayesian learning, learning CAW 
processes and Regulation. 
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Figure 5.5 - Model design flow process 
 
5.4.1 Learning Bayesian Networks 
 
A fundamental requirement is to gain a good working knowledge of the Bayesian 
Theory, initially statistics and afterwards its relevance to BBN.  At the end of this 
learning process one should have gained a capability to design a BBN, though at this 
stage it may not have been advanced to a point that there is a BBN solution to the 
problem.  The solution came later. 
 
Other analytical processes are briefly outlined below. 
 
5.4.2 Analysing CAW processes 
 
• Decomposition of CAW process network identifying relevant approved 
organizations (AO) and EASA regulations applicable to them. 
 
• Representing risk contribution from each organization in an overall high 
level Influence Diagram (ID) that represents the problem to be solved. 
 
5.4.3 Relating CAW elements to BBN 
 
• Considering how hazards that exist in CAW processes and defended by 
regulation could be related to a BBN. 
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• Considering what data to be used, where they would come from, and 
having done that, then defining data requirement and setting up data 
collection process. 
 
• Reconciling differences between root-cause causal chains with what is 
currently achievable in civil aviation. 
 
As to definition of data, elements of the model were identified and defined as 
parameters against which data to be collected. Relevant information was researched 
through literature survey, canvassing subject expert opinion, and complemented with 
the researcher’s prior knowledge and professional experience in this subject.  
 
Figure 5.6 outlines broad areas from which parameters for the model were selected.  
The flowing arrows represent the matrix structure where hazards and risks, their 
causal factors exist through the organization, engineering practices, and workface.  In 
order to comply with regulation, the process should be defended against hazards; if 
the defences either succeed or fail there would be consequences.   
 
. 
Figure 5.6 – Types of data contributing to the model design 
 
At a much detailed level, the model designer must obtain knowledge of hazards and 
risks that exist at all levels of CAW processes as well as in associated external entities 
that provide logistic support to the operators.  Details are required of causal factors 
for human error, contributing factors, interventions and consequences.  These are the 
main data requirements.  Simply, information that defines the conditionality of an 
error or non error event and its outcome constituted the data. 
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But the data cannot be meaningfully utilized, or organized without a detailed 
knowledge of their relationship to all other factors, as represented in Figure 5.5 at 
intermediate level.  The required knowledge can best be gained by experience.  
Otherwise a researcher would have to resort to canvassing the support of a subject 
expert who is familiar with research work, so that he has the patience and curiosity to 
harmonize with the researchers objectives. Luxhoj83, 84 too had recommended that a 
researcher who is unfamiliar with the subject should obtain a subject expert’s 
technical support before and during the data gathering stage and its interpretation.   
 
5.4.4 Design and construction of a model 
 
This phase involved the following activities, details of which will be described in 
Chapter Six: 
 
• Reviewing user requirement, e.g. wish-list criteria, and determining 
how the model could be designed to satisfy user needs. 
 
• Reviewing other relevant risk assessment methods in order to learn 
lessons (or patterns) from them. 
 
• Synthesizing information from the overall net to design a model. 
 
5.4.5 Test and validation 
Once the model was designed, then it should be loaded with data for testing and 
validation, Figure 5.7.  Figure 5.6 already indicated that data may be gathered 
according to a pre-determined structure, and would come from industry.  If data is not 
available, then the researcher might have to redefine data requirement.     
An alternative form is to simulate the data but, to do this, one needs prior information 
on types of errors and error occurrence profile, not necessarily with precession but in 
broad terms.  The model should be tested with data to confirm that it could be 
uploaded and compiled, to confirm that the model can accept data without any 
hindrances.  
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Figure 5.7 – Advance phases of the project  
 
A primed model yields prior probability of error, which can be updated with new 
information to obtain posterior probabilities.  Sensitivity analysis could be conducted 
on the model to obtain further information on the behaviour traits of organizations.  
As part of the model design and verification process, the model should be tested at 
these progressive stages, before declaring the model as successful.  This concludes the 
high-level and intermediate level perception of the methodology. 
5.5 A final word on the design methodology 
The eventual design for the model was a heuristic solution, i.e. one that evolved 
through a process of numerous trials to represent all the foregoing factors in one 
design.  There was no reference standard to quote that could be emulated for this 
part of the design process.  In fact it will be seen in Chapter 6 on Model Design that 
authorities of this topic, BBN for Decision Analysis, such as Clemen85 has 
acknowledged that there is no standard guide to the arriving at a BBN solution to a 
problem, though there are certain disciplines that need to be satisfied in justifying the 
solution.  This is because every problem is unique, and naturally there could well be 
more than one possible solution to a problem.      
In this research study, the main challenge was how to represent the CAW process to 
derive a risk, and then how the entire phenomenon could be related to a BBN.  This 
was based on vision on how they work together, not gained first time, or on a 
particular day. It was the outcome of contemplation on various ideas unsuccessfully, 
and then suddenly one’s vision penetrates through the problem and one sees dawn 
rising through the darkness.  Then one realizes that the problem has been solved.   
Thus the solution is part the result of experimentation with different ideas, part 
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intuition but the vision of an integrated model attributed to contemplation over the 
problem. 
5.6 Bayesian learning 
 
As one of the underpinning concept for the methodology, the remainder of this 
chapter is dedicated to establishing the relevancy of Bayesian Belief Networks to 
safety risk.  Comprehension of this relationship is in itself part comprehending the 
methodology for the design of the model.  
 
5.6.1 Fundamental problem to be resolved 
 
The fundamental question was “how could one predict the chance of an incident 
occurring due to the presence of several inter-related process errors in a complex 
system?”   
 
The relationship between errors and incidents has been postulated by James Reason86, 
87 utilizing the “Swiss-Cheese” model to demonstrate how system error could occur.  
The model illustrates that if multiple errors lined up and critical defences failed to cut 
in on time, then the integrity of the overall system could be undermined and the 
system could fail. 
 
 
Figure 5.8 – Errors line-up in Swiss-Cheese analogy 
 
The CAW process with inherent errors is analogous to a Swiss-Cheese with holes, 
where exposed holes represent active errors and hidden holes represent dormant or 
latent errors. Usually the CAW process performs satisfactorily as it was intended 
according to Regulation, as people that operate this system adhere to industry best 
practices, providing its robustness.  Yet, following the natural human trait of making 
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occasional mistakes, errors and omissions do occur in the process system as relatively 
rare but unpredictable occurrences.   
Safety factors built into the design of an aircraft tolerate these errors to some extent.  
In addition, recognizing the possibility of error, specific defences have been built into a 
CAW process, which hopefully would recognize an upstream error and correct it 
before it or its effects migrate through the system and transferred to the end product.  
It is the industry best practices, safety factors and defences built into the process that 
prevent accidents. 
Occasionally however, defences get omitted, ignored, removed or overridden by 
people who operate or manage the system.  Alternatively, it may be that a defence 
had not been provided due to limitation of knowledge at the time or the need for 
defence was overlooked despite what was thought to be thorough planning.  Given 
these conditions, if errors lined up, a hazard could penetrate the system that would 
undermine the integrity of the end product.  
5.7 Bayesian Theory 
The above analogy enables us to pose a question as a statistical enquiry, i.e. “What is 
the statistical probability of one or more errors lining up to cause an incident or, if not, 
to undermine the integrity of the overall system?” 
 
Figure 5.9 – Errors line-up in Swiss-Cheese analogy 
 (Source: Canadian Transportation Board) 
 
This study considered the possibility that the statistical explanation to the analogy of 
Swiss-Cheese might be rooted in the Bayesian Statistical Theory of conditional 
probability80. 88. 
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Assume that two cheeses slices represent two sequential layers, A and B (e.g. error in 
line management and an unsafe act – see Figure 5.9) of activities in a process system 
and the open and hidden holes representing visible and dormant errors present at 
these layers.  Now consider the probabilities of these respective errors being present, 
and the probability of them lining up.  Line up can occur if error in layer B moves to a 
certain position given error in layer A has already got there; this incorporates 
conditionality.  
Given two errors with different probabilities P(A) and P(B)  occurring independently in 
a system, it is possible to predict the probability of both occurring simultaneously, as: 
P(A and B) = P(A) x P(B) …………………… 5.1 
P(A) and P(B) being independent are called “marginal probabilities”.   
In an incident resulting from a system error, error sequence may occur in 2 stages.  
First error A occurs, and given A had occurred then error B occurs.  Both error A and 
error B must be present for the incident to occur, but conditional upon one occurring 
first. The probability of A and B occurring together in the sequence with this condition 
is: 
P(A and B) = P(A) x P(B l A)  ………………..  5.2 
P(B l A) is the “conditional probability” of B occurring, in this case, given A had 
occurred. 
Within the system A and B together could also occur in different ways, namely B first, 
and then A.  Then,  
P(A and B) = P(B) x P(A I B) ………………. 5.3 
Since P(A and B) is the same in each case (Equations 5.2 and 5.3) could be rewritten as 
follows: 
P(A) x P(B I A) = P(B) x P(A I B) …………   5.4 
from which a formula could be derived: 
P(A I B) = [P(A) x P(B I A)] / P(B) …………  5.5 
This expression could be represented in the following network at Figure 5.10, given 
two prior conditions and a new posterior condition. 
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Figure 5.10 – Conditional probability – Single element 
 
In a process system, this could be equated to a probability of errors occurring 
independently in an Event A in one part of the system, and an error occurring 
independently in another Event B in another part of the same system.  The 
independent marginal probabilities are called “prior probabilities”. 
If within the system, Event B influences Event A through their interconnectivity, then a 
dependency has been set in the overall process.  The error probability at the outcome 
of the interconnectivity can be computed as P(A I B) which is interpreted as the 
probability of error A given error B.  This conditional probability is called “posterior 
probability”. 
This joint error probability is in fact the probability that the two errors from A and B 
could line up causing a system weakness. 
 
Error B
Prior probability
P(B)
Error A
Prior probability
P(A)
Error A , B and C
Posterior probability
P(A | B, C)
Error C
Prior probability
P(C)
Error A and B
Previous - Posterior 
New – Prior
P(A | B)
 
 
Figure 5.11 – Conditional probability – Multiple elements 
 
If the process network has multiple interconnected tasks, then the error probability at 
each downstream node could be thus evaluated using this method.  The upstream 
Error B
Prior probability
P(B)
Error A
Prior probability
P(A)
Error A and B
Posterior 
probability
P(A |B)
107
posterior probability becomes a new prior probability, and the downstream node 
becomes the new posterior. Figure 5.11 illustrates this new situation.  
 In a complex network, the pattern could be repeated until all events that need to be 
taken into account are exhausted.  Thus in a chain of events containing errors, the 
probability of error at the most downstream node represents the aggregate 
conditional probability of error of the interconnected network of events. 
The aggregate probability of error, in this 3 events chain of A, B and C then becomes: 
 
P(A I B, C) = [P(C I A, B) x P(A I B)] / P(C I B) ……………..  5.6 
• P(A I B, C) is probability of error in A given  error in B and error in C had occurred. 
• P(C I A, B) is probability of error in C, given error in A and error in B, i.e. this being the 
same as probability at the interconnecting node between A and B, i.e. P(A|B). 
• P(A I B) is the new prior probability, whereas it was the previous (upstream) posterior  
probability. 
• P(C I B) is the probability of error C occurring, given error in B.  
 
Even though there is no direct connection between C and B, their relationship exists 
through the terminating node to which C feeds in as well as B feeds in via the previous 
posterior.  
This relationship could be repeated for a continuous chain of events, which can be 
extended as new information (or new events) becomes available.   
Returning to Equation 5.5 above, conditional probability calculated with this formula is 
somewhat biased when it is applied to a selected sample of events A and B where 
errors were known to have occurred.  The bias is there, because error in event B could 
be associated with other events which are “NOT A” and these have not been 
accounted for.  Therefore to remove this bias, the probability of error occurring in 
event B should be related to the whole population of events in a group which are both 
“A” events and “NOT A” events.  
An example of such a situation is given in Figure 5.12. 
A surveyor wishes to determine the significance of “Document Error “on incidents that 
occur in his organization.  As error events and incidents are monitored at this 
operator, the surveyor takes the statistics for failed sectors and determines how many 
of those sectors have had human error due to document error.  
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Figure 5.12 – Removing bias by accounting for all similar errors 
 
Given these data, if he makes an estimate based on incident data only, then he would 
be making an unfair estimate of the probability of “Document Error” contributing to 
incidents in the operator’s fleet. This is because there could well have been Document 
Errors induced human error in some of the other sectors flown that had not failed.  
Therefore to make a fairer estimate, he should take into account other sectors that 
had not failed, in which “Document Error” induced human errors were known to have 
occurred yet the sector had not failed.   
The following analytical approach to the probability calculation ensures that bias is 
eliminated.  In this example: 
• P(B) = Marginal probability of Document Error 
• P(B|A) = Probability of document error, given probability that Sectors had Failed. 
• P (A) = Probability of Sector Failed. 
• P(B|Not A) = Probability of Document Error, given Sectors had Not failed. 
• P(Not A) = Probability of Sectors not failed 
 
In order to perform the correct calculation the previous expression for the term P(B) 
has been modified to give: 
 
P(B) = [P(B I A) x P(A)] + [P(B I Not A) x P(Not A)] …………….  5. 7 
This is the probability of error B occurring in the whole population, i.e. the sum of 
probability of error B occurring in those events A where there are errors, and the 
probability of error B occurring in events other than A. If “A” represents Sectors Failed, 
then “Not A”, Sectors Not Failed.  
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Although the “Not A” events may have a relevance to B events (i.e. Document Errors) 
either on its own or by lining up with another error, “Document Errors” in this 
proportion of sectors had not led into any incidents. This point should be borne in 
mind when considering data from a practical environment, which will be input to an 
eventual model. 
Equation 5.5 can now be re-written to represent the unbiased situation. 
P(A I B) = [P(B I A) x P(A)] / [P(B I A) x P(A)] + [P(B I Not A) x P(Not A)] ……..  5.8 
The denominator contains the sum of two probabilities, these being the joint 
probability P(B and A) plus the joint probability P(B and Not A).  It can be seen that P(B 
and A) is in fact the  numerator of the right hand part of the original Equation 5.5. 
Thus the left hand side of the equation which is P(A given probability B) is the ratio of 
joint probability P(B and A) divided by the sum of joint probabilities of (B and A) and (B 
and Not A). 
Similarly, Equation 5.6 can be re-written as: 
P(A I B, C) = [P(C I A,B) x P(P(A I B)]/ [P(C I A,B) x P(A I B)] + [P(C I Not  A, B) x P(Not A I B)] ..5. 9 
It follows from there, that the generic equation for probability A of a series of 
mutually exclusive events, B1, B2, B3.... Bn, (i = 1 to n), can be written as: 
P(A) = ∑ P(A|Bi). P(Bi)𝑛𝑖=1  ..................... 5.10 
The derivation of the formula appears to make this analysis un-necessarily 
complicated, when it is quite simple to estimate P(B) from the base data, simply by 
putting numbers and undertaking a manual calculation. In fact, that is so, but if the 
manual calculation had to be done several thousand times, even millions, as it would 
be required in an industrial process setting, then it would not be efficient to do it 
manually. The simple analysis explains how to derive the formula that could be used in 
a computer program later. 
Now, returning to the relevance of Bayes’ theorem to the phenomenon of alignment 
of errors, the statistical expression (Equation 5.8) could be better visualized with a 
Venn- Diagram given in Figure 5.13.  The Venn diagram is similar to stacking slices of 
Swiss cheese to see which holes line up.  
In Figure 5.13 where the P(AIB) is the size of the intersection of the 2-subsets Event A 
Sectors Failed and Event B Document Errors, expressed as probability, i.e. the 
probability of Document Errors featuring in Sectors that Failed.  The outer ellipse 
represents the total population subject to the survey: i.e. All sectors flown where 
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some sectors had errors and failed, while a larger proportion might have had errors 
but not failed. Of those Not Failed, some had Document Errors, but did not make 
Sectors Fail.  
 
Figure 5.13 - Venn diagram of Event A and Event B 
 
Although the mathematics and visualization turned out to be relatively simple up to 
this point, in real life conditions the situation is more complicated.   
For example, a network representing CAW process could contain several scores of 
nodes simulating significant events of the process, depending on the resolution 
required.   Moreover, each event (or node) may contain several causal factors or if not 
management information. 
In reality, Event A (Sectors Failed) could have been caused by more than one type of 
human error, attributed to different causal factors, thus giving an error distribution.  
This is similar to the cheese slice having X1 number of holes of diameter D1, X2 holes 
of diameter D2 etc until Xn holes of diameter Dn.  The same situation would apply to 
Event B.  The problem that has to be solved then becomes extremely complicated: 
which type of error in Event A would line up with, what other type of error in Event B, 
and Event C and so on, and what is the probability of that occurring?  
It follows from the foregoing that the CAW process could be represented as a series of 
multivariate probability distribution curves, each simulating a different event.  Such a 
family of curves could define one set for prior conditions, and another set define the 
posterior in response to a new input, given there was a prior distribution.  This type 
distribution is known as Dirichlet Distribution80, 89 which being three-dimensional 
resembles a “hay stack”.   
All sectors flown. Intercept is sectors 
failed due to document  error
Sectors flown 
with Document 
Error - Event B
Sectors failed -
Event A
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 Figure 5.14 – Dirichlet distribution 
(Source: en-image:Dirichlet_distributions.png  - Wikipedia) 
 
Figure 5.14 is an example of a set of different probability distributions of Dirichlet’s 
form. Relating to a Bayesian Net, X-Y axes define the State of Nature and Probability 
Density of variables respectively and Z axis define the variation of events (or different 
nodes).   The sharpness of the peaks indicate where the mass of the distribution is 
concentrated, sharper the peak, greater the concentration.  Distribution of priors from 
a large sample size/ population tends to display sharper peaks, whereas small sample 
sizes/population returns a flat distribution. 
 
This research study has not gone into an analysis of advanced statistical theories on 
which the current knowledge of Bayesian Theory is based, and instead focused on the 
application of the concept through Bayesian Belief Networks, this being the main 
objective of this research program.  
5.8 Handling Bayesian Formula in practice  
Returning to the formula derived above, if 5 events each containing 20 potential error 
sources simultaneously interact with another sixth event (i.e. in parallel), then they 
could generate 205 = 3.2M combinations for which conditional probabilities would 
have to be calculated.  The formula can get very complicated indeed, the amount of 
computation, organizing and storing the data manually becomes humanly impractical.  
Such work is best suited to a computer.  Invariably a computer would have to be used 
together with appropriate software.  Commercial off-the-shelf software packages are 
available that could do this work.   
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The demonstration at Fig 5.12 also underscores an apparent weakness in expert 
systems based on experience.  That is, there is a general tendency amongst experts to 
remember and bring forward failures and to ignore situations where errors might 
have happened and successfully defended.  
It is quite understandable if an expert is cautious in his subjective judgment but, in 
fairness, due credit should be given to a defended system where errors might have 
been detected and defended.  This is one reason that all data from one-organization 
should be examined in determining risk, and that data should represent both error 
incidences and non-error performance.   Obviously this example highlights the 
advantage of maintaining records of errors and sectors flown even if the error did not 
fail the sector, as it is generally known in the profession for defended system. 
5.9 Bayesian Belief Network 
Given that a CAW process system may contain several hundred events, the entire 
process may be represented by a complex network  where the configuration of nodes 
similar to those in Figures 5.10 and Figure 5.11 may constitue the primary elements.  
The nodes are assembled in a rationale manner; the causal chain has a direction 
indicated by linked arrows, and its nodes have a sequence, and a relevance or 
relationship according to their functionality. However the path cannot have feed-back 
loops, making this network a directed acyclic graph (DAG). 
Embedded within the nodes in the network are descriptive and statistical information 
on the event and its states of nature. Such a network of nodes that has been uploaded 
with statistical data then becomes a BBN.  With the mathematical manipulation of 
information contained in these networks, it may be possible to infer other “what-if” 
information on the behaviour of the overall process, or to interrogate what would 
happen at other nodes that represent upstream or downstream events. 
The design of BBN will be discussed in detail in Chapter Six.  At this point a simple 
introduction and prcatical use of a BBN is made. 
5.10 BBN commerical software packages 
Commercial BBN software packages are available which faciliate the design of a BBN 
and undertake the computation of probabilities as well as numerous other associated 
tasks.  
Two different software packages were considered for this study, NETICA and Genie 
and Smile. 
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NETICA is marketed by NORSYS Corporation of Canada, and is commercially 
supported. The other system GENIE & SMILE has been produced by Decision Systems 
Laboratory of Pittsburgh University, USA.  The latter has no commercial support 
arrangement, though it is supported by a “blog-based” website.  Genie is understood 
to be more user-friendly and has more features to improve its presentation capability.   
However based on feedback from other user experience, certain desirable technical 
features, low cost and reliable support, NETICA was selected.  NETICA’s scope and full 
range of capabilities could be found in NETICA User’s Guide90. 
5.11 BBN worked example using NETICA software 
 
Although NETICA is a known, well proven and widely used commercial software 
package, being commercially confidential proprietary material, its algorithm and 
computer codes were not available to the customer.  Therefore some test runs were 
done to gain confidence on if the program returned the same results as that is 
obtainable from manual calculations.  One of the tests is described below. 
5.11.1 Setting 
 A BBN was drawn up to represent a simple 2-part maintenance activity: an inspection 
and a follow up defence, i.e. an independent oversight of the maintenance task.   
Results from 10 separate operations were uploaded and compiled in to the network, 
to obtain prior probabilities at each node of the network.  Later the network was used 
to conduct inferences, i.e. predictions, given set evidence at selected variable 
parameters, together with recording of responses at other parameters, e.g. 
probability of error at the outcome for a given set of conditions.  Each of these 
conditions can be regarded as evidence of posterior probabilities in response to new 
inputs, given prior conditions. 
Response values were then examined to see if they fit in with the predicted values 
using Bayes’ Formula, manually. 
The test cases were run and the results matched the figures obtained long-hand, 
confirming that NETICA software is a good representation of the calculations from first 
principles.  This produced a satisfactory result.  Details of the demonstration and 
manual calculations are presented below.  
5.11.2 Details 
 
In this simple BBN, say, 
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• Event A is an inspection which either contains either an Error or No Error. 
 
• Let Event B be a defensive inspection that turns out to have either an Error or 
No Error. 
 
• Outcome could have either a Joint Error or No Error. 
 
That is if the inspection at Event A fails (i.e. has an Error) and the defensive inspection 
at Event B also fails (i.e. has an Error), then there is a Joint Error at Outcome. There 
are 10 separate inspections and 10 separate defensive inspections following the initial 
inspection. 
 
5.11.3 Problem to solve 
 
Given these prior conditions, what is the probability of Joint Error at Outcome for the 
prior conditions, and then, determine what the Joint Error at Outcome is, if the next 
inspection produces an Error at Event A? 
 
 
Figure 5.15 – Simple BBN 
 
5.11.4 Explanation 
 
In this example, what is being simulated is the integrity of the maintenance process, 
i.e. how accurately people are doing their work without making mistakes, i.e. the 
reliability of the human in undertaking the CAW process satisfactorily.   The process 
has been set on the assumption that there could be a defect in the system, e.g. a fault 
in the latch of the cargo door and that the first inspection could be confirmed 
erroneous or error-free by a second independent inspection or by the functioning of a 
sensor that gives a remote indication in the cockpit . 
 
EventA
EventB
Outcome
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An engineer inspects the latch, this is Event A, and later another engineer, say, a 
supervisor, rechecks the work of the first for the integrity of his work, i.e. Event B that 
one could refer to as Defence. 
 
Take the Inspection (Event A). The engineer may do the task correctly and discover a 
fault. In this case No Error was committed on the inspection because he did it 
properly. If there was no fault with the latch, we take it also as No Error regardless of 
the fact the inspection was done properly or not (we cannot fault the engineer 
without evidence).  However if there was a fault with the latch, but not detected 
because the inspection was not thorough, then it is recorded as Error. 
 
Now coming to Event B which is the Defence (against potential error in Event A), this is 
usually a second, independent check of the critical parts of the previous inspection by 
another person, to make sure the first inspection was done properly.  
 
Again, if Event B was carried out properly and if there was No Error at Event A, then 
Event B should return a No Error.  However if Event B was not done properly, then 
Event B returns an Error regardless of Event A was at No Error or Error. As before, if 
there was no fault at the latch in reality but none of the inspections was done properly 
then the system is still good (due to system's design reliability) but we have to accept 
that Event B is returning a No Error. 
 
In the 3rd node, Outcome, this indicates the outcome of two different inspections on 
the same critical component, done successively (or if we are assuming the cockpit 
indication, the defence action may be done either concurrently or consecutively). 
 
The Outcome returns No Error: 
 
• If there is no fault in the system, or 
  
• If Event A and Event B was properly done (Event A No Error and Event B No 
Error) 
 
• If Event A was done properly but Event B was not done properly (the latter is 
redundant if Event A was done properly). 
 
• If Event A was not done properly (Error) and Event B (No Error) was done 
properly (because the fault was captured in the defence). 
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However the Outcome returns Joint Error: 
 
• If Event A was not done properly (i.e. Error) and Event B was not done properly 
(i.e. Error).  This is a maintenance process system failure. 
 
5.11.5 Observed Data 
Table 5.2 represents the observed data.   
ID Number 
Inspection  
(Event A) 
Defence  
(Event B) 
Outcome 
1 No Error No Error No Error 
2 No Error Error No Error 
3 Error Error Joint Error 
4 No Error No Error No Error 
5 No Error No Error No Error 
6 Error No Error No Error 
7 Error Error Joint Error 
8 No Error No Error No Error 
9 No Error No Error No Error 
10 Error No Error No Error 
Table 5.2 – Observations 
5.11.6 Data file 
 
A NETICA compatible text file was produced using the information in Table 5.2. 
 
5.11.7 Compiled BBN 
 
Data was then uploaded into the network through a custom-design data file 
compatible with the program, and the network was compiled to generate a BBN that 
gives prior conditions.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.16  – Belief bars on compiling the net 
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NoError
Error
58.3
41.7
EventB
NoError
Error
66.7
33.3
Outcome
NoError
JointError
70.9
29.1
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NETICA program returned the belief bars at each node as shown, Fig 5.16.  These 
represented the distribution probability of each state of nature at the node, taking 
into account the pattern of arising and observations from the sample.   
 
5.11.8 Inference 
 
Now, evidence was placed at relevant nodes (instantiated) to represent the following 
conditions and the BBN returned different outcome, Figures 5.17 to 5.19. 
 
Evidence if Event A = Error and Event B = Error 
 
 
Figure 5.17 – Evidence at A = Error B = Error  
 
Evidence that Event A = Error and Event B = No Error 
 
Figure 5.18 - Evidence at A = Error and B = No Error 
 
Evidence that Event A = Error given prior conditions 
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Figure 5.19 - Evidence at A = Error and B = Prior conditions 
 
5.11.9 Mathematical calculation 
 
In the network, Event A and Event B are independent (assuming Outcome is not 
observed). In that case, from the definition of independence, we can conclude that: 
 
  P(A|B)*P(B) = P(B|A)*P(A) =  P(A)*P(B), so 
P(A|B) = P(A) and P(B|A) = P(B) 
 
Question:   What is the probability of error at Outcome, if the next inspection (Event 
A) produces an Error? 
 
Probability at Outcome is P(O);  O is Outcome. 
 
This is calculated directly from the network, see belief bars.  Use the numbers from 
network directly, having set the Nodes to the conditions below. 
 
P(O=JointError|A=a, B=b) – this is just a number from the conditional probability 
distribution of node Outcome, depending on instantiations Node A = a, and Node B = 
b. 
 
For example, A=Error and B=Error: P(O) is 0.5976071. See Fig 5.17. 
 
P(O=JointError|A=Error) = P(O=JointError|A=Error,B=Error)*P(B=Error)  +  
P(O=JointError|A=Error,B=NoError)*P(B=NoError) 
From the net,  
P(O=JointError|A=Error) = (0.5976071*0.333333) +  (0.25 * 0.6666667) =  0.36586901  
 
The rounded up values are shown in Fig 5.17, Fig 5.16, Fig 5.18 and Fig 5.16 
respectively. Exact figures obtained from the  
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This value is approximately 36.6% the figure given in the node “Outcome” against 
JointError. 
 
5.12 Summary of Bayesian learning 
 
Summarizing the application of Bayesian concept to the research objective, it became 
clear that the statistical solution to the Swiss cheese model is the key to finding a risk 
assessment model.  Experimentation with a simple BBN has demonstrated that the 
concept could be utilised to compute the statistical conditional probability of a system 
error occurring in a process.  This small element of BBN would then become the 
fundamental building block for a complex process network. 
 
5.13 Data requirement and collection 
 
Regarding data, two factors had to be considered at the outset: Type of Data required 
and the Method of Collection. 
 
5.13.1 Type of data 
 
Specific data to be gathered will be defined in Chapter Six, Design of the Model, and in 
Chapter Seven, Working with Data.  In general data requirements fall into two 
categories:  
 
• Quantitative data on error incidents, consequences, and supporting 
information such as aircraft utilizations; these may be either processed 
statistical data or unprocessed raw data 
 
• Qualitative descriptive data on errors and incidents, together with information 
on CAW processes, rules and regulation, environment of operation and 
conditions, methods and culture, best practices, experiences, expert and 
individual opinions. 
 
5.13.2 Method of collection 
 
Data gathering will be through literature research, by accessing existing relevant 
databases of the Authority as well as from Approved Organizations who might be 
willing to participate, and from other stakeholder organizations such as CHIRP, IATA, 
ICAO and learned bodies who might assist. Furthermore, qualitative information could 
be obtained from interviews and content analysis of case histories.  
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Interview techniques in particular were found to be very successful from the point of 
view of clarity and data quality; they also help to promoting the study amongst 
stakeholders and canvassing their support.  
  
Multiple methods when applied selectively would yield data more effectively on the 
basis of what data is required and how best to get it on time.  It is a recognized 
technique and has been successfully used before in a research study by RAND Institute 
into the role of personnel in NTSB aviation accident investigation115.  
 
5.13.3 Alternative methods 
 
Alternative methods considered were simulated experiments of maintenance error 
occurrences and their outcome, and questionnaires to licensed engineers and 
managers about error situations. 
 
Simulation of error situations under controlled experimental conditions were 
considered but dismissed as impractical or misleading for a number of reasons. People 
would not behave naturally in simulated conditions if their behaviour that was being 
monitored. Sense of self-protection, dislike to be judged by others on personal traits, 
and even deliberate acts to spoil the result are natural hindrances to achieving a 
reliable result from simulated exercises.  Despite these limitations, it is known that 
simulation is widely used under exercise conditions, training or evaluation of a 
process, where the individuals have to perform as part of their training. On such 
conditions the participants themselves are most likely to derive a benefit, which in 
turn makes the simulation worthwhile for them, thus securing their cooperation. 
 
Simulation was also impractical in a busy aircraft maintenance area where safety and 
cost issues were finely balanced. Managers would not have permitted data gathering 
in an environment where industrial safety is critical, distraction of workers from 
primary work could risk compromising the safety of aircraft, and labour costs and 
diversions are highly sensitive issues. Therefore, simulation or even the alternative 
idea of observing people at work was ruled out.    
 
Questionnaires are alternative forms of data collection but it was not suitable on this 
occasion. This study has primarily focused on hard facts of events occurred rather 
than people’s opinions or about their individual judgments or personal experiences. In 
an industry where the free flow of information is highly controlled and pressures on 
employees’ job security are real, questionnaires would have yielded correct 
information. 
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Chapter Six 
Model design 
 
6.1 Influence diagram preceding the model 
This Chapter describes the design of the model in progressive stages and how the 
model evolved from an influence diagram (ID).  There was no known literature that 
provides a precedent to the detail design of a model of this scope as envisaged in this 
research study.  Therefore design was attempted from first principles, and as 
explained in the following sections.  The flow diagram at Figure 6.1, which was drawn 
up retrospectively on the basis of the experience gained, is produced here for the 
benefit future researchers. 
 The modelling process started with the setting out of an ID. An ID is a graphical way of 
representing a decision problem.  Graphically the ID resembles a neural network of 
variables represented as nodes, and their inter-nodal relationship represented as 
links. Such a network is technically defined as a “Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG)”; it is a 
graphical representation that has an identified direction, either forward or backward, 
hence called “directed”.  It is “acyclic” because it should have no feedback loops.   
The first consideration in setting up an ID is the clarification of the decision problem, 
i.e., “What decision problem the ID should represent?”     Further the designer should 
identify and display the essential elements that influence the decision and the way 
they are inter-related.  According to Clemen (2000)85 four contributory factors must 
be considered in this regard. These are:  
a.  End product (or the output) from the model. 
b. Technical logic. 
c.  Architecture, i.e. its components, their sequence and relevance 
d.  Data intended. 
These factors are analyzed in the following sections. 
6.2 Output from the model 
The expected output from the study is a methodology for assessing and quantifying 
risk, which could be used in two industrial applications, i.e. in support of Safety 
Management Systems (SMS) and Risk Based Oversight (RBO) concept. 
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Figure 6.1 – Flow Diagram for Model Design 
 
SMS focuses on the ability of an organization to perform safely in all its activities.  One 
component of the SMS is the assessment of risk arising from consequences of hazards 
that exist in the organization, infrastructure and processes.   This study examines just 
one area that contributes to flight safety risk, i.e. risk contribution from human error 
in the CAW process and its organization.  It follows therefore, the decision problem to 
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which a solution being sought is, “The organization and its CAW process activities, do 
they pose a safety risk?”   The answer may be either an affirmative or a negative.  Thus 
the problem to be solved in relation to the model is “How to configure a BBN to 
represent the CAW organization and processes in order to derive an either Yes or No 
answer on risk? “  
Regarding flight safety, an organization or a process can be only either safe or unsafe; 
the states are mutually exclusive.  There is no intermediate state between safe and 
unsafe. However safety can be conditional. Perception of safety can vary between 
people or between stakeholders, according to the threshold of risk agreed between 
the parties concerned or specified by higher authority. That is, given certain 
conditions, if the risk is greater than a previously agreed threshold then it may be 
unsafe; otherwise it may be safe. 
The model outputs a risk level that could be compared with an agreed threshold.  At 
present there is no such agreed quantitative threshold for CAW processes.  If such a 
threshold could be set up using this methodology is an open question, which this 
thesis will try to address later in the thesis (Chapter Nine).  The risk level is the end 
product from the model which may be viewed according to the values and objectives 
of the organization that owns the process that is being modelled, and what the 
National Aviation Authority (NAA) considers as the safe threshold. 
To bring forward material previously learned, as it is now required for the application, 
risk can be expressed as a single number, this being the product of probability of the 
hazard and its severity of its consequences. For quantification, it may be necessary to 
find a common measure for severity.  For instance, risk could be the product of: 
Probability of a hazard occurring x monetary value of its consequence. 
Some forms of consequences can be the loss of reputation, personal injury and loss of 
human life. It is acknowledged that they may be beyond valuation, especially to the 
victims, and therefore even the idea of putting a monetary value to the loss of life can 
be seen as abhorrent.  But, it is general knowledge that courts do award monetary 
compensation in settlement of legal claims involving personal injury and death and 
that actuarial methods exist to determine their monetary value.   
Alternatively, risk could be expressed as:  the probability of a certain consequence 
given that there is a probability of error present at the end product from the process, 
e.g. one-in-million chance of a catastrophic accident occurring, given that there is one-
in-hundred thousand chance of a maintenance error being left undetected at release 
of an aircraft to service.  This is an idea that will be proposed in this research study 
125
(Section 6.32) because that form of expression may be more meaningful to the 
manager than a single non-dimensional number. 
6.3 Output from the CAW process 
While the output from the model helps to define the decision problem, focus on the 
output from the CAW process may help to determine the means of solving the 
decision problem. 
The intended end product from the process is the generation of an airworthy aircraft 
for a revenue earning flight.  If this objective can be achieved consistently, then the 
organization and the process can be considered as safe. But in reality, the end product 
may turn out to be unsafe sometimes.  For example, an LAE might release an aircraft 
to service believing that it is safe and airworthy on account of it meeting procedural 
requirements, whereas in reality it might not have been safe because of the presence 
of a maintenance errors or CAW process error that has been committed and left 
undetected.   A safe outcome would be known only if the aircraft reached its 
destination without an incident. 
Once an aircraft is released to service, its safety depends on flight operations, 
management of airfield and ATC as well as other extraneous factors such as natural 
hazards or sabotage.  All these other factors could cloud the issue when considering 
flight safety risk.  Therefore, in order to examine only the effects of CAW processes on 
airworthiness, it is necessary to discount (or shut off) all other external influences 
acting on a post-Release to Service aircraft by assuming that other than CAW 
processes, everything else is perfect and error free. This model will thus focus on post-
Release to Service aircraft that may be affected by undetected CAW errors only, and 
the contribution made by the organization’s CAW process towards that risk. 
That said, it is acknowledged that, often, there are situations where causal factors for 
CAW errors in fact lie in areas that fall outside the CAW process domain, such as flight 
operations or human resources.  Examples are: the non-procedural practices when 
rectifying running faults, communication failures at Flight Ops/ Maintenance Control 
interface, and employment of unqualified personnel.  These, as well as similar issues 
relating to other external factors would be accounted for in the model through 
appropriate techniques designed into the model.  
In regulatory oversights, it is the integrity of the organization itself and its capability to 
deliver a safe flight consistently that is assessed.  In current methods, assessment is 
based on the organization either complying or failing to comply with set regulations.  
The proof of compliance is obtained by checking the organization infrastructure, 
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procedures and individual aircraft’s CAW status against regulatory requirements and 
industry best practices.  Since the regulations represent the collective knowledge and 
disciplines acquired from experience of safe operation of civil aircraft, it is generally 
assumed that an organization that consistently complies with regulations is safe; those 
who are non-compliant are considered unsafe at least in those areas that non-
compliance was found. 
Currently, all organizations and its activities are audited under ICAO guidelines (100% 
in 2-years) but the number of inspectors allocated to the organization may depend on 
NAA perceived risk, based on the organization’s size of operation and capability, as 
well as on its performance in audits.   
Philip Hampton [PH Report] challenges the cost of administering the regulation this 
way, recommending research into alternative ways of discharging regulatory 
responsibilities on the basis of risk.  Given that SMS could have a strategic level risk 
assessment method incorporated into its system, then it might be possible for NAA to 
utilize the same model output as an indication of the risk from each organization.  This 
model design tries to find a single solution to meet both these needs. 
This approach could also help to harness better cooperation from those stakeholders 
who hold the view that regulatory compliance in itself does not ensure flight safety, 
and that it is the technical disciplines and alertness of people at the work face that 
assures safety.  The model could test this view; they could use the model either to 
substantiate their claim or if not to accept that regulatory compliance indeed makes a 
major contribution to safety. 
In this problem, the organization and the processes are intrinsically inseparable.  If the 
delivered aircraft is unsafe or technically non-airworthy, then it also means that the 
organization is also unsafe in the way it performed.    In responding to this question, 
the ID will return a measure of the degree of uncertainty, this being the risk.  
The developed ID would define how this measure is represented.  In a strategic 
situation, it is the general overview of the state of the organization and process (in a 
general sense) that is represented by the ID, and not the safety of any specific flight. 
This is because the general state of risk is based on accumulated historical error data. 
However, it will be shown later that, given a general result as presented in the BBN, it 
might be possible to draw an inference about the next flight to be launched by the 
organization in so far as the fidelity of its CAW process is concerned (Chapter Seven).  
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6.4 Technical logic 
Key elements of the CAW process were introduced in Chapter Two.  CAW process, the 
organizations that manage the process, the Regulation and those organizations that 
manage regulatory compliance oversight are all hierarchical processes or hierarchical 
organizations. As such the model would also reflect this quality. 
A number of approved organizations work collectively to ensure that CAW of an 
aircraft is maintained. A decision process takes place at different stages of the CAW 
process, where a judgment is made by authorized specialists or managers about the 
airworthiness of the aircraft.  In practice the judgment is based on the assumption 
that if relevant parts of the CAW process have been completed satisfactorily on a 
continuingly airworthy aircraft, then the end product from the process is airworthy, 
given that there are some checks and balances are in position to substantiate the 
assumption. 
Despite the checks and balances, errors do occur within this system, which go 
undetected. It is these errors that concern flight safety, as they get migrated forward 
through the CAW process to the flight.  Adverse flight consequences and resulting cost 
to the organization that delivered an unsafe flight could be serious. 
A model that represents the airworthiness decision process should therefore identify 
all the approved organizations, encompassing tasks and personnel that contribute to 
generating a safe flight as well as to errors in the CAW process which might risk safety. 
The model should identify where errors occur within the overall process.   
To make it possible, the ID should represent both the hierarchical structure of 
approved organizations involved with the CAW process, the interfaces through which 
activities and information flow between the associated AOs, namely, Pt 145, Part M 
and Part 21 AOs and departments.   
The model should identify those interfaces where CAW process or its organization 
interacts with other non-CAW support services such as human resources or operations 
such as flight operations.  Similarly, the model should differentiate between the 
technical sides of the business from the commercial side and identify the points where 
there is a handshake between the sides.  
The business side does not get directly involved in the CAW process.  Yet, it is a 
particularly important element because it determines the strategic objectives of the 
organization.  They underpin the policies that govern the way flight operations and 
maintenance operations are conducted in relation to business objectives, especially in 
determining the size and nature of operation and its resourcing. Adequate resourcing 
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is crucial to safe operation.   In this respect, an ID should pay particular attention to 
the operator’s corporate policy and management infrastructure. Beyond the 
company’s business objectives are the external factors, national or global issues that 
influence and shape the company’s strategic business objectives. 
6.5 Model architecture 
Literature research points to several different techniques that could be used to derive 
a structure of the ID.  These are: 
• Fault tree analysis 80, 83, 84, 85, 91, 92. 
• Learning from data80, 83, 84, 85, 91, 92.   
• Using case studies83, 84, 85, 91, 92.  
• Other techniques: interviews, surveys, experience, expert opinion83, 84, 91, 92.  
 
Fault tree analysis (FTA), though could be made very comprehensive, is a speculative 
technique. It produces too many combinations on long drawn out causal chains and 
too many redundancies, which may be difficult to handle.  Although FTA might be 
beneficial in a small process, but when relating to a complex process, Luxhoj (2002)83 
recommends that it is best to avoid FTA unless no better information and means is 
available.  
Learning BBN from data involved collecting apparently unconnected random data and 
then attempting to determine a structure of the network; this is called structure 
learning in Bayesian techniques, which allows the placement of the links in a neural 
network. However, a large amount of data must be available at the outset, obtained 
from observations or by surveying.  In this study, this condition could not be satisfied 
as there was no data at the beginning and surveying of licensed engineers at work 
whilst waiting for errors to occur was not a practical proposition that could be 
implemented in a busy airport environment. In any event, it should be acknowledged 
that the CAW environment already exists as an established process through several 
decades of evolution of civil aviation. Therefore the idea of learning a structure from 
data in this application was both irrelevant and redundant.   
Eliminating the above mentioned techniques, the study was left with retrospective 
analysis of case studies associated with error incidents, supplemented with 
information obtained through interviews.  Surveys and questionnaires were 
eliminated on the basis that individual engineers did not want to divulge internal 
practices that lead to errors because of fear of recrimination from management and 
job security.  Indirect evidence to support this assumption has been observed. 
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Analysis of case studies, supplemented by experience and expert opinion gave more 
accurate information.  The study was also supported by UK CAA, Regulator, where 
expertise was available. 
Having considered these alternative approaches, the preliminary structure of the ID 
was set on the basis of experience and expert opinion. On the question if this method 
has any academic precedence, Yin (2009)92 has confirmed that, in soft science, even 
the use of a single case study to develop a generalized causal chain is a valid technique 
for generating a structure.  
 6.6 Design of high-level ID  
Following technical logic, and taking a top-down approach, an exploratory design of an 
ID was produced, which integrated various authorities and functional organizations 
participating in the CAW process leading to an end product, namely a “revenue 
earning flight” Figure 6.2.  This ID incorporates elements of Reason’s socio-technical 
risk management system1 as discussed by Rasmussen (1997)93. 
6.7 Dynamic stability of CAW process 
CAW is an on-going dynamic process.  Errors do occur in the process as a natural 
phenomenon, but in a well managed system these errors are observed and rectified 
before they become a hazard to the end product.  As long as errors are defended or 
remained dormant, and the end product is protected this way, the CAW process can 
be considered as dynamically stable.    Where an error has escaped both detection 
and defences, and has migrated into the flight phase leading to a flight incident, it can 
be considered that the CAW has become unstable at that occasion.  What major 
factors contribute to the instability of CAW process and risk? 
6.8 Major factors that influence risk 
Principal factors that influence risk have been represented in the ID, as: 
• Compliance with EASA Regulation. 
• Performance of Part M AO responsible for CAW of aircraft. 
• Performance of Part 145 AO maintenance provider. 
• Performance of Part 21 AO that provides post-design services and product 
support services, i.e. advice on design issues and integrated logistic support 
issues. 
• Performance of individual licensed engineers and managers. 
• Performance of corporate business organization that sets corporate policies. 
• Effect of global and national level external influences, e.g. global economy, fuel 
prices, global terrorism and post 9/11 security policies. 
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 Figure 6.2 - Exploratory design - High level influence diagram for CAW process 
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• Defences and interventions. 
A graphical presentation of the high-level ID encompassing all these major factors is at 
Figure 6.2; its rationale and composition is described in Appendix 3.    
The performance of the individual is very much at the hub of the risk issue.  His 
training and qualification, skill levels and licensing may be controllable.  However, 
many other factors that affect their performance cannot be standardized or 
controlled; some important ones are their personal traits, physical and psychological 
make-up, domestic conditions, sense of job security, and tolerable individual stress 
thresholds, as well as their health and welfare.  
According to Regulation, an AOC Holder has the ultimate responsibility for the safety 
of aircraft that it operates. To ensure that this responsibility could be effectively 
discharged, the AOC Holder may incorporate within its organization a Part M AO and a 
Part 145 AO maintenance provider; they may be either an integral part of the AOC 
Holder organization or if not outsourced.  In this case the ID has represented the 
associated Part M and Part 145 interconnected such a way that they make 
contributions to the safety of a flight.  There should be satisfactory integrated logistic 
support activities to provide maintenance and CAW process functions, as well as post 
design services and product support from Part 21 AO. 
The defences and interventions system is built into the organization, and into the 
individuals who work in the organization through their training.  A more obvious 
manifestation of the defence system is the Quality and Safety Management System, 
and a less obvious but an effective form of defence is the human factors training given 
to engineers. 
Directing the entire operation of the interlinked AOs is the corporate business 
organization that sets commercial objectives from which management policies for 
individual specialist departments evolve.  The root of all funding decisions, as well as 
the pace of performance of the operation, is set at the corporate business 
organization, and so it has a profound influence on risk.  Corporate business too would 
have to respond to national and global influences, but unfortunately, other than 
containing those external effects corporate business is unable to pass on responsibility 
for error and risk in their organization to external agencies. That is the current state of 
nature. 
 6.9 Role of Part 147 Training Organizations in the model 
Part 147 TO has been represented in the ID, because of its training role in generating 
licensed aircraft engineers.  There is a strong view amongst experienced, senior 
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licensed aircraft engineers and managers that the quality of some newly qualified 
engineers coming into civil aviation leaves room for improvement.  Part of this 
criticism is rooted in the shift in training methods from the traditional 3-year aircraft 
apprenticeships where budding engineers learnt their trade in a predominantly 
practical environment. In contrast current methods are predominantly based on 
computer based training (CBT) in a class-room with very limited hands-on practical 
experience on hardware and pressure conditions at the workface.   
Inclusion of Part 147 TO in the network would have given the opportunity to identify 
training related causal factors that contributed to human error.  
However, UK CAA Personnel Licensing Department advised this study that once an LAE 
was recruited the responsibility for bringing him up to the required standard lay with 
the employer through continuation training.  That, together with the fact that the 
standard for LAE is controlled by the licensing authority, infers that the Part 147 TO 
could not be faulted retrospectively for human errors made by newly rated LAEs. 
Oversight of Part 147 AO should pick up any weakness in the candidate selection and 
training process. Part 147 TO was therefore excluded from the network as an agency 
that has no direct influence on the airworthiness of an aircraft. 
 
6.10 Cost utility 
Rounding off the graphical representation of ID, a utility node was incorporated into 
the ID to represent the significance of failing to deliver the end product as safe as 
intended; this knowledge was considered of value to managers who operated, audited 
or supervised the complex system.   
Whilst this ID helped to visualize the relationships between various interest groups 
and functional organizations, it was only a starting point towards producing a risk 
assessment model (RAM).  To make the ID usable with data, it had to be further 
decomposed and restructured. 
6.11 Decision points   
An ID should represent the decision situation at a particular time, i.e. to inform the 
manager the probability of errors being present at critical points in the CAW process. 
Release to Service or Handling & Despatch are such nodal points where knowledge of 
the airworthiness of the aircraft is absolutely crucial. Pre-flight maintenance of the 
aircraft is usually competed at the point of Release to Service.  At Handling & 
Despatch, an aircraft that has undergone preparation for flight and Released to 
Service is transferred to flight operations responsibility. Pre-Takeoff check just before 
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the beginning of the take-off run is another critical point where knowledge of the 
probability of errors might be beneficial.   
Usually the CAW process terminates at Handling & Despatch, unless an aircraft that 
has left the gate returns to the gate or needed engineering support, say, to rectify a 
running defect.  Therefore, for practical purposes, the effectiveness of the CAW 
process could be measured as the probability of an error being present at Handling & 
Despatch.   
6.12 Error occurrence, detection 
Associated with these decision points are the upstream events of preparation of an 
aircraft for a flight where errors could occur.  At downstream, there may be other 
events that are the consequences of errors, which might manifest themselves or 
detected by flight crew after the aircraft was transferred to them.  Their responsibility 
for the aircraft and for the handling of errors and incidents extends to the point where 
the aircraft was received at the destination gate. 
6.13 Defences 
The organization contains defensive elements that provide defences against potential 
errors; the defences themselves may be effective (i.e. error detected) or ineffective 
(i.e. error missed); these should be represented in the ID. 
6.14 Consequences 
In order for the ID to represent risk level of an approved organization, it should have 
the knowledge of the accumulated experience of errors, as well as no errors, for that 
AO, based on all the aircraft that had gone through the CAW process within that 
organization. The ID should represent all the accumulated experience of 
consequences, as well as information on those flights that had been completed 
without an incidence.  It is this information that directly influences the decision if, at 
any time, the CAW process undertaken by that organization is free of risk or not.  
6.15 Depository of cumulative experience and pattern detection 
To retain the accumulated experience, the ID must be designed as a depository of 
information that influences the decision making process, as well as the way they are 
related.  This information should be collected, flight by flight, in a sequential form in 
order to detect patterns of error arising.   Some Bayesian software such as NETICA 
would utilize the patterns of arising to predict the outcome of an error, i.e. if it would 
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migrate to the critical points or, if not, be detected and neutralized before it causes a 
consequence, as explained in “Section 10.2, Experience”, of NETICA User Guide90. 
6.16 Mapping 
Following on from Section 5.6, Bayesian learning, nodes of the ID represent the events 
of the CAW process, arcs represent the relationship, i.e. the dependencies, sequence 
of events and direction.   If the objective was to represent the decision making process 
on the basis of cumulative experience, then it was necessary to map significant events 
in the CAW process originating at different parts of the organization to the 
appropriate nodes of the ID. 
Events assigned to the nodes of an ID have certain states of nature.  States of nature, 
simply identify if an error is present or not, and if an error is present, then what the 
causal factor is. This information is embedded in the node.    Similarly other nodes can 
register defences, and where these were missed then the consequences and their 
states, e.g. severity. 
6.17 Data requirement 
 It has been recognized early on in the study that a model could not be designed in 
isolation and availability of data must be taken into account. If not the model could 
not be validated in the CAW environment.   The study needed to collect data on errors 
due to various hazards in CAW processes and organizations, defences employed, if 
error detected and consequences if errors caused damage.  Appendix 4 provides a 
brief description of hazards.  Information on errors and error reporting systems are 
described in Chapter Three, Section 3.21 and Section 3.22.  Appendix 5 explains how 
this study has analysed consequences. 
The decomposition of the high level ID depended upon a greater resolution of 
activities in different participating approved organizations, and within them what 
incidences occur and what are the causal chains for these incidences. Again, 
experience and expert opinion was utilised for the breakdown. But expert opinion 
needed substantiation using information and data from the field, i.e. from a practical 
experiment. 
6.18  Experiment 
In hard science usually an experiment is conducted to obtain data. But in soft science 
approach, where people are part of the problem as well as ingredients of experiment, 
simulation does not work well. People behave differently under controlled conditions.  
Therefore it is more appropriate to use data that could be obtained from relevant 
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situations where and when people have already behaved naturally.  Such data are 
available in operator’s proprietary databases but they are protected because of their 
confidentiality; this study tried to obtain them and some operators responded well.   
It is necessary to state here that injecting faults to a live system and wait and observe 
an unsuspecting engineer to pick it up, or not pick it up, is not something that could be 
experimented in busy hangar or ramp environment.  It was considered if such a 
simulation could be tried out in an engineering training school, where safety and time-
pressure were not critical issues for conducting the experiment.  However, the school 
environment is far too relaxed and the presence of the researcher/ observer would 
undermine the spirit of the experiment.   
The idea of Questionnaires was abandoned at the outset, because employees are not 
authorized to disclose sensitive information that the study was trying to collect. 
Consequently, formal requests had to be made to approved-organizations’ 
Accountable Managers, seeking their participation in the study program. 
6.19 Data types 
This study followed the view that an organization working under natural conditions 
was the ideal experiment, and data that was generated under such conditions were 
the best ones for analysis, provided such data could be captured.  Fortunately such 
data are available in civil aviation, and the study originally targeted 3-different types 
of error data recorded by approved organizations, namely: 
a.   Investigation reports from Maintenance Error Management System (MEMS) 
maintained under UK CAA Civil Aviation Publication CAP 562 Leaflet 11-50, 
formerly UK CAA Airworthiness Notice 71. 
b. Mandatory occurrence Reporting (MOR) system under CAP 382 procedure.  
c. Air and ground incidence investigation reports that did not fall under MOR 
procedures. 
These were expected to be supplemented by data from Quality Audit findings, and 
formal regulatory oversight Findings by the NAA. 
At an early stage of the research study, UK CAA denied access to MOR data on 
grounds of confidentiality, causing the study to rely entirely on data that operators 
were willing to provide voluntarily.  
Selective error incidences undergo detailed investigation (called under MEDA process 
– MEDA stands for Maintenance Error Decision Aid) that identified causal factors, and 
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end up with a final management decision on their disposal or corrective actions.  
These together with minor MEMS data were considered to be a better source because 
error incidence data were more likely to be available in sufficient quantities from any 
one controlled group.   
Flight incidents due to CAW error are relatively rare occurrences in one controlled 
group, even though they could be included in MEMS data.  One problem with minor 
errors was that most of these errors are usually classified as at the “bottom of the 
error iceberg” and considered insignificant by management hierarchy.  They could 
thus be absorbed into the routine activities, put away without investigation, or dealt 
with as a routine matter.  Nevertheless, it was decided to follow up MEMS data. 
6.20 Participant operators 
Anticipating data requirements for the validation of the model, a number of airlines 
and MROs were invited to participate in the study programme.  Some have accepted 
and agreed to provide data, but others either turned down the request indirectly, 
ignored or simply pretended to be helping and gave nothing in return.  Company 
proprietary data are highly sensitive, and safeguards had to be set up to protect 
company’s interests before they could be released.  These were done by signing 
Confidentiality Agreement relating to security and desensitizing of published 
information.  These airlines and organizations acted as the controlled groups. 
6.21 Pilot study 
Under this collaborative arrangement, a local regional airline (Airline A) provided a 
sample set of data for a pilot study, namely incidence reports and MEDA investigation 
reports.  These were further analysed, and appropriate causal chains were drawn up. 
Appendix 6 identifies the relevant case studies from this pilot study and, Appendix 7, 
the results of the analysis and respective causal chains. 
Results confirm that causal chains arising from an error/incidence in one location of 
the CAW process could propagate through the whole infrastructure, to higher level of 
the hierarchical structure of an organization 
It was observed that local Investigations usually stopped within a set of boundaries 
leaving incomplete lines of investigation, open-ended at points where there was 
transition to resourcing and policy side. Causal chains should cross over to other 
approved organizations, such as Part 145 AO to Part 21 AO, where root causes for a 
human-machine interface error originated, but these chains had been discontinued. 
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In such cases, investigators scope might have been limited by their individual sphere 
of knowledge, capability and authority. But the most likely reason was that only 
minimum effort should be spent on investigation that would be sufficient to close the 
error report; this may be a commercial viewpoint and judgment.  However, from a risk 
assessment viewpoint relating to strategic issues, wider issues, for example, the 
direction that the causal chain would take outside the frame was relevant to the 
research objectives.  
Both issues, i.e. the limitations of MEDA investigators and the possibility of extending 
causal chains outside the MEDA investigators operating boundaries, were discussed 
with the data provider’s specialist department (Safety and Quality).  The conclusion 
was that extending the causal chains to their likely root causes was valid, but 
alternative decisions had to be taken on cost-effectiveness, as well as the way the 
business was run.  The data provider confirmed the validity of causal chain extension 
applied to researched case studies despite business orientated practical limitations. 
This is an important precedence in so far as the research objectives are concerned, 
relating to fundamental causes that underpin error generation, namely: initial design, 
production, support planning, training as well as corporate policies and resourcing.  
Causal chains so obtained were able to substantiate this limitation almost in all the 
cases studied.  However they did not show a specific pattern, each case offering a 
causal chain different from others. This is partly because the sample size was small.  
However, confirming observations made by Yin92 even with one or few case studies, 
the sample dataset substantiated the way causal chains are sequenced through 
organizations, organization level issues, task level issues and individual level issues as 
per Reasons socio-technical model1. 
6.22 Data requirement – larger scale 
Based on this early analysis, a larger scale data requirement for the main model was 
defined, but keeping flexibility for changes. Since the model would calculate 
probability of error occurring given a set of conditions, it was necessary to relate this 
value to usage parameters, e.g. flying hours or flights or sectors flown or landings etc. 
Furthermore, it followed that all data should come from a controlled group and that 
boundaries of the controlled group should be defined.   
Requested data fell into 3 categories as follows: 
• Boundaries of the controlled group The first group of data were to be used to 
define the boundaries of the reference frame of the controlled group. 
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• Incident data and incident identification data.  The second group was the 
main bulk of data.  They consisted of incidence and investigation reports in 
hard copy form or if not as digitised data files.  
 
• Supporting data.  The final data group was supporting data, to be used for 
analyzing and interpreting main causal factor data.  There was also a need to 
collect data on flights not affected by CAW errors. 
 
Appendix 9 provides details of the full data requirement as released to participating 
operators. 
 
6.23 BBN experts’ guidelines for model construction 
 
Unlike the demonstration of BBN concept by Luxhoj 84using error data from one 
specific structural component, this research study on the CAW process had a much 
wider scope. According to the outcome of the literature survey, no one else seems to 
have attempted to design a risk model of this scope. Given that Luxhoj’s papers were 
short of information on methodology, the design and construction aspects of a wide-
scope risk model had to be done without a precedent, i.e. from first principles.  The 
path taken is described below. 
Given the high level ID (Figure 6.2), the next step was to decompose it so that the 
practical CAW process could be captured by the network.  A missing ingredient was a 
technique for decomposing the high-level ID to lower level elements.  
Given these circumstances and little other guidance to proceed, a suggestion from 
Clemen (2000)85 pp 45 was helpful.  He suggests that an ID could represent a series of 
“Fundamental objectives” and “Means Objectives”, connected up as a network.   
He explains that fundamental objectives are the ones that directly affect the decision.  
Means objectives are the ones that help to achieve fundamentals. In a network, the 
upper levels in the hierarchy represent more general influencing factors to achieving 
fundamental objectives, and the lower levels describe important active elements. 
Between the means objectives and fundamental objectives, there are intermediate 
level objectives. Combinations of means objectives could connect up with 
intermediate levels or higher levels. 
This idea was interpreted as equivalent to functional objectives to be achieved to 
deliver an airworthy aircraft at the end of the CAW process. Fundamental objective is 
for an approved organization, in this case an aircraft operator, to conduct a safe civil 
aviation business.  Means objectives are the numerous operations undertaken to 
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generate an airworthy aircraft for the flight.  Intermediate objectives could be set as 
the integrity of aircraft, or processes undertaken by different sub-organization, i.e. 
Part M and Part 145, as the aircraft is prepared and certified, or the process is 
supported by these subordinate organizations that provide a service to the principal 
business entity. Errors occur in hierarchical layers of this structure.  Knowledge of the 
presence or otherwise of errors at different layers, and their causal factors, provides 
the opportunity to estimate the error contributions from individual elements and 
groups.  
Clemen (2000)85 further suggests that, although this approach often works, if the 
problem being analyzed is a complex one and the analysis is done from professional 
experience, then it may not be necessary to get down to first principles, as long as the 
analyst has a clear and unambiguous view of the respective fundamental and means 
objectives. 
Given these options, the detailed decomposition of the model was undertaken from 
an expert’s viewpoint, supported by the pilot study done with Airline A.  That is, since 
experience was already available, a heuristic approach was taken to decompose the ID 
and reconfigure it as a working model. This working model incorporated features of 
fundamental, intermediate and means objectives. It also included all the design issues 
hitherto discussed in this chapter as well as the characteristics of Bayesian logic 
converted to a BBN as discussed in Chapter Five.  Where relevant, lessons learnt from 
literature survey have been taken into account at this point of the design.  Figure 6.1 
(Flow Diagram to Model Design)  was constructed to consolidate the knowledge 
acquired through this design exercise and to demonstrate the road map that may be 
of use to future researchers in this domain. 
6.24 Rationale for decomposition of the high-level ID 
The following paragraphs provide further explanation on the decomposition of the 
high-level ID and reconfiguration of the model. 
During the course of this study, the current CAW process has been discussed with CAA 
experts, high level managers in industry, safety and quality staffs from approved 
organizations, trainers and representatives of licensed engineers.  There is general 
consensus that although the current system provides a reasonable standard for safety 
assurance it left many gaps.  There is a general acknowledgement that, often, events 
that actually happen at the shop floor and management chain on a day to day basis 
are the critical actions that ultimately decide the achieved safety despite the formality 
of regulatory compliance.  NTSB or UK AAIB detailed investigation reports of CAW 
error attributed aircraft accidents substantiate this view 
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Thus, it is absolutely essential that “safe performance of the organization in CAW 
processes and their management” is represented together with “regulatory 
compliance” within one model because an unsafe act may well be non-compliance 
from regulation at the time of its commitment.  Meeting compliance and delivering a 
safe CAW process are concurrent, parallel, activities that lead to the integrity of the 
end product.  These objectives lay at intermediate stages between the fundamental 
objectives of the business entity and the end product. It follows that at a higher level 
the model should represent the business and its corporate policies, external factors 
that influence the business, and departmental policies that integrate the full operation 
at least to the extent of identifying the CAW interface. This is because the scope of the 
study is limited to CAW issues and its parent associations only.   
The business, contractual and management interfaces are important because it is at 
the interfaces where the objectives change from financial to engineering (hence 
safety) or vice versa.  Independent business decisions are made upstream of the 
interface. At downstream, errors may be made if the CAW organization is unable to 
cope with the business demand, or in reverse, business terms might either impede or 
deny engineers from getting necessary specialist support promptly, say, when under 
time pressure.   
Causality of the CAW errors may lie in a prior business or corporate policy decision. 
For example, commercial policies of an organization might directly influence 
airworthiness decision process through time pressures put upon the individuals who 
work in the CAW process.  In contrast a CEO or his deputies might claim that they 
never put pressure on employees or that they are not aware of the pressures upon 
the employees, and that the employees are expected to report undue pressures and 
stresses95.   
Unfortunately, employees depend upon the organization for their job security or 
career prospects; thus instead of reporting pressures they are more likely to act under 
duress, occasionally erring, in favour of the organization when put under a stressful 
situation.  Middle managers tend to use their positions of authority to prevent, block 
or inhibit the subordinates from making reports. This is the reason why there are 
confidential reporting systems, such as CHIRP/MEMS, despite managers’ public denial 
of malpractices.   
Because of complexities of this nature, the language of communication too changes at 
the interfaces.  Therefore it is imperative, that the outcome of the CAW process, or 
more importantly the implications of improper CAW process, is reconverted to a 
language that the businessman understands. A cost utility at the end of the network 
would satisfy this need. 
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In general, once corporate policies are set and the CAW organization has been 
harmonized to meet the business need, then CAW may tick over as a dynamically 
stable process. Errors might arise in the system and be either defended or resolved 
through small adjustments to the system. However, any changes to corporate policies 
might have significant implications to the dynamic stability of the CAW process, and 
therefore such occurrence should be represented as parameters that influence CAW 
decisions.   Routine review of Maintenance Organization Exposition by the operator 
and regulator is a case in point that highlights the importance of change management. 
Size of the operation and its resource capability is another important consideration.   
A large complex operation involving a fleet of several hundred aircraft is expected to 
generate more hazards, and in the first impression a greater risk, than a smaller 
operation with less than 10-aircraft. However, what is more important is the balance 
between the size of operation and its resources to meet the challenge.  For instance a 
small operator who is operating the airline on a shoe-string budget might have an 
operation at a higher risk, than another larger operation that is well manned by 
qualified people. Although this may be the first impression, in practise, it might be 
found eventually that such generalization would not remain true.   For example, one 
could argue that the ratio, fleet size to engineering staff complement is a better 
indication of its resource capability to deliver a safe continuing airworthiness process. 
Rating of the demanded pace of work is another important factor. The network should 
represent these influencing factors.   
Apart from the defences built into the CAW processes,   the Quality Management 
System is the main organizational defence against shortfalls in CAW organization and 
practices.  If a QMS functions efficiently, it could pre-empt any shortfalls or 
weaknesses in the organizational compliance with regulation. Therefore it is bound to 
be a strong influencing factor on CAW of the end product.   
A summary of the current oversight process was given in Chapter Two and Chapter 
Three.  This process is principally based on an audit of the organization to ensure that 
it complies with the applicable and relevant safety regulation, and if it has sufficient 
strength and capability to sustain the declared objectives in its formal Exposition. 
6.25 Model 
The initial idea for decomposing the high-level ID was tested by examining three 
known models for risk management to see if there is a commonality of features 
between them.  However these models had neither been purpose designed as risk 
assessment models nor were using BBN techniques as this study was pursuing.  They 
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were common sense evolution of management models based on practical experience.   
The models were: 
• A model produced by Marsh17to capture the current oversight process as 
practised by UK CAA.  It uses expert judgement based on evidence. 
 
• MCDA/AHP type oversight process currently practised by the CAA of the 
Netherlands62. 
 
• Aircraft Structural Integrity policy for the Royal Air Force96.  The policy 
effectively sets out a management model to minimize the risk attributed to 
potential structural failures of military aircraft. 
 
Features of the three models were decomposed, compared and results are 
reorganized and tabulated in Appendix 10, under assumed high-level groupings.    
Although the comparison is not perfect, a pattern emerges from that, sufficient to give 
confidence that the idea for decomposition and regrouping is fairly correct. That may 
be considered sufficient for setting a heuristic layout. 
As an outcome of this comparison, it became clear that the process of minimizing 
safety risk needed a holistic approach, all elements of the organization working 
together as an integrated system.  For example, the idea of the top level managers 
looking for workers to do all the sacrifices is taken out of this equation, by putting the 
managers in the equation; likewise, while QMS may have an audit role, they are just 
as well important as defences against error or even themselves as causal factors for 
some errors. The concept assumes that everyone in the system is susceptible to make 
errors as well as capable of acting as defences. Guided by this holistic approach, it was 
possible to synthesize the information and to observe patterns between the 3-systems 
chosen in this occasion. 
   
• Size of an operation should be compatible with its capability. 
 
• Corporate policies should be compatible with flight safety objectives, 
particularly on strategic planning, resourcing, and promotion of a safety 
culture. 
 
• Regulations should be earnestly complied with and not treated as just a 
process needing a “tick in the box”. 
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• Performance of the CAW process should be monitored such a way that error 
generation, as well as good performance, is measured and acted upon. 
 
• Safety and quality audit programme should be effective and not just a safety-
cover to the CEO. 
  
• There should be a dynamic and effective change management system that 
could respond to changing strategic influencing factors (Deltas) that has an 
impact on flight safety. 
 
Appendix 8, points to the strengths, similarities and relative gaps of the 3-system, and 
offers a possible way forward for combining these indicators in a new proposal that 
could provide a more comprehensive risk assessment system.  Assessing risk by 
accounting for errors in these 6-functional areas was considered to be the 
intermediate level objectives for the model as mentioned by Clemen (2000)85.  In 
reverse, if errors are eliminated from each of these 6-areas, then the risk level of the 
entire operation could be reduced. 
Using the foregoing analysis, the high level ID was redrawn as a block diagram with a 
number of functional subsystems, each identifying with the group that individually 
influences the airworthiness process and decision taking (Figure 6.3).  
 
Figure 6.3 – Block diagram of the model 
 
The subsystems are: 
• Size and capability of operation 
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Error free sectors 
• Compliance with regulation. 
• Routine performance by AO in its tasks. 
• Performance in safety and quality audits. 
• Corporate policies and change management. 
• Consequences. 
 
Human errors occur within these sub-systems, singly or collectively, which could cause 
system errors. The probability of a system error occurring, when combined with the 
severity of consequence would yield a risk value.  The configuration acknowledges 
that error generation within each subsystem occurs independently from what 
happens in other subsystems. However, when it concerns the safety of the end 
products from the organization, then these separate subsystems has interdependency 
through the end product. 
The joint probability of a system error occurring could be visualized in Figure 6.4 as a 
Venn-Diagram. The box represents all operations of which the majority are error free. 
Each (free-floating) oval shaped subset represents probability distribution of different 
types of error attributed to any one subsystem.  Their intersections represent system 
error probability attributed to two or more subsystems and any error lining up.  Note 
that shapes, sizes and intersections are not to scale. This is one snapshot of a dynamic 
system. 
  
Figures 6.4 – Visualization of system error probability 
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Quantification of risk can be achieved through a statistical probability of system error 
and estimated cost of consequence.  The main part of the model will address the 
probability of system error.  An appropriately designed BBN to represent the system 
should be capable of combining the probability of error in each sub-system and 
returning a joint conditional probability of system error. 
6.26 Taxonomy 
Implicit with the design and construction of the model, facilities should be provided to 
upload data.  In order to proceed with the construction of the model, prior 
information on taxonomy for data is required.  Therefore taxonomy issues are 
discussed here. 
6.26.1 MEDA taxonomy  
This study primarily followed MEDA taxonomy, complemented by some features from 
the HFACS (ME) taxonomy.  This is because MEDA is the most widely used taxonomy 
by UK and international airlines, and therefore there was greater likelihood to find 
error data from participating approved organizations.  
MEDA is used in error investigation, specifically in Part M and Part 145 organizations. 
Causal factors for some errors that occur in Part M or Part 145 AOs might lay in other 
organizations, for example design shortfalls or errors in aircraft maintenance manuals 
for which Part 21 organizations are responsible.  MEDA taxonomy has made provision 
to identify such events, though it is understood that the extent of investigation 
undertaken is rather limited. 
6.26.2 Supplementing MEDA and HFACS (ME) taxonomy 
 In generating taxonomy for this model, MEDA and HFACS (ME) identified parameters 
were supplemented on the basis of researcher’s experience and advice received from 
subject matter experts in industry and Regulator.  For instance, “contractual 
interfaces” where errors occur is one such addition. 
Field research during this study has revealed that unless an error incident has a 
serious safety implication, little follow up action is taken by airlines to pursue the 
matter to root causes and to prevent recurrence of such errors.  Some evidence 
gathered during this study substantiated this view.  It has been pointed out to the 
researcher that often the way the commercial side of the operator’s business is 
managed, follow up investigations of most error incidences at Part 21 organization are 
considered as non cost-effective to either the operator or the Part 21 organization.   
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6.26.3 Contractual interfaces   
In contrast, from a safety viewpoint, the study observed that the contractual interface 
between the operator and the Part 21 organization is generally a weak area where 
conflict between safety and profit exists.  Inhibited two way information flow, 
reluctance to investigate defects, investigations shrouded by commercial or legal 
sensitivities have been identified as the main factors that lead to management 
decisions in favour of commercial interests.   
A well documented example of this type of conflict is the principal parties’ failure to 
find a lasting solution to the long known problem with Concorde aircraft’s main 
undercarriage wheel tyres when damaged by runway debris.  In the final similar 
incident involving an Air France Concorde, the aircraft was destroyed in a tragic 
accident that cost 109 lives and ended the Concorde program9.  On the question of 
blame, according to the judgment given by a Court of Law in France, it is reasonable to 
infer that there have been high level management decision errors made between the 
Operator and the Design Authority; they failed to follow up adequately previous, 
somewhat low profile incidents, and so failed to generate a lasting design solution to 
the original design shortfall. 
6.26.4 Corporate policy 
Since MEDA was initially intended as a tool to help investigation of error at human-
machine interface, it has a poor resolution relating to root causes that may lie in the 
upper levels of an organizations hierarchy (i.e. corporate policy or change 
management). Data to populate those nodes in the corporate policy and change 
management networks might not be found from MEDA records.  Similarly, MEDA is 
not relevant to regulators oversight inspections, and therefore error data relating to 
compliance would have to be extracted from regulators in house records, subject to 
conditions. 
In the more recent time, commenting upon the inadequacy of MEDA taxonomy, UK 
CAA paper 2007/0453 has introduced three categories of maintenance error for the 
purpose of analyzing  some 3,000 Mandatory Occurrence Reports (MOR) accumulated 
over a period of 10-years. This too supported the view on MEDA’s limitations.   
6.26.5 EASA regulation  
The adequacy of MEDA taxonomy was reviewed with UK CAA to determine if it met 
the models objectives, especially with respect to regulatory compliance issues.  UK 
CAA was of the opinion that any model that could be used to assess risk under RBO 
concept ought to have a relationship with specific EASA regulation.  This is because 
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the existing system of legal liability of an operator, i.e. to ensure that the organization 
and its mode of operation does not constitute a risk to flight safety, could be exercised 
by identifying the specific EASA regulation that the operator might have failed to 
comply with.    
This argument from CAA’s was accepted as a very important contribution to the 
objectivity of the model from the Regulator’s perspective.  Moreover, the same 
argument could be taken forward to assist the operator. For example, if the model is 
used as a part of the organizations SMS, then it could also be used for self-regulation 
with respect to compliance requirement.  The organization would then have a 
management tool in hand, by which it could review its level of compliance against the 
regulation.  
Accordingly, EASA Regulation 1702/2003 Part 2197, and EASA Regulation 2042/2003 
Part M and Part 14598 were used as guides for decomposing the compliance 
subsystem, and parts of the routine performance subsystem for Part M and Part 145 
organizations.  Compliance subsystem would capture errors during oversight audits 
and inspections by Regulator in the form of Level 1 and Level 2 Findings; this 
subsystem is reserved for this purpose but its data would be used in conjunction with 
data from other subsystems to assess the overall risk.  Any errors in compliance 
discovered by the operator as a result of incidents would be captured by the routine 
performance subsystem. 
6.26.6 Consequences and cost 
Nodes on the Consequence net are not entirely error data, but also outcomes of 
presence of error and impact on the operation and cost when recovering from the 
relevant upstream error or incidence, which missed timely detection.  Any error 
detected before an aircraft was declared airworthy for flight operation could be 
treated as “No Consequence” on the basis that the cost of recovery from the error is 
part of the routine cost of maintenance.  That’s the way it is done at present in most 
organizations.  Obviously if a greater accountability of error is required such costs 
could be included at the appropriate node, as a modification to this network. 
Consequence and cost data are included here because the product of error probability 
and consequence should yield the level of risk.  The scale for the risk has yet to be 
established depending on the results the model would generate. 
Detailed decomposition of the subsystems according to the taxonomy adopted is 
tabulated in Appendix 10. 
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6.27 Overview of model construction with BBN software  
The model was constructed in stages, i.e. subsystem by subsystem, each subsystem 
individually tested.  Once it was ascertained that each subsystem worked well 
independently, then they were integrated together to form the complete network. 
The networks were constructed using commercially available NETICA software that 
has been purpose designed for BBN work, and marketed by Norsys Software 
Corporation of Canada.  Alternative software packages are available in the market and 
all of them have various advantages and disadvantages.  For examples, at one 
extreme, programs with reputed names are extremely expensive, whereas at the 
other extreme those free-to-download software available from internet have no back 
up support and their integrity is unknown. The medium priced packages with 
commercially available back up support, all have gaps in technical features.  NETICA 
was selected mainly on the combination of affordability and availability of professional 
level support. It can produce neat networks when the model is extremely complex, as 
in this case with minimal crisscrossing of links. There is no facility to use colors to 
discriminate subsystem nodes in a complex network like this; this is a program 
shortfall. 
The construction process starts with the definition of the taxonomy for the nodes, 
their states of nature, and the conceived architecture, i.e. the direction and 
relationships between nodes, and their hierarchy; these were discussed in the 
previous sections.  The next task is to transform the concept into a tangible model and 
transfer the knowledge about nodes and states of nature on to the model.  Only then 
would the model be able to undertake computations using data that would be input at 
alter stage. 
NETICA program is the “tool” that helps to construct the model and uptake 
knowledge, done concurrently. NETICA provides the graphical representation of the 
belief network, as well as the mathematical relationships between nodes, and within 
the nodes.  Relationship information is embedded with the node and normally 
remains hidden from view.  But the software enables the relationships to be examined 
as hidden files, as and when required.  Most importantly, the algorithm based on 
Bayes’ Theorem for conditional probabilities, used for computation of error 
probabilities at any point in the network, is built into the program. The algorithm is 
Norsys’ proprietary information that is not available to public.  
The basic steps of construction are: 
• Defining the nodes of the model, as these are the main “bricks” of the 
construction. 
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• Entering pre defined states of nature. 
• Placing the nodes in the correct relationship or hierarchical order. 
• Connecting them with links. 
 
All the necessary instructions for the construction can be found in NETICA User’s 
Guide (2003)90 or in NETICA Help Files located in the program software.  Like any other 
software program, the user must familiarize with the program before using it, or 
preferably attend a structured NETICA course.  
 
6.28  Model construction 
A necessary first step of the construction was the laying out of the high level 
subsystems described in Section 6.25 as a network.  This has been done at Figure 6.5, 
following which the construction of subsystems began. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.5 - The aggregate - First level of decomposition 
 
The following sections highlight some salient factors taken into account during the 
design of each subsystem of the model and refer to the final evolved architecture 
after each design has gone through an iterative design and review process.   Early 
designs, which are now redundant, have been omitted in order to avoid clutter and 
improve clarity of this document.  However some of the important Regulator inputs 
that arose during the iterative process are discussed in Section 6.30.  These 
discussions centered on the first detailed model (Figure 6.16, now obsolete and 
enclosed for reference only). Resulting amendments have been incorporated into the 
final design, which is outlined below. 
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6.28.1 Size and Nature of Operation and Capability 
Size of the Operation and its Capability is in essence the main infrastructure of the 
aircraft operator.   Some of the information gleaned from Marsh17 on ROWI model has 
been used to decompose this subsystem.  See Section 4.4 for ROWI Model details.  
Graphical representation of the subsystem is at Figure 6.6.  
 
 
Figure 6.6 – Size of the Operation versus Capability 
 
6.28.2  Regulatory Compliance 
The background to the decomposition of the “Compliance” sub-system was explained 
earlier in Section 6.26.5.  Graphical representation is at Figure 6.7 for Part M and Part 
145 AO, and Figure 6.8 for Part 21 generic OA. 
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Figure 6.7 – Pt M and Part 145 Regulatory Compliance 
 
 
Figure 6.8 –Part 21 generic OA Regulatory Compliance 
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6.28.3 Routine Performance 
The “Routine Performance” sub-system has a complex picture as it demonstrates the 
synergy between Part M, Part 145, and Part 21 AOs, see Figure 6.9. 
The original intention was to include Part 66 licensing requirements and influencing 
factors associated with a Part 147 Training organization, because of their influence on 
the quality of Licensed Aircraft Engineers employed by operators.  This idea was 
dropped at this stage of development; the rationale for its deletion was explained in 
Section 6.9. 
Key features included in this subsystem are as follows. Part M and Part 145 
organizations are independent in discharging their respective responsibilities. Part 145 
AO is the maintenance provider whereas the Part M AO is responsible for ensuring 
that CAW is assured through the CAW process.  This does not absolve Part 145 AO 
from following regulatory compliance and industry best practices to ensure CAW; they 
are responsible for meeting that objective unlike some MROs tend to believe. Part M 
AO specifies the task needs to be done on the aircraft, and formally transfers the 
responsibility to perform the tasks safely according to EASA regulations and industry 
best practices.   
The legal responsibilities for the tasks and interactive support are defined in the 
interfacing contract between Part M and Part 145 AOs.  Part 21 PDS and Product 
Support are usually obtained by Part M AO, for which they would have another 
interfacing contract between Part M and Part 21 AOs.  Part 145 AO, if they need Part 
21 support, would call it up via Part M AO, unless there is prior contractual agreement 
for direct contact between Part 21 AO and long-established Part 145 AO. 
Part M AO performance is measured against tasks organizational issues defined by 
EASA regulations and decision nodes that sum up the outcome of upstream events; 
Part 145 AO performance is measured against regulation as well as key elements of 
integrated logistic support with respect to organizational issues.  It is also measured 
against capability and other personal traits of the individuals who either perform the 
work or manage them, and various factors that represent personal and task related 
factors at the work face. 
Part 21 OA performance is linked to the overall performance sub-system, because 
causal factors for error may well lie in the Part 21 OA.  For example an error in the 
aircraft maintenance manual that could lead to a human error at workface could well 
be an error caused by poor integrated logistic support planning and management at 
the Part 21 OA.  The decomposition allows errors to be attributed to the most 
appropriate source, and moreover encourages the investigator of an incident or error 
154
to pursue the investigation to the root cause, unless of course it was blocked or over-
ruled by management. In this latter case, the management should account for the 
blockage. 
 
 
Figure 6.9 – Subsystem Operational Performance 
 
6.28.4 QMS Defence 
Decomposition of the Quality Management subsystem was based on the broad 
requirements outlined in EASA Regulation 2042/2003 Accepted Mean of Compliance 
MA 712, Figure 6.10.  To enable MA Subpart G organization to ensure that CAW of 
aircraft remain in compliance with Part M requirements there should be a quality 
management system.  It should address CAW Quality Policy, Quality Plan, QA 
Procedure, QA Remedial Action Procedure and Training and Qualification Standards 
for Audit Personnel.  These objectives for meeting these requirements should be 
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defined, documented and resourced under the QMS organization, as well as 
implemented through the QMS infrastructure and program.  The detailed 
decomposition was based on EASA Regulation Part M – MA 712 and Accepted Means 
of Compliance, supplemented by subject matter expert advice.  
 
 
Figure 6.10 – Subsystem Safety and Quality 
 
6.28.5 Corporate Management and Change Management 
Corporate Policy subsystem, which includes Change Management extension, 
incorporates the CEO/AM’s unique position as the Chief Executive and the interpreter 
of the corporate board’s strategic policies.  The decomposition follows the traditional 
hierarchical structure of top level management (Figure 2.3). CEO/AM has to take into 
account external factors that would influence his decision making role and the 
decisions.  Global factors, central and local government policies and objectives, trade 
unions have been identified here; it is not an exhaustive list, and there could be 
others.  
At the output end, errors might occur in corporate and policy issues that affect CAW 
processes, but usually they might be dressed as errors of judgment.  Origin of errors in 
specialist departmental policies at high level may be rooted in corporate policies, so 
they might conflict with safety requirements, with the way CAW process is conducted.  
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represents an organization’s alertness to foresee upcoming changes or evolution of 
strategic objectives, to consider the implications and then plan and manage the way 
the operation ought to respond.  Business management, operations, engineering and 
technology and human resources issues, as well as changes to the existing Expositions 
have been identified as factors that have significant influences on risk.  Errors in 
identifying changes and in timely responses could cause downstream problems. The 
network will show how top level decisions could affect safety at lower levels. 
At higher levels of the operator’s organization, errors are most likely to be called 
“Errors of Judgment” in order to mitigate their impact, because top level managers 
tend to protect themselves and the corporation against possible liabilities arising from 
“management errors”. Therefore, in practice, operators might not allow this part of 
the network to be implemented in their organizations; this is a practical reality. 
However in an SMS they could consider adopting this principle for their own benefit 
and long term welfare of the organization.  The graphical representation is at Figure 
6.11. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.11 – Subsystem Corporate Policy and Change management 
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6.28.6 Consequences 
 
The “Consequences” subsystem, Figure 6.12, starts at “CAW Management” node 
which combines/ coordinates outputs from Pt M and Pt 145 organizations.  If CAW 
process is satisfactory it is assumed that the process and aircraft are error-free, 
moving them on to next progressive stages of “Release to Service”.  Note that this 
document and Netica model uses the terminology “Release to Fly” to describe the 
same event, which is a critical milestone in the CAW process that places an aircraft 
fully serviceable and airworthy for the intended purpose.  It is done through a process 
of checks and cross checks of aircraft documentation after having ensured that all 
engineering maintenance activities have been correctly completed and certified by 
authorised personnel. 
 
At Handling & Despatch, flight line staff of the maintenance organization share 
responsibilities with staff of flight operations, until the aircraft is pushed back and 
aircraft captain takes over the full responsibility for the safety of his aircraft, but 
within the limits of his terms of reference.  Handling & Despatch is a transition point, 
the last stage of the CAW process.  If errors are present and detected, it is assumed 
that they will be defended by the routine process of stage checking and cross-checking 
up to this point.  It is expected that any errors would be detected by defences, but it is 
also possible that some errors might escape detection and would get transferred to 
the next stage of the decision process.  It is also possible that new errors get 
introduced at this stage due to human activity, like leaving a cleaning rag in an air 
intake or forgetting to fasten an access panel to a ground power cable plug point. 
Although the CAW process usually terminates at Handling & Despatch node, if there 
are running repairs to attend to after push back, then CAW process may be extended.   
Once an aircraft has left the gate, safety of aircraft is in the hands of Flight Operations 
with responsibilities shared with ATC and Airfield management.  Defence at Pre-
Takeoff is done by flight crew, for example, when errors might show up as cockpit 
indications or anomalies in handling or in aircraft systems performance.  
Errors if detected at any stage would lead to a consequence such as delay in meeting 
the flight schedule, or cancellation of the flight together with associated primary and 
consequential costs, e.g. hotel costs or alternative transport for passengers. Assuming 
that an aircraft has left the gate with an undiscovered CAW process error, it might be 
detected by flight crew if it affects the normal operation and handling of the aircraft.  
In the event, if a dormant error escapes detection at Pre-Takeoff , it could continue to 
remain dormant throughout the flight or manifest itself as an incident before the end 
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of the flight.  An incident would generate a consequential cost.  The Combined Cost 
node pulls together all the consequential costs. 
 
 
Figure 6.12 – Consequences 
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The form of the model when all the subsystems are integrated is at Figure 6.17. Prior 
to their integration each subsystem was separately tested with simulated data to 
ensure that it would compile properly and that it would produce a meaningful result.  
Proof of compilation was particularly important because it confirms that the logic 
incorporated into the model architecture was correct. Configurations of individual 
subsystems have been reviewed by CAA experts as part of the established research 
process. This has lead to more detailed decomposition of Compliance subsystem, 
providing a greater resolution of causal factors required for regulatory purposes. 
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first order interaction between subsystems and various other constituent elements 
within each subsystem.   In practice, in a complex organization cross fertilisation of 
influencing factors do take place between subsystems.  These second and higher order 
influences are not represented in this network for several reasons: 
 
• It is not graphically practical to do so in here without cluttering up the graph 
and confusing the reader. 
 
• This DAG is not a decision tree but an influence diagram and there is no need 
to represent all second or third order factors. 
 
• The ID is not exactly matching the flow process of activities but following the 
flow of influencing factors that contribute to the decision, which is, if there is a 
risk due to CAW error.  
 
• It is necessary to limit the number of potential combinations that could be 
formed by the whole range of different nodes and states of nature; if not the 
capability of the computer will be the limitation.   
 
Therefore a reasonable position to adopt is to accept the argument that cross-
fertilisation does take place in real life and whatever the state of nature achieved at 
each event is in fact its result.  
 
It should be noted that knowledge of existing oversight inspection processes has been 
incorporated in to this model as a springboard. It is an advantage because it provides 
confidence in the proposed configuration.  Moreover, experts who gained their 
experience in a traditional risk assessment environment would find that the transition 
to a new method is easy, and the configuration follows what they were familiar with. 
Thus change management is encouraged and facilitated.  The capability provided by 
this model to convert an organization’s human errors to a risk as a statistical 
probability should be a strong attraction to safety managers in any industry.  
Finally, it should be reiterated that to determine the effects of flight incidents due 
solely to CAW error, the model should assume that no errors are contributed by flight 
operations, air traffic control and airfield control.  This is a reasonable assumption, 
because in real life, post accident investigation would reveal and apportion 
contributory elements to each relevant service if it is involved, and CAW process 
would take its fair share.  For the purpose of model construction, it was assumed that 
all other services were perfect and made no contribution to safety risk, except where 
cross inputs were taken account at the interfaces. 
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6.30 Integrity checks on the model and industry expert inputs 
 
As briefly mentioned in Section 6.28, integrity checks were done on an earlier version 
of the ID   (Figure 6.16) to confirm if it correctly represented the CAW flow process, as 
far as practicable, that potential sources of error have been comprehensively covered, 
and that the model reflects current industry practices.  This task was assisted by UK 
CAA SRG Airworthiness Standards and Procedures (ASP) Department.  The following 
Sections record the action taken in addressing the key issues raised by UK CAA. 
 
6.30.1 Mapping EASA regulation 
 
A significant step change resulting from UK CAA advice was that the number of nodes 
increased from the 107 nodes initially started with to 176 nodes.  The original layout 
essentially followed the simpler MEDA taxonomy. The layout that has evolved largely 
follows EASA Regulation, as a guide to decomposing the Regulatory Compliance 
subsystem.  This is the line that UK CAA had recommended, because if the model had 
to be credible for legal purposes, then it should shadow the Regulation that both UK 
CAA inspectors and operators recognize. 
 
6.30.2 Level of resolution of causal factors 
 
Another factor that inflated the size of the data set is the level of resolution required 
with respect to causal factors, which in turn provides clarity when prioritizing 
investment to reduce risk. There was a decision to be made at one stage, if to reduce 
the parameters by descoping the model. 
 
UK CAA’s views, as expressed at the 6-monthly progress review meetings, were that 
the model should not be de-scoped in order to ensure that it provides a fine 
resolution, to link risk to causal factors.  This advice was consistent with other known 
advocacies calling for a greater resolution of causal factors, i.e. UK CAA Paper 
2007/0453, current work in the revision of MEDA tool, CHIRP/MEMS reports and UK 
Flight Safety Committee, Maintenance Sub Committee all that support better 
resolution. 
 
Given the concept adopted and a required degree of resolution, it is inevitable that a 
larger starting data set must be available to make the model work and to derive a 
sensible result from the model.  However, those who oppose this method of risk 
assessment might suggest that this demand for a large starting set of data would 
make the model impractical.   
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In rebutting the opposition argument, it should be stated that the model does not 
require factual information all the time.  Input data could be estimated using best 
guess, to be refined later as more and more data comes in.  The technique adopted 
for validation of the model will be discussed in Chapter Eight. Moreover, once 
sensitivity analysis has been carried out on the model, it might be possible to derive a 
smaller set of KPI that could be monitored by the Authority.  Even so, there ought to 
be caution until trends are established.  This is because conditions could change in 
time, which would shift the sensitivity from one parameter to another.   If not careful, 
one could end up with monitoring the wrong KPI, when the actual damage is in fact 
occurring elsewhere. 
 
Other data handling issues raised by UK CAA Regulator during the testing stage are 
discussed below. 
 
6.30.3 Proactive and reactive errors 
 
Proactive errors are those detected by engineers and managers in the course of their 
routine tasks.  Reactive errors are those discovered as a result of investigation 
following an incident or another reported (proactive) error. An issue was raised if both 
types of errors would be recorded and if recording proactive errors would be 
penalizing, i.e. to the organization’s image.  Both types must be recorded to obtain a 
true performance state.  Proactive errors are not penalizing.  It is important that 
proactive errors are recorded, because in doing so the operator would accumulate 
credit for the effectiveness of its defence system as proactive error records are a 
manifestation of the organization’s alertness to human error, and the quality of work 
output.  Obviously any proactively detected errors would invariably be defended and 
would have no detrimental flight consequence; therefore, unlike a reactive error 
would do, effects of proactive errors would not feature in flight consequences other 
than as No Error. 
 
6.30.4 Level 1 and Level 2 Findings  
 
Usually Level 1 and Level 2 Findings are made by CAA Regulator.  In the risk model a 
proactive finding can be considered a form of defence, because it would trigger an 
action to put matters right.  This information is fed back to the AO immediately after 
the oversight, and should be available to them for inputting to the model.  During 
validation trial, Regulator findings were provided by the operator itself.  These errors 
would be recorded in the Compliance subsystem only 
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Shortcomings in compliance, discovered as a result of an investigation into an incident 
is a reactive input.  However errors would be recorded under the relevant node in 
performance, and NOT in compliance subsystem.  CAA had queried if retrospective 
finding of non compliance with regulation resulting from an incident investigation 
would reflect unfavorably on CAA’s ability to undertake regulatory compliance 
oversight inspection.  It cannot be considered so, because it is known that such 
inspections take on a snap-shot of the organization at the time, and that time 
dependent changes could occur. Besides, audits are usually spread over a 2-years 
period.  At any one time, less than 100% of the auditable items would get inspected. 
Therefore it is perfectly acceptable to have compliance shortfall identified by the 
operator as a result of an investigation, without it adversely reflecting on the 
Regulator.  If the error relates to a long period trend, then of course that would rightly 
raise a question about the relevant inspector’s alertness and skill levels, or the 
possibility of his making errors.  He too is human. 
 
6.30.5 Weighting L1 and L2 Findings 
 
CAA currently uses a weighting factor to discriminate between Regulation clauses 
according to their importance.   This model does not allow weighting, and the concept 
has no facility. However, in a model that is driven by actual information on real events, 
it was considered that weighting has no significance.  For instance, consider the case 
where there were two causal factors to an incident. Suppose that it was the less 
significant factor that led to the accident and not the more high profile causal factor.  
No matter how important a causal factor is in its own right, if it had not contributed to 
the known incident then there is no point in weighting it.  Whatever the causal factor 
that contributed to an incident, would be recognized by the model, and the model 
would then show it in its marginal distribution list, as embedded within the node. 
 
Weighting may however be considered as a influencing factor by the Regulator 
whenever they use the risk data provided by the model for follow up decisions, such 
as legal penalties, revoking a license or providing leniency.  For this purpose, the 
Authority could maintain a “Look up Table” or similar administrative aid to 
complement the information stored in the model.  Before setting the Table, it is best 
to examine through sensitivity analysis which causal factors have the most impact on 
risk.  Sensitivity analysis will be explained in Chapter Seven, Working with Data. 
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6.30.6 Incidents under investigation 
 
Errors and causal factors for those incidents under investigation would not be 
available until the investigation was completed.  CAW Risk Model calculates for known 
data only, yet it is not advisable to ignore any “pending data”.  Therefore flights that 
have had errors, for which investigation findings have yet to be made available, would 
have to be “parked” in a separate area of the database and brought into the main 
database when all the necessary information is available. Meanwhile, they could 
remain in the parking area, and be visible to all concerned.  It is a practical, 
administrative issue and does not affect the way the model computes the risk.  
 
6.31 Combined Cost 
 
This section provides an explanation of the design of the Combined Cost Node (Figure 
6.13).  This node provides information to undertake risk calculation, if risk is to be 
determined using the traditional formula:   
Risk = Probability of the hazard occurring x severity of consequence. ....... 6.1 
The parameter “Cost” is used in general sense to indicate the monetary outcome of an 
error that is either discovered or missed.  It includes the cost of putting matters right 
on discovering an error or of its consequences, regardless of the fact that it might be a 
part of the sunken cost, a new expenditure or an insurance payout.  If error was 
missed and led to an incident, then the consequence could generate bigger costs, 
either to the operator or if not to its underwriter. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.13 - Contributions to Combined Cost Node 
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6.31.1 Combined Cost node design   
 
It should be noted that cost is a continuous variable, but in order to generate 
probability distribution it would have to be discretized, either at data gathering stage 
or if not at the processing stage.  In this model, for simplicity of handling, cost has 
been discretized into Cost Groups at the data handling stage. 
 
The node has 11 cost groups against which cost data can be recorded.  These are 
labelled as “No Cost”, “Cost Group 1”, Cost Group 2” etc to “Cost group 10”.  A 
monetary value is assigned to each group using a “log scale to base 10”.  At present 
the monetary value of the lower end of the scale is zero and the upper limit is £10B, 
facilitating the recording of a full range of costs from a negligible cost of an 
inconsequential error to an extreme high cost of a disastrous consequence.  It is 
recognized that lower end cost groups 1 and 2 and possibly 3 are of no significance; 
nevertheless they are retained here for completeness and to demonstrate the 
concepts.   
 
In a real life application, lower cost groups could be truncated if necessary, and upper 
cost groups could be further subdivided to improve resolution according to the wishes 
of an operator. Moreover new groups could be added to identify even “profits to the 
operator” as it has been suggested by one operator that some accidents end up with 
profits (presumably as insurance payouts). 
 
6.31.2 Cost contributions   
 
Various contributors to the Combined Cost Node are identified in Figure 6.13, though 
it may not necessarily be the full picture. Costs arise from several sources, depending 
on if there was an error, if it was detected, or if it was missed.  A detected error may 
be allowed to lapse, be carried forward or be corrected.  A missed error might remain 
dormant or cause an incident. Delayed or cancelled flights, diversions, engine shut 
down in flight and accidents make large contributions to the cost. 
 
Altogether there could be several thousand permutations based on the number of 
defences, whether an error was detected or missed, the outcome of a detected error 
or a missed error and the monetary gain or loss they could incur. When relevant 
information is input to an individual node, the software allocates the observed data to 
the most appropriate permutation.  
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 6.31.3 Missed errors.  
 
Consequence of a missed error that moves into the flight phase is recorded in the 
Flight & Consequences Node. This node has 7 categories of consequences, but it could 
be more or less according to the level of resolution required. The categories define 
varying severity of consequences, and range from “No Effect” at one extreme to a 
“Fatal Accident” at the other.  Each consequence may have a monetary outcome 
according to its severity, varying from zero to £10B or more. The rank order of flight 
consequences is not matched to the rank order of Cost Groups, but they are mapped 
as permutations in a conditional probability table, i.e. 7 consequences and 11 Cost 
Groups produce 77 permutations.  
 
6.31.4 Detected Errors.  
 
If an error is detected, corrective action can range from no action, an investigation, to 
a near and far term solutions to prevent a recurrence, e.g. simple AMM amendment 
or fleet modifications.   Putting right a detected error could vary from no cost at one 
extreme to several million pounds at the other extreme.  Thus possible consequences 
of a detected error are linked with Cost Groups through different permutations. 
 
6.31.5 Monetary value of consequence of error 
 
Tangible costs.  Only tangible costs can be collected, these being: material, labour and 
consequential losses.   Consequential losses could be the cost impact on the 
operation, i.e. the business turnover, loss of aircraft availability, extra airport fees, 
hotel charges etc, as well as personal injuries.   
  
Personal injury and fatalities.  Cost of injury and fatalities have been considered to 
the extent what lawyers and insurers would agree on a monetary value to 
consequences of injury and loss of life and what law courts agree as reasonable.  
There are guidelines on how these figures are reached116.  However this research 
study has refrained from estimating a compensating value either to loss of life or to 
preventing a fatality, or to injury or what a court might award.  The study simply 
allocated a range of values to cost groups, which might be sufficient to cover any 
foreseen eventuality; it could be extended if necessary. 
 
Intangible costs.  Intangibles such as loss of reputation of the company, the cost of 
emotional suffering of the injured or of the relatives of the dead have not been 
accounted for.  Again, the range of cost groups provided should be sufficient to record 
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losses due to a company going bankrupt resulting from loss of reputation and future 
business.  A company going into liquidation might be a tangible cost. 
 
6.31.6 Output from Combined Cost Node.   
 
The output from the Combined Cost is the probability of the cost occurring in each 
respective Cost Group, based on the operator’s performance up to that point in time 
when the relevant data was collected.  The results could be used to calculate the risk.  
It may be noteworthy that the output from the combined cost node matches the 
definition of risk given by SMM at Section 3.3, i.e. the predicted probability and 
severity of the consequence(s) of a hazard taking as reference the worst foreseeable 
situation. 
 
6.32 Risk output 
At present the model does not provide a risk output as it is traditionally defined, i.e. 
the product of the probability of hazard and severity of its consequence.  Instead the 
model provides a lot more information: the probability of causal factor (this being the 
hazard), the probability of error at critical points in the CAW process, the probability 
of the type of consequence and the probability of a certain cost arising resulting from 
the hazard.  This is a much larger range of management information than a single-
number risk value could provide.  Thus a CEO/AM could have the “X” probability of a 
certain consequence given that the CAW process in his organization carries a human 
error probability of “Y” at the end of the process.  Operators have expressed the view 
that this method of presentation was more beneficial to them than the use of a single 
number.  If he can improve on “Y”, then “X” will improve; thus safety management 
could be objective with a measurable result. 
If a single numerical risk value is needed as a stand-alone parameter then it can be 
obtained as the (mathematical) product of the probability of Cost Group and the 
allocated monetary value to that Group. The lower limit of the cost group can be used; 
other interested parties could well use an upper limit, mean or a lower limit according 
to what they wish to promote.  Since the Cost Groups were based on a log to the base 
10 scale, there is a large differential between the upper and lower limits of the group.  
Therefore, at the end, interested parties should come to a common agreement, say, 
between an operator and an underwriter, on the required degree of resolution and a 
fair definition for the Cost Group.  
 
Risk calculation was not included in the current configuration of the model as it 
terminated at the point of outputting probability values for each Cost group.  A 
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subroutine for this function could be added during the development phase.  
Meanwhile for demonstration purposes, risk calculation was performed manually, 
outside the model.   
 
6.33 Confidence on the structure of the model 
 
Finally, on the question of how much confidence one could place on the model, a vital 
point to be made is whether the ID constructed is the “correct one” for the decision 
situation.  In this regard, Clemen (2000)85 (pp 67) offers important advice.  He states 
that the question pre-supposes that a unique correct ID exists, and goes on to qualify 
by stating that this supposition is not true, because there are many ways in which an 
ID can appropriately represent a decision.   
 
Clemen (2000)85 offers guidance by stating that, instead of the correctness of the ID, 
one should consider if the ID is appropriate or not.  He quotes Phillips (2000): “Phillips 
(1984)99 states that a model can be considered requisite only when (either) no new 
intuitions emerge about the problem, or when the model contains everything that is 
essential for solving the problem.  That is when the decision maker’s thoughts about 
the problem, beliefs regarding uncertainty and preferences are fully developed”.  
Clemen (2000)85 further states that, “A careful decision maker may cycle through the 
model several times as the analysis is refined, part of which will be doing sensitivity 
analysis.  The only way to get to a requisite decision model is to continue working on 
the decision until all of the important concerns are incorporated” 
During the early stages of the research study many different attempts were made to 
arrive at an ID to represent the CAW process, error, consequence and risk, but they all 
failed until the earliest ID constructed that resembled the current family of ID (Figure 
6.2).  Since then there have been different evolutionary stages of the model.  The one 
reviewed by CAA had the same subsystems as the present one, but it contained only 
107 nodes (Figure 6.16). The current generic model has 178 nodes, whereas the model 
offered up for validation trial has been further modified to suit local conditions. 
On the basis of the experience gained in this research study, the following advice is 
also offered to future researchers by way of a qualification to Clemen’s guidance. The 
iterative process is a necessity in any model that has a heuristic root. It is certainly 
essential if structure learning from data precedes model design. Structure learning is 
essential if the process that is going to be modelled has had either no previous 
structure, or if a structure was present and dormant but it had not been recognized. 
To give an example of structure learning, learning the habits and patterns of motorists 
who criss-cross a region going to work in the morning or returning home would 
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require structure learning from data gathered, if that region has not been previously 
surveyed.   
Fortunately this study did not require such structure learning, because CAW process in 
itself already had a structure. It is a process that had evolved from almost 100 years of 
experience in aviation; there is a large reservoir of knowledge and experience of this 
existing process, where a hierarchical and sequential order exists.  The researcher’s 
relevant knowledge and experience in industry has been used for setting up the initial 
structure, and the solution has been progressively stage reviewed by a panel of 
industry expert in order to gain consensus as these experts represented those who 
have the purview for CAW process audits in UK. Their comments and suggestions have 
been incorporated into the model, and in doing so the original layout has been revised 
iteratively.   
Furthermore, the final, generic model has been presented to CHIRP/MEMS Steering 
committee, consisting of safety and quality managers from industry and specific 
aircraft operators who participated in the program.  The solution has been well 
received by them before it was further offered up for validation using field data, which 
will be described later in Chapter Eight.  A similar approach to iteration, based on 
industry experts’ consensus, had been taken in the development of an MCDA/AHP 
type risk model by CAA-NL in which a fish-bone structure had been used to represent 
relationships between abstract qualities of an organization62. 
The current solution, in the form of this model, is more robust than any structure that 
would have been possible with computer based structure learning, because available 
error data for any one organization is insufficient to create a reliable structure. 
That said it is necessary to reflect on the fact that the model is a generic model.  Its 
application to a specific operator may well require minor amendments regarding 
certain nodes, without altering the fundamental structure, as it was the case when the 
model was used in the validation phase.  If the generic model is going to be used for 
setting a bench mark for industry through a pilot study, then it would be necessary to 
agree on the structure of the model by all those participating in such a pilot study, if it 
were to be modified to suit the pilot study. 
6.34 Air cargo subset 
Addressing the needs of the air cargo community a subset of causal factors that 
contribute to risk to the safety of the aircraft has been designed.  They fall outside the 
strict boundaries of CAW processes, usually falling into a domain straddling between 
CAW processes and flight operations.  However human error in the course of 
169
preparing the aircraft for its role could compromise the airworthiness of an aircraft 
that has already been certified as airworthy and has been released to service. 
The subset takes into account errors attributed to conditions in the cargo loading 
environment, cargo loading operation and the state cargo has been restrained in the 
aircraft.  Defences undertaken prior to certifying the load as fit to fly might or might 
not detect any errors. If they were detected, then there would be a consequence that 
could add a cost to the operation.  If error was missed before the aircraft completed 
its Handling & Despatch, and if flight crew too missed noticing it, then it would be 
carried forwarded to the flight.  The error could lead to an incident, or if not either it 
would remain dormant in the aircraft or dissipate with off-loaded cargo provided the 
hazard was confined to the cargo container. 
 
 
Figure 6.14 – Air cargo subset 
 
 
Figure 6.15 – Air cargo subset – Causal factors 
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Figure 6.14 provides the configuration of the BBN for the air cargo subset.  Figure 6.15 
represents the same configuration in the Belief Bar form, exposing the nodes and 
states of nature.  Causal factors considered are tabulated as causal factors 
distribution, i.e. blank form and no data input. It shows equal probability distribution, 
i.e. no bias due to the absence of data. 
The subset is intended to be grafted between the Handling & Despatch node and the 
Combine Cost node.  Figure 6.18 represents the model when air cargo subset is 
included. 
6.35 Output from this chapter 
The principal outputs from the research work described in this chapter are: 
• The model structure representing the hierarchical order of the CAW process, 
influencing factors, and the relationships between process events, errors, 
consequences and risk. 
 
• Taxonomy of events, errors, consequences, causal factors, all embedded in 
relevant nodes of the model. 
 
An electronic digital copy of the model with embedded parameters is in the 
accompanying CD; it requires a NETICA commercial software package to be installed in 
the computer, recommended Version 411 or later. 
The next Chapter will describe how the model could be used with data. 
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Figure 6.16 - Initial Design of CAW Risk Model (now obsolete) 
173
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intentionally Blank 
 
174
  
PtM_SpH_Findings_L2
PtM_SpI_Findings_L1
PtM_SpH_Findings_L1
PtM_SpB_Findings_L1
PtM_SpB_Findings_L2
PtM_SpD_Findings_L2
PtM_SpE_Findings_L1
PtM_SpE_Findings_L2
PtM_SpG_Findings_L1
PtM_SpG_Findings_L2
PtM_SpD_Findings_L1
PtM_SpC_Findings_L2
PtM_SpC_Findings_L1
Part_145_AO_Findings_L2
Part_145_AO_Findings_L1
PtM_SpI_Findings_L2
Part_M_SubPartI_Compliance
Part_M_SubPartH_Compliance
Part_M_SubPartC_Compliance
Part_M_SubPartB_Compliance
Part_M_SubPartG_Compliance
Part_M_SubPartD_Compliance
Part_M_SubPartE_Compliance
Health_and_Welfare
Competence Tech_Knowldg_Skills
Certification_Recert
Personal_Stress
Physical_health
Individual_traits
Part_66_Licensing
Maintenance_Data
Logistic_Support
Task
ToolsAndTestEqpt
Facility_Environment
Workface_Stress
Defence_HandD
Handling_Despatch
CAW_Management
Pt_145_Performance
Compliance_145
Part145_PartM_Compliance
Compliance_M
QMS_Organization
Part_145_QA_Performance
Supplier_QA_Performnace
Part_M_QA_Performance
QA_Performance
PtM_SpC_Cont_Airworthiness
PtM_SpD_Maintenance_Standards
PtM_SpI_Airworthiness_Review
Part_M_Org
Quality_Management_System
OEM_Spares
Pt21_ILS_PtM_interface
RandM_Tests
Production
Maintenance_Manuals
Product_Training Pt21_ILS
Ac_Design
Product
Pt21_SpD_ChangesTo_TC
Pt21_SpB_TypeCertificates
Pt21_SpE_Supplemental_TC
Type_Certificate
Pt21_SpF_ProductionWO_POA
Design_and_Production
Pt21_SpK_Parts_and_Appliances
Pt21_SpQ_IdentifictnProducts
Pt21_SpO_ETSO_Authoriztn
Pt21_SpH_AirworthinessCert
Pt21_SpI_Noise_Certificates
Airworthiness_Certificate
ETSO
Pt21_SpM_Repairs
Pt21_SpA_GeneralProvisio
Pt21_SpJ_DOA
Pt21_SpG_POA
Pt145_Activity_Area
Pt145_Finding_Reporting
Pt145_Corrective_Action
SubContractor_QA_PerformanceSC_Finding_Reporting
SC_Corrective_Action
SubContractor_Activity_Area
Supplr_Corrective_Action
Supplr_Finding_Reporting
Supplier_Activity_Area
PtM_Corrective_Action
PtM_Finding_Reporting
PtM_Management_Activity
Monitor_Effectiveness_of_AMP
Audit_Procedure
Remedial_Action_Procedure
CAW_Management_Activity
MaintenanceContract_Monitoring
QMS_Tasks_Processes
Resources_and_TrngStandards
Quality_Plan_and_Program
CAW_Quality_Policy
QA_Scope QMS_Policy_Plans_Scope
Flt_Ops_Policies
Logistic_Support_Policies
Commercial_Policies
Central_Government
HR_Policies
Trade_Union
PtM_SpB_Accountability
PtM_Pt145_Contract_IntFace
PtM_SpH_CRS
PtM_SpG_CAMO
PtM_SpE_Components
Global_Factors
Local_Government
Business_Management Engineering_and_Technology Human_Resources
Change_Management
Operations MOE
Pt145_Org_PerformanceEng_Ops_PoliciesCEO_AM_DecisionsCorporate_Board LRU_Spares
Manning
Attitude_to_Task
GSE
Training_and_Qualification Health_Fitness
Cont_training Physiological_limits
Pt21_Regulation
Corporate_and_Policy_Issues
Aircraft
AC_Age
Sectors_Flown
Full_Maintenance_Cycles
Ac_Generation_Time
Operational_Role
Route
Nature_of_Operation
Staff_Coimplement
Operation_Vs_Capability
FleetSize_to_TR_Cat_A_Staff
FleetSize_to_TR_Cat_B1_Staff
FleetSize_to_TR_Cat_B2_Staff
FleetSize_to_NonCat_Tech_Staff
Tech_Staff
FleetSize_to_TR_Cat_C_Staff
FleetSize_to_Tech_Managers
Other_Support_Staff
FleetSize_to_Logs_Staff
Registration_No
Geographic_Location_Time
Aircraft_Type_Series_FW
Aircraft_Type_Series_RW
Flight_Origin
Destination
Departure_Time
Defence_PtM
Conseq_PtMConseq_Pt145 Conseq_HandD
Defence_Pt145 Defence_PreTO
Conseq_PreTO
Release_to_Fly Take_Off Flight_and_Consequences Combined_Cost
Task_Managmnt_Docs
Figure 6.17 – CAW Risk Model 
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Figure 6.18 – CAW Risk Model with Air Cargo Subset 
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Chapter Seven  
Model – Working with data 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
A high-level perspective of the role and types of data, and the way they fit into the risk 
assessment methodology was given in Chapter Six and in Figure 6.1. This chapter 
demonstrates how the model works with data.  It will discuss the procedures followed 
for data preparation, their uploading to the risk model and then, the way tests were 
conducted to confirm that the model was working satisfactorily. 
 
Flow Diagram for Data Handling – Methodology
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Figure 7.1 – Flow diagram for data handling 
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7.2 Overview of data handling 
7.2.1 Raw data 
The risk model needs data from error free flights as well as data on errors that occur 
in the organization and human/ aircraft interface during the implementation of CAW 
process. Proactive error data as well as reactive error data are used. They are available 
in various reports of investigations carried out on reported errors, ground and flight 
incidents, quality audit and the Regulator oversight inspection “Finding” reports.  
These reports may contain information that have been already analyzed, and probably 
categorized, by subject experts for different technical management purposes.   
Proactive error data comes from detection during routine CAW process activities, or 
associated support activities; findings from Quality Audits and the Regulator oversight 
inspections are also categorized as proactive for the purpose of this model. Reactive 
error data comes from investigation of incidents. 
All this information collectively constitutes raw data for the purpose of risk 
assessment.  To use this data in the CAW risk model they should be converted and 
transferred to a digital database. 
 7.2.2 Data analysis 
First, raw data should be analyzed and reorganized to a form that is usable for risk 
assessment, taking into account the defined taxonomy for the risk assessment model. 
This task can be handled by a subject expert only, as it requires a full comprehension 
of CAW process, rules and procedures as well as considerable knowledge and 
experience of various subjects: aircraft engineering, maintenance and integrated 
logistic support, aircraft type and associated equipment, organization management 
and human factors to name a few. These analysts must know what the required 
standards ought to be in CAW processes and its management, and industry best 
practices to ensure the airworthiness of an aircraft. 
7.2.3 Database 
There should be a purpose designed database to uptake analyzed and reorganized 
data, and to retain them for use as required. In this occasion a spreadsheet has been 
used for this purpose. The spreadsheet should be designed using proprietary database 
software, such as Excel or Access; this study used Microsoft Excel.  Prior knowledge of 
the taxonomy for the risk model and of the risk model structure is necessary to 
undertake this work. 
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7.2.4 Operating model with data 
When the spreadsheet template is ready, analyzed data could be transferred to the 
spreadsheet, progressively building up the database. In the next step of data handling, 
data from the database containing several thousands of flights could be uploaded into 
the model as a batch file, and then compiled.  NETICA User Guide90 provides 
instructions on the correct procedure, and then how to compile the network.  
A compiled model displays the risk status of the organization linked to the point in 
time to the last input data set.  If it is reasonably close to the current time period, then 
it could be used as indicative of the current status of the organization.  With new data 
input, the status would change, but in practice the rate of change may be 
imperceptible under normal steady safe conditions. However new error findings at 
sensitive nodes could make noticeable differences to the risk level. 
Initial results output by the model are called prior probabilities at each node.  At this 
point the model is ready for drawing inferences and other uses, e.g. to determine 
implications of a new error finding at an upstream point in the CAW  process on the 
error probability at a critical node such as Handling & Despatch. Response to a finding 
is called posterior probability.  For example, a result may be expressed as, “given prior 
probability, if a new error finding was at Task node, then the posterior probability of 
error at Handling & Despatch would be (X) per cent”. X is the new value output by the 
model.   
7.3 Database spreadsheet 
Using information from the raw database, a data file should be prepared either in 
Excel or Access spreadsheet.  This will be the database for the model. 
Columns of the spreadsheet carry the names of nodes of the BBN.  Embedded within 
the nodes are States of Nature for each node.  
The nodes and states of nature have already been pre-defined in the taxonomy used 
for the model, as listed in Appendix 10 and Appendix 12.  The column headings for the 
spreadsheet follow the same pattern, and same order. 
 
Drop down menus designed into the matrix under each node (or column heading) 
enable the operator to select the most relevant information from a multiple choice of 
states of nature.  A specimen of such dropdown menus is shown in Figure 7.2. Full set 
of drop down menus is in Appendix 12.  
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 Figure 7.2 – Specimen drop-down menus for mapping State of Nature data 
Using this arrangement now it is possible to prepare a template spreadsheet to accept 
analyzed data. The first row of data could be set to either “No-Error” or “No-Error-
Probability” as the case may be from each drop down menu. Then by selecting the 
first row of data and dragging down to cover as many rows as desired a large 
spreadsheet could be initialized with “No Error” data.  That means all potential CAW 
process cycles/flights, where there would be no errors, would have been already 
uploaded. This initialization of the spreadsheet should not be construed as an 
incentive to avoid recording data; it is a facility to minimize the effort for recording 
“No Error” data that might be perceived as an unproductive task.  With a pre-
initialized spreadsheet the organization simply tracks progress of CAW process/ flight 
cycles for each aircraft that goes through the organization, and enters only error data 
when they do occur. It is a very simple operation, and maintaining the spreadsheet is a 
very low cost task in man-hours. 
The spreadsheet carries row numbers on the extreme left end column.  Rows of the 
spreadsheet, line by line, represent successive flights launched by the organization in 
a chronological order together with the CAW process started from the end of the 
previous flight.  The CAW process cycle starts on the aircraft’s arrival at the gate and 
finishes on departing from the gate. The flight phase follows on after departing from 
the gate and terminates on arrival at the destination’s gate. That is the full cycle. The 
cycle is repeated, and each row of the spreadsheet represents this full cycle. 
In addition to the row numbers, an organization could record other management 
information such as aircraft registration number, flight identification, location etc, 
which would help to track the progress of organizations flight operation activities. 
However if there are no errors, the risk model does not need this data. They must NOT 
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be uploaded to the model; they can be retained in separate non-active columns for 
local management purposes.  In a more developed commercial model this type of 
separation could be undertaken by programming the software for user interface. 
Thus a full database should contain Error and No-Error information on all the flights 
launched by the organization and its preceding CAW process.  A portion of the 
completed spread sheet is presented in Figure 7.3.  A full spreadsheet can be found on 
the attached CD, File titled: Combi 5_All_Cer2_data for txt file in the Folder titled, 
Integrated Model. Note that drop down menus are usually disabled in a text file. 
 
Figure 7.3 – Portion of the spreadsheet 
7.4 Data capture 
Rules for data capture had to be devised as the study progressed.  This section 
discusses the experience gained, though by no means it is an exhaustive set of rules. 
The listing is not in any particular order.  The following data capture method is 
principally applicable to an AOC Holder with an integrated Part M and Part 145 
organizations, and outsourcing en-route maintenance support from a third party 
contractor. 
7.4.1 General guidelines on data capture 
Data should be recorded for every aircraft operated by AOC Holder, for every CAW 
process cycle/ flight. To enable this, a row in the spreadsheet is dedicated to the CAW 
process cycle/ flight. 
IDNum PtM_SpH_CRPtM_SpI_AirwPtM_Pt145_CPtM_Pt145Pt145_Org_PMaintenancGSE ToolsAndTeLRU_Spares Faci l i ty_EnvLogis tic_SupTask_Mana Manning Atti tude_to_Workface_S
1 No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error_Pr No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error_Pr No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error
2 No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error_Pr No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error_Pr No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error
3 No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error_Pr No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error_Pr No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error
4 No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error_Pr No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error_Pr No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error
5 No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error_Pr No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error_Pr No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error
6 No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error_Pr No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error_Pr No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error
7 No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error_Pr No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error_Pr No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error
8 No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error_Pr No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error_Pr No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error
9 No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error_Pr No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error_Pr No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error
10 No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error_Pr No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error_Pr No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error
11 No_Error No_Error Contract_conError_ProbabNo_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error_Pr No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error
12 No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error_Pr A45_MaintenNot_updatedNo_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error Error_ProbabNo_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error
13 No_Error No_Error Contract_conError_ProbabNo_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error_Pr No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error
14 No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error_Pr A40_Tooling_No_Error No_Error Unreliable No_Error No_Error Error_ProbabNo_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error
15 No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error_Pr A25_FacilitieNo_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error Other Error_ProbabNo_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error
16 No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error_Pr A45_MaintenPoor_access_No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error Error_ProbabNo_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error
17 No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error_Pr A45_MaintenPoor_access_No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error Error_ProbabInaccessible No_Error No_Error No_Error
18 No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error_Pr A45_MaintenPoor_access_No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error Error_ProbabInaccessible No_Error No_Error No_Error
19 No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error_Pr No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error_Pr No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error
20 No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error_Pr No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error_Pr No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error
21 No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error_Pr A30_PersonnNo_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error Error_ProbabNo_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error
22 No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error_Pr A30_PersonnNo_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error Error_ProbabNo_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error
23 No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error_Pr No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error_Pr No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error
24 No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error_Pr A40_Tooling_No_Error No_Error Poor_ControlNo_Error No_Error Error_ProbabNo_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error
25 No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error_Pr A40_Tooling_No_Error No_Error Unreliable No_Error No_Error Error_ProbabNo_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error
26 No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error_Pr A42_AcceptaNo_Error No_Error No_Error Other No_Error Error_ProbabNo_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error
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If there were no errors reported or discovered, nor any error related incident, then 
the row should record No Error data in every cell in the row. 
If an error was reported or detected, then relevant data should be recorded in 
appropriate cells in a row.  
Flight or aircraft identification information should be recorded in relevant cells, only 
when an error has occurred.  If there were no errors, then this type of management 
information must NOT be recorded as model input data. 
If there is an error input, then the causal factor for that error should be recorded in 
the relevant node.  All other relevant information should also be recorded under each 
node, if known. Relevant information to be recorded could be selected from the drop 
down menus.  Only prescribed selections could be made; terms made up by the user 
would not be accepted. 
“No Error” data is accountable.  If a node registers No Error, then it is called “No Error” 
data.  If there is no error, then each node of the spreadsheet would uptake “No Error” 
data.  If the spreadsheet has been already initialized with “No Error” data, then the 
information is already there in position. 
All nodes in a row must be completed with either No Error data or Error data.  If there 
is no information, or data not known then it is best to input a No Error against the 
node; the assumption is that the event/node concern has not contributed an error; it 
gives the organization the benefit of doubt. 
Consequences are based on the actual outcome of the flight and NOT on a worst 
foreseeable scenario as ICAO SMM Chapter 5 “Definition of Risk “suggests29, 38.  The 
final outcome of the CAW process would be known only after the aircraft has arrived 
at the gate of the destination. Until the outcome is known, data entry activity on the 
row should remain open, and at that point it should be closed after entering the final 
set of Flight Consequence and Combined Cost data. 
7.4.2 Quality audit and Regulator oversight Findings 
Errors detected during quality audits or as findings from Regulator oversight 
inspections are recorded on a row placed at a chronological order, matching the date 
of finding.  If it is not related to a specific aircraft, such as a general organizational 
issue, then the record would be entered as an imaginary pre flight CAW process in 
order to take this information into the database.  This technique might not be strictly 
accurate, but it has been devised in order to take into account the positive 
contribution from this defence, because invariably a Finding would lead to an in-house 
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improvement of the CAW process or organization.  Any inaccuracy due to the 
introduction of “phantom flights” would be negligible. 
7.4.3 Multiple causal factors in one node 
A node should record only one selection at any one time, i.e. either a No Error or if 
there was an error, the causal factor. Only one causal factor must be recorded at any 
one time. If more than one causal factor is possible, record only the most important 
and relevant causal factor. 
If it is essential to record a second causal factor, then allocate another row number, as 
if generating a “phantom flight”. 
7.4.4 Incidents under investigation 
Database work assumes that causal factor investigation has been done in each pro-
active or reactive case.  During this research study, existing already completed 
investigation reports were used as raw data.  But in real life, there could be a phase 
lag between availability of causal chain investigation results and the incidence of the 
error line.  Meanwhile it may be necessary to “park” the relevant row, until data is 
available.   The record should be completed, closed and moved to the main database 
after its completion when investigation results are available. 
It is assumed that, there will be an urgency to complete investigations promptly if this 
type of error recording under a new risk assessment concept is adopted by industry.  It 
is acknowledged that in the present system, there is some laxity in getting 
investigations completed promptly. 
The “parking area” concept would prevent the corruption of database, say, due to 
forgetfulness and missing information, or undermined importance due to time delay. 
7.4.5 Relevancy of data and consistency 
All data must come from one identified organization, if it is necessary to assess the risk 
contribution from one organization, like maintenance provider.  If it is an operator, i.e. 
AOC Holder with an integrated Part M and Part 145 AOs, then the risk contribution is 
from the operator and their operation.  
If an operation involves more than one organization, the sectors flown and errors or 
incidents for all aircraft that fell within the operation should be included regardless of 
the fact at which location they originated. This is because the aircraft operator, AOC 
Holder, is responsible for the airworthiness of the aircraft; how they achieve it, say, by 
either using its own Part M and Part 145 AOs or if not out-sourced organizations is 
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immaterial to the model. The model assesses the risk contribution from the AOC 
Holder’s CAW process operation.  There is a node for location data, and that will pick 
up intelligence of out-sourced services, so that the AM/ CEO could effectively manage 
that service according to their performance. 
However if risk contribution from one named organization based at one location is 
considered, such as an MRO, then data should relate to all aircraft handled by that 
organization irrespective of the fact to which AOC Holder the aircraft belonged.  This is 
the case when an AOC Holder has its own Part M and Part 145 organization at one 
location. These AOs may handle own in house aircraft as well as any visiting aircraft.  
Data relating to all handled aircraft should be recorded in the database relevant to the 
organization.  This way, it is possible to ensure that there is a consistent data set for 
the organization, on which risk assessment could be made. 
7.5 Uploading data into the risk model 
The spreadsheet in Excel or Access should be converted to a text file before it is 
uploaded on to the risk model. Following uploading, the model should be compiled 
and this gives a model that has been primed.  NETICA User Guide90 provides 
Instructions for uploading data and compiling the model. 
7.6  Inference 
The primed model displays the status of the organization.  This information could be 
obtained by studying each node of interest.  The information contains “Prior 
Probabilities” for the organization, based on the period of operation to the point at 
which data was collected.   
The model is also ready for inference, or interrogation. For example it could provide 
posterior probabilities in response to a finding in any one node or a series of nodes 
that represent a system failure. But before advancing to such tasks, it is necessary to 
get familiar with the displays, and undertake testing to see if the model behaves 
sensibly. 
7.7 Nodes and “State of Nature” 
In the graphical display of the model, each node (of a NETICA based BBN) is presented 
as a labelled box, with its name displayed. By clicking the mouse on the box, the node 
opens up to reveal a drop down window. 
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Figure 7.4 – Nodes and States of Nature – Equal marginal probabilities 
7.7.1 Pre-initialized values – equal probabilities 
Figure 7.4 is an example of nodes in open form, designated in the style of “Belief 
Bars”.  This portion consists of some elements from “Part 145 AO Routine 
Performance” subsystem.  The example demonstrates the state of nodes prior to 
uploading of data, i.e. pre-initialization state of the model. In each box there is a listing 
of states of nature.  For example, “Workface Stress” is considered as an “element 
level” influencing factor on risk, as it contributes to human error. Here the 
contribution attributed to Workface Stress could naturally exist in one of eight states: 
if there is no stress hence No Error, or if there is an error, then it could be in one of 
the seven remaining states; these seven are the possible causal factors that caused 
the stress.  It may not be an exhaustive list of states, but this is the list specified by the 
taxonomy which is based on experience. 
If new evidence reveals that the states of nature is limiting, then they should be 
amended by incorporating the new state. That would require a program change and 
perhaps a perceptible change of risk level as a result. Therefore it is a task for a 
Bayesian modelling specialist and not for the typical aircraft engineer, unless he has 
been trained in BBN skills. 
Returning to the demonstration above, if there is a possibility of a state, then there 
must be a numerical probability of it happening. The numbers at the right hand side of 
the box are the numerical probabilities, here given as per cent.  Here the indication is 
that they display equal probabilities. That means, if there is no data or any other 
knowledge of the behaviour of the parameter, the program assumes that all the states 
of nature could have an equal probability of occurring.  These are marginal 
probabilities if nothing is known about their behaviour.  If nothing is known about the 
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behaviour, then it is the most reasonable assumption.  However as data is 
accumulated the probability distribution will display bias. 
It can be seen from the boxes for the remaining nodes in Figure 7.4 that the marginal 
probability value can vary according to the number of states of nature in each node.  
Yet they all add up to 100%, allowing for rounding errors and truncation of decimal 
places in this display.  The value 100% represents the certainty of something 
happening, either error or No Error put together, that is the total probability or the 
area under the graph if the situation is represented as a probability density curve.  A 
new finding in the node, as used when interrogating the model for “what-if”, would be 
indicated by a 100% probability against the relevant state. That is because a new 
finding is a certainty that there is an error.  No matter how many states are there, if a 
state has been identified as a possibility, then there will always be a probability of it 
occurring, no matter how small it is. That is the way nature is.   
There is an important lesson to be learnt, when it comes to the Flight Consequence 
node. If a catastrophic accident has been identified as one possible flight 
consequence, then in the calculations, there will always be a small margin of 
probability for it to happen, sooner or later, as a classical risk analyst would say.   
Experience, and therefore data, will eventually show if there is a bias. 
7.7.2 Prior probabilities subject to data input 
In comparison, Figure 7.5 demonstrates the states of nodes, after the model has been 
uploaded with experience (i.e. data) and compiled. 
 
 
Figure 7.5 – Nodes and States of Nature - Output 
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Data input to the model accumulate in each node as they have been assigned.  On 
compiling, the node displays the results in belief bars, and the distribution list gets 
updated, showing bias.  Again, this portion of the model is from the Part 145 AO of 
“Routine Performance” subsystem. The results displayed here are from a simulation, 
and not real data. 
 
This time, the numbers at the RHS of the tabulation indicate the probability 
distribution of causal factors for errors at that node in a given population as well as 
“No Error” (i.e. satisfactory) events.  As anticipated, simulated “No Error” data has the 
highest percentage in the probability distribution, with varying levels of probabilities 
of other causal factors for errors occurring.  These are the marginal probabilities (or 
prior probabilities) for this node, based on the population from which data came. It 
follows therefore that as more and more experience is gained, as more data is added 
to the database, the knowledge on the behaviour of the nodes, as well as of others, 
improves.  
 
This demonstration underscores the value of recording No Error flights/CAW process 
cycles. This is because, in a reasonably safe operation, there is bound to be a much 
faster accumulation of error free CAW process/flight cycles than those, which had 
error reports.  The distribution of probability for No Error and error flights would then 
becomes more representative, and recording of No-Error flights is beneficial to the 
organization in reflecting its performance. 
 
7.8 Guidance on testing 
Before using the integrated model with data, it was necessary to establish what tests 
were to be done on the model to ascertain its integrity.  Literature research failed to 
yield any definitive information on tests, except guidelines provided by Clemen 
(2003)85 that has already been discussed in Chapter Six (Section 6.33). It seems that 
guidelines on standard tests on BBN integrity do not exist, and there appears to be a 
gap in the knowledge as public domain literature currently stands.  This query was 
referred to an experienced BBN practitioner who had once been a member of the 
Genie and Smile BBN software development team, who has substantiated that there 
were no standard tests, and that sensitivity analysis served this purpose, at least 
partially.  
In the absence of specific guidance, the following check list is proposed based on the 
practical experience gained from this research study.  The BBN should be reviewed to 
ascertain if: 
• Logic of the influence diagram is correct. 
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• D-separation exists, between multiple parents’ nodes that feed into child 
nodes. 
• Architecture is complete. 
• The BBN would compile properly when uploaded with data 
 
It was already explained in Chapter Six that parts of the model, in subsystem form, 
were tested to ensure that they have been correctly constructed.   
The most common errors were in spelling and syntax, or not observing the general 
rules for handling the software program at the construction stages. These types of 
error showed up immediately, as the construction could not proceed without 
correcting them immediately; others show up during compiling. 
7.9 Testing subsystems using a specimen database 
It was reported in Chapter Six, that each subsystem was tested for integrity before the 
subsystems were integrated into the model. 
Node No of errors Row numbers  Causal factor 
Pt21  Regulation 
 
3 110 55 65 2 2 2 
Ac  Design 2 60 178 7 2 
R and M  Test 1 116 4 
Production 3 58 90 193 2 2 2 
Product 2 13 84 3 3 
Maintenance  Manuals 17 + (2) 
125 19 126 132 183 40 105 110 163 64 143 
176 15 73 92 72 76 174 197 + (159  69) 
2 2 7 6 3 5 2 8 6 4 6 4 5 4 3 
6 7 3 8 +   (5    8) 
Product  Training 12 
175 131 123 168 101 181 191 136 1 42 79 
76 
3 3 4 2 2 2 4 3 3 2 3 2 
OME  Spares 4 + (1) 192 64 7 77 + (179) 2 4 6 4 +( 4) 
Pt21  ILS 7 21 162 49 108 112 139 173 + 159  179  69 2 
Pt21  ILS  PtM  interface 3 144 158 59 +  (159   179  69) 4 7 2 +  (9  7  9) 
Planning  Scheduling 9 115 156 74 165 143 200 148 26 160 4 4 8 6 7 8 7 4 5 
Resourcing 13 
107 130 93 128 59 75 125 97 149 33 89 67 
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4 3 7 7 4 3 3 6 6 7 5 4 7 
Direction 2 50 171 5 3 
Control 25 + (3) 
96 68 49 62 157 35 53 87 43 164 103 57 84 
121 33 170 4 199 106 72 91 40 24 107 141 + 
(179 159 69) 
4 4 5 5 3 2 2 3 2 3 2 2 5 3 6 
3 2 6 5 5 4 4 2 4 4 + (5 4 6) 
Part  M  Org 12 + (2) 
147 92 155 (179) 139 59 2 50 63 4 184 48 + 
(159    69) 
2 
PtM  Pt145  Contract  
Interface 
14 + (3) 
34 76 154 96 59 142 152 6 182 57 74 132 48 
78+  (159  179  69) 
3 4 6 2 2 6 2 7 5 3 6 4 3 3 +  
(6  2  6) 
 
CAW  Management1 5 + (3) 154 31 155 120 137 + (159 179 69) 2 
Release  to  Fly 3 159 179 69 2 
 
Table 7.1 - Testing performance net - Part 21 and Part M elements 
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Each subsystem was tested by uploading simulated data to ensure that they compiled 
properly and to check if they produced meaningful results.  Errors discovered during 
this process were corrected through modifications to the network.  Data used in these 
trials were simulated using a random number generator, to identify the rows 
(representing CAW process /flight cycle) where errors occurred out of a limited 
population (201 rows).  The number generator identified the row numbers and causal 
factors. A specimen error table simulated this way is presented in Table 7.1.  The 
numbers in brackets identify those errors associated with system failures; they have 
been bracketed to assist tracing. 
The data is for testing the Routine Performance subsystem for Part 21 product 
support elements together with associated contractual interfaces between Part 21, 
Part M and Part 145 organizations, represented by BBN in Figure 7.6. 
 
Figure 7.6 – Part 21 Routine Performance subsystem 
 
 
Figure 7.7 - Part 21 Performance - Support Contract Interfaces 
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This dataset was transferred to a spreadsheet, uploaded and compiled to give prior 
probabilities; prior conditional probability values for few nodes in the form of belief 
bars are presented in Figure 7.7. Only some of the nodes have been exposed for 
demonstration purposes in order to reduce clutter. 
Values of prior probability at each node, for No Error condition, are tabulated in Table 
7.2. The only way to test the accuracy of the results is to manually calculate them, as it 
was done in Chapter Five, Section 5.11.9. In this situation, attempting a manual 
calculation is unreasonable because it is very complex and impractical. For example, 
CPT for Part M Org node contains several hundred combinations of parent and child 
nodes’ parameters; it is this complexity that drives BBN applications to be computer 
based.   However, this situation posed a challenge, “How does one know that the 
program is calculating correctly?” 
Node Num of errors 
Num of 
No-error 
No error 
Flat rate % 
No error 
Conditional  
Prior Probability % 
Pt21  Regulation 3 198 98.5 98.0 
Ac  Design 2 199 99.0 94.5 
R and M  Test 1 200 99.5 97.2 
Production 3 198 98.5 97.6 
Product 2 199 99.0 91.6 
Maintenance  Manuals 17 + (2) 182 90.5 80.8 
Product  Training 12 189 94.0 87.8 
OME  Spares 4 + (1) 196 97.5 89.2 
Pt21  ILS 7 194 96.5 86.5 
Pt21  ILS  PtM  interface 3 198 98.5 87.4 
Planning  Scheduling 9 192 95.5 92.3 
Resourcing 13 188 93.5 90.9 
Direction 2 199 99.0 94.8 
Control 25 + (3) 173 86.1 84.1 
Part  M  Org 12 + (2) 187 93.0 82.1 
PtM  Pt145  Contract  Interface 14 + (3) 184 91.5 81.9 
CAW  Management 5 + (3) 193 96.0 92.2 
Release  to  Fly 3 198 98.5 96.4 
Table 7.2 – Comparison of prior probability at nodes for No Error – Part 21 Performance  
Literature research did not reveal a definitive answer to this question; Clemen 
(2003)85 responded to it qualitatively but not quantitatively. In this study, it has been 
shown in Chapter Five, Section 5.11 that NETICA’s calculation of conditional 
probability is accurate for a small group of nodes. In that case the next step is to 
consider if this accuracy is carried forward through the network. Contemplating on 
this problem, a rule of thumb method emerged that can be used to gain confidence; it 
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is done by observing the pattern of behaviour of prior probabilities propagating 
downstream as they interact with error observations in relevant downstream nodes.   
The pattern was initially detected as a visual observation, and subsequently noted that 
it can be demonstrated as follows.  Table 7.2 provides prior conditional probabilities, 
as well as the flat rate probabilities for the same nodes, based on the number of 
errors/ no errors observed against a base of 201 CAW process cycles/ flights (i.e. the 
number of rows in the database).  In order to observe the pattern better, no-error 
counts, flat rate probabilities and conditional probabilities have been plotted on a 
graph at Figure 7.8. Flat rate probability values for each node have been used as a 
reference, because it can be easily calculated manually. Once, the pattern was set for 
the flat rates, one can observe how conditional probability values propagate through 
the network relative to the reference flat rate. X-axis scale automatically set by Excel 
only for the comparison of patterns, and not for reading the values.  
 It can be seen how the flat rate varies in response to variations of No-Error counts, 
but it is more interesting to observe that the conditional probability values vary in 
harmony. In this case it can be seen that the relative deviations of conditional 
probability values from the reference line on the graph are larger than the flat rate 
values.  This behaviour is consistent and there are no glitches or sudden jumps to 
excessive peak or trough values that would possibly indicate anomalies.  
 
Figure 7.8 – Propagation of No-Error probabilities across the BBN 
Similar tests were done on some of the other systems of the network with different 
configurations, and they were found to be behaving the same way.  One other 
specimen result is given below for the Size of Operation Vs Capability subsystem, in 
which four separate groups of nodes feed into form a larger subsystem.  For the tests, 
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501 CAW process cycles/flights were used.  The behaviour patterns for the four 
individual groups are shown in Figures 7.9 to Figure 7.12, and for the combined group 
in Figure 7.13.  Relevant data are in Table 7.3. 
Node Num of errors 
Num of 
No-error 
No error 
Flat rate % 
No error 
Conditional  
Prior Probability % 
Aircraft Group     
Aircraft_Type_Series_FW 0 501 100 96.7 
Aircraft_Type_Series_RW 5 496 99.0 97.7 
Registration_No 5 496 99.0 96.7 
AC_Age 5 496 99.0 97.1 
Sectors_Flown 5 496 99.0 97.1 
Full_Maintenance_Cycles 5 496 99.0 97.1 
Aircraft 5 496 99.0 91.6 
Operation_Vs_Capability 5 496 99.0 90.7 
Nature of Operation Group     
Ac_Generation_Time 5 496 99.0 98.4 
Operational_Role 5 496 99.0 97.5 
Route 5 496 99.0 98.2 
Nature_of_Operation 5 496 99.0 96.9 
Operation_Vs_Capability 5 496 99.0 90.7 
Geographical Location Group     
Flight_Origin 5 496 99.0 96.5 
Destination 5 496 99.0 96.5 
Departure_Time 4 497 99.2 96.9 
Geographic_Location_Time 5 496 99.0 94.9 
Operation_Vs_Capability 5 496 99.0 90.7 
Manpower Resources Group     
FleetSize_to_TR_Cat_A_Staff 3 498 99.4 98.8 
FleetSize_to_TR_Cat_B1_Staff 3 498 99.4 98.8 
FleetSize_to_TR_Cat_B2_Staff 3 498 99.4 98.8 
FleetSize_to_TR_Cat_C_Staff 1 500 99.8 99.2 
FleetSize_to_NonCat_Tech_Staff 2 499 99.6 99.0 
FleetSize_to_Logs_Staff 3 498 99.4 98.8 
FleetSize_to_Tech_Managers 2 499 99.6 99.0 
Tech_Staff 5 496 99.0 97.2 
Other_Support_Staff 4 497 99.2 98.5 
Staff_Complement 5 496 99.0 96.9 
Operation_Vs_Capability 5 496 99.0 90.7 
Table 7.3 –Prior probability at nodes for No Error – Operation Vs Capability  
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 Figure 7.9 - Aircraft group - Propagation of No-Error probabilities 
 
Figure 7.10 - Nature of Operation group -- Propagation of No-Error probabilities 
 
Note that in the graphs for each of the individual groups, the right hand end 
terminating point is affected by interaction with the remaining 3-groups. The 
combined group, Figure 7.13, shows a certain amount of rippling effect in the area 
where the 4-individual groups begin to interact with one another. Even so, the 
deviations can be explained by observing the number of No-Error incidents, 
confirming that the underlying theoretical calculation of conditional probability was 
progressing smoothly. 
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 Figure 7.11 - Geographical location group - Propagation of No-Error probabilities 
 
 
 
Figure 7.12 - Manpower resources group - Propagation of No-Error probabilities 
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 Figure 7.13 - Combined subsystem - Propagation of No-Error probabilities 
The inference drawn from this observation is that the BBN computed results appear to 
be sensible.  It is a rough check for gaining confidence that the computation software 
is doing its task properly, given that the proprietary software program algorithms and 
codes are not accessible to customers for their auditing. 
Similarly, all other subsystems were checked out for accuracy, before the integrated 
model was run using a combination of data sets, 501 CAW process cycles/ flights.  
However, on this occasion, 2 non fatal (i.e. major) accidents were introduced into the 
dataset, as it is a simulation and more data was needed to see how the model behaves 
with data.   
This data file is too large to be incorporated into the report as it cannot be reduced in 
size while retaining legibility. However it has been included in the attached CD, in 
Folder for Subsystem Tests.   
Figures 7.14 to 7.20 demonstrate the tested status of each of the subsystems; Figure 
7.21 (at the end of this chapter) presents the fully integrated model. 
The results confirm that, given input conditions containing a high concentration of 
error incidents, the error probability at the exit end of each BBN is of the correct order 
as anticipated.  This is of course not the scale of error probability that would be 
anticipated in a safe commercial environment.  These results represent simulations to 
check if individual subsystems and the integrated model would work properly with 
data. 
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The belief bars, exposed, register the prior probabilities for the nodes concerned. The 
results indicate that each subsystem is returning sensible prior probability values for 
each relevant node consistently, and provides confidence on the integrity of the 
network architecture. 
 
 
Figure 7.14 - Operation and Capability 
  
 
Figure 7.15 - Corporate Policy and Change Management 
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Figure 7.16 - Change Management 
 
 
Figure 7.17 - Compliance Part M and Part 145 AO 
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Figure 7.18 - Compliance Part 21 AO 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.19 - Performance Jointly Part M, Part 145 
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0.20
0.20
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 Figure 7.20 - Quality Management System 
 
7.10 Overview - using the risk model 
The integrated model, when uploaded and compiled, provides a snap shot of the 
dynamically stable state and the level of risk of that organization, which the error and 
no-error data represent.   The state is represented by the prior probability of Error or 
No Error at each node.  A dynamically stable system may already contain an unknown 
number of dormant errors and new error incidents, but the state is safe, as the effects 
of errors are considered to be either insignificant or are suppressed by design safety 
factors and defences built into the system.  The system is dynamic because the CAW 
process, together with its participants, is continually in a state of transient.  All 
organizations that safely conduct their civil aviation flight operations and engineering 
operations according to Regulation are expected to have dynamically stable systems.  
A significant flight or ground consequence would indicate that the dynamic stability 
has been compromised and tending to become unstable. 
The model provides prior probabilities of error at nodal points of the CAW process on 
the basis of historic data up to that point in time.   Each nodal point also provides the 
probability distribution of causal factors that contributed to errors.  All this 
information could be either read off directly by examining the model, or be 
interrogated.  In Figure 7.21 some of the nodes have been exposed in “Belief Bars” 
mode to illustrate the steady state prior probabilities.   
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Senior managers of an organization would be interested in the error probability at 
critical nodes, e.g. those representing Release to Fly, Handling & Despatch, and 
Takeoff.  They might also focus on the probability of occurrence of various potential 
consequences of different levels of severity, conditional upon an initial dynamic 
stability of the system, and how they vary with errors elsewhere. Probability of error 
at each of these last 3-nodes is critical to the determination of risk at the output from 
CAW process, given all other error contributions and defences at upstream points. 
As more new data are captured and processed, the model gets updated. Accordingly, 
the state should theoretically change but, in practice, in an organization that is 
dynamically stable and safe, the change might be hardly perceptible.  However if 
changes become perceptible and significant, then it can be deduced that instability of 
the process is taking place somewhere within the system and this calls for an 
investigation to determine where the instability is taking place. In fact the model will 
show the sensitive spots which may be the roots of instability. 
Sensitivity analysis, which will be described later in this section, helps to determine 
the nodes that might be likely sources of instability.  This together with a node’s 
probability distribution of causal factors will enable to pinpoint the source of 
instability, and to determine priorities for corrective actions. 
The model can be used for drawing “what-if” type inferences according to posterior 
condition input nodes.  This technique can be used for prediction purposes, i.e. for 
investigating the effect of any changes to an already dynamically balanced state of the 
organizations CAW process. This can be done by clicking the relevant causal factor at 
the chosen node, and by observing its effect at the end of the process, say, at 
Handling & Despatch node, or for that matter its effects on any other node in the 
model. 
The same process could be followed to determine the effect of multiple findings, such 
as that would occur if a number of errors line up as that would occur in a system 
failure.  In this case findings could be made at several nodes in a causal chain and the 
effect at the critical node could be observed.  Naturally, if the output is not 
acceptable, i.e. exceeds a pre-determined threshold value, then urgent corrective 
actions should be taken. 
Specimen readings from a primed model are given below and can be examined on the 
software files in the Folder for Integrated Model. Refer to CD File: DJ CAW Risk 
Model_Combi 5_All_Ver2. 
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7.11 Steady state 
Table 7.4 and Table 7.5, which should be studied together, provide a specimen set of 
results corresponding to the steady state of an organization.  
For demonstration purposes, only a few of the critical nodes of the CAW process have 
been selected; Table 7.4 Column (b) lists their prior probability of an error being 
“present” or “not present”.  These nodes represent critical milestones of the CAW 
process, i.e. at the Output of an aircraft from Pt 145 Organization, Completion of CAW 
Management by Pt M Organization, Releasing an Aircraft to Fly, Completion of 
Handling & Despatch and prior to Takeoff.  
Given that CAW process is susceptible to human error, it is possible that some 
dormant errors from upstream activities of the process might have been carried 
forward to these nodal points.  But these nodal points are defended, therefore some 
of the dormant errors might get detected and resolved, and others might be missed.  
Moreover, it is also possible that new human errors could get introduced due to 
manual intervention. Therefore the resultant error probability at the successive critical 
nodal points could fluctuate with experience, as recorded. 
Status at key nodes Prior probability % 
Posterior probability % (due to findings) 
Wrong 
funding 
decision 
Dormant 
error in 
aged 
aircraft 
Pt 145 LRU 
Spare - 
Faulty PMA 
part 
Pt 145 Task – 
Poor 
maintenance 
practice 
a b c d e f 
Part M Org      
No Error Probability 91.53 86.9 91.53 66.8 84.3 
Error Probability 8.47 13.1 8.47 33.2 15.7 
Pt 145 Performance      
No Error Probability 82.8 71.9 82.8 51.6 37.5 
Error Probability 17.2 28.1 17.2 48.4 62.5 
CAW Management      
No Error Probability 88.2 82.5 88.2 71.0 66.0 
Error Probability 11.8 17.5 11.8 29.0 34.0 
Release to Fly      
No Error Probability 90.4 86.7 90.4 79.2 76.0 
Error Probability 9.61 13.3 9.61 20.8 24.0 
Handling Dispatch      
No Error Probability 87.4 82.5 79.8 81.8 81.1 
Error Probability 12.6 17.5 20.2 18.2 18.9 
Take Off      
No Error Probability 92.6 90.2 88.8 89.8 89.5 
Error Probability 7.45 9.81 11.2 10.2 10.5 
 
Table 7.4 - Probability of Error at Key Nodes (Italics indicate change) 
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Usually, practical CAW process activities on an aircraft terminate at the end of 
“Handling & Despatch” event, unless the aircraft had to return to the gate or the 
aircraft captain called for any running repairs.  Therefore “Handling & Despatch” is an 
appropriate point where the final probability of error attributed to CAW could be 
assessed. 
Once an aircraft is despatched and before takeoff, the flight crew could discover a 
previously undetected CAW.  In this case the aircraft might either return to the gate 
for disembarking passengers, or if not it might undergo a running repair while 
passengers remain on board; however if the flight crew decided that the error was not 
serious enough to delay the takeoff then the flight might continue without 
interruption. 
 
Alternatively, if there was a dormant error and yet, if it was not detected at takeoff, 
then the error would be carried forward. The flight might either continue safely to its 
destination or, if not, experience a flight incident with further consequences. 
 
Status at key nodes 
Prior 
probability % 
Risk = Error 
Probability x 
Consequence 
Posterior probability % and Risk 
Wrong 
funding 
decision  
Delta 
Risk 
Error 
related to 
an aged 
aircraft 
Delta risk 
( a ) ( b ) ( c ) ( d ) ( e ) ( f ) ( g ) 
Flight and  Consequences  
No Error 92.1  89.9  88.7  
Flt Completed Error CF No  Cost 0.80  1.0  1.11  
In Flt Shutdown Flt Completed 1.43  1.82  2.04  
Incidence RTB 1.43  1.82  2.04  
Incidence Flt Diverted 1.43  1.82  2.04  
Non Fatal Accident 2.05  2.63 +0.58 2.97 +0.92 
Fatal Accident 0.80  1.0 +0.20 1.11 +0.31 
Combined Cost (Including cost 
of detected errors) 
 
No Cost 84.7 0 82.9  81.9  
Cost group 1  >  £10 1.54 1.5p 1.71  1.80  
Cost group 2  >  £100 1.67 £1.67 1.84  1.93  
Cost group 3  >  £1,000 1.68 £16.80 1.84  1.93  
Cost group 4  >  £10K 1.56 £156 1.76  1.87  
Cost group 5  >  £100K 1.61 £1610 1.84  1.97  
Cost group 6  >  £1M 1.64 £16.4K 1.90  2.04  
Cost group 7  >  £10M 1.39 £139K 1.56  1.65  
Cost group 8  >  £100M 1.39 £1.39M 1.56  1.65  
Cost group 9  >  £1B 1.39 £13.9M 1.56 +£1.7M 1.65 +£2.6M 
Cost group 10   >  £10B 1.39 £139M 1.56 +£17M 1.65 +£26M 
Table 7.5 - Consequences and Risk (Italics indicate change) 
 
204
Table 7.5, under “Flight and Consequence”, lists consequential effects of errors carried 
forward in a flight, as well as those detected during the CAW process and prior to take 
off.    
 
There could be a range of different consequences, which, according to past 
experience, could be represented as different prior probability densities, Column (b). 
Associated with in-flight consequences and detected errors prior to take off is a cost 
element.  All these cost elements have been pulled together under Combined Cost.  In 
this simulated exercise they were test estimates (arbitrary figures) that fell within cost 
bands rather than actual costs. 
 
If both the probability of consequence and its numeric value (in this case the cost) are 
known, then the risk could be determined as a single figure.  But as explained in 
Chapter Two and Chapter Three, risk is conditional.  Experience would show that 
conditions prevailing in an organization could produce any one of several possible 
outcomes at different occasions, and Consequence nodes reflect the full range of 
possibilities and their probability density distribution. 
 
The output “Combined Costs” is a good representation of the overall cost of error, 
irrespective of the fact that errors end up either as incidents or are detected in the 
process and managed. 
 
These outputs jointly provide full information on the risk level of that organization 
based on its performance, which may be more meaningful and of interest to AM/CEO 
than a single number risk level.    
 
A manager familiar with the model could choose any one of these nodes from the 
model, to examine its status in order to gain an insight to the overall performance of 
the organization.  The error probability data at different significant process stages of 
the organization, consequences as well as range of probability values of cost of 
consequence can be made available.  Some of the nodal points of the process are both 
safety and business critical to the operation.  These are “Release to Fly, “Handling & 
Despatch” and “Takeoff” points.  The more upstream nodal points are indicative of 
primary root causes and dependent error sources where corrective actions and 
funding priorities might be needed. 
 
Should an AM/CEO call for a single number risk level for the organization as a Key 
Performance Indicator (KPI), e.g. the maximum risk or an average, the highest risk and 
mean of the probability range could be obtained.  
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7.12 Prediction 
 
Given a prior condition, it is possible to use the model to make predictions, for 
example to determine the effect of a potential new error in any of the input nodes, 
which is referred to as a “Finding”.  “Finding” is either a detection of an error, a 
consequence, or a change of condition to a dynamically stable process system, such as 
an error of judgment in decision making.  A decision relating to either a reduction of 
funding, manpower resources, or a hasty engineering operation forced on by time-
pressure and commercial consideration is a case in point. 
 
By simply selecting the relevant node and causal factor the model will compute the 
effect of the conditional change of state on the error probabilities at critical nodes of 
interest and their potential consequences.  Thus the risk level information is available 
to the organization and its managers.  This new state is called “Posterior Probability”. 
 
Table 7.4 Columns (c) to (f) and Table 7.5 Columns (d) and (f) demonstrate the way 
probabilities at critical nodes change in response to change of conditions at upstream 
nodes, in these examples a single change of conditions has occurred.  Similarly 
multiple errors or a simulated causal chain could be induced to determine the error 
probability at critical points, potential consequences and hence risk. 
 
Whether or not the states predicted are acceptable or not is a matter for the AM/CEO 
of the organization and the national authority.  This thesis will discuss that issue in 
Chapter Nine.  It is reasonable to state that there should be an agreed benchmark.  
Though it might be difficult to negotiate a benchmark, it is technically possible. This 
model provides a management tool that enables the setting up of such benchmark for 
the individual organization and possibly for the industry. 
 
7.13 Dynamic state 
 
Steady state snapshot and capability to predict is not the end of the story for this 
model. Conditions of the organization change with time, and therefore the risk level.  
The complete interactive CAW process is in a dynamic state and therefore the 
database must be kept updated continually in order to gain information on the 
organizations risk level.   
 
Thus, the model recognizes the fact that the risk level of an organization could 
fluctuate from moment to moment, but from a management viewpoint the objective 
is to maintain the risk level below an accepted threshold, or better still, to gradually 
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reduce it, ideally to zero risk.  The model provides this capability to monitor and 
manage the risk level almost in real time, and therefore the risk assessment can be an 
on-going live process based on a systematic rationale rather than on a periodic review, 
if any, that usually precedes an oversight inspection. 
 
7.14 Sensitivity test 
 
Sensitivity tests can determine how sensitive the risk level is to input parameters.  In 
this case input parameters are the errors that occur in the CAW process, in 
compliance with regulation as well as shortfalls in defences such as quality audits. The 
tests pinpoint which nodes (i.e. events and causal factors) have an impact on critical 
nodes of interest, and what their order of importance is.  Sensitivity of any identified 
node/ parameter to changes in another node/ parameter can be tested by making a 
“Finding” at the input node (i.e. the independent) and then by observing the response 
of the critical node of interest (i.e. the dependent).   
 
Having identified the dependent and independent nodes to be examined, the test 
starts with the steady state.  With a finding made at each parameter of the 
independent node, the maximum and minimum values of the response at the 
dependent node can be observed.  
 
The exercise can be repeated for each one of the remaining independent nodes in 
turn, observing the response at the dependent node. By examining the range of 
responses, and amplitudes, it is possible to determine which of the independent 
nodes have the greatest response at the dependent node.  Based on these results, the 
independent nodes can be ranked in the order of their importance. 
 
Sensitivity test on the nodes of a complex network can be extremely tedious if it were 
to be undertaken manually, node by node. Therefore, NETICA software has been 
designed to perform this function such that it can test all the nodes and their states of 
nature rapidly.  All nodes could be sensitivity tested to determine which ones are 
significant or critical to the CAW process or the CAW management or business 
function. 
 
The software reduces the results and presents them as a metric called “Reduction of 
Entropy” which is a measure of sensitivity.  Larger the entropy reduction assigned to a 
node, greater is the sensitivity.  Advanced statistical theories relating to sensitivity 
tests used in NETICA are described by Spiegelhalter (1989)89 and Neapolitan (1990) 
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page 394100, whilst the theory relating to Reduction in Entropy has been explained by 
Pearl (1988) page 321101.  
 
The practical procedure for undertaking a sensitivity test with NETICA program is 
explained in the NETICA User Guide.  A small part of a sensitivity test output is 
reproduced below for demonstration purposes, Table 7.6.   
 
Probability ranges Min Current Max RMS Change 
No error 0.08333  0.9207      0.9881        0.2375     
Safe flight-error carried forward 0.001988      0.008046  0.08333      0.02136    
In flight shut down 0.001988     0.01425      0.1667       0.04324    
Incident returned to base 0.001988 0.01425     0.1667        0.04324    
Incident – Flight diverted 0.001988  0.01425      0.1667       0.04324    
Non fatal accident 0.001988 0.02046       0.25         0.06511    
Fatal accident 0.001988     0.008046      0.08333      0.02136    
         Entropy reduction = 0.2836 (47.4 % 0f 0.59873 max given in Table 7.7) 
Table 7.6 - Sensitivity of 'Flight and Consequences' to findings at 'Takeoff' 
 
In this example, the selected independent node is “Flight and Consequences”.   The 
output is based on 501 simulated CAW process cycles/ flights used for testing the 
model.  The test checks the sensitivity of “Flight and Consequences” node to Error and 
No Error inputs from the preceding node “Takeoff”. 
Current values are the prior probabilities following uploading data and compiling.  Min 
or Max values are the probabilities taken by each of the parameters (states of nature 
of Flight and Consequences node) when Takeoff node’s state of nature has either the 
minimum probability value or the maximum probability value respectively. 
For instance, “Takeoff/No Error” takes a min value, if a finding is made in 
“Takeoff/Error”.  This would give a corresponding min value in “Flight & 
Consequences” at “No Error”, and gives max value in “Flight & Consequences/Other 
States of Nature”.  Similarly, “Takeoff/ No Error” takes a max value when it is 100%.  If 
there is certainty that all flights at “Takeoff” are free from error, this could be 
indicated by making a finding and that would give a maximum value to “Flight & 
Consequences/No Error”, and minimum values to the remaining states of nature of 
that node.  
RMS is the root mean square, which is the square root of the average of the values 
squared; it gives information on how each state of nature in the query node (i.e. 
“Flight & Consequence”) behaves in response to changes in variable node (i.e. 
“Takeoff”).  The larger the value of RMS change the greater the sensitivity.  In this 
case, “No Error” state is the most sensitive to change in “Takeoff” conditions, with 
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sensitivity decreasing in non-fatal accident, followed by the group of 3 consequences 
(“In-flight shutdown”, “Return to base” or “Flight diverted” and the least sensitive 
final group(“Error carried forward” and “Fatal accidents”).  Careful observation of the 
error pattern and common sense judgment would probably have given the same 
answer but in retrospect, quantitative data from the analytical process provides a 
higher level of confidence than that is attributable to expert judgment.    
This form of analysis could be repeated for each of the nodes in the model. 
NETICA uses the “entropy change” to measure of sensitivity of the entire node.  
Entropy change could be visualized as its level of instability or readiness to change, 
hence its sensitivity.  
Entropy reduction (designated I) has been defined as the mutual information between 
the query variable (in this case “Flight and Consequences” designated as Q) and the 
varying variable (in this case “Takeoff” designated as F) measured in bits.   
Norsys Software Corporation, in a private correspondence, has provided this study 
with the underpinning mathematical analysis as follows: 
Reduction of entropy I = H(Q) – H(Q|F), where H(Q) is the entropy function for query 
node:  This is the summation of P(q)log2P(q) for each state of Q, from 1 to n. 
𝐻(𝑄) =  ∑ 𝑃(𝑞). log𝑃(𝑞)𝑛𝑞=1  ..............................................  7.1 
H (Q|F) is the entropy function for query node, given probability of variable occurring. 
This is the summation of P(q|f)log2P(q|f) for each state of Q, from 1 to n and for each 
state of F, from 1 to n. 
𝐻(𝑄|𝐹) =  ∑  𝑛𝑞=1 ∑ 𝑃(𝑞|𝑓). log𝑃(𝑞|𝑓)𝑛𝑓=1 ..........................  7.2  
𝐼 =  ∑  𝑛𝑞=1 ∑ 𝑃(𝑞|𝑓). log𝑃(𝑞|𝑓)𝑛𝑓=1 /𝑃(𝑞).𝑃(𝑓) ....................  7.3 
 
NETICA program undertakes this complex calculation and outputs the result as an 
Entropy Reduction for the query node related to the variable node.  Unless the 
variable nodes were specified prior to the sensitivity test, NETICA outputs Entropy 
reduction associated with all the nodes in a descending order.  Transcribed below are 
the first 20 variable nodes and the entropy reductions associated with the query node 
Flight & Consequences, Table 7.7. 
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Node Mutual  Info 
Flight and Consequences 0.59873      
Take Off  0.28358      
Combined Cost  0.19423      
Handling and Dispatch  0.13358      
Release to Fly 1   0.02057      
Operation Vs Capability 0.01971      
Defence Pre TO   0.01794      
CAW Management 2      0.01165      
Quality Management System   0.00777      
Consequence  Pre-TO        0.00738      
Defence Handling and Dispatch        0.00658      
Pt 145 Performance   0.00424      
Aircraft               0.00410      
Geographical  Location and Time      0.00236      
Consequence Handling and Dispatch   0.00234      
Defence Pt M      0.00174      
Nature of Operation  0.00140      
Staff Complement  0.00139      
Attitude to Task  0.00132      
Pt145 Org Performance 0.00124      
Table 7.7 - Specimen output from sensitivity analysis 
Taking this concept forward, Table 7.8 lists the relative sensitivity of output at a 
number of query nodes in response to various input parameters, e.g. “Combined 
Cost”, ”Takeoff” and “Handling and dispatch”.  In each situation the top-ten nodes 
that have the most significant impact on the selected query node are listed in 
descending order. 
 
7.15 Significance of sensitivity test 
 
Sensitivity tests are significant for the direction and control of a process system 
through identifying and monitoring Key Performance Indicators (KPI).  The test helps 
to determine which of the nodes are important, and which other nodes have the 
greatest impact on them.  In a very complex organization, it is not possible for the 
higher management to monitor all aspects of the process, and then they should resort 
to identifying one or few nodal points of importance.  This capability is of interest to 
the AM/CEO in order to identify those KPI that AM/CEO or his deputy ought to 
monitor for the welfare of his organization that depends on the integrity of end 
product, this being flight safety.  
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Rank 
 
Combined Cost Take Off Handling and Dispatch 
Finding at Node 
Entropy 
Reduction = 
Sensitivity 
Finding at Node 
Entropy 
Reduction = 
Sensitivity 
Finding at Node 
Entropy 
Reduction = 
Sensitivity  
( a ) ( b ) ( c ) ( d ) ( e ) ( f ) ( g ) 
1 
Flight & 
Consequences 
0.194 
Flight & 
Consequences 
0.284 Take Off  0.169 
2 Take Off  0.150 H & D 0.169 
Flight and 
Consequences 
0.134 
3 H  & D  0.078 Combined Cost 0.151 Combined Cost 0.078 
4 
Consequence of 
Detected Error at 
H & D 
0.051 Release to Fly 0.026 Release to Fly 0.067 
5 
Consequence of 
Detected Error at 
Release to Fly 
0.048 
Operation V 
Capability 
0.025 
Operation V 
Capability 
0.065 
6 
Consequence of 
Detected Error at 
Release to Pt M 
0.046 Defence Pre TO 0.022 
CAW 
management 
0.025 
7 
Consequence of 
Detected Error at 
H & D 
0.043 
CAW 
Management 
0.015 Defence H & D  0.022 
8 
Consequence of 
Detected Error at 
Pre Take Off 
0.032 QMS 0.010 
Pt 145 
Performance 
0.014 
9 
Consequence of 
Detected Error at 
Pt M Org 
0.030 
Consequence of 
Detected Error 
at Pre Take Off 
0.009 
Aircraft related 
errors 
0.013 
10 
Consequence of 
Detected Error at 
Pt 145 Org 
0.025 Defence H & D 0.008 
Task  related 
errors 
0.009 
Table 7.8 - Sensitivity test results 
 
Deep within the process are other nodes where often those errors at the bottom of 
“the error iceberg” reside. Local managers who are responsible for these process 
subsets could check the sensitivity of their output to related inputs, quite often 
affected by policy decisions.  Management reports that are supported by factual 
numeric data rather than speculation and guesswork should improve communication 
with AM/CEO. 
 
It should be stated here that performance indicators for organizations derived through 
sensitivity tests could be different from one organization to another.  This is because 
every organization has a unique behavioural pattern that generates different error 
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probabilities and consequences in addition to the variation of natural conditions that 
lead to incidences.  Traditionally the uniqueness has been termed the “culture” of the 
organization either for a lack of suitable terminology to describe its individual 
signature.  Whilst this study refrains from generating another terminology to replace 
“culture”, through the model, it provides a rationale to explain why such differences 
exist.   
 
Human behaviour and variability of conditions are such, one cannot expect uniformity 
between organizations.  Human errors occur despite regulation and standards.  It is 
not always possible to achieve an error free ideal, because human behaviour and error 
occurrence do not follow or cannot be controlled by dictate. One possible way 
forward for improvement is to give organizations the right tools to prove that 
whatever their culture, they could monitor their performance, gradually improving 
their own signature and eventually turnout an error free, safe aircraft consistently.  
This study provides an insight to this truth. 
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Figure 7.21 -Integrated CAW Risk Model 
213
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intentionally Blank 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
214
Chapter Eight 
Model validation using field data 
 
8.1 Validation trial 
 
The CAW Risk Model was validated using field data from a commercial, civil aviation 
operator, designated as Operator X.   The aim of the validation trial was to investigate 
if the model has value as a practical risk assessment tool in industry, whereas its short 
term objective was to ascertain if the model could be used with currently available 
field data, and if the results were meaningful and sensible.  Presenting the outcome of 
the trial in the closing phase of the research study, this chapter describes the 
challenges that had to be overcome and how they were addressed. 
 
8.2 Preamble on Model   
 
To recap on the previous work, the generic CAW Risk Model used for validation is a 
maintenance-centred Bayesian Belief Network, which represents factors that 
influence the continuing airworthiness process of a commercial aircraft. The model at 
this point contained 175 nodes and 1,094 parameters.  The nodes represent various 
elements of the CAW process, where errors, defences or consequences of error occur.  
In order to provide maximum coverage of process events and causal factors of error, 
as many of them as practically possible have been taken into account, whilst 
acknowledging that there might be some unforeseen gaps in the coverage.  If so, then 
the model should provide a way of dealing with the unknowns.  This issue will be 
addressed later.   
 
At each node, its states of nature define if an error is present or not according to the 
taxonomy of causal factors designed for this model. Some nodes record management 
information, such as type and registration number of aircraft or the maintenance 
station where the error had occurred. 
  
The model has been designed to capture information about the CAW process that 
takes place between consecutive flights as well as the consequences, i.e. if the CAW 
process was error free or erroneous, if the error was detected and defended or if 
missed then what the flight or ground consequence was. Data capturing is repeated 
sector by sector consecutively.  
 
Despite the models capability to capture a wide range of data, only few nodes will be 
actually needed at any one time to record information relevant to an error 
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occurrence.  All other nodes would simply record “No Error” status, because they have 
neither contributed nor indirectly related to the error occurrence. If the CAW process 
between two consecutive sectors flown did not show up any errors, then all nodes 
would register “No Error” information.  
 
Errors captured by the model fall into 3 categories according to the way they were 
discovered and reported. 
 
•  Reactive errors, revealed as a result of an investigation into a ground or 
flight incident to an aircraft, equipment or to personnel. 
 
• Pro-active errors, which are either recognized as they occurred or 
discovered by personnel in the course of their normal work.  Some of these 
errors might have occurred on an unknown date and time, and could have 
remained dormant until their discovery. 
 
• Errors detected as a result of an oversight inspection or a routine local 
quality audit.  These were grouped under pro-active category for the 
validation trial. 
 
ERRORS
New errors
Dormant Errors
Proactive
Discovery
 
Missed errors
Consequences:
Either none or ground or flight incident
Cost implications
Revealed by investigation or reported by staff
Missed errors, indicate laxity  in safety standards
Detected and reported by staff.
Immediately defended or
May be allowed to fly and resolve later
No effect on the schedule, or
Might have an outcome on the scheduled flight
Cost implication
Defended errors, credit to the organization
Reactive
Investigation 
 
Figure 8.1 – Error incidents according to how detected 
 
All errors, if detected, are expected to be defended.  Obviously, those errors detected 
before an aircraft is released to fly would improve flight safety, which is a credit to the 
organization. Depending on their potential consequences, some detected errors might 
be documented and be authorized to be carried forward as deferred defects until a 
suitable opportunity was found to correct them provided that they do not undermine 
flight safety.  
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Conversely, missed errors underscore the fact that the organization should improve 
upon safety standards. Errors, detected as a result of investigation, might have already 
had a detrimental consequence, but defending them even retrospectively would be 
important to prevent recurrence, and to promote flight safety. 
 
All errors, missed or detected, would have an eventual cost implication.  Missed errors 
that are either detected after “release to fly” or lead to incidences during the flight 
phase could have a significant cost impact.  A timely detected and defended error 
might be dealt with lightly, so far as the affected flight is concerned.   
 
Provision has been made in the model’s design to collect cost data, despite that the 
industry does not appear to be interested in collecting cost data related to human 
error.  Several organizations informed this study that they did not maintain specific 
cost data related to maintenance human error. Generally costs are absorbed into the 
standing maintenance cost overhead on the belief that separate accounting may be 
uneconomical.  
 
8.3 Field data source requirement 
 
According to the research objectives, the model was to be used to determine risk in 
continuing airworthiness attributed to human-error.  Whatever the hazards attributed 
to human error that comes from one approved organization, their contribution to risk 
can be assessed by the model.  It then becomes a measure of reliability of the 
organization own performance. Concurrently, the model identifies contributions from 
other external influences, organizations and processes that might have generated the 
root causes of the error.  Data flow must be continuous and causal chains identify 
both internal and external error sources.  
 
The model can be utilized by one approved organization such as an MRO that provides 
Base servicing support to a number of aircraft operators, as in Figure 8.2. All data that 
is taken into account for risk calculation must come from that one named 
organization, and those related to it where causal chains extend to others, such as 
Part 21 POA or DOA.  However, the risk calculation for the organization should be 
based only on those errors attributed to the approved organization and its staff.  If not 
it would be unfair to the organization.   All error occurrences and consequences ought 
to be captured and it should be possible to authenticate the event and details through 
documentary evidence to safeguard the reliability of data. 
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Figure 8.2 – Synergy between maintenance organization and operators 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.3 – Synergy between operator and maintenance organization 
 
Where an AOC Holder undertakes flying operations that involve more than one 
approved organization, as in Figure 8.3, the model can be used to measure the 
reliability of the overall operation instead of one approved organization providing 
maintenance support.   In this arrangement, the model can be used to determine the 
risk to continuing airworthiness from a complex network of maintenance 
organizations, whose operation is coordinated by one AOC Holder.  This is in fact the 
reality for most fleet operations that contains a large amount of route flying within a 
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pre-planned network.  In this situation, the focus of attention is the AOC Holder and 
his fleet and the risk is measured against the named fleet.  Therefore, all the input 
data must be related to that named fleet, regardless of the fact where or in which 
maintenance organization the CAW errors occurred or discovered. 
 
8.4  Exclusion of public domain databases 
 
Data from public domain accident investigation databases such as UK AAIB, NTSB, 
Canadian Transport Safety Board, have been excluded from validation trial as 
unsuitable data.  This type of database did not maintain all relevant data for the whole 
fleet or a particular organization, year on year.  Any useful data for this study must be 
linked to a specific maintenance organization or fleet, and they must be continuous, 
complete and accountable.    
 
8.5 Potential data source options 
 
Given these conditions, the study faced one of its main challenges, that was, “how to 
obtain authentic error incidence data from operators and maintenance 
organizations”.  Through background research, it was known that approved 
organizations were required by regulations to maintain a register of maintenance 
error occurrences as part of their Maintenance Error Management System (MEMS), 
UK CAA CAP 562 Leaflet 11-5051.  All error occurrences, regardless of their severity of 
consequences, are recorded here, even though only a few of them might be 
investigated subject to the discretion of organization’s management. Nevertheless, 
MEMS database was considered more likely to provide the study with a fully 
documented and reliable record of error occurrences, as well as detailed investigation 
reports where possible.  This database, together with information on error-free 
sectors flown and other aircraft utilization data would give the study a capability to 
calculate error probabilities. 
 
Key items in the required data list were details of maintenance errors encountered, 
findings of quality audits and compliance oversight inspections, together with their 
supporting information. Information regarding the operator’s organizational structure, 
its general procedures relating to engineering operations, types of aircraft, roles, and 
staff complement were examples of supporting data.  Appendix 9 lists the full details 
of data items that were desired and or requested. 
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8.6 Potential participants 
 
Identification of the type of data needed was only part of the challenge. The other 
part was the identification of operators that was willing to participate in the validation 
trial by supplying relevant data.  This is because MEMS data were considered as 
proprietary data by their owners, and UK CAA had agreed to this status.  As such, 
general public had no right of access, particularly when the owners considered that 
they are commercially sensitive and are unwilling to divulge their experience to third 
parties.   
 
Recognizing these potential difficulties that might be encountered, early attempts 
were made to canvass support from the industry.  These efforts were primarily 
focused on briefing operator’s safety managers through UK Flight Safety Committee’s 
Maintenance Sub-Committee and CHIRP MEMS group, and concurrent direct 
approach to selected operators. 
 
UK CAA and CHIRP/MEMS were helpful in providing introductions to potential 
participants. Initially there was considerable interest from some operators to find out 
what is involved in this work.  Later the interest waned as they begun to realize that 
the research methodology extended into organizational factors that has a significant 
impact on the errors at work face, and that causal chain analysis would put managers’ 
roles under scrutiny.   
 
The very nature of CHIRP/MEMS points to the existence of a culture in the industry 
where occasionally mistakes are covered up by management, employees are not 
allowed to speak up or formally report mismanagement or error, and employees fear 
reporting error because of intimidation or threat to their job security.  In fairness it 
should be said that this is NOT the norm for the industry, but the existence of 
malpractices are known throughout the industry.  That is why “safety culture” is an 
important topic in flight safety or human factors training. 
 
Unfortunately for the research study, other external factors arose that adversely 
affected data gathering phase.  With the onset of economic down turn and “credit-
squeeze” started in late 2008, operators considered this type of research for which 
their support was canvassed were, for them, non revenue generating diversions.  
Therefore requests for support were not well received.  Ironically, it was also a period 
that investigations on two major accidents put the industry in the defensive and 
closed their doors to outsiders investigating internal methods.  
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One was the crash landing of a Boeing 777 at London Heathrow Airport (See Appendix 
2) which, mercifully, narrowly missed from becoming a major disaster.  The other was 
the publication of the Haddon-Cave enquiry report102 that reviewed broader issues 
surrounding the loss of the RAF Nimrod MR2 aircraft XV230 in Afghanistan in 2006.    
These events were not helpful to the study from a data capture viewpoint, but they 
underscored the importance of research studies of this nature that relate to 
structured approach to assessment of risk in flight safety. 
 
Although Haddon-Cave report referred to a military aircraft accident under war 
operational conditions, it focussed on some historical aspects of safety design and 
safety management of the project at its design, and inception to service, and so casted 
the limelight over organizational factors that led to the accident.  The report was very 
revealing on the mismanagement and intimidation of staff analysts by managers in 
authority in order to achieve program timescales and stage payments whilst ignoring 
detailed design safety issues and requisite investigations102.   
 
The traditional slow migration of technical staffs and management methods between 
different employees in aerospace industry, military and civil aviation means such 
malpractices could well exist in the wider civil aviation industry in UK.  They may be 
the real face of poor safety culture that exists beneath the external veneer that is 
more attractively presented to the public.  It was into such an industrial environment 
that this research study was introduced, whose prime need was to have free access to 
safety data and investigations that provides an insight to a company’s culture, 
attitudes and in some cases shortfalls in the processes and regulatory compliance.  
 
While the study made an open invitation to participate to a wide range of commercial 
operators, nine specific commercial organizations were invited directly to participate 
in the study, by providing maintenance error data.  Six of them were Air Operator 
Certificate (AOC) Holders. Three were Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul 
Organizations (MRO).  Recognizing the potential availability of good quality data, one 
defence establishment and a defence industry establishment was also invited. 
 
In the event only 3 organizations responded positively and others were patchy, as 
summarised in Table 8.1.  Some started off well, but withdrew later, offering various 
reasons for their inability to continue, whereas some others were evasive or if not 
obstructive. The nature of response or the lack of it may well represent the industry’s 
attitude to this very sensitive subject of human error.  Ironically, without their 
realisation, negative responses were in fact positive data for a study in soft science, as 
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it is in this case. It enabled the study to assess varying attitudes, culture, sensitivity, 
secrecy and fears that exist in civil aviation industry. 
 
No doubt all organizations placed safety at highest priority, but when it comes to 
business the standard statement from senior managers was “Safety? Yes, but not at 
any cost” implying that there is a financial limit beyond which their safety measures 
cannot be funded. The impression given was that human error exists and cannot be 
fully eliminated; operators do whatever is possible to control human error but as a 
business interest and self protection it is best to keep the lid down and the public to 
be unaware of the extent of error that prevails in their organizations. Organizations 
appeared to fear that divulgence of this type of information would make them 
susceptible to liability claims as well as exposure to poor publicity that might make 
them less attractive to travelling public. 
 
It was very gratifying that a large operator provided a Director level interview 
explaining at length their safety policies and attitudes towards regulation, as well as 
their new directions in oversight.  But when it came to sharing data they withdrew 
access on ground of economy. Another large operator allowed a casual meeting with a 
Director; but despite their promise, follow up requests were either ignored or 
blocked.  Much later on in the study, when relevant information became available 
from another source, the researcher realised that he had unwittingly touched on an 
issue that was sensitive to the airline, of outsourcing C-Checks to a Far East country. 
 
Interestingly, some organizations remained in touch with the progress of the model 
development and then withdrew support.  Some claimed the economic down turn and 
lack of man power to support our request, but it was also obvious that they, especially 
the middle managers, were feeling uncomfortable about the concept of investigation 
along causal chains. Causal chain type analytical investigations would cross normal 
management boundaries that inhibit progress of in-house safety engineers who are 
usually subject to local industrial disciplines, despite that they have direct access to 
AM/CEO.  
 
Transparency of causal chain investigation is generally seen as a threat by middle 
managers, because where it is correctly due, the model fairly transferred 
responsibility for errors from the human/ machine interface at the LAE level to 
organization and management structure.  This could be a point of contention and a 
loss of interest to those managers who usually tend to look for faults with the work 
force but rarely within themselves. 
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It was an uphill struggle to get the operators interested into researching into an area 
which they consider to be very sensitive and guarded.  Naturally, the expressed view 
was that it was commercially sensitive from the viewpoint of competition and that 
their opponents should not get to know their information.  But in reality, from the 
nature of the discussion and how communications were handled later, it can be 
inferred that the resistance was mainly for self protection.  One very experienced 
Senior Safety Manager warned that this type of data collection would be detrimental 
to the business interests of an organization, as underwriters would want to examine 
the data with respect to declarations and liabilities.  In contrast, one airline that 
supported the study was not only willing to share its data with others, but was also 
interested in setting up a national data bank and a forum where data could be shared.  
His main argument was that safety is not a commodity owned by one operator; public 
would be served better if lessons learnt from incidents are shared with other 
operators.  
 
Of the 3-organizations that formally agreed to provide data and participate, one 
regional operator was extremely helpful in the early phases of the study that enabled 
the design and development of the pilot model. Unfortunately, they did not 
participate in the full validation trial and failed to respond to requests.  One other 
organization who provided data was an MRO, but it was not possible to obtain a full 
and consistent set of historic data because they had no access to their clients’ aircraft 
historical data.  In the event, the model was validated in only one environment, which 
provided a comprehensive set of data, without any hold ups or reservations regarding 
access to data.  However, data were released under a confidentiality agreement that 
data source would be dis-identified and any published report would be desensitized.  
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Type of 
Organization 
Type of Operation 
Initial 
Approach 
Response 
Closure 
Date 
Remarks 
AOC 
Large passenger operator – 
short, medium and long range - 
worldwide 
Sep 07 
Policy level discussion with Eng Director. Withdrew support at 
GM Engineering Services level, quoting labour shortage. 
Jul 09 
Economic downturn and inability to provide labour to 
extract data were quoted reasons 
AOC 
Large passenger carrier. Long 
haul -  worldwide  
Jan 08 
Allowed informal meeting with Eng Director, promised to 
follow up.  But repeated reminders were ignored 
Dec 08 Eliminated as unwilling to cooperate 
AOC- Airline A 
Regional passenger operations. 
Short and medium range  
Oct 08 
Fully supportive at Director and Safety Manager level. Provided 
archival data for pilot studies. Complete error history withheld.  
Jul 10 
Wider data set for validation failed to materialize 
within timescale 
AOC  -  
Operator X 
Large air cargo operator world 
wide 
Jun 09 Fully supportive at MD and Safety Manager levels Jul 10 Provided a full set of data with uninhibited access 
AOC  Business jet operator Mar 09 
Initially unresponsive.  Eventual meeting with safety manager. 
Claimed no data in error register.  
Apr 09 Self protecting, denying and reluctant data source. 
MRO 
Maintenance of business jets 
and large air transport  
Mar 09 
Expressed a view that MRO not responsible for CAW 
management.  No error records available.  Promised to discuss 
with QM and respond but not returned. 
Apr 09 Self protecting and reluctant to provide data 
MRO 
Maintenance of large air 
transport 
Sep 08 
Provided set of data of events within organization. Back up 
data not available due to aircraft being external customers. 
Presentation of generic model well received. 
Aug 09 
Initial set of a data incomplete due to inability to track 
subject aircraft.  Research effort shifted to full set of 
data from another AOC.   
MRO 
Maintenance of large air 
transport 
Sep 09 
Interviews at Technical Manager and QM level.  Could only 
provide desensitized and abridged results of investigation and 
no internal reports 
Oct 09 Eliminated as an unsuitable data source 
CHIRP MEMS 
Group 
Air operators and MROs all 
types MEMS information 
sharing committee 
Sep 09 
Presentation of generic model well received. But non 
responsive to open request for participation in validation trials. 
Jul 10 
Unresponsive to open invitation. Variable interest with 
some members very keen and supportive, and others 
evasive. 
AOC  
Large air cargo operator world 
wide 
Sep 09 
Correspondence and telephone calls from contact point about 
difficulties and lack of internal cooperation. Promised 
interview with Safety Manager; it did not materialize 
Apr 10 Eliminated as an unsuitable data source. 
Table 8.1 – AOC Holders and MROs invited to participate in validation trials 
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8.7 Data from Operator X   
 
The Operator X is an Air Operator Certificate Holder, operating large freighter aircraft 
of modern design, established as one European regional arm of a global network.  Its 
role is to provide serviceable aircraft to meet the transportation requirements of the 
parent company by pre-positioning aircraft and flight crews at designated locations of 
the network.  The fleet’s international routes network covered all of Europe, with 
some flights going beyond Europe to south and east, and to North America.  
 
At the parent support base, this operator had an integrated maintenance 
management organization licensed under EASA Part M as well as a Part 145 licensed 
organization that carried out aircraft maintenance tasks, flight preparations and 
handling. At outstations, aircraft were maintained by either a third party contractor or 
another sibling organization of the parent company.  In depth Base Maintenance such 
as “C Check” was undertaken by external service providers, i.e. dedicated MROs.   
 
The services of outstation contractors and MROs were managed through appropriate 
interface contracts between Operator X and the contractors. Quality of maintenance 
was subjected to quality audits by Operator X’s Quality Audit Department. 
 
UK CAA had a standing responsibility to oversee the Operator X’s maintenance 
organization in order to ensure that they remain compliant with regulation.  
Furthermore, as an IATA member, Operator X has undergone an IATA Operational 
Safety Audit (IOSA) that was subject to periodic reviews. 
 
The operator’s Safety Department maintained a computer database (“Safety Net”) of 
error incidence and investigation reports for all their aircraft, irrespective of the 
location where errors were detected, diagnosed or rectified. In addition, it kept 
records of error incidence on all aircraft handled by the parent base, irrespective of 
the fact that some of those aircraft belonged to other aircraft operators.  Furthermore 
the Quality Audit Department maintained another database, which stored quality 
audit findings related to the fleet and to internal and external organizations that 
maintained these aircraft, as well as UK CAA “Findings “on non-compliance with 
regulations.  Together, these two databases were able to provide a good insight to the 
way AOC Holder conducted its affairs to ensure that their aircraft were flown safely. 
 
Full uninhibited access to these archives was allowed and it was evident that the 
organization was methodical, serious and objective, comprehensive and thorough, in 
setting up these databases.  Although Operator X has been in existence for more than 
20-years, their Safety Net- based database had been in use for only 26-months at the 
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time of this investigation.  All the available data was released for analysis.  Summaries 
of relevant error occurrences, less audit findings, extracted from the two databases 
are in Appendix 13, and listings in Table 8.27 and Table 8.28 at the end of this chapter. 
 
From a preliminary analysis of data it was possible to separate relevant information 
into two groups. 
 
• The first group consisted of those errors encountered on fleet aircraft during 
their maintenance at any location in the company’s route operating network 
or at the dedicated MROs.  With this information for the fleet operation, it was 
possible to determine the probability of error presence at critical nodes such 
as Handling & Dispatch, probability of its Consequences and their Cost impact, 
and finally the Risk.  A manager might be able to use this information to gauge 
how safe the fleet was with respect to the reliability of people who 
participated in the continuing airworthiness of the fleet. 
 
• The second group are error incidences that either occurred or found by the 
base station staff on any aircraft that they had handled, i.e. the company’s 
own aircraft and any other visiting aircraft.  Therefore this group of error data 
helps to assess the risk contribution from one specific maintenance 
organization to any aircraft that it maintained during the relevant period. The 
probability of a presence of an error on an aircraft at the point of its “release 
to fly” may be taken as a measure of the reliability of the organization in 
maintaining continuing airworthiness.  
 
Statistical data derived from the 2-groups are tabulated in Table 8.2 and Table 8.3. 
 
The generic CAW Risk Model, without the air cargo subset, was used for validation 
because cargo handling error data were not made available.  Prior to up taking data, 
the model was modified as follows: 
 
• Deleted 4 nodes from Operation & Capability. One had no relevance to the 
operation and the other four were intended to desensitize input data.  These 
were: Aircraft Type& Series RW; Sectors Flown; Operating Role; Destination. 
 
• Added 1 node to Part 21- Part M Interface, namely Pt 21_ Pt M Product 
Support Contract. Added 2 nodes to QMS exit end, namely: Defence Quality; 
Consequence Quality.  Added 1 node PtM_Pt145 Contract Interface. These 
were refinements.  
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The risk model composed of 175 nodes, 204 links and 2,948,941 combinations of 
parameters, see Figure 8.18, located at the end of this chapter. 
 
Parameter Jan 08 – Dec 08 Jan 09 – Feb 10 Jan 08 – Feb 10 
Sectors flown 16032 18240 34272 
Detected errors 3 54 57 
Dormant errors 7 63 70 
Incidental error lines 10 117 127 
CAA Findings L2 6 3 9 
QA Findings L2 34 23 57 
Total audit findings 40 26 66 
Total  number of errors 50 143 193 
Total lines 16072 18266 34338 
Simple error probability x 10E-03 3.111 7.829 5.621 
Table 8.2 - Fleet maintenance operations 
 
Taking the 4th column in Table 8.2 that represents the entire period, it can be seen 
that the fleet has flown 34,272 sectors.  During this period 127 errors had been 
observed of which 57 were recorded as detected. The remaining 70 were dormant 
errors.  A “Detected” error is defined as one that either occurred or observed and 
reported by personnel.  It could be a new occurrence or, if not, a recurring-fault that 
has been previously misdiagnosed.  A “Dormant” error is one that had occurred 
sometime in the past but remained obscured or undetected, carried into the flight 
phase unknowingly and later resurfaced and discovered. Some of the errors 
categorized as dormant errors in this study had been detected by the engineers, 
whereas other dormant errors have been recognized as a result of the research study.  
Of the 127 errors, 99 had gone past handling and despatch, takeoff and into the flight; 
some of these were replication of the same error that either remained undetected or 
had its root cause unknown and unresolved. 
 
In addition, 64 audit “Findings” had been reported as part of the Quality Audit process 
as well as 2 “Findings” as part of regulatory oversights.  If they were not audit/ 
oversight inspection “Findings”, most likely they would have been transmitted to the 
flight phase as undetected errors.  However in this instance, they were detected and 
defended, and for the purpose of the research study considered as pro-active error 
occurrences that were defended. 
 
Statistics for the period 26-months, when categorized into 2 separate periods show 
that the error records were fewer during Jan – Dec 08.  This might have been partly 
due to genuine reasons of fewer error occurrences, but also it could be due to the 
reporting system not being properly utilized, perhaps due to unfamiliarity.  The MEMS 
reporting system had been in operation since Yr 2000.  But the IT database (Safety 
Net) had been in use only since 2008.  Certainly by 2009, IT base (Safety Net) was 
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being fully utilized, as evident in the volume of data and distribution.  This was the 
situation for fleet maintenance operations.  In the case of base station maintenance 
operations, error occurrences were fewer and so consistent with the fewer sectors 
launched from this organization. Therefore the average error probability for base 
station errors was similar to that for the fleet. 
 
 
 
Parameter Jan 08 – Dec 08 Jan 09 – Feb 10 Jan 08 – Feb 10 
Sectors flown 3781 3213 6994 
Direct errors 1 6 7 
Dormant errors 0 0 0 
Incidental error lines 1 6 7 
CAA Findings L2 1 1 2 
QA Findings L2 14 3 17 
Extra error lines 15 4 19 
Total  number of all error Lines 16 10 26 
Total lines 3796 3217 7013 
Simple error probability x 10E-03 4.214 3.108 3.707 
Table 8.3 – Base station MO operations 
 
 
8.8 Analysis and uploading 
 
Using data from detailed investigation reports it was possible to determine the 
primary and secondary causal factors as well as the causal chain, according to the 
taxonomy established for the model. A few specimen results are at Appendix 13, and 
the remainder in the spreadsheet.  
 
Results of this analysis were uploaded to separate spreadsheets representing “AOC 
Holder Maintenance Operations” and “Approved Maintenance Organization 
Activities”.  Columns of the spreadsheet represented the nodes of the model. Drop-
down menus embedded into the nodes offered parameters against which errors, 
defences and consequences could be recorded.  For the full spreadsheets, see 
software CD/ DVD, in the Folder titled “Ops X validation”, Excel files. See file list in List 
of Software. 
 
8.9 Input Cost data   
 
Designing a cost model was not within the study’s remit, but the study identified 
elements that might contribute to a cost model.  Operators were neither willing to 
provide cost data nor had any clear idea of how to record cost of error, which usually 
is considered as part of maintenance cost.  Operators did not have explicit human 
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error cost data.  Therefore this study used very rough subjective estimates based on 
the researcher’s experience; without that it would not have been possible to make 
progress with demonstrating this part of the risk model.  
 
Fortunately, most of the encountered errors and their investigation reports indicated 
that the investigations themselves were the most frequent outcome from the 
occurrence.  Except for a few cases, corrective actions had been subsumed by routine 
maintenance; therefore associated cost could not be identified. Similarly, there were 
no records of consequential costs but rough estimates were made to cost aircraft 
downtime resulting from the repair or corrective actions.   
 
In order for the study to proceed, estimates were made using a rule of thumb.  About 
one man-week labour was allocated for an investigation, cost £1,000, even though the 
elapsed time for completion might have taken several months.  In most cases, the 
consequential cost was the loss of use of aircraft for half-a-day, for which £50K was 
allocated.  These values could have been more or less, but as the objective was to 
prove the concept, the actual values did not matter.  If data was made available by the 
operator, then it would have been possible to allocate them to the right location. 
 
8.10   Results 
 
By compiling the model using uploaded data, probability of error occurrence at each 
node has been calculated.  Separate calculations have been done for data relevant to 
“AOC Holder Maintenance Operations” for the entire fleet and for one “Approved 
Maintenance Organization”, namely the parent base station.   Results of the 
calculations are stored in each node, and could be read off as required.  Refer to 
software CD for BBN network with compiled input data, Folder “Ops X Validation” BBN 
files.  The calculated probabilities are called “prior probabilities” of error occurrences 
and they represent the organization’s experience over the defined period, i.e. a 
snapshot of the performance at the end of this timeframe. 
 
8.10.1 Prior probabilities for fleet maintenance 
 
For “AOC Holder Operations” Table 8.4 presents the calculated prior error 
probabilities for a number of nodes selected from the “Consequences” sub-system as 
these are the most critical for flight safety.  These are in fact critical nodes at the 
advanced stages of the CAW process before an aircraft is released to service, at the 
point of its release and the stages before the aircraft takes off. The model has 
calculated the values No Error Probability and Error Probability, at each node, 
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according to the data collected during the respective periods.  The same information 
is presented graphically in Figure 8.4 and Figure 8.5, the latter magnifying part of 
Figure 8.4 representing small probability values. Note that graphs are meant to 
demonstrate patterns and scales of the range, and not for interpolation. 
 
Status at Key Nodes 
Prior Probability Based on Experience % 
Jan 08 – Dec 08 Jan 09 – Feb 10 Jan 08 – Feb 10 
Part M Org 
No Error Probability 99.7 99.7 99.8 
Error Probability 0.29 0.26 0.16 
Pt 145 Performance 
No Error Probability 99.4 98.7 99.3 
Error Probability 0.60 1.32 0.75 
CAW Management 
No Error Probability 99.5 98.862 99.3 
Error Probability 0.54 1.138 0.66 
Release to Fly 
No Error Probability 99.6 98.93 99.4 
Error Probability 0.40 1.07 0.61 
Handling Dispatch 
No Error Probability 99.3 98.86 99.3 
Error Probability 0.66 1.14 0.73 
Take Off 
No Error Probability 99.6 99.6 99.8 
Error Probability 0.37 0.40 0.24 
Table 8.4 – Prior probabilities at key nodes - Fleet maintenance operations 
 
 
 
Figure 8.4 – Prior probabilities at key nodes - Fleet operations 
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Figure 8.5 – Prior error probabilities at key nodes - Fleet operations 
 
Prior probabilities of incidents occurring during the flight phase based on past 
experience are shown in the upper half of Table 8.5; the lower half presents 
probabilities of the monetary consequences of error, i.e. the Cost.   
 
Status at Key Nodes 
Jan 08 – Dec 08 Jan 09 – Feb 10 Jan 08 – Feb 10 
Probability Risk Probability Risk Probability Risk 
Flight and Consequences % £ % £ % £ 
No Error 99.6  99.6  99.7  
Flt Completed Error CF No  Cost 0.25  0.38  0.23  
In Flt Shutdown Flt Completed 0.028  0.01  0.005  
Incidence RTB 0.028  0.014  0.008  
Incidence Flt Diverted 0.028  0.01  0.005  
Non Fatal Accident 0.028  0.01  0.005  
Fatal Accident 0.028  0..01  0.005  
 
Combined Cost (Including cost of disposing detected errors) 
No Cost 98.9 0 97.8 0 98.6 0 
Cost group 1  <  £10 0.090 0.009 0.20 0.02 0.12 0.012 
Cost group 2  <  £100 0.094 0.094 0.21 0.21 0.12 0.12 
Cost group 3  <  £1,000 0.21 2.1 0.33 3.3 0.27 2.7 
Cost group 4  <  £10K 0.17 17 0.27 27 0.20 20 
Cost group 5  <  £100K 0.090 90 0.22 220 0.13 130 
Cost group 6  <  £1M 0.090 900 0.20 2K 0.12 1.2K 
Cost group 7  <  £10M 0.090 9K 0.20 20K 0.12 12K 
Cost group 8  <  £100M 0.090 90K 0.20 200K 0.12 120K 
Cost group 9  <  £1B 0.090 900K 0.20 2M 0.12 1.2M 
Cost group 10   <  £10B 0.090 9M 0.20 20M 0.12 12M 
Table 8.5 – Prior probabilities at key nodes - Consequences and Risk – Fleet maintenance 
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The rationale for presenting cost of the consequences of error in “Combined Cost” 
node was given in Chapter Six, Section 6.31.   The output from the Combined Cost is 
the probability of the cost occurring in each respective Cost Group, based on the 
operator’s performance up to that point in time when the relevant data was collected.  
The results could be used to calculate the risk. 
 
Graphical presentation of data, prior probability of various Flight Consequences, is at 
Figure 8.6;  to improve clarity the indiscernible portion of the graph (i.e. low 
probabilities) are magnified in Figure 8.7.  
 
 
Figure 8.6 – Prior probabilities in Flight & Consequences node - Fleet maintenance 
 
 
Figure 8.7 – Prior probabilities at Flight & Consequences node - Fleet maintenance 
 
Data for the Combined Cost node are represented graphically in Figure 8.8 and Figure 
8.9. 
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 Figure 8.8 – Prior probability of Cost Group Combined Cost - Fleet maintenance 
 
 
Figure 8.9 – Prior probability of Cost Group Combined Cost – Fleet maintenance 
 
8.10.2 Risk information for fleet maintenance operations 
Risk data are presented in Figure 8.10 and Figure 8.11.  For clarity, part of the graph 
Figure 8.10 has been magnified and presented in Figure 8.11. 
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Figure 8.10 – Risk values for each Cost Group - Fleet maintenance 
 
 
Figure 8.11 – Risk values for each Cost Group - Fleet maintenance 
 
How does one interpret risk data?  It is demonstrated below with examples. 
For example, if Cost Group 6 is taken, whose upper limit is £1M, the probability of that 
level of cost occurring as a result of CAW error is 0.12% at the next flight, based on the 
experience to this point in time when the last set of data was input.  This in itself is a 
risk value. If 1,000 flights were launched at that point, there is bound to be a 
consequence whose costs would add up to £1.2M.  That is one way of interpreting the 
cost.  
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The traditional way for calculating risk is, Risk = probability of occurrence x severity of 
consequences.  If this formula is used, the risk value is 0.0012 x £1M = £1200.  That 
means, based on the experience, the next single flight could incur a risk of £1200.  
How could there be such a cost?  There could be different ways.  For example, 
according to the way the costs were built up, there could be an error in the next flight, 
which if it was detected or, if not, led to a superficial flight incident, could cost the 
organization about £1200 to investigate and deal with it. 
If nothing happened and if it flew next 1,000 flights, one of them might incur a cost of 
£1.2M for whatever CAW error associated incident,  or if not several flights could have 
errors and incidents whose combined costs would add up to £1.2M.  Obviously, if 
AM/CEO wishes to cover his risk with insurance, then that is the minimum insurance 
cover that he should obtain.  If he is not going to make any changes to his 
organization, nor update his error experience, and accept this last calculated risk level 
for the next 1-year and fly 10, 000 flights in one year, then he should anticipate to 
cover himself for a possible error related cost of £1.2M x 10, i.e. £12M.  It seems to be 
reasonable for typical situations where the costs are imaginable and feasible. 
Meanwhile, the lower value Cost Groups too could have probability of occurring, and 
costs arising as a result.  But if those risk values are of a lower magnitude, then 
AM/CEO need not worry about them, because he has already prepared himself to 
handle the larger risk at £1M Cost Group 6. In fact for all practical purposes the 3- Cost 
Groups at the lowest end of the scale can be neglected.  They are retained here for 
reference purposes in order to provide full transparency of the concept development. 
However, if one is to cover for the risk of an entire business going into liquidation as a 
result of a CAW error, and if the business is worth £1B, then the AM/CEO should look 
at the Cost Group 9.  If they wish to cover for that possibility then the potential risk is 
much higher, because the calculation has put an equal probability of it occurring and 
increasing liability.  Equal probability, because there were not enough data to force 
the probability down by way of evidence of experience; in its absence, the statistics of 
the state of nature, in the form of the computer program, has allocated the values of 
equal probability depending on the known limited evidence and patterns of 
behaviour.  If probability is to be forced down, then more evidence should be 
collected, or input one’s belief that is acceptable to the insurer. 
In this model, the provision has been made to deal with Cost Groups going up to £10B, 
but it does not mean AM/CEO would have to consider taking on those risks, unless he 
wants to. Therefore the sensible thing to do is to truncate down Cost Groups to what 
is practical and reasonable, and trust one’s luck that the decision was right.  If no 
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cover is provided, then of course, the business would have to be liquidated if 
something disastrous happens.   
Similar situations could arise if a CAW error leads to a major disaster like an aircraft 
crashing onto population centre.  It could happen, but very, very rare because the air 
space is controlled and thankfully, the CAW system is largely defended.   
The model simply demonstrates how and where such costs and probabilities come 
from.   The model gives the rationale. It does not dictate to the AM/CEO what to do.  It 
guides the AM/CEO, and after that, it is up to them to interpret and use the result 
wisely.  More of the equal probability allocation and its magnitude will be discussed 
later in this chapter. 
8.10.3 Prior probabilities for base station 
Prior probabilities for the base station are tabulated in Table 8.6, and graphically 
represented in Figures 8.12 and Figure 8.13.   
 
Status at Key Nodes 
Prior Probability Based on Experience % 
Jan 08 – Dec 08 Jan 09 – Feb 10 Jan 08 – Feb 10 
Part M Org 
No Error Probability 98.6 98.3 99.2 
Error Probability 1.40 1.68 0.83 
Pt 145 Performance 
No Error Probability 98.0 97.4 98.8 
Error Probability 1.97 2.60 1.23 
CAW Management 
No Error Probability 98.3 97.8 99.0 
Error Probability 1.74 2.24 1.03 
Release to Fly 
No Error Probability 99.1 98.8 99.4 
Error Probability 0.94 1.24 0.58 
Handling Dispatch 
No Error Probability 98.2 98.0 98.9 
Error Probability 1.79 2.03 1.07 
Take Off 
No Error Probability 99.1 99.2 99.6 
Error Probability 0.95 0.77 0.40 
Table 8.6 – Prior probabilities at key nodes - Base station maintenance  
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Figure 8.12 – Prior probabilities at key nodes – Base maintenance operations 
 
 
 
Figure 8.13 – Prior error probabilities at key nodes (magnified) – Base maintenance 
operations 
8.10.4 Flight Consequences and Risk information for base station 
For the base station, Table 8.7, upper half presents Flight & Consequences returns; 
their graphical representation is at Figure 8.14 and Figure 8.15. 
The risk values due to error in base station maintenance activities are in Table 8.7 
lower half.  Interpretation of results is similar to that given in Section 8.10.2.  
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 Status at Key Nodes 
Jan 08 – Dec 
08 
 
Jan 09 – Feb 
10 
 
Jan 08 – Feb 
10 
 
Probability Risk Probability Risk Probability Risk 
Flight and Consequences % £ % £ % £ 
No Error 99.0  99.1  99.6  
Flt Completed Error CF No  Cost 0.16  0.29  0.15  
In Flt Shutdown Flt Completed 0.16  0.12  0.059  
Incidence RTB 0.16  0.12  0.059  
Incidence Flt Diverted 0.16  0.12  0.059  
Non Fatal Accident 0.16  0.12  0.059  
Fatal Accident 0.16  0.12  0.059  
 
Combined Cost (Including cost of disposing detected errors) 
No Cost 97.2 0 96.9 0 98.3 0 
Cost group 1  <  £10 0.26 0.026 0.30 0.03 0.15 1.5p 
Cost group 2  <  £100 0.27 0.27 0.30 0.30 0.16 0.16 
Cost group 3  <  £1,000 0.39 3.9 0.31 3.1 0.25 2.5 
Cost group 4  <  £10K 0.32 32 0.42 42 0.24 24 
Cost group 5  <  £100K 0.26 260 0.30 300 0.15 150 
Cost group 6  <  £1M 0.26 2.6K 0.30 3K 0.15 1.5K 
Cost group 7  <  £10M 0.26 26K 0.30 30K 0.15 15K 
Cost group 8  <  £100M 0.26 260K 0.30 300K 0.15 150K 
Cost group 9  <  £1B 0.26 2.6M 0.30 3M 0.15 1.5M 
Cost group 10   <  £10B 0.26 26M 0.30 30M 0.15 15M 
Table 8.7 – Prior Probabilities at key nodes - Consequences and Risk - Base station 
maintenance  
 
 
Figure 8.14 – Prior probabilities Flight Consequences – Base station 
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Figure 8.15 – Prior probabilities at Flight Consequences (enlarged) – Base station  
 
 
8.11 Application 
 
The model could be used to elicit information about the human error issues in the 
CAW processes of Operator X’s fleet operation.  For instance given the steady state 
operations and prior error probabilities, what would be the error probability at 
Handling and Dispatch if a new error was present at an upstream node, e.g. at Task 
node, but missed detection.   The query could be answered in the inference mode, by 
setting the Task node, relevant causal factor to 100% and then by reading off the 
response at Handling and Dispatch, error probability.  By setting Task node’s causal 
factor to 100%, the model removes the uncertainty (or confirms 100% probability) of 
an error present. The model responds by calculating the new probability of error at 
Handling and Dispatch, i.e. the posterior probability given there was a new error 
present at another (upstream) node.  
 
Table 8.8 presents a matrix of posterior probabilities at a number of key nodes in 
response to the presence of errors at upstream nodes. Four examples given:   
• Adverse funding decision by CEO which may be construed as an error of 
judgment.  
• Two unconnected errors occurring together  Pt 145 AO having problems with 
personnel and insufficient trade cover under manning. 
• Production fault interacting with unsatisfactory AMM, together with failure to 
update maintenance data. 
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• Shortfalls in Pt 145 interface contract and shortcomings in Quality Control at 
work face.  
At Handling at Dispatch, error probability has increased from 0.73% at steady state to 
17.6%, 24.1%, 22.3% and 11.0% respectively for each of the error incidences listed 
above. 
Status at Key Nodes 
 
Prior 
Probability % 
Posterior Probability % 
 
 
Adverse 
Funding 
Decision 
by CEO 
 
 
Errors in 
Pt 145 
Personnel 
+ Trade 
Cover in 
Manning 
 
 
Errors in 
Production 
+ AMM +  
Data  
Not 
updated 
 
 
Errors in  
Pt 145 
Interface 
Contract + 
Quality 
Control 
 
Part M Org 
No Error Probability 99.8 95.3 91.1 72.5 98.3 
Error Probability 0.16 4.67 8.92 2.75 0.16 
Pt 145 Performance 
No Error Probability 99.3 74.3 35.3 45.8 47.5 
Error Probability 0.75 25.7 64.7 54.2 5.25 
CAW Management 
No Error Probability 99.3 86.5 66.9 48.5 73.5 
Error Probability 0.66 13.5 33.1 51.5 26.5 
Release to Fly 
No Error Probability 99.4 89.0 73.2 58.3 78.5 
Error Probability 0.61 11.0 26.8 41.7 21.5 
Handling Dispatch 
No Error Probability 99.3 82.4 75.9 77.7 89.0 
Error Probability 0.73 17.6 24.1 22.3 11.0 
Take Off 
No Error Probability 99.8 96.8 96.8 97.0 98.5 
Error Probability 0.24 3.19 3.19 2.96 1.54 
Table 8.8 – Effect of Findings 1 – Posterior probabilities at key nodes.   Fleet maintenance 
operations Jan 08 – Feb 10 
 
Through a similar process, posterior probabilities of Flight Consequences have been 
calculated for the impact of an inappropriate funding decision or a system error 
triggered by reduced funding level leading to under-manning and shortfall of trade 
cover. Details are in Table 8.9.  
The lower half of Table 8.9 demonstrates the way the risk level changes with new 
error incidents or, in this particular example, the potential for errors due to reduced 
funding levels and their impact on risk.  In order to quantify the severity of 
consequences, monetary value of the consequence at Combined Cost has been used.  
Thus the Table indicates how the probability of certain levels of cost arising as a 
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consequence of reduced funding levels, given that there has been a past pattern of 
relationships between finding levels, error and consequences. 
 
The absolute value of the prior probability of risk has been challenged by Operator X, 
and it has been addressed. The “change of risk” due to change of conditions is in fact 
more important than the absolute value, because in strategic planning and change 
management, it is the change of status due to new conditions that needs to be 
monitored and corrected before the situation gets out of control. 
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Flight and  Consequences 
No Error 99.7  97.7  96.8  
Flt Completed Error CF No  Cost 0.23  2.21  2.98  
In Flt Shutdown Flt Completed 0.005  0.025  0.33  
Incidence RTB 0.008  0.47  0.63  
Incidence Flt Diverted 0.005  0.025  0.33  
Non Fatal Accident 0.005  0.025  0.33  
Fatal Accident 0.005  0.025  0.33  
Combined Cost (Including cost of detected errors) 
No Cost 98.6 0 94.3  91.1  
Cost group 1  <  £10 0.12 0.012 0.43  0.63  
Cost group 2  <  £100 0.12 0.12 0.44  0.64  
Cost group 3  <  £1,000 0.27 2.7 0.58  0.77  
Cost group 4  <  £10K 0.20 20 1.65  2.99  
Cost group 5  <  £100K 0.13 120 0.44  0.64  
Cost group 6  <  £1M 0.12 1.2K 0.43  0.63  
Cost group 7  <  £10M 0.12 12K 0.43  0.63  
Cost group 8  <  £100M 0.12 120K 0.43  0.63  
Cost group 9  <  £1B 0.12 1.2M 0.43 3.1M 0.63 5.1M 
Cost group 10   <  £10B 0.12 12M 0.43 31M 0.63 51M 
Table 8.9 - Effect of Findings 2 – Posterior probabilities at Consequences and Risk given 
priors. Fleet maintenance operations Jan 08 – Feb 10 
 
This type of inference resulting from either specific error situations or general trend 
monitoring could be accomplished through regular updating of the database and 
recalculating new posterior probabilities.  Thus through continual updating, the 
AM/CEO or their departmental managers and safety managers would have a dynamic 
risk assessment tool at their finger tip by which they could manage the safety level 
within their organizations.  
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Table 8.10 and Table 8.11 respectively provide new posterior probabilities and risk for 
Parent-Base organization, as a consequence of potential errors occurring at upstream 
points.   
 
Status at Key Nodes 
 
Prior 
Probability 
% 
Posterior Probability % 
 
 
Adverse 
Funding 
Decision by 
CEO 
 
Pt 145 
Personnel  
+ 
Performance + 
Trade Cover in 
Manning 
 
Production 
fault + 
unsatisfactory 
AMM 
updating + 
Maintenance 
data not 
update 
 
Pt 145 
Interface 
Contract  + 
Quality 
Control 
 
Part M Org 
No Error Probability 99.2 74.7 77.3 34.8 99.2 
Error Probability 0.83 25.3 22.7 65.2 0.83 
Pt 145 Performance 
No Error Probability 98.8 78.4 50.4 53.0 49.2 
Error Probability 1.23 21.6 49.6 47.0 50.8 
CAW Management 
No Error Probability 99.0 87.1 73.5 50.0 74.4 
Error Probability 1.03 12.9 26.5 50.0 25.6 
Release to Fly 
No Error Probability 99.4 93.5 86.7 75.0 87.1 
Error Probability 0.58 6.50 13.3 25.0 12.9 
Handling Dispatch 
No Error Probability 98.9 82.5 88.4 84.7 92.9 
Error Probability 1.07 17.5 11.6 15.3 7.12 
Take Off 
No Error Probability 99.6 94.1 96.1 94.8 97.6 
Error Probability 0.40 5.88 3.91 5.16 2.41 
Table 8.10 - Effect of Findings 1 – Posterior probabilities at key nodes given priors.  Base 
station maintenance operations Jan 08 – Feb 10 
 
Once managers learn the way error probabilities at critical nodes, and risk levels 
behave in response to human error in CAW process, they would want to make course 
corrections and other improvements to the system.  What is the most effective way to 
do this correction when the system is so complex?  The answer lies in sensitivity 
analysis.  Once the objective was identified, e.g. to reduce error probability at 
Handling and Dispatch, sensitivity analysis would identify those nodes that have the 
most impact on the Handling and Dispatch node, in order of priority.  Corrective 
actions could be focussed on the higher priority nodes in the ranking.   Table 8.12 
presents an example of three critical nodes: Combined Cost, Flight Consequences and 
Handling Dispatch, and the top 10 parameters to which these nodes are most 
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sensitive.  Table 8.13 presents those parameters that have most impact on the Task 
node for fleet operation and parent base-station respectively. 
 
Following the identification of sensitive parameters, it will be necessary to know which 
causal factors are most active and therefore should be brought under control.  This 
knowledge could be gained by examining the probability distribution of causal factors 
within a node.  Table 8.14 provides the probability distribution of causal factors in the 
Maintenance Data node, and Table 8.15 in the Task node.  Figure 8.16 is the graphical 
representation of Table 8.14. 
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Funding 
Decision 
by CEO 
 
Delta 
Risk 
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Reduced 
funds + 
Personnel in 
Pt 145 
Performanc
e  & Trade 
Cover in 
Manning 
 
Delta 
Risk 
£ 
 
 
 
 
Flight and  Consequences 
No Error 99.6  89.9  93.2  
Flt Completed Error CF No  
Cost 
0.15  1.0  2.53  
In Flt Shutdown Flt Completed 0.059  1.82  0.85  
Incidence RTB 0.059  1.82  0.85  
Incidence Flt Diverted 0.059  1.82  0.85  
Non Fatal Accident 0.059  2.63  0.85  
Fatal Accident 0.059  1.0  0.85  
Combined Cost (Including cost of detected errors) 
No Cost 98.3 0 88.5  81.8  
Cost group 1  <  £10 0.15 1.5p 1.04  1.62  
Cost group 2  <  £100 0.16 0.16 1.05  1.63  
Cost group 3  <  £1,000 0.25 2.5 1.13  1.70  
Cost group 4  <  £10K 0.24 24 1.05  3.50  
Cost group 5  <  £100K 0.15 150 1.04  1.62  
Cost group 6  <  £1M 0.15 1.5K 1.04  1.62  
Cost group 7  <  £10M 0.15 15K 1.04  1.62  
Cost group 8  <  £100M 0.15 150K 1.04  890K 1.62 1.47M 
Cost group 9  <  £1B 0.15 1.5M 1.04  8.9M 1.62 14.7M 
Cost group 10   <  £10B 0.15 15M 1.04 89 M 1.62 147M 
Table 8.11 - Effect of Findings  2 – Posterior probabilities at Consequences and Risk given 
priors Base station maintenance operations Jan 08 – Feb 10 
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 Rank 
 
Combined Cost Flight Consequences Handling and Dispatch 
Sensitive to 
error at 
Sensitivity  
Index 
Sensitive to 
error at 
Sensitivity 
Index 
Sensitive to 
error at 
Sensitivity 
Index 
1 
Consequences 
Pt 145 
0.02039 Take Off 0.02373 
CAW 
Management 
0.01340 
2 Defence Pt 145 0.01951 
Defence Pre 
Take Off 
0.01062 QMS 0.00964 
3 
Consequences 
Handling  & 
Dispatch 
0.01699 
Consequences 
Pre Take Off 
0.01034 
Defence  
Handling & 
Dispatch 
0.00830 
4 
Handling  & 
Dispatch 
0.01686 
Handling & 
Dispatch 
0.00424 
Consequences  
Handling & 
Dispatch 
0.00809 
5 
Consequences 
Pre Take Off 
0.01655 Release to Fly 0.00134 
Pt 145 
Performance 
0.00598 
6 
Flight and 
Consequences 
0.01370 
CAW 
Management 
0.00108 QA Performance 0.00452 
7 Take Off 0.01283 
Quality 
Management 
System 
0.00079 Task 0.00384 
8 
Consequences 
Quality 
0.01216 
Defence 
Handling & 
Dispatch 
0.00068 
Pt 145 and Pt M 
Compliance 
0.00376 
9 Defence Quality 0.01114 
Consequences 
Handling  & 
Dispatch 
0.00066 Defence Pt145 0.00284 
10 
Pt145 Pt M 
Compliance 
0.00907 
Pt 145 
Performance 
0.00047 
Consequences 
Pt 145 
0.00274 
Table 8.12 – Sensitivity of 3-key nodes to other parametric changes - Fleet maintenance  
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   Sensitivity of Task to Errors at Other Nodes 
Ranking Sensitivity Base station Fleet Sensitivity 
1 0.07075 Attitude to Task  Attitude to Task  0.0229 
2 0.05414 Task Management Docs Pt145 Org Performance 0.02063 
3 0.05258 Pt145 Org Performance Task Management Docs  0.01858 
4 0.05247 Workface Stress  Workface Stress  0.01687 
5 0.04801 Facility Environment Logistic Support 0.01531 
6 0.04703 Maintenance Data Facility Environment 0.01474 
7 0.04666 Tools And Test Eqpt Maintenance Data 0.01442 
8 0.0464 GSE  Tools And Test Eqpt 0.01405 
9 0.04407 LRU Spares  GSE 0.01362 
10 0.04202 Logistic Support Manning  0.01287 
11 0.04064 Manning LRU Spares 0.01268 
12 0.02517 CAW Management  Corporate and Policy 0.00749 
13 0.02431 Corporate and Policy Individual Traits 0.00587 
14 0.0127 Individual Traits Logistic Support Policy 0.00279 
15 0.00967 Part M Org   Eng Ops Policies  0.00246 
16 0.00935 Logistic Support Policy Commercial Policies  0.00231 
17 0.00847 Eng Ops Policies 
Certification 
Recertification 
0.0022 
18 0.00834 HR Policies  HR Policies  0.00216 
19 0.00773 CEO AM Decisions    CEO AM Decisions    0.00207 
20 0.00754 Commercial Policies  Pt M  Pt145 Interface 0.00172 
21 0.00705 Pt M Pt 145 Interface Change Management 0.00136 
22 0.00614 
Certification 
Recertification 
Tech Knowledge Skills  0.00116 
23 0.00458 Change Management Flt Ops Policies  0.00105 
24 0.00397 Flt Ops Policies Pt M Pt145 Contract 0.00096 
25 0.00352 Tech Knowledge Skills Global Factors 0.00046 
Table 8.13 – Sensitivity of Task node error to causal factors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Maintenance Data Node Probability - % 
No Error 99.7 
Inadequate or unavailable 0.049 
Not updated 0.037 
Poor access to data 0.032 
Unavailable at workface 0.031 
Conflicting data 0.031 
Information not used 0.029 
Incomprehensible 0.026 
Incorrect data 0.026 
Incorrect amendment 0.026 
Ambiguous 0.026 
Confusing graphics 0.026 
Table 8.14 - Example of probability distribution of causal factors at one node - Fleet 
Operation 
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 Task Node – Types of Error Probability of Error 
No Error                          0.99314000 
Installation error                0.00072866 
Poor maintenance practice         0.00072262 
Poor or incomplete diagnosis        0.00066641 
Inattention damage                0.00064765 
Poor inspection or test standard        0.00059209 
Misinterpretation of data         0.00055062 
Approved data not followed          0.00052496 
Unrecorded work                   0.00052168 
Servicing error                   0.00050657 
Work uncertified                  0.00047141 
Missed independent checks         0.00046378 
Certified without verification    0.00046378 
Table 8.15 – Probability distribution of error at Task node (high resolution) 
 
Figure 8.16 – Probability distribution of causal factors in Maintenance Data node 
 
 
8.12 Operator’s belief 
 
Referring to “Combined Cost” Operator X made an observation that they would be 
more interested on the error probability at the end of the CAW process, and what the 
potential flight consequence was, rather than risk level as calculated at Combined 
Cost.  The idea of putting a cost to fatal accidents was not well received. 
 
During the follow up discussion it emerged that part of the objection was rooted in 
the idea that “human lives“ would have to be costed as if they were a commodity for 
the purpose of measuring severity of consequences.  Obviously, it is unacceptable to 
public sensitivity and an organization or concept that tries to pre-empt their potential 
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liabilities would be seen as uncaring in the public eye.  Harmonizing with the Operator 
X’s sentiment on this point, the study too has been hitherto advocating the use of 
probability at Flight Consequences as a suitable measure, keeping Combined Cost data 
as back up information.   
 
However, in trying to take out the emotion from a problem- solving  type research 
assignment, it was necessary to adhere as closely as possible to already established 
conventions.  For that reason, the entity risk was presented in the traditional way.  
This calls for a cost to be assigned to the loss of human life, or alternatively the value 
of saving a human life, and the study has taken the practice set by insurance 
underwriters.  It is recognized that actuaries place a cost to “loss of life” for insurance 
and legal purposes.  This study did not attempt to value human life, but simply place a 
cost band that might be adequate to cover loss of human life as well as other material 
assets. 
 
Operator X further challenged the results for “Flight Consequences” results stating 
that the prior probabilities of major and fatal accidents as derived by the model were 
unacceptable to them.  This figure was 0.005 per cent for fatal accident, i.e. 5 x 10-5 
which the operator claimed was unacceptably pessimistic and that at that rate the 
operator would have no option but to close down their operations.  
 
The operator also queried the rationale for equal probabilities between fatal accidents 
and non-fatal accidents, stating that these values would not be so in real life.  
Referring to global figures, they claimed that there would be a more skewed profile, 
which the study interpreted as one resembling the trailing end of a log-normal 
distribution curve.  The operator claimed that they maintained global safety standards 
and therefore, it would be reasonable to apply global accident rates to their 
organization, whereas the figures computed by the model were widely out from the 
global standards.  They wanted to know if the model could be modified to match 
global experience that they consider as their prior error probability. 
 
This challenge was not surprising as it followed a natural phenomenon called, 
“Representativeness”,  which is a collective term used to describe a range of fallacies 
that people make when making subjective assessment of probabilities103 In this 
particular situation two of the fallacies that came into play were insensitivity to prior 
probabilities and insensitivity to sample size.   
 
In insensitivity to prior probabilities the subject gets misled by past patterns to form a 
stereotype image of the performance.  It ignores the fact that the next event could fall 
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outside the pattern and at that point all other possibilities as well as that of the 
previous pattern are possible. The other fallacy, insensitivity to sample size, ignores 
the principle that a large sample is more likely to converge to the universal mean and 
that a small sample size could produce a wider scatter from the mean.   
 
Nevertheless, in order to address Operator X’s concerns, the model was rerun using 
an alternative, simulated data file representing Operator X’s belief.   The following 
sections outline the approach taken, data used and the results. 
 
8.13 Global experience 
 
Global experience in the safe operation of commercial air transport is published in 
IATA Annual Safety Report in the form of statistical data on fatal and major accidents 
world-wide.  The actual values vary from year to year, but in general there is evidence 
that the overall fatal accident flat-rate has levelled off around 0.7 per million sectors; 
the lowest level published was 0.65 fatal accidents per million flights for western built 
passenger jets according to IATA20..  In contrast world-wide cargo aircraft experience 4 
times as many fatal accidents as of passenger aircraft. 
 
The overall global rates are composed of a mixture of regional variations operating to 
different regulations, and relating to jet and turbo prop aircraft of different makes, 
age, technology and weight categories, as well as of manufacturing base.  IATA data 
was limiting however, because they do not contain information on less severe 
consequences. 
 
Data for UK civil aviation accidents had a slightly better resolution, and therefore it 
was decided to use UK experience in this analysis instead of global experience.  On 
reflection, UK national experience was more appropriate for this operator, as they 
were regulated by UK Civil Aviation Authority.    The UK rates for achieved safety level 
were numerically better (i.e. lower accident rate) than the global rates. 
 
Moreover, this AOC Holder operated a fleet of aircraft (Type 1) and (Type 2), which 
had proven high safety performance standards applicable to western-built passenger 
jets, even though they were used as cargo aircraft.  Evidence from US supports the 
view that large cargo carriers operate to similar safety standards as that of passenger 
carriers104.  In the UK, there was no evidence to suggest that cargo aircraft were less 
airworthy than passenger aircraft nor operating in environments as in North America 
or in Africa.  It was known that the most aircraft from AOC Holder’s fleet were aged 
23-26 years, but they have not had any accidents. Except for the fact that they were in 
cargo role, they were regulated to the same EASA standards as applicable to 
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passenger jets.  All this evidence justified the application of the achieved UK national 
safety standard to this operator, according to their belief, irrespective of the error 
performance observed for the period taken for the validation trials.   
 
8.14 Data for UK achieved safety level 
 
Raw data on UK experience, as used in this study, came from UK CAA Published report 
CAP 7806.  Some gaps in CAP 780 data, especially those relating to low severity 
consequences that were not usually covered by MOR, have been filled with data from 
UK CAA Paper 2009/05105. The latter is an updated revision to CAA Paper 2007/0453. 
Relevant data are tabulated in Table 8.16. 
 
Period of flying  1998-2007 CAP 780 Data 
Sectors flown 10.899M Rate per M sectors 
Reported accidents 132 12.1112 
Fatal accidents 5 0.458758 
Non fatal accidents 127 11.652445 
Serious incidents  155 14.22 
MOR Occurrences 42,000 3853 
Table 8.16 - Raw data- UK experience for 10-yr period 1998-2007 
 
CAP 780 data represented all incidents attributed to a full range of causal factors, 
mostly falling outside the domain of maintenance and CAW processes, e.g. flight 
operations.  In estimating the proportion attributed to maintenance related human 
error, 15% of the full values were taken, given that historic evidence indicate that that 
6-15% of all flight incidents are attributed to maintenance related errors6,7,8.  
 
There was no exact match between the categories of consequences as used in CAP 
780 and those categories used in the CAW Risk Model.  Table 8.17 Columns 2 and 3 
summarize the way available evidence from CAP 780 were categorised.  These were in 
turn remapped against the list of consequences used in the model, Table 8.17, 
Columns 4 and 5.  Column 2, lists an ideally desired categorization for a much 
improved resolution, whereas Column 3 demonstrates the wide-cut method adopted 
by CAP 780.  Column 4 lists the categorization as used in the CAW Risk Model. Column 
5 is the way this study spread the known evidence given in block-figures to a 
distribution using the well known 1 in 600 rule31 for an error-pyramid. That is the best 
the study could do with a scanty set of data to create a “Belief-Based” incident 
distribution 
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Desirable distribution of flight 
consequences 
Estimates per M 
sectors 
 
Categorisation used 
in the model 
Case files used in 
the model/M 
1 
Flights believed to be clear of CAW 
errors. No flight incidents 
Remainder of 1M No Error Remainder 
2 
Flights carrying known or detected 
errors, but authorised to fly 
NA 
Flight completed. 
Error carried. 
531 3 
Flights carrying missed or dormant error, 
identified after an investigation, but had 
no flight incidents 
NA 
4 
Flight incident, but flight completed as 
planned 
578 
incidents 
5 Flight incident en route, aircraft diverted 
Incidence.  Flight 
diverted 
53 
6 
Error found after take-off, aircraft 
returned to base 
Incidence RTB 10 
7 Flight incident, engine shutdown In flight shutdown.  
Minor non fatal 
accident 
5 
8 
Minor accident with or 
without fatalities 
2.133 serious 
incidents 
9 
Major accident with or 
without fatalities 
1.75 
non-fatal accidents 
Major accident 1 
10 
Catastrophic invariably with multiple 
fatalities 
0.06881 
fatal accidents 
Fatal accident 0 
Table 8.17 – Mapping Probability distribution - UK experience 
 
The above distribution was simulated in an input case file for the model.  Initially, the 
test file represented one-million sectors, later expanded to three-million sectors, with 
pro rata increment of the number of consequences, and eventually to 6M.  Table 8.18 
presents a breakdown of the input files used.  
 
Category of consequence 
Validation 
trial 
Simulated  data files representing  
UK rate 
Prior data 
plus real 
data 
No of lines/ sectors 34338 1M 2M 3M 3.034338M 
No error 34239 999400 1998800 2998200 3032439 
Flight completed- error carried 98 531 1062 1593 1691 
Incidence- flight diverted  53 106 159 159 
Incidence RTB 1 10 20 30 31 
In flight shut down  5 10 15 15 
Major accident   1 2 3 3 
Fatal accident  0 0 0 0 
Table 8.18 – Input simulated case files and real case files from Operator X’s validation trial 
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8.15 Interpretation of the results from simulation 
 
Conditional probabilities calculated at the Flight & Consequences Node are tabulated 
in Table 8.19, Columns 3, 4 and 5, for case files containing 1M, 2M and 3M sectors 
respectively; these are the priors based on Operator X’s Belief.  Then Column 7 would 
be considered as the posterior when a prior (based on Belief) is updated by 
superimposing real data.  Results in Columns 3, 4, and 5 can be compared with the 
results of the validation trial (Column 2), as well as with the posterior probabilities 
when prior probabilities were updated using real life experience (Column 7).  They 
exhibit the phenomenon of the results converging to a universal mean as the 
population size increases.  
 
Category of 
consequence 
Validation 
trial 
Simulated  data files representing  
UK rate 
Prior data 
plus real 
data 
No of lines/ sectors 34338 1M 2M 3M 6M 3.034338M 
No error 0.99742 0.99932 0.99934 0.99935 0.99933 0.99935 
Flight completed- 
error carried 
0.002300 0.00059447 0.00057937 0.0005743 0.00057395 0.00057794 
Incidence- flight 
diverted 
5.21E-05 6.1239E-05 5.8768E-05 5.7946E-05 5.96E-05 5.495E-05 
Incidence RTB 7.50E-05 1.3271E-05 1.1936E-05 1.1496E-05 1.1532E-05 1.1254E-05 
In flight shut down 5.21E-05 7.6932E-06 6.4901E-06 6.0946E-06 5.9423E-06 5.7916E-06 
Major accident  5.21E-05 3.231E-06 2.1337E-06 1.7736E-06 1.4708E-06 1.6951E-06 
Fatal accident 5.21E-05 2.1155E-06 1.0445E-06 6.934E-07 3.5297E-07   6.7093E-07 
Table 8.19 - Probability distribution of consequences – Simulated prior and posterior based 
on updating the belief with real data 
 
 
That aside, this exercise has principally demonstrated that it is possible to initialize the 
model by simply uploading it with a prior probability distribution of consequences, in 
this case a flat rate based on the UK commercial transport achieved safety level.  But, 
the trial confirms that the operator would have to pretend having had at least 3M 
sectors of experience to verify that the model returns a value resembling the UK flat 
rate for major accidents, 1.75E-06 (Table 8.17 Column 3); the conditional probability 
rate returned was 1.7736E-06.  Exact match could not be expected, because the input 
UK rates are flat rates (i.e. arithmetic averages) whereas the output values from the 
model are conditional probability values.  Errors would be due to the way the incident 
distribution profile was created (Table 8.17, Column 5) but these errors are 
unquantifiable at this stage of the research study.  It is recognized that some errors 
are there, but the principle of “Representativeness” (See Section 8.12) has been 
demonstrated, which is the lesson to be learnt here. 
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When 34,338 sectors of Operator X were superimposed on a UK standard rate profile, 
the model computed rate for major accidents turned out to be 1.6951E-06, which is in 
fact better than the UK rate.   
 
At 3M sectors, based on conditionality, the model returns a total of 74 incidents per 
million sectors, composed of flight diversions (57), return to base (11) and in-flight 
shutdowns (6), against the UK rate of 68 per million based on flat rate.   
 
Interestingly, the fatal accident conditional rate returned after 3M sectors is 6.934E-
07, resembling the global fatal accidents flat rate of 0.7 per million, or the lowest 
recorded 0.65 per million hull loss rate for western built jets in 200620.  When 34,338 
sectors were superimposed, Operator X’s rate for fatal accidents turned out to be 
6.7093E-07 or 0.67 per million. 
 
After 6M of simulated sectors, fatal accident rate dropped to 0.353 per million 
(=3.5297E-07), which was close to 0.459 per million UK national rate; there were 5 
actual UK fatal accidents, in 10.889M sectors (=0.459 per 1M). 
 
These figures are consistent, providing confidence that the mathematical calculations, 
statistical concepts and technique used by the model are reasonable. By inference, it 
confirms that the logic and architecture of the model are also correct.  
 
Referring to Table 8.19, last column, it is interesting to note that when 3M simulated 
sectors were updated with Operator X’s 34,338 sectors, the posterior probabilities 
turned out to be smaller than the operator’s belief.  If the Regulator were to accept 
the Operator’s claim that they were operating to global (or if not UK) safety levels, 
then the follow on result confirms that the safety performance of the operator is now 
better than his belief, despite the significant number of observed errors for the period 
concerned. 
 
One explanation to this apparent dichotomy lay in the “Defence” activities.  As long as 
any detected errors are successfully defended by CAW staff, or their effects are 
intercepted by flight crew to prevent them turning out to be incidents, then the 
Operator and the Regulator could remain content that errors are managed and flight 
safety is maintained.  Design safety features and sheer chance (or luck, as some 
people call it) also would have helped to maintain the dynamic balance of risk level. 
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Finally, does this simulation confirm the Operator’s belief that they were operating to 
global (or if not UK) safety levels?  No doubt it is operating to global standards, but 
whether it achieving the global level of safety is debatable and should be left to the 
Regulator to decide on the basis of evidence and results.  The superimposition of 
actual experience on a prior belief of operating to global (or UK) safety standard 
returned Operator X’s desired result.  That is because the 34,338 that the operator has 
produced as its experience is dwarfed by the 3M sectors used to simulate the claim 
that they were operating to global safety level.  If the 3M simulated sectors represent 
their (previously unrecorded) experience, say over 40-years, then their claim is 
justified. 
 
This means, if the operator has already been achieving global safety level, then a 2-yr 
period of glitch is not significant if it is viewed from a strategic perspective.  The trend 
has already been set and robust, and an excursion from the trend need not create an 
alarm.  However the excursion ought to be reviewed against the contributing data, 
and then monitored to ensure that it does not set a new diverging trend, in which case 
there would be a safety risk.  That is one side of the argument. 
 
On the other side, there might be a different interpretation as explained below. 
 
8.16 Alternative interpretation of results 
 
From a statistical viewpoint, an operator might not be able to claim the global rate of 
probabilities on the basis of their following EASA procedures alone, if in reality they 
have not generated a large enough experience to justify the claim.  The only way they 
could claim the global rate was if they had flown sufficient numbers of sorties over an 
extended period of time equivalent to global rate, say at a rate of one million sectors 
in one year, which a very large operator might fly. 
It is not surprising that an operator wishes to claim the merits of the global experience 
because they belong to the same club as all other operators who operate aircraft 
safely to regulation.  But it may unreasonable to claim the data that belong to the 
group as belonging to each member for their use, unless they have their own 
individual experience to justify that claim.  Statistically the collective group data does 
not belong to one member.  If they try to use it, then they are trying to usurp an 
achieved level by the group that cannot be individually justified.  
Quoting one example, how could an operator justify high standard, if they have flown 
an aircraft 28-times consecutively with a loose article next to engine and flap controls.  
If a passenger knew of this situation, would he have considered it safe to travel in this 
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aircraft? Most likely, the answer is no.  In this instant, no flight incident took place, 
and that was most likely down to luck than to any finesse in the way aircraft was 
maintained or the way it was designed.  Bad weather or another condition requiring 
an abnormal manoeuvre could have dislodged the loose article leading to a potential 
incident.  The fact that nothing happened should not be construed as credit to the 
safety standard of the operator.  In fairness to the operator, in this particular case the 
outcome categorized as “No Flight Incident” by this study as it was upholding the 
principle that only actual experience would be input.   
If the study adopted the ICAO definition of risk (Section 3.3), the potential 
consequence could have been categorized as a potentially major accident, or even 
worse, the loss of an aircraft in a worst foreseeable scenario. In that situation, under 
the threat of this possibility, would not an AM/CEO have grounded his fleet until the 
offending aircraft and loose article was found?  
On querying about this incident by the researcher, the operator quoted the 
maintenance procedure, stating that there was no need to inspect the engine nacelle 
repeatedly.  Moreover they stated that once the original error was admitted as 
erroneous, then that should be the end of the error incident and that all other 
subsequent sectors flown were safe, as nothing happened during those sectors, and 
that there was no regulation to cover unknown conditions.  But the fact remains, that 
those sectors were potentially unsafe from a flight safety point of view.  That is, given 
the nacelle inspection was inadequate in the first place and the control of disposable 
stores had not been properly done, if the first sector flown after maintenance was 
unsafe, then all other sectors flown after that were also unsafe. The cover provided by 
the rules or, more correctly lack of rules, had no meaning and no value, if in the event 
the presence of the loose article had caused an accident during any subsequent flight.  
Whilst the primary cause remained as the inadequate loose article check after the 
maintenance task, there were other contributory factors. These were the failure to 
account for the items taken to the aircraft and unsupervised work under time 
pressure during unsocial hours. Thus on the question of safety, Operator X should 
respond to it objectively with safety in mind, rather than with rules in mind.   
Given this type of situation, where the real safety is missing but apparent safety by 
manipulation of rules exists, the Regulator can anticipate an operator making this type 
of claim in order to safeguard their market position, commercial and legal interests. 
However, analysis based on BBN relevant to the trial period in which data was 
collected, suggests that claimed safety based on adhering to rules and procedures 
alone would not suffice.  
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This example demonstrates and provides the proof for misrepresentation of safety 
through normal practice as followed by operators and the Regulator under the 
present rules-based safety assessment, which is process driven even though the rules 
have been written objectively.  The process, and the local disciplines that convert the 
rule to an action, failed to deliver the objective.  They might go parallel most of the 
way, but whenever specific cases as this example are examined, it can be seen that 
true safety had diverged from apparent safety.  
This analysis leads us to consider using risk level based on the organizations real safety 
performance rather than on their belief on account of their claim to adhering to EASA 
or other regulation.   The proof of the claim is in the performance, and not in the 
belief.  
Thus, the Regulator might grant a license to a new operator to undertake an operation 
on account of their meeting EASA Regulation as a minimum requirement, as it does at 
present.  But when it comes to routine monitoring, a new, previously unknown 
operator might draw more attention, closer supervision and more detailed audits and 
oversights, to reflect its own history, experience and performance.  The Regulator may 
subjectively judge the situation pessimistically until the reliability and integrity of its 
operations is proven and remains consistent over a longer period.  A large airline that 
usually flies about 1M sectors or more per year that has consistently shown safe 
performance would fall into a safer category justifying fewer or less frequent 
oversights. 
8.17 Compromise between the two interpretations 
Given the foregoing two interpretations how should the Regulator determine and 
select a suitable course of action?  Should they opt for the risk level calculated on the 
operator’s belief that it was operating to global safety standards, superimposed by 
actual experience over a short period (Method 1), or the risk level calculated for the 
actual experience alone (Method 2)? 
The recommendation from the study is that the former (Method 1) should be used for 
determining risk level from a strategic viewpoint, and that the latter (Method 2) 
should be used from a tactical viewpoint.  Since the operator is responsible for the day 
to day airworthiness and flight safety issues, they should pay attention to the way risk 
levels change with routine occurrence of errors.  If they do not follow this line, but fall 
back on the strategic and long term risk levels, then they would be undermining their 
readiness and alertness necessary to maintain high safety standards. 
Strategic risk levels based on global levels superimposed with actual experience could 
be used by the Regulator as a performance indicator to help implement RBO concept.    
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8.18 Risk based on Combined Cost  
There was no Global or UK standard probability distribution of cost due to accidents.  
IATA usually publishes Air Claims provided cost data annually but even they comprised 
of block figures for fatal and major accidents; the figures fluctuate wildly from one 
year to another. However using IATA historical data, it was possible to estimate that 
the maintenance error contribution to the cost of their consequences was around 
£6M per 1M sectors, i.e. flat rate at 15% of the total cost. The researcher’s intuition 
based on professional experience is that this estimate is too low.  Even if this figure 
was doubled to account for the cost of unreported incidents, it amounts to £12M per 
million sectors, attributed to human error in maintenance.   The £12M cost was 
spread out amongst 600 error lines as in Table 8. 20.  For the computer run, the UK 
cost break down per million sectors flown was assumed to be the same as for global 
cost breakdown. 
 
 
Cost Group Value Lower Limit (£) Sectors Total Cost (£) 
No Cost 0 60 0 
1 1 0 0 
2 10 0 0 
3 100 202 202,000 
4 1,000 312 3,120,000 
5 10,000 20 2,000,000 
6 100,000 6 6,000,000 
7 1M 0 0 
8 10M 0 0 
9 100M 0 0 
10 1B 0 0 
Total  600 11,322,000 
Table 8.20 - Cost distribution profile 
 
Table 8.21 presents the probability values returned by the model for each cost group 
for Operator X’s direct experience (34,338 sectors), for 3M simulated sectors of UK 
safety level flying, and finally for 3.034338 M sectors, i.e. simulation updated with 
Operator X’s own experience. Risk values have been manually calculated and inserted 
alongside with the probabilities for each Cost Group’s lower limit. 
 
Column 2 of Table 8.21 demonstrates that the high incident rate for the period 
concerned is associated with a higher risk level than expected from operating to global 
rate at Column 4, but if viewed from a long established trend, the excursion should 
not create undue alarm.  This is similar to a well proven safe driver placing an 
insurance claim in one year because he had a minor accident.  One or even two claims 
would not necessarily make him a high risk, provided of course he has already paid to 
cover his no claims bonus protection.   In fact the last two columns of Table 8.21 
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suggest that, against its strategic position, Operator X was doing quite well in further 
reducing the overall risk due to CAW human error.   Thus the delta risk, i.e. the change 
of risk and magnitude becomes performance indicators, suggesting that Operator X is 
doing well in reducing risk.  Again the explanation lay in the defences and error 
management mechanism that has been in force during the period concerned.  
 
Status at Key Nodes 
34,338 3,000,000 3,034,338  
Probability Risk Probability Risk Probability Risk 
 
Combined Cost (Including cost of disposing detected errors) 
No Cost 0.98565 0 0.99772 0 0.99766 0 
Cost group 1  <  £10 11.941E-04 0 2.2819E-04 0 2.2654E-04 0 
Cost group 2  <  £100 12.43E-04 0.01 2.2819E-04 0 2.271£-04 0 
Cost group 3  <  £1,000 26.74E-04 0.12 2.2819E-04 0.02 2.9155E-04 0.03 
Cost group 4  <  £10K 19.653E-04 1.19 2.2819E-04 0.23 2.3537E-04 0.24 
Cost group 5  <  £100K 13.003E-04 11.94 2.2819E-04 2.28 2.2776E-04 2.28 
Cost group 6  <  £1M 11.941E-04 119.4 2.2819E-04 22.8 2.2654E-04 22.7 
Cost group 7  <  £10M 11.941E-04 1,194 2.2819E-04 228 2.2654E-04 227 
Cost group 8  <  £100M 11.941E-04 11,941 2.2819E-04 2,280 2.2654E-04 2,270 
Cost group 9  <  £1B 11.941E-04 119,410 2.2819E-04 22,800 2.2654E-04 22,700 
Cost group 10   <  £10B 11.941E-04 1.194M 2.2819E-04 228,000 2.2654E-04 227,000 
Table 8.21 – Risk distribution profile 
 
Relevant computer run results can be examined in the software files included in the 
CD/DVD; see folder titled Ops X Operations/ Ops X Belief/ BBN files. 
 
Although Table 8.21 provided risk values, the study could not form a judgment on the 
significance of the risk value as an Accountable Manager (AM) would form.  An 
AM/CEO would have a wider view of all other financial information for the company, 
i.e. the business objectives, costs, profits and liabilities etc.  Thus they would be able 
to weigh this risk of CAW error against all other risks that an AM is required to cover.   
 
For instance, under regulation, an operator is required to insure his aircraft against 
passenger, flight crew and third party liabilities in the event of a catastrophic accident.  
Human error might trigger the consequences that would end up as a catastrophe, but 
from the evidence available, most human errors in CAW contribute only a marginal 
risk as demonstrated here. The larger risks that an operator is required to cover under 
regulation would come from pilot error, equipment unreliability, airfield and ATC 
management, bad weather, terrorist activities and acts of God. 
   
For a Boeing 757 the insured value for third party liabilities is of the order of £300M, 
and it does not include the cost of replacing the lost aircraft.  The risk value that the 
model returns at the cost group equivalent to £300M, i.e. Cost Group 9, is £22,700.  
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Thus if the  estimated Costs assumed for the trial were to be taken as real cost of 
consequences, then it is possible to say that for this operator, the risk contribution 
due to human error in CAW processes was only £22,700 per £100M when the 
CEO/AM was covering a liability for third party claims of at least £300M.  This study 
considers that this a reasonable risk to take.  
 
In contrast, if short period experience alone was taken into consideration, i.e. 34,338 
sectors only, then the risk level increases to £119,410 per £100M per flight based past 
experience to that point in time.  It is nearly a 5 fold increase, which a CEO might 
consider unreasonable. 
 
8.19 NETICA - Handling of parameters for which data not available   
It is necessary to explain the reasons for the model returning prior probabilities for 
certain states of nature within the nodes, even when evidence, albeit they are limited, 
has indicated that those states of nature did not occur. 
There are two reasons for this.  One is the computing technique that handles zero 
evidence, and the other is a more realistic issue in probability concepts relating to the 
probability of events happening due to unknowns.  This latter cannot be ignored 
simply on account of the fact that there was no data for the relevant states of nature.  
As long as they have been identified as possible outcomes, they would have a 
probability of occurrence though not known.  
NETICA handles this issue at the Conditional Probability Table (CPT) for the relevant 
node, which has been integrated into its software.  The CPT collects data for various 
combinations of parent nodes’ states of nature and those states defined for the child 
node.  A specimen CPT is given in Table 8.22 that summarises the input data according 
to the combination of events. 
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No Error  34239 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Error  0 98 0 1 0 0 0 
Table 8.22 - Input data counts 
 
It can be seen that data was available for only 3 of the 14 cell-combinations in this 
matrix.  In order to handle the unknown, the program modifies the CPT by inserting 
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one event in each blank cell and balances this action by adding one event in each cell 
containing data.  The outcome is as shown in Table 8.23.  
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No Error  34239+1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 +1 
Error  +1 98+1 +1 1+1 +1 +1 +1 
Table 8.23 - Data modified i.e. normalized 
 
Following this modification, the total experience is taken as 34352 events (i.e. 34246 + 
106) as at Table 8.24 whereas the pre-modified experience was 34338 events (Table 
8.22).  This is the standard NETICA practice, as per NETICA User Guide’s Section 10.290. 
Takeoff Flight and Consequences 
No Error  34246 
Error 106 
Table 8.24 - Data modified – New experience  
 
Simple probabilities are then calculated on the total experience in which the 
summation of each line’s probability values should add up to 1 or 100% (Table 8.2).  
Note that there are no zero probability values in those cells where actual data for the 
trial period turned out to be zero. 
 
Takeoff 
Flight and Consequences 
No Error 
Flt completed 
error CF 
In flight shut 
down, Flight 
completed 
Incident RTB 
Incident 
Flight 
Diverted 
Non fatal 
accident 
Fatal accident 
No Error  0.999825 2.92005E-05 2.92005E-05 2.92005E-05 2.92005E-05 2.92005E-05 2.92005E-05 
Error  0.00943396 0.933962 0.00943396 0.0188679 0.00943396 0.00943396 0.00943396 
Table 8.25 - Conditional probabilities based on modified data – new experience 
 
 
Utilizing these simple probabilities of arising, as well as other upstream conditions 
defined by the BBN, NETICA program then calculates the conditional probabilities for 
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each of the states of nature (consequences) at this node.  Results were already given 
in Table 8.19, Column 2, reproduced at Table 8.26.  These values are rounded off and 
pictorially presented in the BBN, but the actual high resolution values could be read 
off from hidden files in NETICA software embedded deep within the CAW Risk Model. 
An example is tabulated below, Table 8.26 and Figure 8.17.  
Category of consequence Validation trial 
No of lines/ sectors 34338 
No error 0.99742 
Flight completed- error carried 0.002300 
Incidence- flight diverted 5.21E-05 
Incidence RTB 7.50E-05 
In flight shut down 5.21E-05 
Major accident  5.21E-05 
Fatal accident 5.21E-05 
Table 8.26 – Distribution profile of Flight Consequences 
 
Take_Off
No Error Probability
Error Probability
99.8
0.24
Flight_and_Consequences
No Error
Flt Compltd ErrorCF NoCost
InFlt Shutdown Flt Compltd
Incidence RTB
Incidence Flt Diverted
NonFatal Accident
Fatal Accident
99.7
0.23
.005
.008
.005
.005
.005
.   
Figure 8.17 – Mapping conditional probabilities to BBN nodes 
 
This study has researched the theoretical justification and mathematical basis for this 
technique, where a small equal amount is added to each cell in order to learn Dirichlet 
priors as the technique is called.  It is rooted in research by Spiegelhalter et al (1993) 
Section 4.189 which explains how to handle situations when conditional probabilities 
themselves were unknown quantities.  Although the verification of Spiegelhalter’s 
work was outside the remit of this study, there was confirmation of its integrity by 
Norsys Software Corporation (in a letter to the researcher) which utilises the theory in 
their commercial software that has been widely accepted throughout the world.  The 
results obtained during the exercise to derive global safety level profile through 
simulation have in fact provided an alternative form of verification of the technique. 
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There are further qualitative justifications for the use of this technique.  Addition of 
one event to each cell of the CPT might appear to give a pessimistic view of the 
performance of the organization, because the experiences taken into account in the 
calculation are more numerous than those actually encountered.  But in reality what it 
does is to make the acknowledgment that all those identified combinations are 
possible.  In the absence of any other data an estimate is made that the probability of 
that combination occurring is very small.   This is better than stating that the 
combination could not occur according to one’s experience, because if the possibility 
exists then a finite probability exists no matter how small it is. 
This probability can neither be negative nor zero.  If zero value was left in a cell 
because no events were actually experienced, then it would return a zero 
probability. An event that may be possible but not yet occurred is not the same as a 
zero probability. A zero probability means that the event is an impossibility, which is 
not true, if the event has been already defined as in the model.  
 
If not zero, the cell entry would have to be a one, because an event cannot be a 
fraction.  Therefore, it makes sense for the program to count one event against each 
cell in the “Counts Mode” as part of initializing process for the program. 
 
The outcome of this computing technique is that even if the event had not actually 
happened, the output would show a probability of the event occurring, which is 
exactly as it would be the reality in nature.   
 
On equal distribution of probabilities across those states of nature where data is not 
available, this too has merit.  If there is no knowledge about their behavior, then there 
is no other option than accepting that any one of the possible events is equally likely 
to occur.  
 
The magnitude of the probability is open to debate, and therefore its accuracy and the 
question if this representation is fair.   The accuracy depends on the actual number of 
sectors flown.  If the number of data lines (i.e. sectors flown) is small, then the 
probability of the event occurring is shown as high, because the simple probability 
values stated in the CPT comes from the formula: 
  
No of events in the error combination /Total number of errors experienced ……. 8.1 
 
 This is in fact correct as an argument even though the numeric value has been slightly 
modified. It may be possible to reconcile with the result that it indicates the level of 
uncertainty as a probability but not as an exact absolute truth.  To give an analogy, 
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given a meter has been defined, one kilometer has 1,000 meters, which is absolute 
truth, whereas degree of uncertainty as a probability is relative and depends on what 
is known and what is not known.  It is not possible to define what is not known and 
therefore an assumption has to be made. 
  
If the sample is small then less is known about the behavior of the organization, and 
there is less knowledge and experience with conditions under which incidents could 
occur.  Therefore it is quite feasible and reasonable that there is wide scatter of the 
probability of something happening, compared to that from another who has flown a 
several million more sectors and its reliability has been well proven.  This is because 
the event would happen in a defended system, and the risk has a dependency on the 
experience as well as defenses. 
  
Quite simply, insufficient knowledge of an operation may lead to estimating the 
likelihood of a severe event occurring as high.   At best, if one of several consequences 
is possible but there was no previous experience of their distribution (at the specific 
operator) then the fairest estimate is an equal likelihood of any one of them occurring.  
The equal distribution of probabilities will reduce the numerical value of any one of 
them as the total uncertainty is spread out over several possibilities.  In contrast, if the 
number of sectors flown is large, then the calculated probability will be 
proportionately smaller. 
 
This situation can be best demonstrated by referring back to the Dirichlet’s probability 
distribution curves given in Chapter Five, Figure 5.14.  If less is known about the 
organization, then the distribution of unknowns at higher values will have a flat spread 
(graph at lower-left corner).  If the operator has greater experience, say, several 
millions of sectors flown and a lot is known about the operator, say, they are 
consistently safe, then the peak of the graph rises rapidly (as No-Error flights are 
recorded); in the process, the rapidly increasing peak value, pulls down the probability 
values towards the tail end of the probability distribution curve (see graph at the 
lower-right hand corner).  This is because the total probability would add up to 100%; 
if the peak rises, the tail end should dip provided that the operator is dynamically 
stable.  In real life, the curve would be highly skewed to the left (No-Error) and then 
drop rapidly giving a tail that is asymptotic to infinity.  There is not enough data 
available to the research study to create such a distribution profile.  In any event, each 
operator should be considered on its own merit. 
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There are two other techniques for handling states for which data is not available. 
 
• Technique 1 is to truncate the model by eliminating those nodes for which 
data not available.  Introduce them later when new information is available.  
Academically, or as a research study it has merit, but not as a practical tool in 
industry. If the possibility of a state exists, then it could occur any time, and 
the model must make provision for it in the model.  Operators must have full 
visibility of all possible “states”, if not they would not be able to correctly 
allocate the most relevant causal factor.  Anything “not seen” may be taken as 
it “does not exist”.  Furthermore, a later addition of new “states” would 
change the structure of the model and probabilities.  The end result after 
modification could have a significant step change that would be difficult to 
manage if the concept has been used for assessing risk over a long period.  In 
contrast, a small change would have no impact as risk values usually change 
with updating, and the organization is used to tolerate small changes. 
 
• Technique 2 is to eliminate those combinations that are considered 
impossible.  In this generic model the number of combinations is so large, 
running into almost 3M, it is impossible or impractical to undertake this entire 
task manually.  As it would be improper to eliminate some and leave others, all 
combinations were retained regardless of the fact if they are possible or not.  
In fact further investigation into this issue revealed that the Bayesian research 
community has already recognized the difficulty of truncating unlikely 
combinations from large number of combinations.  Other computer techniques 
have to be used for their development, which is still at research stage 
according to enquiries made during this study.  
The decision to leave all combinations intact has other justifications. For instance, the 
range of events and causal factors that were included in the model was not 
exhaustive. Only those parameters that were either obvious, brought to our notice by 
expert LAEs, or suggested through other research papers have been included.  It is not 
a fully surveyed listing.  There may be many other events and causal factors that 
deserved mention as possibilities.  Similarly the number of nodes is also not 
exhaustive.  The model may need other nodes to represent the full CAW process as an 
ID.  Since this is a generic model, the study was not too concerned about obtaining a 
definitive list of nodes and causal factors, but as many as possible to maximise scope 
and to demonstrate what the models capabilities are. 
Given these other possibilities and limitations of knowledge, the study accepted the 
argument that even if an aircraft had gone through all the critical nodes as error free, 
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there could still be other conditions unaccounted for, which could contribute to 
human error that would affect risk.  There have been instants when an aircraft has 
had a dormant problem or an error, it has gone through final checks at critical nodes 
and cleared as safe to fly, yet the error resurfaced during flight resulting with an 
incident.  Therefore, clearance of an aircraft as safe by CAW process has a legal 
validity that it is airworthy, but still it might not give a guarantee that the aircraft will 
be 100% safe and airworthy.  An infinitesimally small probability of risk could still 
remain.  Ironically, it is in fact the events that occur at those infinitesimally small scale 
of probability or limits of imagination that cause accidents, and not the obviously 
glaring hazards. 
Accordingly, this study adopted the technique that no combination would be 
eliminated, just because the process seemed to provide adequate safety, or because 
some combinations were unlikely or appeared to be not relevant.  In accident, 
relevancy or the lack of sufficient safeguards, checks and balances emerges during the 
investigations after an accident.  The study moved away from the idea that experts 
knew it all, and erred towards uncertainty and incompleteness of information; this 
was the most rational and common sense posture to adopt.  Thus no combinations 
were truncated on account of apparent irrelevancy.  The result from simulation 
proved that retention of all combinations to account for unknowns is justified. 
8.20 Reliability of validation trial results 
 
The operator had raised a query on the reliability of the results and applicable 
confidence levels. It has already been shown that the number of sectors flown has a 
significant impact on the probability values output by the model.   
 
In response it should be stated that the validation trial was not a sampling exercise 
from which predictions on the whole population would be made.  Although the trial 
was limited to only a proportion of flying that the operator had undertaken since the 
licensing of this AOC Holder, the trial made use of all the flying that was done during a 
period when systematic error data recording had been undertaken.  That means the 
entire population of available data was used in the trial. 
 
The objective was to test the possibility of using the result as a starting point, i.e. to 
set a reference line, and then to continue with the building up of a full error data 
history for the fleet.  The reference line would certainly be affected by the number of 
sectors flown.  Thus, it was envisaged that new operational data would be added to 
the database, and simultaneously, through continual updating, the model would 
calculate new probability values enabling change of risk level to be determined. This 
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technique could be used for monitoring the safety performance of the operator and 
trends.   
 
That said, statistical reliability and confidence levels become relevant if the result, e.g. 
the calculated risk level, was to be used as a  bench mark for comparing one 
operator’s safety performance with another operator’s or with a global or national 
standard. In that case, the population size, i.e. the number of sectors flown, would 
have a major impact on the reliability of the result.  If one operator has flown million 
sectors in one year, and the other has flown 30,000 sectors, then the result from the 
larger operator becomes more reliable than that from the smaller operator, given 
other conditions remain on par.  Reliability of the test results could be quantified by 
calculating statistical confidence limits to the required level of confidence. 
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Table 8.27- Fleet Maintenance Operation - Errors observed for period Jan 08 – Feb 10 
Date ID AC Type AC ID Nature of Error 
AMO 
Location 
1 Feb 08 41 Type_A2 Reg_6 Refuel valve fails to open due faulty relay fitted. L3 
13 Dec 08 19 Type_A2 Reg_7 Loose articles (fasteners)  in pneumatic coupling L1 
25 Dec 08 23 Type_A2 Reg_9 Loose article (Oil can) left in engine pylon L1 
4 Feb 09 23a Type_A2 Reg_9 
Loose article (Oil can) found in engine pylon during C 
Check. 
Dormant 
28 Feb 09 27 Type_A2 Reg_9 
EGPWS spurious warnings led to radar altimeter 
transmitter/receiver loose connectors 
MRO1 
1 Mar 09 27 Type_A2 Reg_9 EGPWS spurious warnings misdiagnosis MRO1 
3 Mar 09 27 Type_A2 Reg_9 EGPWS spurious warnings misdiagnosis L2 Base 
4 Mar 09 27 Type_A2 Reg_9 EGPWS spurious warnings misdiagnosis L4 
5 Mar 09 27 Type_A2 Reg_9 EGPWS spurious warnings misdiagnosis L1 
7 Mar 09 27 Type_A2 Reg_9 EGPWS spurious warnings misdiagnosis L1 
11 Mar 09 27 Type_A2 Reg_9 EGPWS spurious warnings misdiagnosis L10 
15 Mar 09 27 Type_A2 Reg_9 EGPWS spurious warnings L2 Base 
30 Mar 09 4 Type_A2 Reg_6 Inoperative cargo deck rollers L2 Base 
3 Apr 09 4d Type_A2 Reg_6 Inoperative cargo deck rollers L2 Base 
21 Apr 09 35 Type_A2 Reg_16 Post C Check, loss of Oxygen accumulator pressure MRO1 
30 May 09 37 Type_A2 Reg_10 Transfer of No-Go Item to ADD L1 
24 Jun 09 39 Type_A2 Reg_8 Missing Splice Prev Owner 
3 Jul 09 40 Type_A2 Reg_14 Engineer forgot to deactivate battery charger L46 
3 Jul 09 40a Type_A2 Reg_14 Active battery charger – dormant error Dormant 
3 Jul 09 40b Type_A2 Reg_14 Active battery charger – dormant error Dormant 
3 Jul 09 40c Type_A2 Reg_14 Active battery charger – dormant error L1 
2 Aug 09 43 Type_A2 Reg_8 Circuit breakers left pulled post maintenance L1 
2 Aug 09 44 Type_A2 Reg_22 Incorrect robbing procedures and tech log certification L1 
10 Aug 09 47 Type_A2 Reg_19 APU oil empty due to incorrectly installed filler cap L1 
24 Aug 09 48 Type_A2 Reg_12 
Incorrect Decal markings at fuel drip stick locations on 
both wings 
L2 Base 
26 Aug 09 51 Type_A2 Reg_1 UC gear pin stowage missing L1 
28 Aug 09 55 Type_A2 Reg_3 Red "remove before flight" ribbon hanging from flaps L1 
31 Aug 09 50 Type_A2 Reg_17 
MEL not followed, initially, to clear status message (“R 
ELEV PCU”) 
L1 
31 Aug 09 53 Type_A2 Reg_19 Cabin door opened without deactivating power assist L1 
9 Sep 09 46 Type_A2 Reg_15 
Thrust reverser Incorrect sensor adjustment, rigging 
and tech log certification. 
L1 
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Date ID AC Type AC ID Nature of Error 
AMO 
Location 
11 Sep 09 11 Type_A1 Reg_24 3-day over-run of fuel sump draining MRO2 
15 Sep 09 1 Type_A1 Reg_23 Structure fouling Pt 21 POA 
15 Sep 09 1b Type_A1 Reg_23 Structure fouling Pt21 POA 
15 Sep 09 57 Type_A1 Reg_23 
Engineer slipped, sprained ankle and damaged skin of 
the outboard aileron 
L2 Base 
24 Sep 09 5 Type_A2 Reg_7 Reported ac light on rotation Dormant 
24 Sep 09 5e Type_A2 Reg_7 Reported ac light on rotation L1 
30 Sep 09 59 Type_A2 Reg_14 
Damage to spinner assembly done as a result of 
investigating OSIC 
L1 
6 Oct 09 6 Type_A2 Reg_14 Improper robbing procedure L2 Base 
6 Oct 09 9 Type_A2 Reg_5 Faulty wiring of fuel pump MRO1 
6 Oct 09 60 Type_A2 Reg_20 Tech log open defect Flt Crew 
17 Oct 09 9i Type_A2 Reg_16 Faulty wiring of fuel pump Unknown 
27 Oct 09 61 Type_A2 Reg_5 CB information on MEL regarding cargo aft fan incorrect L2 Base 
2 Nov 09 2 Type_A2 Reg_19 Overdue Service Check L3 
2 Nov 09 8 Type_A2 Reg_21 
Failed to record fuel state on Tech Log after defueling 
for maintenance work 
L1 
3 Nov 09 9d Type_A2 Reg_10 Faulty wiring of fuel pump  
3 Nov 09 9f Type_A2 Reg_11 Faulty wiring of fuel pump  
13 Nov 09 63 Type_A2 Reg_9 Rumbling noise from nose wheel L1 
12 Dec 09 9k Type_A2 Reg_18 Faulty wiring of fuel pump  
17 Dec 09 9c Type_A2 Reg_8 Faulty wiring of fuel pump  
27 Dec 09 9g Type_A2 Reg_14 Faulty wiring of fuel pump  
27 Dec 09 9j Type_A2 Reg_17 Faulty wiring of fuel pump  
28 Dec 09 9h Type_A2 Reg_15 Faulty wiring of fuel pump  
1 Jan 10 64 Type_A1 Reg_24 Aircraft slipped off axle jack during wheel change. L1 
15 Jan 10 3 Type_A3 Reg_25 Incomplete maintenance  due to distraction L1 
16 Jan 10 16 Type_A2 Reg_5 Smoldering fire in 2 cable bundles and burnt wires. Pt 21 POA 
17 Jan 10 9b Type_A2 Reg_6 Faulty wiring of fuel pump NK 
22 Jan 10 13 Type_A2 Reg_12 Burnt and separated wiring in a loom Pt 21 POA 
11 Feb 10 17 Type_A2 Reg_15 
Insufficient bleed of hydraulic system after leg 
replacement 
L1 
Table 8.27- Fleet Maintenance Operation - Errors observed for period Jan 08 – Feb 10 
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Table 8.28 - Findings from Audits and Regulator Oversights 
Date Relevance AC ID Nature of Error 
AMO 
Location 
16-Jun-08 
General 
organization 
General 
organization 
CAME Procedure 9.2.3 should include an explanation 
of required inspection  
L2 Base 
20-Aug-08 Type-A2 Reg-21 
Spoiler removal NRC card does not meet  DAEP10 
requirements for independent inspections 
MRO3 
20-Aug-08 Type-A2 Reg-21 
C Check tally sheet missed out control entries for 
removal and refitting of access panels 
MRO3 
20-Aug-08 Type-A2 Reg-21 
Job Cards 72 and 73 had no findings recorded; it 
should have  C-EAT Ac Type A2-51-43-06 
MRO3 
20-Aug-08 Type-A2 Reg-21 
3-task cards among control documents had no card 
reference numbers, and not listed in the tally sheet. 
They were unrelated to aircraft worked on at this 
location  
MRO3 
12-Sep-08 
General 
organization 
General 
organization 
Description of facilities 1.8.4.7 for BFS station 
incorrect.  Accommodation was changed in Mar 08.  
i.e. documents out of date. 
L23 
07-May-09 
General 
organization 
General 
organization 
Laptop is the only accessible means to digitized data.  
If laptop failed there was no other method for access 
to maintenance data  
L10 
07-May-09 
General 
organization 
General 
organization 
Tech Log page 83119 has no aircraft registration 
details pre-printed as per DAEP 6 procedures, pg 4 
L10 
27-May-09 
General 
organization 
General 
organization 
Privilege of ARC extension not detailed in personal 
authorization documents 
L2 Base 
15-Mar-10 Type-A2 Reg-6 
Contractor non compliant  with MA708b; unable to 
demonstrate they were in full control of the 
management of task cards vide MA708b  
MRO1 
11-Jan-08 Type-A2 Reg-21 
Contractor cleared ADD entry whilst not sanctioned by 
inter-facing contract to do so. 
L2 Base 
11-Jan-08 Type-A2 Reg-21 Aircraft maintenance manual copies were out of date. L2 Base 
11-Jan-08 Type-A2 Reg-9 
Company had no contract with the 3rd party 
contractor who repaired this aircraft 
L2 Base 
30-Jan-08 
General 
organization 
General 
organization 
Calibration certificates unrecorded on TRAX causing 
equipment status unreliable 
L2 Base 
30-Jan-08 
General 
organization 
General 
organization 
Bonded store insecure enabling access by 
unauthorized personnel 
L2 Base 
30-Jan-08 
General 
organization 
General 
organization 
Accessibility to airworthiness data unsatisfactory 50% 
of the time 
L2 Base 
30-Jan-08 
General 
organization 
General 
organization 
Line PC had no access to EMOS or Safety Net L2 Base 
30-Jan-08 
General 
organization 
General 
organization 
Insufficient access to maintenance data. Inadequate 
number of PC access points. 
L2 Base 
31-Mar-08 
General 
organization 
General 
organization 
Faulty audit report raised because QA used an 
electronic document standard that had not been 
updated.  Paper and electronic forms were 
inconsistent. Change Management has been defaulted 
for not having the same standard. 
L2 Base 
31-Mar-08 
General 
organization 
General 
organization 
Faulty standard used by QA. Reported finding invalid. 
Maintenance certificate erratic as ac released under 
misquoted authority. Aircraft should not have been 
released without rectifying the defect. 
L2 Base 
29-Apr-08 
General 
organization 
General 
organization 
For 2 engineers, either no file or no training certificate 
on file. 
L2 Base 
29-Apr-08 
General 
organization 
General 
organization 
Appraisal certificate missing for engineer. L2 Base 
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Table 8.28 - Findings from Audits and Regulator Oversights 
Date Relevance AC ID Nature of Error 
AMO 
Location 
06-May-08 
General 
organization 
General 
organization 
TRAX data on the disposition of major assets were 
incorrect. Engine S/N 30070 allocated to an aircraft 
whereas it was in fact off wing and at POA on major 
overhaul. 13 engines were allocated wrongly on 
TRAX. 
L3 
28-May-08 
General 
organization 
General 
organization 
L15, Line Maintenance, No tooling inventory 
available. 
L15 
28-May-08 
General 
organization 
General 
organization 
Equipment calibration records were not properly 
managed. 
L15 
28-May-08 
General 
organization 
General 
organization 
No stockholding sheet for shelf items, even though 
life control items were being controlled by L2 Base 
logistic.  
L15 
09-Jun-08 
General 
organization 
General 
organization 
Training staff not fully conversant with company 
procedures and processes.  Trainers needed training. 
L16 
09-Jun-08 Type-A2 Reg-20 
Details of work required, authority and references 
were not stated in the Tech Log (as it should be) 
following authorization to repair a defect was given 
by L2 Base maintenance control centre 
L16 
09-Jun-08 Type-A2 Reg-20 
AC released without providing references to an 
approved repair scheme or procedure. 
L16 
10-Jun-08 
General 
organization 
General 
organization 
Engineer's file not updated with his HF training 
certificate. 
L6 
16-Jun-08 
General 
organization 
General 
organization 
No shift handover diary maintained. L1 
17-Jun-08 
General 
organization 
General 
organization 
No handover log maintained. L1 
02-Jul-08 Type-A2 Reg-15 
Part M AO CAW records unsatisfactory.  Irregular 
recording of aircraft hours. 
L3 
02-Jul-08 Type-A2 Reg-19 
Part M AO CAW records unsatisfactory.  Irregular 
recording of aircraft hours and engine installation not 
signed for. 
L3 
11-Jul-08 
General 
organization 
General 
organization 
No MCC training certificates held for MOC staff. L1 
22-Jul-08 
General 
organization 
General 
organization 
Nitrogen cylinder due calibration was not replaced by 
management. 
L5 
22-Jul-08 
General 
organization 
General 
organization 
Contractor had not supplied an up to date listing of 
technical manuals to Line Station at L5 
L5 
28-Jul-08 
General 
organization 
General 
organization 
Inadequate cargo deck rollers inspection frequency, 
to be increased from 1C check to 3A Check. 
L2 Base 
30-Jul-08 
General 
organization 
General 
organization 
L15 library failed to show a receipt for the return of a 
Type 2 aircraft MEL document. Investigation revealed 
that no MEL was ever sent to L15.  
L15 
30-Jul-08 
General 
organization 
General 
organization 
Flight Ops library unable to reassure about fuel 
quantity measuring stick data due to the absence of 
an updated document. Different document to an old 
revision state is available, but no one sure what the 
latest standard was.  
L2 Base 
16-Sep-08 
General 
organization 
General 
organization 
Gas cylinder storage and husbandry unsatisfactory. MRO1 
16-Sep-08 
General 
organization 
General 
organization 
Manual 323 CMM Fire Overheat Detector Rev 7 had 
not been incorporated 
MRO1 
16-Sep-08 
General 
organization 
General 
organization 
DAEP temporary revision folder was missing and 
unaccounted for 
MRO1 
09-Dec 08 
General 
organization 
General 
organization 
No minutes of meetings between Accountable 
Manager and Heads of Dept maintained, meaning no 
policy decisions are recorded. 
L33 
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Date Relevance AC ID Nature of Error 
AMO 
Location 
11-Jun-09 
General 
organization 
General 
organization 
Maintenance Control Centre at L1 had no visibility of 
contracts that parent operator maintained with other 
3rd party contractors at outstations. 
L1 
13-Jun-09 
General 
organization 
General 
organization 
Check Pack "A" incomplete. L1 
13-Jun-09 
General 
organization 
General 
organization 
No Tech Log entry made at the commencement of A-
Check. Error on part of the Supervisor, but primarily 
attributed to training program differences at L1 
L1 
13-Jun-09 
General 
organization 
General 
organization 
A-Check supervisor was unaware of company 
procedure due to different training standards. 
L1 
13-Jun-09 
General 
organization 
General 
organization 
Task card requires changing from Mechanic to 
Inspector annotation following changes procedures. 
Cards should be updated 
L1 
13-Jun-09 
General 
organization 
General 
organization 
Delay in A-Check caused by lack of printing 
equipment for tech documents.  This is not strictly an 
error but an admin or management shortfall. 
L1 
15-Jun-09 
General 
organization 
General 
organization 
L1 contractor has a backlog of untrained staff due to 
lack of Trainers 
L1 
15-Jun-09 
General 
organization 
General 
organization 
Large backlog of QA observed Non-Conformances 
awaiting AO's approval 
L1 
08-Jul-09 General organization 
General 
organization 
Engines with misaligned spinner caps still received by 
POA for engines, despite a previous audit report 
highlighted this problem.  Problem was engineers not 
following AMM procedures. 
L2 Base 
17-Sep-09 General organization 
General 
organization 
L2 Base MOC under-manned and after 8-months still 
no improvements to manning situation. No recruiting in 
the offing. 
L2 Base 
17-Sep-09 General organization 
General 
organization 
Access to CAME and DAEP restricted due to lack of 
proper electronic links to the server. L2 Base 
28-Oct-09 General organization 
General 
organization MOE manpower plan out of date. Not updated. MRO1 
28-Oct-09 General organization 
General 
organization MOE revision status page not signed. MRO1 
28-Oct-09 General organization 
General 
organization 
MRO1 does not record ADD Ref Num block when 
clearing ADDs, making it difficult to track and manage 
ADD entries on TRAX system.  TRAX system expects 
to use these entries.  
MRO1 
28-Oct-09 General organization 
General 
organization 
MRO1 safety data spread sheet is widely out of date, 
and needs updating. MRO1 
28-Oct-09 General organization 
General 
organization 
Incident Report form, No Entry annotated to protect 
identity or anonymity. MRO1 
28-Oct-09 General organization 
General 
organization HF training out of date for one engineer. MRO1 
28-Oct-09 General organization 
General 
organization 
No management traceability of engineers reading 
Safety Notices placed on the notice board.  Need a 
better traceability system. 
MRO1 
28-Oct-09 General organization 
General 
organization 
Engineering Quality Manual amended to revised status, 
but the fact was not recorded in the amendment page. MRO1 
30-Oct-09 Type-A2 Reg-14 
Poor husbandry. Off ac equipment unlabeled, not 
segregated and unprotected from pollution. Lacking in 
technical discipline 
MRO1 
27-Nov-09 General organization 
General 
organization Third party contract has not been updated L75 
20-Jan-10 General organization 
General 
organization Inventory of tooling and parts 8-months out of date L10 
20-Jan-10 General organization 
General 
organization 
Management of amendments to tech documents 
unsatisfactory. Amendments have not been 
incorporated in a timely fashion, making documents 
unreliable 
L10 
Table 8.28 - Findings from Audits and Regulator Oversight
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Figure 8.18 – Generic CAW Risk model modified for Operator X used in validation trial
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Chapter Nine 
Discussion – Model application 
 
 
9.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter takes an overview of the CAW Risk Model’s potential for application in air 
transport industry as a general strategic level risk assessment tool for use by high level 
managers. 
 
During the advanced stages of this research, participating operators and the Regulator 
raised a number of specific questions in order for them to assess the practicability of 
the model within civil aviation industry. 
 
• Could this model be adopted as part of an operator’s SMS?  
• Would it be suitable for publication in UK CAA SMS guidance material? 
• Bearing in mind the significant man-hours associated with populating this model 
would the industry be willing to adopt this? 
• What would be the cost benefit to industry? 
• Could CAA establish a baseline risk acceptance level using this model? 
• How should the CAA create equality of an acceptable level of risk across industry? 
• How do you see the CAA establishing acceptable levels of trend deviation? 
• Would it be possible to set league tables as a consequence, say, categorized as 
gold, silver, bronze standards? 
• What is the risk to the CAA of “backing off” from the current oversight regime? 
 
The Chapter first considers if the model met its intended industrial needs, i.e. as a 
supporting tool in the application of RBO concept and in SMS.  The responses to the 
questions follow as a discussion, where the differences between the desired 
objectives and what is practical in an industrial environment are reconciled.   
 
Some of the information given here are personal opinions of the individual 
airworthiness experts who participated in the program.  Nevertheless, they were a 
part of the research and could be considered as valid expert opinions. 
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9.2 Regulatory role – Model supporting RBO concept 
 
In RBO application the model meets the desirable criteria for a quantitative risk model 
as visualized in Philip Hampton Report13, see Table 9.1.  The following sections qualify 
them. 
 
9.2.1 Open to scrutiny.  The BBN concept is well documented and proven in other 
areas of application.  Software programs used in the core of the model for calculating 
conditional probabilities are well known and commercially available.  Therefore the 
underpinning theories and technical logic are open to full scrutiny.   
 
9.2.2 Past performance and potential risk.  The database, on which the model 
calculates, represents the performance of the organization up to that point in time.   It 
uses past data to estimate current potential risk. Where error data is not available, 
e.g. in a newly established organization, it may be possible to simulate data based on 
beliefs.  
 
Criteria (Source – PH Report) BBN 
Open to scrutiny Yes 
Balanced to include past performance and future 
potential risk 
Yes 
Use all good quality data Yes 
Implemented uniformly and impartially Yes 
Express simply, preferably mathematically Yes 
Dynamic and not static Yes 
Carried through to funding decisions Yes 
Include an element of random inspection Yes 
Incorporate deterrent effect Yes 
Table 9.1 - Meeting desirable criteria for a risk model 
 
9.2.3 Good quality data.  Obviously, calculations based on simulations would not be 
accurate as those based on hard evidence.  All good quality data, i.e. hard evidence, 
would be used first and the least reliable data last.  Poor quality data would be 
gradually faded out as more and more good quality, new information is accumulated. 
 
9.2.4 Calculates current risk.  Once the model calculates current risk as determined 
by the historical data collected to that point, it is possible to ascertain the trend by 
regular updating.  Management could be alerted to potential increases of risk level 
and by identifying hazards that cause increasing risk.  
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9.2.5 Uniform and impartial implementation.  Since the risk assessment is based on 
a statistical calculation to a formula and is structured, the methodology remains the 
same regardless of who would use the model; personal opinion does not come into it.  
However the initial handling of the event, if it was to be reported or not, or to be 
investigated, and its categorization, all these could be affected by an individual or by 
local safety culture.  Rules for reporting and categorization of data could be written in 
order to reduce this personal bias and to make the process as neutral as possible.  
 
9.2.6 Mathematical expression.  The output is expressed mathematically, and 
simply in terms of a probability of an error occurring, the probability of consequences 
resulting from the error and the probability of the cost related to that error. 
 
9.2.7 Dynamic process.  It was explained that the risk assessment process is a live, 
on-going process as data are continually accumulated and calculation updated. Thus 
the process is dynamic.  The latest state of play can be read off at any time by 
managers. 
 
9.2.8 Results carried through to funding decisions.  It is the management who 
would decide if the output from the model would be carried through to funding 
decisions.  The model provides the supporting information: i.e. the risk level, trends, 
points in the process where significant causal factor concentrations exist and the 
sensitivity of risk to certain causal factors.  After that, it is up to the management to 
make the best use of this information in their funding decisions. 
 
9.2.9 Random inspections/ audits.  Issues concerning either random inspections or 
deterrent effects are concerned with the application of the model to monitor 
regulatory compliance.  For example, if there were to be any relaxation of the 
oversight regime on account of RBO concept and the degree of control that the 
Regulator might wish to retain in order to enforcement the law.  These are 
management and administrative activities.  The model is only a tool to enable both 
the operator and the Regulator to assess the risk.  
 
9.2.10 Performance indicators.  Through sensitivity analysis it is possible to identify 
specific nodes in the process network, which are critical to the safe operation.  If these 
could be monitored, then they could become relevant performance indicators.  From 
a problem solving viewpoint, indicators based on sensitivity analysis may be better 
than those currently used, i.e. number of MOR raised or the number of accidents or 
incidents industry-wide. This issue is further discussed in Section 9.9. 
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9.3 SMS implementation – Model’s support role 
 
The potential use of the risk model as a supporting tool in a safety management 
system answers the first question posed by UK Regulator, i.e. if it should be 
considered for adoption as part of the SMS. It was already stated that the ICAO 
mandate on SMS has revived authorities’ interest in and need for a reliable risk 
assessment methodology that provides a quantitative output.  This model meets that 
need.  This section explores how the risk model fits into a safety management system. 
 
ICAO Doc 9859 SMM states that a SMS should have the following elements, namely: 
  
• Policy for and the organization of SMS.  
• Methodology and process for safety risk management and its implementation. 
• Continuing safety assurance process.  
• Safety awareness and promotion program.   
 
CAW Risk Model satisfies two of the elements, i.e. it provides a methodology and a 
process for safety risk management as well as a continuing safety assurance process. 
 
 
Process 
(Source – SMM ICAO Doc 9859 Ch 8) 
Subjective judgment  – 
expert opinion 
BBN 
Hazard identification Identifies new hazards 
Works with previously 
identified hazards  
Risk assessment 
Susceptible to self-protection as 
well as business pressures 
Neutral 
Probability of the hazard precipitating an 
unsafe event given optimum conditions 
Informed individual judgment – 
wide margin of error 
Data driven 
Severity of consequences 
Informed individual judgment – 
wide margin of error 
Data driven 
Rate of exposure to unsafe conditions, 
i.e. conditionality 
Informed individual judgment –
wide margin of error 
Data driven 
Risk assessment/ estimation Inexact – informed judgment More exact 
Acceptability of risk 
Subjective judgment but standards 
may vary with business pressures 
Relative to  previously set 
threshold 
Risk mitigation 
Individual personal decision on 
how to mitigate, then subjective 
judgment if it works 
prioritizes critical causal 
factors + validate 
effectiveness of 
mitigation 
Performance indicators Set subjective standards Data driven, yields KPI 
Table 9.2 - Model comparison – Traditional vs BBN 
 
Table 9.2 compares the relative strengths and limitations of the risk model with 
traditional subjective methods, using ICAO Doc 9859 statement on the capabilities of a 
satisfactory SMS; it must be capable of: hazard identification, risk assessment, output 
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risk value as a tangible measure, deciding the acceptability of the risk, risk mitigation, 
and setting new performance indicators.   
 
On hazard identification, the traditional system works better because a human could 
identify new hazards whereas a model cannot do it unless it is linked with sensors and 
pre-programmed.  Unfortunately, unknown conditions cannot be modelled, i.e. the 
BBN model could work with previously identified or predicted as feasible situations. 
 
In all other respects the CAW Risk Model is far superior to the traditional methods. 
 
Risk assessment is based upon three factors coming together: the probability of a 
hazard precipitating to cause an unsafe event, the severity of consequences and finally 
the rate of exposure to unsafe conditions.  In the traditional system all these 3 factors 
are based on expert opinion, whereas in the BBN model, they are data driven.  Expert 
opinion may be bias, conservative and may have an element of self preservation 
against the unknowns, whereas the BBN approach is neutral. 
 
Being a structured procedure that could be repeated, the BBN process outputs a near 
exact result whereas the traditional method, being subjective, tends to be inexact and 
might not be repeatable given the same set of conditions and a different assessor.  
 
Whether or not a risk is acceptable is based on subjective judgment and how the 
manager feels about the risk level relative to other business objectives.  Whereas in 
the traditional method this decision is entirely subjective, with a BBN it is possible to 
compare the risk level against a pre planned threshold level, thus taking some of the 
subjective judgment out of the consideration.  In BBN the threshold can be 
numerically defined.  
 
Once the risk level is determined, the method of mitigation could be fully objective 
with BBN.  This is because the data base would have identified the causal factors and 
the model would show relationship between causal factors and risk level.  Sensitivity 
analysis would show which causal factors would have the greatest effect on the risk.  
With this information at hand, mitigation action and priorities could be determined.  It 
is also possible to measure the effectiveness of the corrective action.  However the 
decision on which mitigation action is most attractive to the organization can only be 
taken by the human, having given due regard to all other conflicting needs.  
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9.4 Suitability of the model for publication in CAA SMS guidance material 
 
UK CAA have issued a SMS Implementation Plan published on UK CAA website, UK 
CAA Webpage Safety Management Systems Implementation Plan, which had come in 
to effect from 1 January 2009, encouraging operators to establish SMS within their 
organizations within two to three years.   
 
The plan has provided SMS guidance material, Safety Regulation Group:  Safety 
management Systems – Guidance to Organizations106 as well as SMS Compliance 
Checklist/ Gap Analysis Form.  The Form helps, as name implies, to analyze the 
differential that exists between the organizations current state of compliance and 
what was required by ICAO mandate.   
 
It is beneficial to inform the industry on the applicability of the generic model in the 
context of SMS Guidance Notes.  Industry could consider adopting this model as part 
of its SMS.  Publication of information would encourage operators to start 
experimenting with the concept with a view to eventual adoption within their 
organizations. 
 
A model specific for an AOC Holder operator would not be suitable for an MRO, 
although generically they could be similar.  Further work would establish if a single 
model would suit all, or different models would have to be tailored for either 
individual organizations or groups.   
 
 Ideally each operator (or AO) should have a tailor-made model designed to match its 
operation and local conditions, as they could be different from the generic. For that 
purpose the organization would have to employ a subject matter expert, ideally on 
both Bayesian modelling and CAW management.  This is because Bayesian modelling 
is a specialized field and the typical safety engineers coming from a practical 
background is unlikely to have the aptitude and analytical skills to handle the abstract 
issues involved.  Of course, there may be exceptions amongst them who have the 
necessary skills and currency, in which case they would be ideal as they already have 
all the necessary practical experience in safety management. 
  
9.5 Industry willingness to adopt the model 
 
Would the industry adopt this model given it is labour intensive to populate the 
model?  Industry might adopt the model if UK CAA provided the leadership.  In the US 
for instance, FAA has taken leadership in setting up a pilot project involving number of 
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operators to set up SMS.  In UK, CAA might do things differently, but certainly 
leadership in such important policy changes would help. 
 
Although individually each airline might have independent views and often prefer to 
reserve their position, when it comes to industry wide issues, they are likely to 
exercise group behaviour.  If the stronger and more vocal operators adopt the model, 
then the remainder of the industry would fall in line.  The cost of introducing and 
using the model is unlikely to be a deciding factor, even though the industry would be 
wary of cost escalation of any form in the present economic climate (2010).  Timing 
and reluctance to change are the more likely reasons, even though cost of labour may 
be quoted as the excuse because in the present economic climate fear of any new cost 
brings out sensitivities. 
 
Current economic conditions have led to operators shedding labour that does not 
contribute to revenue generating activities and upholding essential safety related 
activities.  Changes that a new risk assessment method could bring could have long 
term economic benefits, but it might not be convincing to the operator.  In this 
background any new activity that appears to demand additional labour would be 
received with disinterest at best or derision at worst. Therefore, they should pause 
and reflect what the investment and return could be. 
 
During the validation phase of the concept model, the labour cost for researching and 
categorizing relevant data from the non-relevant, analyzing them and uploading took 
about three man-months.  That is data from a medium sized regional airline, 
accumulated over a period of 3-years, and one-person (the researcher) working with a 
set of rudimentary software.   With a fully developed model and user-friendly set of 
software, and safety engineers who are fully familiar with the aircraft system working 
with data, the labour cost could be less.  Eventually, the volume of data to be initially 
analyzed would determine the overall cost.  The effort and labour cost for updating 
would be very small.   
 
The idea that the new model and its use could be labour intensive is irrational and 
comes more from the fear of the unknown rather than from reason.  The cost of the 
new system ought to be considered in the light of labour cost to operate the existing 
safety management and risk assessment methods already in operation in 
organizations. 
 
There was another fear expressed that a new model may be forced to exist alongside 
with existing rules and data bases, and that such databases could not be analyzed 
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easily to match with the taxonomy used in the model.  Obviously, the generation gap 
of a new model and taxonomy and the old database will be a problem.  The 
researcher has encountered this problem, but he has dealt with it as he was willing to 
take up the challenge as part of the project.  On a routine basis, employers might not 
like to accept that burden and could use it as an excuse to block or delay the advent of 
new risk assessment methods.  The correct way to overcome this problem is through 
change management.  For example the preparation of staffs to handle the new 
system, the design and publication of data collecting documentation or IT methods 
that match the new system would help. 
 
If the authority decides to allow operators some degree of self-regulation, then there 
could be an issue regarding the confidentiality of operator’s data when it comes to 
sharing them with the Regulator.  If UK CAA already has access to the operator’s 
information, then this study cannot see what the problem would be in future.  
However, if UK CAA does not have access, then as part of change management, new 
rules should be introduced regarding data sharing.  If a CEO/AM acts in the interest of 
safety, as they often declares, then there is no need for them to shy away from the 
truth. 
 
9.6 Cost benefit to the industry 
 
In the absence of hard data, a qualitative assessment of cost benefits has been made 
using common sense and informed judgment.  This assessment assumes that a fully 
developed model, together with user-friendly interfaces, is available.   It is envisaged 
that the system would require a modest cost outlay initially (say, around £10,000 for a 
unit-model) but it would return significant benefits for risk management, in terms of 
better control over risk status and greater flexibility to conduct engineering operations 
based on better understanding of the way errors impact on risk level. 
 
• Outlay.  The organization would have to identify staff complement to operate 
the system, to uptake existing data and to update the database with new 
information progressively.  One trained person could operate the system, 
possibly a maximum of 2 to provide 100% cover, but undertaking other safety 
management tasks  It may be possible to utilize existing staff who operate 
either MEMS or quality management system or if not SMS, as part of extended 
responsibilities.  The volume of extra data to be uploaded and the effort 
needed appears to be onerous, but in reality, with modern user friendly data 
exchange interfaces, the data collection processes could be accomplished with 
relative ease.  
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 • Archival data. The analysis and up taking of archival data may be a substantial 
workload for one or two experts, and the cost would depend on the size of 
archival data. It was already stated that the researcher spent about 3-months 
working alone to analyze and uptake 2-years worth of data offered by the 
participant operator.  The elapsed time and effort included time spent in 
associated tasks such as researching aircraft systems and technical terms 
related to incident reports on specific aircraft types, as well as trying to 
comprehend various organizational issues of the operator’s maintenance 
support services, all of which the researcher was unfamiliar with initially.  
Concurrently, the researcher was also making adjustments to the design of the 
model in response to his experiences with field data.  Therefore, it is 
reasonable to state here that if the archival data were to be analyzed and 
uploaded by experts who are already knowledgeable of the aircraft and total 
environment where these incidents had occurred, then up taking archival data 
was not going to be such an onerous task to handle, as some opponents of 
change would like to make out. 
  
• Transition to self-regulation and reduce cost of oversight inspections. The 
model offers organizations an opportunity to exercise a degree of self-
regulation.  Sincere application of the model in an organization could provide 
necessary evidence to the Regulator that the organization has the capability as 
well as the will to regulate itself.  If the organization could show through the 
database and resulting risk assessment that its defence system is effective in 
containing errors, then it would provide the Regulator sufficient confidence to 
revise the frequency of oversight inspections in favour of the operator, thus 
reducing operator’s costs.  If an operator was accepted as fit for self 
regulation, then they might be able to save a considerable amount in reduced 
fees.  This does not mean that the legal responsibility for Regulating is passed 
on to the operator.  The Regulator will remain responsible but it should be able 
to delegate a degree of autonomy to the operator based on evidence. 
 
• SMS application.  The greater return to the operator will come from using the 
model as a part of the SMS, in order to determine where risks come from.  The 
way the model has been designed, it provides senior managers a form of 
“nervous system” to feel the health of their organization’s CAW process 
machinery, and to identify where significant hazards and error generators 
exist.  From his strategic position, a CEO/AM or his deputy would be able to 
recognize where problems are building up due to human errors that might 
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upset the dynamic balance of the CAW process.  He could then act on that 
information immediately or allocate appropriate priorities for funding. 
 
• Minimize cost of accident.  The most important saving that could be gained is 
in reducing wastage resulting from consequences of an error: the cost of repair 
or replacement of an engine,  recovery from a collapsed undercarriage during 
a landing, loss of an aircraft, injury or death to passengers and flight crew, or 
damage to third parties on the ground.  This is where the greatest cost savings 
are.  A CEO/AM might say that they have already covered these possibilities by 
insuring against such eventuality.  But even so, with a better knowledge base 
of risk and ability to reduce it, they would be able to negotiate more 
favourable premium rates from insurance underwriters.  
 
• Recognition of good performance.  Recognition of good performance is 
strategically important for an organization’s reputation.  This model empowers 
the organization to make full benefit of good performance, as the model 
records and utilises good work, i.e. all the flights that the organization has 
launched with no errors at the end of the CAW process and those sectors 
completed safely and effectively.  This means giving due credit to a well 
defended CAW process.  Existing data collection and risk analysis methods, 
though aware of this situation, have no means of crediting the organizations 
for their positive error free actions, and only records negative actions. This is 
not fair to the operators. 
 
• Minimize technical admin cost and consultancy fees.   Direct access to 
evidence as it occurs, will reduce the need for ad-hoc hiring of consultants to 
investigate what is wrong with organizations and to find solutions.  This is in 
fact the trend nowadays in commercial organizations that minimize in-house 
specialist technical staffs and rely on external consultancies.  The model, as 
presented here, is designed for the use of technical managers who has a great 
deal of general knowledge of engineering management but little knowledge of 
Bayesian Theory.  The model will certainly save resources in this respect by 
keeping all the necessary work in-house and eliminating exorbitantly high 
consultancy fees. 
 
9.7 Establishing a baseline risk acceptance level 
 
It has been queried if the model could be used to establish a baseline risk acceptance 
level.  Yes, theoretically it is possible, but it is necessary to conduct a wider range of 
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validation trials to determine the distribution of results across a larger group of 
operators.  Only one validation result is available at present, and that is insufficient to 
draw any conclusions. 
 
In addition there are two other issues that needed prior resolution.  One, the basis on 
which the risk level is calculated, i.e. is it on the operator’s belief or is it on his 
recorded performance data.  The latter draws out the second issue, the size of the 
population has a significant bearing on the value of the calculated risk level.   
 
If operator’s belief was used, then the starting risk level would be the same for all 
operators, because it is anticipated that they will claim to be operating to a global 
standard by virtue of the fact that they have adopted EASA regulations and that UK 
CAA have licensed them to operate as a safe organization.   
 
However, if actual experience was used to compute risk level, then there is bound to 
be differences between different organizations.  A flat distribution would suggest a 
wide scatter, whereas a peaked distribution such as Normal would indicate a central 
tendency.   If there is a wide scatter, then either each individual organization would 
have to have its own acceptable risk level as a performance indicator, subject to that it 
be interpreted together with evidence on its safety performance.  A peaked 
distribution, on the other hand, might suggest that a common acceptable risk level 
might exist across either throughout industry, or if not across certain groups.  
 
Meanwhile, how would one determine if the level obtained from the model for an 
individual organization is considered acceptable?  To answer this question, first, it is 
necessary to reflect on the way a surveyor currently determines if an operator’s 
continued airworthiness process activities are safe or not, as explained in Chapter 
Three, Section 3.13.  
 
If an operator is in compliant with regulation and an oversight audit is satisfactory, 
then the operator is considered safe.  Yet even in such an organization, incidents do 
occur due to human error.  Unless an organization has an uncontrolled history of 
human error attributed incidents, occasional incident due to human error should not 
lead to the Regulator declaring that the organization is intrinsically unsafe. Thus, in 
principle, a human error occurrence is not the main issue in determining minimum 
safety level; compliance with regulation is the principal criteria.  But in a practical 
scenario, it is compliance with regulation and how human error issues are managed 
that determines if the organization is performing safely.  The risk level obtained from 
the model becomes a reference level from which variations could be measured. 
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9.8 Trend deviations 
 
If acceptable risk levels can be established as discussed in the previous section, then it 
may be possible to establish trend deviations.  Naturally it would depend on the 
distribution profile, and what the variation would mean in practical terms, say, with 
respect to evidence of safe performance from the organization.  At present there is 
only one result from the validation exercise; this is insufficient data.   
 
Deviations should be allowed, if it is associated with positive management actions to 
control the risk. 
 
9.9 Key Performance Indicators 
 
Currently statistics on global and national aircraft accidents, MOR, MEMS outputs and 
trends are used as Key Performance Indicators of the status of health of the industry 
with respect to airworthiness issues, i.e. how effective safety regulations and 
management process have been performing.  It has been the practice that based on 
these statistics the Regulator may issue advisory notes to operators on specific areas 
that need monitoring and control. 
 
Some operators expressed their reservations to the current method of KPI usage as 
follows: 
 
• The results are always retrospective; suggested improvements are in hindsight, 
and will be applied retrospectively. Improvements can be seen in future years. 
 
• Rules and regulations based on industry-wide historical data may not be 
applicable to all the AOs.  Information that may be advisory for every operator 
to ensure no future similar occurrence would be useful, only if the AO use 
similar equipment or operate in similar circumstances.  But in many cases, AOs 
differ from one another such that generalization may not be acceptable to 
them. 
 
• Some specific operators have stated that they do not agree with generalized 
KPI from the national or global authorities’ viewpoint.  Those AOs do not wish 
to focus on or monitor one risk influencing factor which may not be relevant to 
their situation and wishes instead to actively monitor another factor or 
parameter that is more relevant to them. 
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The CAW model could help make improvements to the existing system by increasing 
resolution of influencing factors relevant to certain groups of operators or individual 
operators. 
 
• Error probability at output could be used as a performance indicator, as well as 
the influencing factor that mostly impact on the output. 
 
• Through sensitivity analysis available in the CAW Risk Model, it is possible to 
identify those risk influencing factors that has the most impact on the error 
probability of output from individual operators.   
 
• Each responsible inspector should come to an agreement with AO, which 
parameters are important to the AO, and should monitor them. 
 
• The Regulator could then integrate inspectors’ reports for their own benefit or 
to advise any other similar equipment users. 
 
• CAW Risk Model is a dynamic model, and as long as it is used regularly, the 
user can have almost real time data, as well as the ability to monitor own 
trends. 
 
9.10 League tables  
  
A question has been raised if individual organizations should be categorized and listed 
in a league table of achieved risk levels in order to publicize their safety performance.   
Again, it is too early to comment on this, because there is insufficient information on 
acceptable risk levels and allowable variations.  Once these values are established, 
then, theoretical divisions, such as gold, silver or bronze, could be established based 
on quantified values.  But the merits of having such divisions should be assessed with 
respect to actual evidence of safe performance.   
 
It is also necessary to establish if the number conveys a state of safety or the lack of it 
as observed in practice and what the public reaction to such leagues would be; 
otherwise the concept of league tables would be ridiculed by those who would be 
adversely affected by it. 
 
On the philosophy of setting league tables or advocating their publication, this study 
would prefer to remain neutral; it is a political issue and falls outside the scope of this 
study.  Some operators may be encouraged to develop better safety management as a 
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result but others might complain that it could affect the commercial side of their 
business. The concept may be an encouragement to have a better safety culture.   
 
That said, it is common knowledge that there are league tables for the nation’s 
schools and hospitals.  Some groups of the public and some experts opposed to this 
concept, but after several years of their imposition by the central government, 
authorities and the public in general seemed to have learnt to accept this idea. In this 
regard, public opinion in general seems to be that the public has the right to know 
when it comes to the question of risk.  Perhaps the same applies to risk to flight safety 
because flying has become a very common mode of transport for the general public. 
 
9.11 Risk to the CAA of “backing off” 
 
The idea of CAA “backing off” from close supervision of operators arises from a 
concept that allows an operator to undertake a degree of self-regulation using the 
CAW risk model as a safety management tool under SMS guidelines.  The idea is not 
meant to absolve UK CAA from its responsibility to the implementation of oversight 
audits as a regulatory requirement. The phrase “back off” is meant to describe a state 
where the Regulator relaxes its oversight posture yet retains the responsibility to 
ensure that operators are complying with the regulation. 
 
If “back off” is exercised with the concept of RBO, then the Regulator exercises a 
relaxation on the basis of demonstrated low risk.  Both parties agree on the standard 
by sharing base data collected by the subject organization, and the state of continual 
updating of the risk level.  The assigned CAA inspector could have remote access to 
monitor the organization and he needs to visit the organization only to resolve issues 
that could not be handled remotely.   
 
There would however be a new task to police that the organization is recording 
information earnestly and that there is no attempt to manipulate the computation by 
surreptitious means. Trust and integrity of the operator is paramount here, and it is 
something that has to be built up. That together with occasional system of checks and 
balances would give both parties confidence that the system is operating correctly as 
intended. 
 
The combined effects of the relaxed approach, i.e. remote monitoring, limited checks 
and balances to ensure that the risk assessment process and self-regulation is 
functioning as expected, and the reduced oversight program based on risk level, 
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would be adequate to discount any fears that the “back-off” would introduce new risk 
to UK CAA. 
 
In an alternative mode of operation, UK CAA might “back off” on the basis of 
transferring the full responsibility for self-regulation to the operator.  Certainly it 
would require a major change in legislation, and if it did happen, UK CAA is unlikely to 
be held responsible for operator’s lack of compliance.  UK CAA might be given a new 
task of policing the operator’s operating the new system properly, and the power to 
deter any breaches through a regime of penalties.  Under these circumstances, the 
question of risk to CAA would not arise. 
 
A further alternative approach would be the contracting out of oversight audit 
function to a commercial third party.  This approach would be similar to the first 
approach, except that the cost of oversight inspection might be subject to market 
testing; thus the operator might get its cost reduced.  As to the risk to UK CAA, the risk 
of backing off is now carried by the third party contractor who has accepted the 
responsibility for ensuring that the operator is complying.  UK CAA carry the 
responsibility for ensuring that the commercial auditors are properly licensed and are 
worthy of their role.   The third party contractor is accountable to UK CAA.  This option 
too would require amendments to the existing legislation regarding the roles of UK 
CAA, the operator and the third party auditors with respect to regulatory compliance. 
 
9.12 Relevancy to human factors issues 
 
A discussion on risk assessment due to human error would not be complete if it did 
not contain some comments on one or two significant human factors issues that are 
relevant to this study.  Improvements to risk assessment techniques would be futile, if 
insufficient effort was made to comprehend and rectify some of the human issues that 
either contribute to error generation or inhibit error management.  Based on the 
researcher’s critical observations during this study, and information obtained from 
discussions with subject matter experts, the following comments are made. 
 
9.13 Holistic approach to error management - Health and welfare 
 
Whilst the industry is decisive and effective in mitigating error attributed to shortfalls 
in design, production, testing of aircraft and related hardware, it is less motivated to 
resolve causal factors related to the individual.  It was seen in Figure 3.5 that issues 
relating to the physical and mental well being of the people who work in stressful 
environment are at the centre of basic HFACS framework, yet this is the very area 
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whose development has been neglected by employers in civil aviation industry.  In 
recent years the emphasis has been in how best to take most out of people to 
maximize productivity, to increase profit margins and to hire and fire people at will in 
order to manipulate labor to meet commercial objectives. 
 
The message conveyed in this section is that it is the human in the loop that makes 
errors in design, production, testing, and maintenance, and planning how these 
activities should be done.  Part of that is the limitation of knowledge, leading to failure 
to account for certain conditions that the equipment would be subjected to during 
service.  Another part is his state of mind when working with existing knowledge that 
prevents him from using his knowledge.   
 
CHIRP/MEMS database107 reveals that a large proportion of recorded human error 
incidents were people related, as opposed to process related.  Closer examination of 
data reveals that some errors are related to individual performance that demands on 
mental faculties of memory and assimilation of information under pressure. For 
example, having analyzed 270 cases of installation error of which 205 were reported 
under MEMS and 65 under MOR, CHIRP/MEMS117 attribute 39% of installation errors 
reported under MEMS to individual performance, and 49% of the installation reported 
to UK CAA under MOR in year 2007.  Memory lapse accounts for 6% of individual 
performance lapses, whilst personal fatigue accounts for 12% of performance lapses.   
 
Subject experts have often pointed out that despite publicity and local initiatives to 
disseminate information this pattern was repeating year on year.  Part of the reason 
may lay in the authorities failure to recognize it as a significant problem and give due 
attention to investigate and alleviate the human factor issues that lead to the 
deterioration of mental faculties. 
 
9.13.1 Role of serotonin deficiency 
 
The role of the neurotransmitter serotonin in memory functions, assimilation of 
information and normal mental faculties is well understood by the medical 
profession110, though the general public has little comprehension of it except the 
general idea that the chemical puts the people in a good mood.   During the course of 
this research program, the researcher had the rare opportunity of closely studying a 
case of loss of memory and difficulty to assimilate information of a person who was 
employed outside an aircraft environment.  The case was traced back to the inception 
of the problem, and followed its real time diagnosis and cure.  With the permission of 
the patient the case is cited here, under the principle advanced by Yin (2009)92  (see 
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Section 6.5) regarding the use of single case histories in soft science research.  
Through following up this case history in real time, the researcher’s curiosity was 
aroused that led him into researching relevant scientific research papers in the 
medical field, and to discuss relevant issues with medical professionals . This section 
of the report is written from the knowledge so acquired, for the benefit of those in 
aeronautical profession researching into causation of human error, in order to open 
up their horizon beyond the world of aircraft.  
 
Whilst serotonin makes people feel good according to the popular belief, deficiency in 
serotonin, by way of imbalance from what the nature intended, could cause 
significant deterioration of memory functions and mental faculties. The imbalance, 
usually a reduction in the level to below the norm is clinically referred to as a 
depression, meaning a depression of serotonin level in the brain, and NOT a case of 
losing one’s happiness according to the popular misconception.   Obviously, 
depression of serotonin could create an unhappy mood, which is a symptom, which 
then results with further depression of serotonin level, causing a vicious cycle from 
which a person might find it difficult to come out unless the cycle is broken by 
intervention. Intervention to restore balance is possible, but it will take some finite 
time, and with timely treatment the person will get back to normality.  
 
Serotonin in the brain acts like e-mail to send information from one brain cell to the 
other. When serotonin is deficient, it creates a condition that is similar to not having a 
2-way medium of communication; once the 2-way flow of information between brain 
cells is impeded or blocked, it inhibits memory functions, which easily leads to not 
coping with information flow, to confusion and to irrational thinking. More of this 
could be read in relevant medical literature available in public domain. 
 
From a human error perspective, this phenomenon has much significance. When 
engaged in technical work that requires concentration and assimilation of information 
rapidly, analyzing and acting on them, sufferers of serotonin deficiency could be most 
susceptible to making errors as they begin to lose memory functions and analytical 
reasoning skills required for the diagnosis of engineering and management issues 
related to their task. The deterioration would get exacerbated if they were put under 
time pressure, e.g. the knowledge of approaching or imminent departure schedule if 
they are working on a pre-flight task.  Under serotonin deficiency, even a simple task 
of searching for some information on the computer or in an AMM could be perceived 
by the sufferer as a major task that he would not be able to handle, as he loses his 
situational awareness, orientation, energy and the will to make the body act. And 
strangely, according to the consulted medical professionals’ opinion, the loss of will, 
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forgetfulness or tendency to distraction from the task has been attributed to the 
brain’s own natural defence mechanism from overloading it. 
 
Ironically such people may outwardly show no physical symptoms, and more so in a 
social setting where they might be observed and therefore show the best behavior. 
This phenomenon may explain why sometimes, the most trusted and experienced 
engineers and line managers, some of whom have had very long service in the 
profession, make otherwise inexplicable errors.  In any social group and community 
there might be a proportion, i.e. a norm for the general population, which might be at 
varying levels of stress close to their individual stress thresholds, with different people 
in the group affected at different times.  It might explain the reasons why, despite all 
other palliatives, the same types of person-related error get repeated, and why the 
rate of human error arising continues unabated, year on year105, 107. It was interesting 
to reflect on an open question that Head of Chief Surveyor’s Office, UK CAA, posed to 
the researcher at the beginning of this research study, and left unanswered at the 
time, “How could a fully qualified and experienced LAE leaves out a shim when fitting 
a wheel on to an aircraft?”  Would a simple statement like, “He forgot, despite his 
experience” fits the answer? If he did, he might not have been at fault willingly, 
because he might have been internally suffering from stress. This explanation may 
sound incredible, but in fact, it is perfectly possible for a sufferer of serotonin 
deficiency. 
 
9.13.2 Role of stress and loss of sense of welfare 
 
According to Royal College of Psychiatrists111 a key contributor to depression is 
excessive stress from their life style, social and domestic pressure, exacerbated by 
work place stress, and the way they interact with a persons’ sense of fear, security, 
worth and well being. Since the susceptibility to depression is a function of many 
variable parameters such as a person’s inner make up, body chemistry, age, and stress 
threshold, it is extremely difficult to predict when a person might be going through an 
early stage of depression.  Experience of the person or their trustworthiness does not 
come into the equation, when the person is suffering from depression. If anything, his 
awareness of his status in the organization and his realization that he is not coping 
well could make matters worse for him, despite the image that he would like to 
project. 
 
 Standard guidelines from safety management literature, such as ICAO SMM, Doc 
985938, recommend that engineers observe if work colleagues change their normal 
habits, change mood, beginning to make simple mistakes at work or show signs of 
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forgetfulness.  These may be the tell-tale marks, but in a CAW process, that is critical 
to the safety of the aircraft and its passengers, reliance on a colleague to watch the 
behavior of another is somewhat a simplistic, though tactful, approach to a serious 
problem.  In fact it is unlikely that a colleague will report on another workmate whom 
he likes and only consider reporting someone who is disliked according to group 
behavior, sometimes times for wrong reasons. The case study A 07/026_1 (Error 2) 
discussed in Appendix 6 is one such case.  
 
Furthermore, a Director of another airline cited a case of a senior aircraft worker who 
was about to be dismissed for a human error related violation when it was learnt at 
the eleventh hour that he had been suffering from serious health and welfare issues 
for long time, unknowing to the management.  The Director regretted not having had 
adequate insight to people’s welfare issues, but in mitigation expressed the view that 
under current legislation and trade union relationships, there was little the 
organization could do to cross the boundaries between a person’s privacy and 
organizational welfare and task needs. 
  
9.13.3 Development of interventions through new research 
 
Whilst much attention and effort is made to monitor the health and welfare of flight 
crew, ground staff who manage and implement CAW processes receive much less 
attention and authorities’ recognition in this respect, by way of welfare services for 
the staff at work place and improving working conditions and security of employment.  
In fact the current tendency of organizations is to shed any support services that had 
been previously established to deal with health and welfare issues of personnel. The 
usual reason given is that privacy, human rights and labor laws, more likely the trade 
union influences, prevent authorities from acting on health and welfare issues of 
individuals.  In fact the lack of relevant statistics of evidence is quoted by senior 
managers for not doing anything positive in this regard.   
 
Fear of job security alone is a strong reason for people not to come forward to seek 
assistance. The intangibility of information that a sufferer might present as evidence 
could be open to disbelief or criticism is a major inhibition. Therefore this study 
observes that there should be a better industry-wide understanding of the exact 
mechanics of the human body undergoing stress, the serotonin deficiency factor, and 
resulting susceptibility to make human error.  The overall interactive phenomenon 
should be treated as a latent natural hazard common to all people and not to the 
failing of one individual human who was forced to cross his stress tolerant threshold 
by the circumstances. 
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 As part of this research study the National Authority’s attention has been drawn to 
the general issue of health and welfare, pointing out that “forgetfulness” is a 
significant causal factor, and perhaps there may be some deficiencies in the way the 
aircraft workers’ health and fitness is assessed.  The response has been that the 
Authority and approved organizations are currently working to the regulation and that 
there is no evidence to raise an alarm. However the point being made in this thesis is 
that evidence may be there in the data already accumulated industry wide, and in the 
databanks of appropriate professions engaged in research into this phenomenon. If 
they have been largely ignored because industry was trying to protect itself from 
expenditure perceived as nugatory, then this is an opportune time to review that 
previous establishment posture. No amount of sophisticated risk assessment will help 
to reduce human error if nothing worthwhile is done at the fundamental root level, 
where conditions for committing errors begin. In this context CAW Risk Model would 
help to record and discriminate between the importance of causal factors, but it will 
not stop or reduce risk unless the authorities concerned are properly educated and 
are willing to act on acquired intelligence. 
 
It is quite understandable that an authority trying to work for a limited budget does 
not wish to start unaffordable research in the short term, but in the long term it would 
be a positive and constructive action to start, even some low profile research studies 
to see how best to reduce errors arising from this causal factor.   Approved 
organizations too ought to revive a “sincere interest in people” instead of interest in 
people as PR stunts for recruitment drives.  
 
Recognizing the relationship between human-fatigue due to extended work hours and 
risk to flight safety, International Federation of Airworthiness (IFA) has circulated a 
paper112 on its website that proposes the need for the industry recognition of hazards 
of extended work hours.  The paper proposes the formulation and establishment of a 
set of standard guidelines and procedures that may be implemented industry wide, at 
least voluntarily, in order to mitigate the risk contribution from this cause.   Following 
the same theme, IFA had presented further papers on human fatigue at the IASS 
2008118 and at Aviation Fatigue Management Symposium educating aviation industry 
collectively on the hazards of human fatigue and the need for Fatigue Risk 
Management System. 
 
From Health and Safety Act viewpoint too, IFA proposal makes good sense; it 
resonates with the same spirit of The Examiner, Irish News, which reported an 
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accident to a mechanic working on a Ryan Air aircraft, who lost his arm at a moment 
of distraction after allegedly working on the aircraft for 14-hours113.  
 
This research study too reiterates that current regulation may be inadequate on the 
question of health, welfare and fitness of aircraft engineers from a human error 
reduction point of view. Therefore, perhaps, the National Authority should take a 
more holistic view of the entire topic relating to those who are engaged in CAW 
process activities; they should initiate suitable further research to gather evidence to 
justify investment in people in order to mitigate risk from this universal hazard 
common to people. 
 
9.14 Parallel advances in the social order 
 
It has come to light during research interviews that the reluctance of some operators 
to cooperate with the study is attributed to a sense of fear and insecurity.  It was the 
fear that by having an error data base, they would be under legal obligation to provide 
information to those who have the legal right to know, whereas if they did not keep a 
database they would be free of such threat.  They saw the presence of the model 
together with its database as a threat to their security and commercial interests. 
 
Two specific groups with the right to access data are insurance underwriters who 
provide insurance cover and the other, the legal profession who represent victims of 
aircraft accidents and incidents.  There are others interested in data; civil police 
investigating any criminal activities, individual employees or their trade unions that 
represent them on industrial disputes, such as job evaluations issues or unlawful 
dismissal by the employees, and the Inspectorate for Health and Safety at Work.   
 
The trend in new legislation that compel organizations to be more vigilant on safety 
issues and to release pertinent information to the law courts or anyone else who has 
the right to know is bound to stay with us. Latest legislation on Health and Safety 
relating to corporate manslaughter and top executives individual responsibility to 
exercise “Duty of Care” for those who come under his sphere of responsibility is a case 
in point.  Such changes in law and current trend to make organizations more 
accountable to the public are a part of the natural progression of social order that we 
live in.    
 
This fear underpins one of the strong inhibitions to the open reporting of error, and 
authorities’ reluctance to share error data with external bodies as they fear that they 
could be open to legal liability claims or undermine their commercial interests. 
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Meanwhile other operators who saw open reporting as constructive and progressive 
reacted differently. Apart from the positive contribution, they supported its role in 
promoting flight safety as well as providing critical information to the management 
enabling them to prioritize investment and to timely resolution of issues that 
undermine safety. 
 
Therefore, no matter how well and sophisticated the business of error management 
and risk assessment is developed, it can only work on the basis of obtaining correct 
data. And if the data is not forthcoming due to the current social order with respect to 
legal liability for error, then the society must ensure that the frontiers of the social 
order too are advanced in harmony with the demand for better methods to assess 
risk.  Related sectors in which such advances to be made are in resourcing and 
taxation, tort and contract laws, health and safety, industrial relations, business 
management, to identify a few.  This study is of the opinion that it is up to the HM 
Treasury to influence the respective government departments to make such progress, 
just as the way it would like UK CAA to make improvements to the way risk is assessed 
in civil aviation. 
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Chapter Ten 
Conclusion 
 
 
10.1 Introduction 
 
A computer model based on Bayesian Belief Network concept has been designed and 
developed to assess risk due to human error in organizations undertaking continuing 
airworthiness processes.  The model works together with a database of human error 
occurrence and their causal factors.  The model is applicable to both passenger and 
cargo aircraft CAW process operations. The model is generic and may have to be 
modified to suit specific organizations.  
 
In order to convert the model to a practical tool, it would require further development 
such as the provision of user-friendly interfaces, packaging into a commercially 
attractive product, e.g. a “software package” for use with a desktop PC or a laptop 
computer, and the provision of a product support system. 
 
Concluding the research study, this Chapter will now review its achievements relative 
to research objectives, highlighting strengths and limitations of the model in industrial 
application.  The chapter is rounded off with a statement of the study’s contribution 
to knowledge and recommendations.  
 
10.2 Model’s output and use 
 
• The model outputs prior probabilities of error at critical nodes, their 
consequences and costs.  The output represents the error and non-error 
performance of an approved organization. Given that errors occur, if they are 
under control and managed, then the risk level remains tolerable.  The prior 
probability represents the risk level of the organization in a dynamically 
balanced steady state. 
  
• By continual updating, the model provides new risk levels that may be either 
within tolerable limits or without.  The Regulator, in consultation with the 
organization, should determine the acceptable steady state level and tolerable 
variation.  
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• Similarly, by monitoring the results and causes, it is possible to establish trends 
that can be used to control adverse trends. 
 
• In prediction mode, the model could be used to determine the effect of 
undetected error at any point in the core CAW process or peripheral 
subsystems on the end product.  
 
• The use of the Risk value as a single number has been replaced by a matrix of 
Probability of Error vs Probability of Consequences or Probability of Cost Level. 
This takes into account the fact that an error probability at the point of aircraft 
dispatch could have different possible outcomes. 
 
• The range of information provided by this risk model would be of benefit to a 
CEO/AM than the availability of a single risk number.  Given the full range of 
matrix output, trend data, prediction facility and hot-spot monitoring of 
outcome to error occurrence, they can select and focus on the performance 
indicator that is most relevant to their organization. 
 
10.3 Validation trial  
 
• Validation trials confirmed that it was possible to use the model in conjunction 
with historic field data files from a participating aircraft operator.  However 
Flight Consequences predicted by the model, based on data for 34,000 sectors, 
proved to be were more pessimistic than the operator’s expectation.   
 
• Alternative data based on operator beliefs, that it was operating to global 
safety levels by virtue of following globally accepted safety standards, returned 
outputs consistent with known global safety levels.  It confirmed that the 
model was functioning correctly.   However the belief would hold true only if 
the operator had flown around 3M sectors and experienced pro-rata number 
of incidents or fewer.   
 
• The 34,000 sectors and the error incidents experienced could not be regarded 
as achieving global safety level, even though it was perfectly valid to 
acknowledge that the operator was operating to global safety standards. 
 
• The trial confirmed that operating to a global safety standard such as EASA 
regulation does not necessarily mean actually achieving the global safety rate.  
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Despite operating to regulation, errors could occur that might contribute to a 
higher probability of accident. 
 
•  The result confirmed the differential between the belief and the reality of 
higher risk, a situation that is already generally known in the industry.  
Licensed aircraft engineers acknowledge that demonstration of compliance 
with regulation alone does not provide full safety, because despite regulation 
operators occasionally fail in their safety performance. This is the basis for 
continual audits. 
   
• Provided the achieved risk level is acceptable to the Regulator and any adverse 
trends are properly managed and controlled, there is no reason why the 
operation could not be continued.   This is the common sense approach, which 
supports the case for safety management system. 
 
• On the question of inputting either belief or actual data: 
 
o If safety is paramount, the risk level based on actual experience should 
be adopted.  That is the safe approach that would give confidence to 
the operator, to the Regulator and the public, and moreover 
harmonizes with the ICAO guidelines that have been adopted by 
industry to this date. 
 
o The risk level based on belief may have to be used if actual data is not 
available, e.g. in a new organization without a previous history.  
 
o Beliefs based on claimed achievement of global safety levels should be 
tested against organization’s historical experience and size of database. 
 
• A common sense approach is that risk level based on experience should be 
used, not as an absolute value, but as a reference from which improvements 
could be measured or deterioration could be monitored and corrected. It is an 
indication of the reliability of the human in the CAW process, and not 
necessarily how reliable the eventual flight is.  This is because there are factors 
other than CAW, which contribute to safety but not taken into account in this 
analysis, e.g. flight crew action that would defend the consequence of a human 
error in CAW. 
 
• Acceptance or rejection of the human error contribution in CAW, e.g. in terms 
of probability of errors and consequences, depends upon the threshold values 
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that could be set initially by the organization itself in consultation with the 
Regulator.  
 
• To implement this process industry-wide, there should be an industry standard 
bench marking to establish threshold levels and allowable variations.  Further 
development work may be required to establish these criteria. 
 
• The output from the model is sensitive to the size of the population.  Larger 
the population, the more reliable and smaller the estimated risk levels 
become.  This means, those organizations that do not have a large historical 
database are likely to be judged as less reliable, requiring more frequent or 
more thorough oversights, compared with others that have a long history of 
good safety performance.   
 
10.4 Air transport application 
 
Regarding the applicability of the model in air transport industry in relation to either 
RBO concept or ICAO mandate on SMS: 
 
• The model provides a management tool that could be used in the 
implementation of risk assessment tasks within a safety management system 
and implementation of RBO concept at strategic level. 
 
• If the Regulator wishes to adopt the model for RBO implementation, then it 
would be prudent that the final form of the CAW model is agreed with the 
operators.  In this case, Regulator would have to take leadership, conduct a 
pilot study in participation with a representative set of operators, for 
establishing either benchmarks or threshold values of risk, and allowable 
variations. 
 
• A pilot study would also provide the opportunity to validate the model in 
industry as a tool for exercising some degree of self-regulation and its use in 
SMS. 
 
• Relief from current oversight regime might be possible if operators are allowed 
to exercise a degree of self regulation as part of their SMS, using risk 
assessment models based on BBN concept.  In such a system, the Regulator 
would have to exercise an audit function to ensure that the operator is 
faithfully adhering to the principles of recording all errors and accountability 
for them.  The Regulator should be legally empowered to penalize offenders. 
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 • Once industry consensus on the use of the model was obtained, information 
on the model could be included in SMS guidance notes, so that if any operator 
is willing to adopt it, then they could do so voluntarily within the current 
framework of SMS implementation. 
 
• Implementation of RBO concept is within the Regulators prerogative whereas 
the use of the model in SMS is left to the operators and associated approved 
organizations. The model does not dictate policy decisions on acceptable risk 
levels and variations, but helps to guide managers in formulating a policy. 
 
• If the model is to be utilized in industry, then it would require further 
development, in the areas of database construction and management, user-
friendly interfaces, and display of outputs.  Such developments are essential in 
order to reduce the labor costs in the application of the model. 
 
10.5 Differentials in roles and scope 
 
• The CAW Risk Model is suitable for use in both passenger and cargo air 
transportation environments.  
 
• The air cargo subset of parameters caters for cargo handling data.  A similar 
subset could be added to account for passenger handling, vide evidence in UK 
CAA Paper 2009/05105 that errors in passenger role equipment and emergency 
cabin equipment leads to airworthiness issues. 
 
• Provision has been made for the model’s use with either fixed wing or rotary 
wing aircraft.  
 
• Subsystems, nodes and other parameters could be added or truncated as 
necessary depending on application or change of operating conditions. 
 
10.6  Strengths 
 
The study confirmed that the model meets the desirable criteria for a risk assessment 
model as identified in PH report.   
 
• Data driven.  The model is primarily data driven, but it is also possible to use 
beliefs based on individual opinion.  Hence it is more robust, transparent, open 
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to scrutiny and unambiguous than traditional methods based on subjective 
judgment alone. 
 
• Mathematical basis.  Risk is based on conditional probabilities calculated using 
Bayes’ Theorem, which is a mathematical formula. 
 
• Quantitative Output.  The output is quantified. 
 
• Better assimilation of information and more accurate computation.  The 
model estimates probabilities for a wide range of operational conditions much 
better than a human could ever do. 
 
• Cost Data.  The model provides an indication of what errors cost the 
organization.  This cost utility may be very useful to the corporate business 
managers. 
 
• Utility for AM/CEO.  The model is a management tool for AM/CEO and high 
level managers. Once the statistical case is known managers could take their 
own decision, according to their personal judgment and experience, using 
model output as a point of reference. The output is a guide to AM/CEO and not 
a dictate. 
 
• Improved resolution. The resolution of the network could be adjusted, and the 
resolution could be increased or decreased by modifying the network. 
 
• Existing Data.  The model uses existing data as far as possible. Absence of data 
is not critical to calculations, but if data is available then it makes the 
calculation more accurate.  
 
• Widening database.  If a comprehensive dataset is not usually collected and 
recorded, then the model’s provision for them encourages the organizations to 
maintain a better set of data in future, thereby improving fidelity of results. 
 
• Mature organizations. Mature organizations that have an established 
operating history and existing database could start off with hard evidence 
data. 
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• New organizations. New or small organizations with no existing database 
could start off on the basis of best estimate and expert assessment, until these 
are gradually replaced by hard evidence data. 
 
• Types of Error.  All observed CAW Errors regardless of their importance can be 
recorded.  Thus innocuous or incipient errors at the “bottom of the error 
iceberg” are also taken into account, even though under normal circumstances 
they are ignored as insignificant. 
 
• No Error Flights.  Recording of No Error flights or flight preparation gives credit 
to the organization for safe performance.  It would provide a true probability 
of error, whereas errors-only recording would give a biased, pessimistic view of 
the organization.   
 
• Causal Chain or Random Fragmentary Data.  Causal chain data resulting from 
full investigations provide best evidence. Where a full causal chain is not 
available or investigation not fully followed up, fragmentary information can 
be utilized.  The model was found to work with fragmentary data, and the 
assumption is that they are random events that occur in isolation. 
 
• Effectiveness of Defences.  Effectiveness of defences can be determined with 
this model because it allows defences to be recorded.  It is possible to increase 
the resolution of the relevant nodes to determine which defences are more 
effective than the others are.   
 
• Consequences.  Provision has been made to record a wide range of 
consequences of an error observation.  
 
• Crossing management barriers. As the model is based on causal chains, the 
model encourages full causal chain investigation providing an opportunity to 
cross management barriers. 
 
• Policy transition. The model provides the link between different layers of 
organization, helping to identify points where safety needs conflict with 
commercial needs.  
 
• Provides sensory system. The model provides the senior managers with a 
sensory system, to detect critical trouble spots, and to take timely actions to 
correct them. 
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 • Opportunity for self regulation. If utilized in their organizations, the model 
provides the operators an opportunity to undertake self-regulation, and to win 
over the trust and confidence of the Regulator. Thus, an operator could benefit 
by minimizing Regulator’s involvement in extensive oversights. Operators are 
encouraged to be self critical on areas where compliance has been less than 
adequate. 
 
• Better management of oversight resources.  The model provides the 
Regulator an opportunity to better manage their oversight inspection 
resources, i.e. to match resources to the level of risk of individual 
organizations. 
 
• Unknown conditions. The model cannot assimilate unknown conditions, only 
those pre-programmed into the model.  For the assessment of risk due to 
unforeseen events, some intuition is needed and it can only be done with 
human skills and a degree of subjectivity. 
 
10.7 Limitations 
 
• Poor cooperation from managers.  A key strength of the model is also seen as 
a potential weakness. The causal chain type investigation might make 
managers feel exposed since most errors have a root cause in the 
organizational level influencing factor.  Therefore self protection could come 
into play, and they might reject a concept that makes them vulnerable. 
 
• Management discretion on extent of investigation. The categorization of 
errors, decision to investigate or not investigate, to report or not to report are 
functions still controlled by human operators and managers. 
 
• Not conducive to tactical level assessment. The system provides a means for 
handling strategic level risk assessment, but it is less applicable to tactical level 
assessment, unless the model is already pre-programmed. 
 
10.8 Achievement of research objectives 
 
• The primary objective has been achieved satisfactorily, which was to design a 
generic Bayesian model that could assess risk due to human error in the 
approved organizations that undertake CAW processes of air transport.  
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 • The model could be used as a risk assessment tool in SMS in so far as 
strategic risk assessment and monitoring is concerned.   
 
• It can be used for tactical risk assessments about the organization and 
process, by way of predictions, provided prior conditions have been 
integrated into the model. 
 
• The CAW Risk Model does not support tactical risk assessment 
decisions relating to specific aircraft systems. It was not the intention. 
For that, expert judgment based on experience and evidence from 
system diagnostic tools and processes should be used. 
 
• The model can be used in supporting RBO concept, in so far as the issue 
of determining urgency and resource allocation is concerned. 
 
• The secondary objective of finding an alternative means of satisfying meeting 
Regulatory requirement is part-satisfied.  The following qualifications are made 
to highlight other related issues that could not be addressed within the scope 
of this research study. 
 
• Utilizing the model, an organization can embark on a program of 
continual self-regulation even to a greater depth than possible with 
existing method of oversight audits.   
 
• The model’s effectiveness will depend on the honesty and integrity of 
the organization. 
 
• Where openness is missing, and the operator acts purely on its 
commercial instincts the concept could fall into disrepute. 
 
• If self-regulation were to be sanctioned, then the process would have 
to be audited by the Regulator, and they should be legally empowered 
to enforce penalties against breaches. 
 
•  Any changes of Regulatory compliance audits would have to be 
preceded by change of legislation.  
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10.9 Contribution to knowledge 
 
•  Application of the BBN concept to assessing risk in civil aviation safety 
management in a wider scale has not been hitherto attempted.  This could be 
due to lack of vision as how best to represent the wide range of influencing 
factors, and their complex interactions, in one network.  Overcoming this 
blockage, the CAW Risk Model has paved a way by offering a heuristic 
approach that has been tested and subjected to limited validation.  
 
• This research study led to the recognition that the statistical solution to the 
analogy of Swiss cheese in Reason Model lay in Bayes’ Theorem on conditional 
probability.  This relationship has not been specifically mentioned in any 
relevant literature although the analogy has been made qualitatively.   To that 
extent, this is new knowledge. 
 
• It is possible to quantify risk due to human error as a statistical probability. In 
fact the achieved risk values may be more severe than what operators believe 
may be happening in their own organizations, as they have been distracted by 
collective global flat rates and design reliability levels to the detriment of their 
own standards. 
 
• There is no simple, single solution to the problem of assessing risk in civil 
aviation.  The methodology depends on the circumstances and purpose.  This 
research study addressed a method that is more appropriate for strategic level 
risk management. Though the model is designed for CAW environment, its 
concept could be applied to other specialist areas of civil aviation such as flight 
operations or any other Regulatory regime. 
 
• As a by-product of this research study, this thesis presents a simple, 
systematic, step by step guide to the design and use of a BBN, which has not 
been available to new comers to this subject, particularly to those such as 
research students who wish to develop their knowledge by self-effort. 
 
• This study has also introduced a rule of thumb method to check if a complex 
BBN using proprietary software (whose algorithm is not in public domain) is 
seen to be calculating prior conditional probabilities correctly, a technique that 
has not been encountered in literature. 
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10.10 Recommendations 
 
10.10.1 Publication of CAW risk model information in SMS Guidance Notes 
 
Under Section 10.4 it was concluded that the risk model could be used by air 
operators as part of their SMS.  In doing so, they could use the model as a supporting 
tool to exercise a degree of self-regulation and to measure its efficiency.  Under its 
current policy of encouraging operators to implement ICAO mandate for SMS, UK CAA 
has published guidance note on SMS. This study recommends that information about 
CAW Risk Model should also be published in the same SMS Guidance Notes as an 
example of a risk assessment and quantification tool.  Operators would then be free to 
adopt the model if they wish to do so. 
 
10.10.2 Extended validation trials with a larger group of operators 
 
Industrial application of the model may require UK CAA approval as well as consensus 
from civil aviation industry.  Although the model has been tested and validated using 
one aircraft operator’s field data, it would be prudent to extend this validation 
exercise across a larger group of operators to gauge their reaction as well as to gain 
their confidence in the use of a new risk assessment method.  Such trials should be 
used for the benchmarking of threshold levels and establishment of allowable 
variations (Sections 9.7 and 9.8).  It is recommended that UK CAA should consider 
taking leadership for conducting extended validation trials amongst a larger group of 
operators. 
 
10.10.3 Research into human fatigue that leads to human error 
 
Section 9.13 discussed the significance of human in the loop of the CAW process and 
the need for physical health and mental welfare in order to minimize human error.  
Whilst organizations are ready and willing to invest on inanimate HF issues such as 
aircraft design or procedures by way of mitigation, they are less enthusiastic to invest 
on improving the physical health and mental welfare of its staff, especially those at 
the workface.  Lack of evidence and data is often quoted by those responsible, but this 
study noted that evidence is in fact available, but it is not systematically documented 
or analyzed.   
 
Part of the shortcoming in the current state of play is that neither authority nor 
approved organizations takes responsibility to lead research into this area or to come 
up with proposals to improve the worker’s welfare and working conditions.  In its 
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absence, IFA have taken an initiative in the form of publishing and promoting research 
papers on Human Fatigue at Workplace, at learned bodies or conferences, but no 
organization that has executive powers have taken steps to take forward IFA’s 
recommendation.  Consequently, this study recommends that UK CAA should take the 
lead on research into the relationship between human error at work and the health 
and sense of well being of those who work in the CAW environment.  The purpose of 
such research should be to determine the required level of investment on people in 
order to reduce human error and promote flight safety 
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List of software files 
 
The following software files are included in the accompanying CD/DVD, segregated 
into folders.  They are listed here in the order as they appear in the CD/DVD. 
 
L1 L2 L3 L4 L5 Remark 
CD/DVD – Bayesian Model for Strategic Level Risk Assessment in CAW of Air Transport - Software 
 Integrated Model Folder 
  Combi5_All_Ver2 text file Text 
  Combi 5_All_Cer2_data for txt file Excel 
  DJ CAW Risk Model_Combi 5_All_Ver2 BBN 
  DJ CAW Risk Model_Combi 5_All_Ver2_Air Cargo Subset BBN 
 
 Ops X Validation Folder 
  Ops X Base Folder 
   Ops X Base Yr 08_09_10 Folder 
    DJ CAW Risk Model Ops X Base_Yr 08_09_10 Results BBN 
    Ops X Base Yr 08_09_10_date_for txt file Excel 
    Ops X Base Yr 08_09_10_text file Text 
 
   Ops X Base_Yr 08 Folder 
    DJ CAW Risk Model Ops X Base Yr 08 Results BBN 
    Ops X base Yr 08 data_for txt file                Excel 
    Ops X Base Yr 08_text file Text 
 
   Ops X Base_Yr 09_10 Folder 
    DJ CAW Risk Model Ops X Base Yr 09_10 Results             BBN 
    Ops X base Yr 09_10 data_for txt file                Excel 
    Ops X Base Yr 09_10_text file Text 
 
  Ops X Operations Folder 
   Ops X Belief Folder 
    DJ CAW Risk Model for 1M Sectors_inc 600 error lines UK Stnd only BBN 
    DJ CAW Risk Model for 2M Sectors_inc 1200 error lines UK Stnd only BBN 
    DJ CAW Risk Model for 3M Sectors_inc 1800 error lines UK Stnd only BBN 
    DJ CAW Risk Model for 3M Sectors_inc 1800 error lines UK Stnd plus 34338 sec BBN 
    DJ CAW Risk Model for 6M Sectors_inc 3600 error lines UK Stnd only BBN 
    Modified Uk Stndard Case File V2 for txt                Excel 
    Modified UK Stndard Case File V2 text file Text 
 
   Ops X Combine Years Folder 
    DJ CAW Risk Model Ops X Combie Years Risk Status_Yr 08_09_10 Result             BBN 
    Ops X Error Data Combined Years_for txt file                Excel 
    Ops X Error Data Combined Years_text file Text 
 
   Ops X Year 08 Folder 
    DJ CAW Risk Model Ops X_Yr 08 Result             BBN 
    Ops X Yr 08 data_for txt file                Excel 
    Ops X Yr 08_text file Text 
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L1 L2 L3 L4 L5 Remark 
   Ops X Year 09_10 Folder 
    DJ CAW Risk Model Ops X yr 09_10 Result             BBN 
    Ops X Yr 09_10 data for txt file                Excel 
    Ops X yr 09_10_text file Text 
 
 Subsystem Tests Folder 
  Change Management Folder 
   Change Manage_Datasheet_MSO_07                Excel 
   Change Manage-Text File  Text 
   DJ Change Management             BBN 
 
  Compliance Folder 
   Compliance_Modified 120609 Data MSO_07                Excel 
   Compliance_Modified Txt File Text 
   DJ Compliance_Pt145_PtM_TestV5_Modified 120609             BBN 
 
  Consequences Folder 
   Consequence_Datasheet_Casefiles_Txt Word Text 
   Consequences_Datasheet_Casefiles_MSO_07                Excel 
   Consequences_Datasheet_Casefiles_Txt file Text 
   DJ Consequence Loop             BBN 
 
  Operation and Capability Folder 
   DJ Operation and Capability_V2             BBN 
   Operation Capability_txt file Text 
   OpsVCapability_Datasheet_Casefile_MSO-07                Excel 
 
  Pt145_Pt147 parts of Performance Folder 
   DJ Pt145_Pt147 Parts of Performance             BBN 
   Pt145_Error_Datasheet_SRG Modif txt file Text 
   Pt145_Pt147_Casefile_MS07                Excel 
 
  PtM_Pt21 parts of Performance Folder 
   Final Test Folder_Peformance Subsystem_PtMandPt21 Folder 
    DJ Combine PtM_Pt145_Pt21 Interface_Performance             BBN 
   DJ Part 21 TC             BBN 
   Pt21_PtM Errors Case Files_txt_Word Text 
   Pt21_RegErr_Datafile                Excel 
   Pt21_RegErr_Datafile_txt file Text 
 
  QA Sytem Folder 
   DJ Quality Audit             BBN 
   QMS_Datasheet_Casefile_MS07                Excel 
   QMS_Datasheet_txt file Text 
 
 
NOTE:   
 
To view and interact with BBN files a NETICA v411, or later version, software program should 
be installed in the computer. It is not included in the CD/DVD due to licensing regulations. 
 
Excel files will require MS Office 2007. 
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Appendix 1 
Air transport industry consulted during the research program  
A1.1 Organizations  
• European Aviation Safety Agency, Safety and Research Department 
• UK Civil Aviation Authority, Safety Regulation Group 
• UK Civil Aviation Authority, Economic Regulation Group (Departments for 
Legal, Insurance and Fleet Usage Statistics) 
• UK Flight Safety Committee (FSC) 
• UK FSC Maintenance Sub Committee 
• International Federation of Airworthiness Engineers 
• MoD RAF - former Directorate of Aviation Regulation & Safety 
• Confidential Human Factors Incident Reporting Programme  – Maintenance 
Error Management System (CHIRP/MEMS) 
• Baines Simmons international 
• International Bureau of Aviation, IBA Group 
• Association of Licensed Aircraft Engineers (ALAE)  
• Large long haul air line 1 
• Large long haul airline 2 
• Regional airline  
• Regional air line - Engineering Services/ MRO 
• Large air cargo operator 1 
• Large air cargo operator 2 
• Business jet operator 
• Business jet operator maintenance dept/ MRO 
• Large aircraft MRO 
 
A1.2 Courses / Seminars/ Workshops / Conferences Attended 
• Decision Analysis Course – Defence College of Management & Technology, 
Shrivenham -  2008 
• Advances in Risk & Reliability Technology Symposium   - 18th AR2TS – 
Loughborough University - 2009 
• Risk Analyses Model - Civil Aviation Agency of The Netherlands – 2007 
• Basic Human Factors Course – CAA International - 2007 
• Advanced Human Factors – CAA International – 2008 
• Human factors Conference - Royal Aeronautical Society –2009 
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• Part 145 EASA Regulation – CAA International - 2007 
• Part M EASA Regulation – CAA International - 2007 
• Airworthiness & Maintenance Conference – Royal Aeronautical Society – 2008 
• Airworthiness Management – IBA Group – 2009 
• UK FSC and UK FSC MSC 2-monthly meetings – 2008 to 2010 
• 62nd Annual International Air safety Seminar – Flight Safety Foundation - 2009 
• Future MRO in Civil Aviation – 2008 
• Future MRO in Civil Aviation – 2009 
• Military Aircraft Maintenance & Repair – 2010 
• Maintenance, repair & Overhaul (MRO) Oversight Today and The Future – 
Federal Aviation Administration - 2010 
• Aviation Disaster: Investigating the Causes, Resolving the Claims –  Avicon/ 
RTi/IMC/ Cozen/ INCE - 2008 
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Appendix 2 
 
Specimen case studies - Accidents resulting from human error 
 
A2.1  Case 1 – Errors in maintenance practices and aircraft maintenance manual4  
 
On Thursday 10th Jun 2004 at 19:07 UTC a British Airways Boeing 777 G-YMME, 
carrying 151 passengers and a flight crew of 15 took off from London Heathrow bound 
for Harare, Zimbabwe.   Unknown to the Captain, the aircraft was spilling large 
quantities of fuel as it was rotating for take-off, but the captain of another aircraft that 
was waiting for take-off clearance witnessed the event and reported to Heathrow air 
traffic control. By this time G-YMME was climbing away trailing a 2-mile long plume of 
escaping fuel, putting the aircraft in danger from fire and explosion. 
  
Heathrow ATC promptly alerted the captain of G-YMME, who confirmed the fuel loss 
and decided to recover his aircraft back to Heathrow. He jettisoned part of his fuel 
load over the sea to make his aircraft light enough to land, and recovered back to 
Heathrow uneventfully.   
 
Soon after landing and once the aircraft came to rest, emergency crews inspected the 
aircraft and confirmed the strong presence of fuel vapor in the port landing gear bay 
area.  The port engine was shut off, the aircraft taxied back to the terminal where the 
passengers were disembarked. 
 
Further inspection of the aircraft on the ramp revealed that fuel had spilled out of the 
aircraft’s centre wing area tank (CWT), from an open aperture known as a purge door.  
The open purge door-panel was found hanging on a lanyard inside the tank. Hanging 
beside the open aperture, there was a transparent plastic bag secured to the tank 
structure with a string, which contained the screw fasteners for the door and some 
escaped fuel. 
 
This incident was at the centre of a UK Aircraft Accident Investigation Board (UK AAIB) 
enquiry which revealed that the purge door had been opened during a scheduled base 
maintenance inspection of the aircraft, which had been completed about one month 
before this accident. Unknowing to those authorize to release the aircraft, it had been 
released to service with an incomplete maintenance task, i.e. with the door still open.  
Following release to service, the aircraft had flown several sectors over a period of 
one-month, carrying the dormant error.  Unfortunately, because of the relatively small 
fuel load that had been carried in the CWT in those flights, the error had not come to 
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anyone’s notice.  However, for the Harare bound flight, a larger fuel load had been 
carried, which on this occasion spilled out of the tank as the aircraft was taking off. 
 
 
 
Figure A2.1 – Open Fuel Tank Purge Door – Source of fuel spillage  
(Source: UK AAIB) 
 
The presence of an open purge door and the failure to detect it was due to a 
catalogue of errors committed by the engineers involved, as well as the managers who 
were supervising and coordinating the maintenance tasks.  During the investigation, 
the Board discovered further errors in the technical documentation associated with 
the tank purging, leak testing and structural inspection of the tank.  There were also 
failures by the maintenance organization to account for the people who worked on 
the aircraft, as well as to mal practices of utilizing personnel unqualified on the type 
for supplementary work.  These errors were as follows: 
  
• According to the AMM for B-777 aircraft, purge door removal was not an 
authorized procedure for the task.  A person employed on the aircraft had 
removed it because of his prior experience on B-747 aircraft that had a similar 
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purge door in the centre wing tank (CWT), or if not he had instructed another 
person to remove it.  This was the initial error, because he was using an 
unauthorized procedure. 
 
• The removal would have been acceptable, had it been reported and a job card 
was raised. This had not been done, and therefore the failure to raise a job 
card to register the deviation from AMM constituted the primary error. 
 
• This primary error had given rise to the following consequences that 
compounded the original error. 
o Proper coordination of the task completion, supervision and inspection 
of the area had not been carried out, as none of the engineers and 
managers tasked with this work was aware that a purge door had been 
removed.  
o A purge door removal job card, had it been raised, would have cross 
referred to the purge door leak test.  Since there was no job card, there 
was no cross-reference, i.e. no work record trail. 
o A general catch-all leak test had been done to cover all known 
engineering tasks on the CWT.  A 40,000 kg fuel load, believed to be an 
adequate amount, had been used but this amount was insufficient to 
cover the purge door.  It has since been established by the investigators 
that to catch a purge door leak an uplift of 52,200 kg was needed.  The 
limited catch-all leak test failed to detect the open purge door. 
o Investigation also revealed that the published information in AMM on 
the purge door leak test was erratic, in that it called for a test using 
32,000 kg, whereas the correct amount should be 52,163 kg.  
Misinformation in the AMM was a dormant error, though in this case it 
had not contributed to the error. 
 
• As a spin-off of the investigation, it has been discovered that the AMM was at 
error in referring to the structural area that needed inspection, for which the 
tank was drained and ventilated.  The area within the tank that needed 
inspection was in fact quite different from the area illustrated on the AMM. It 
follows therefore, that all previous inspections that had been carried out on 
this aircraft and others might not have met the intended purpose.  AAIB report 
had not dwelled on the way how BA recovered from any past errors. However, 
for the future, the AMM has been amended to provide accurate information. 
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• Access to the CWT and follow up inspection procedure required the removal of 
a baffle door.  This information had not been mentioned in the AMM.  That 
means the AMM had been in error, and in the past, engineers might well have 
deviated from AMM procedures whilst undertaking this task. AMM has been 
amended since this discovery. 
 
• There had been no record of the persons who were involved in the tank 
inspection of repair; therefore there was no means of identifying the person 
involved in the error. The maintenance organization had been moving labor 
between different types of aircraft regardless of the fact that some might not 
have the correct rating for the aircraft on which they were deployed, e.g. using 
a B-747 rated engineer on a B-777 aircraft.  Nor have the management kept 
track of their deployment.  AAIB report identified the issues concerned but has 
stopped short of commenting of internal labor management arrangements 
that might have contributed to this error. 
 
• None of the ground inspections of the aircraft during the one-month period 
detected the open door.  Clearly this suggests that pre-flight inspections were 
probably too focused and the general surveillance of the state of the aircraft 
was superficial.  In mitigation it has been said that the purge door opening was 
at a high up location, inside the port wheel well, which is not easily visible from 
ground. 
 
Luckily there was no fire and explosion on this occasion, even though the possibility 
existed as there were heat sources in the vicinity. 
 
A2.2 Case 2 – Design, Changes to Operating patterns and Change Management10  
  
On 17th January 2008 a British Airways Boeing 777-236ER G-YMMM, inbound from 
Beijing China, was coming into land at Heathrow airport.  As the aircraft was at the 
final phase of the approach, its Rolls Royce Trent engines began to lose power and 
failed to respond to critical power demands.  Eventually, with the engines rotating just 
above the idling speed, the aircraft managed to glide into the airfield, crash landing on 
the grass area short of the runway threshold.   With skilful handling of the aircraft at 
this critical stage, the pilot averted a potential disaster that could have resulted from 
the aircraft crashing into the thickly populated, built up area surrounding the airport. 
One passenger suffered serious injury during the crash landing; 34 passengers and 13 
crew members suffered minor injuries; the remainder of the 135 passengers and 16 
flight crew members escaped unhurt. 
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There was strong suspicion from the outset that the power loss might have been due 
to fuel starvation to the engines.  But two more years of investigation had to pass by 
before UK AAIB concluded that it was ice accretion and blockage of the fuel-oil heat 
exchanger in the fuel flow path to the engine that had caused the starvation.  AAIB 
Report10 summarizes its findings as follows: 
 
“Whilst on approach to London (Heathrow) from Beijing, China, at 720 feet AGL, the 
right engine of G-YMMM ceased responding to auto throttle commands for increased 
power and instead the power reduced to 1.03 Engine Pressure Ratio (EPR). Seven 
seconds later the left engine power reduced to 1.02 EPR. This reduction led to a loss of 
airspeed and the aircraft touching down some 330 m short of the paved surface of 
Runway 27L at London Heathrow. The investigation identified that the reduction in 
thrust was due to restricted fuel flow to both engines. 
  
It was determined that this restriction occurred on the right engine at its Fuel Oil Heat 
Exchanger (FOHE). For the left engine, the investigation concluded that the restriction 
most likely occurred at its FOHE. However, due to limitations in available recorded 
data, it was not possible totally to eliminate the possibility of a restriction elsewhere in 
the fuel system, although the testing and data mining activity carried out for this 
investigation suggested that this was very unlikely. Further, the likelihood of a 
separate restriction mechanism occurring within seven seconds of that for the right 
engine was determined to be very low. 
  
The investigation identified the following probable causal factors that led to the fuel 
flow restrictions:     
  
1)      Accreted ice from within the fuel system [1] released, causing a restriction to the 
engine fuel flow at the face of the FOHE, on both of the engines. 
  
2)      Ice had formed within the fuel system, from water that occurred naturally in the 
fuel, whilst the aircraft operated with low fuel flows over a long period and the 
localized fuel temperatures were in an area described as the ‘sticky range’.   
  
3)      The FOHE, although compliant with the applicable certification requirements, 
was shown to be susceptible to restriction when presented with soft ice in a high 
concentration, with a fuel temperature that is below -10°C and a fuel flow above flight 
idle. 
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4)      Certification requirements, with which the aircraft and engine fuel systems had to 
comply, did not take account of this phenomenon as the risk was unrecognized at that 
time”. 
[1] Fuel system upstream of FOHE. 
 
At the Flight Safety Foundation’s 62nd International Air Safety Seminar, 2009, a Boeing 
representative presented detail findings of a technical investigation into the fuel-oil 
heat exchanger design. It has been established during the investigation that some 
other versions of Boeing 777 aircraft have GE engines in which the heat exchanger 
was from a different supplier.  Although those versions had flown similar long-transit 
polar routes, they have had no previous heat exchanger icing incidents reported.  In 
fact there was a detail design difference between the two types of heat exchangers, 
which might explain why the RR engines heat exchanger was likely to be susceptible to 
ice accretion.  
 
 
 
Figure A2.2 – Fuel-Oil Heat Exchanger – Location of ice accretion (Source: UK AAIB) 
 
The GE engine’s version had a smooth surface on the fuel inlet side of the heat 
exchanger matrix, whereas the RR engine version had a rough inlet surface where the 
tubes of the matrix were protruding through the surface. It seems that this detail 
difference of protrusions was critical as it was contributory to trapping the ice 
particles that were floating in fuel, before they enter the tubes where the particles 
would have been melted. This phenomenon is similar to autumn leaves accumulating 
near those parts of buildings where the wind flow is stagnant. Here, a lesson from 
nature would have taught the heat exchanger designers a lesson had they been 
mindful.  
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This then is an example of a design shortfall, due to limitation of knowledge, which in 
turn limited the scope of design and reliability testing specifications for this 
component.  The conditions might have been exacerbated by the Boeing 777 aircraft’s 
increased utilization in polar routes, which would increase the probability of 
encountering unusual cold conditions than that had been previously perceived.  All 
these conditions would go into reliability testing but in this case, certification had 
proceeded on the basis of known information.  It seems that at the time, all stake 
holders had missed to notice the detail differences in the design of two types of heat 
exchangers and to ask the question, why were they different?  
 
This case is also an example to demonstrate change management, in this case the 
need for strict discipline in managing detailed technical investigations required before 
the role and utilization of an aircraft is changed from the specification for which it was 
initially designed.  There is no evidence to suggest that management did not take 
place; the situation is highlighted to underscore the importance of change 
management.  The end result is adequate evidence to indicate if that management 
process had been sufficient or not, and if decisions to fly polar routes were swayed by 
commercial sense despite unknown risk influencing factors coming from equipment 
limitations. 
 
A2.3 Case 3 – Maintenance, Airfield Management, Design9  
 
Both the previous cases ended up with no fatalities.  But the case of Air France 
Concorde Flight Number 4590 that departed from Paris Charles de Gaulle airport 
ended up tragically. All occupants perished when the aircraft caught fire during take-
off and then lost its capability to maintain speed and height until it could be safely 
recovered to an adjacent airfield. The aircraft crashed into a hotel at Gonesse, near Le 
Bourget’ air field, in the conurbation of Paris, north.  All the 109 occupants on board 
died along with 4 people on the ground.  Six others on the ground were injured. 
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Figure A2.3 – Concorde Flight 4590 – Damaged by debris from a burst tyre 
(Source: amazingdata.com) 
 
During the take-off run, the aircraft had run over a loose metal strip that had fallen on 
to the run way from a Continental Airlines, DC-10, that had previously used the 
runway.   The edge of the metal strip had cut into one of the Concorde’s tyres, 
bursting them and then parts of debris from the explosion impacting on the under 
surface of the wing and so piercing an integral fuel tank located in the impact area. 
Fuel spilt under surge pressure and high speed conditions had caught fire from the 
engine afterburners.  Subsequently, investigators had traced the source of the metal 
strip to a thrust reverser of the DC-10, which had been repaired to a poor standard, in 
that the security of the metal strip had not been assure, and the specified material 
stainless-steel had been substituted with titanium. 
 
It is noteworthy that there have been more than 50 several prior cases of burst tyre 
some of which ended up with damaged fuel tanks and potentially serious 
consequences.  Ironically the authorities, including the airlines involved, had not 
followed up the investigations to a positive conclusion and a lasting solution, leaving 
the aircraft vulnerable to similar repetitive hazards. 
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Figure A2.4 – Causal factor _ Runway debris (titanium metal strip) 
(Source: BEA Report9)  
 
The French investigation report into the accident, also found, that a scheduled runway 
sweep for debris, which had been timed to take place prior to Concorde’s departure, 
had been postponed to a much later time because of an exercise.  
 
Figure A2.5 – Fragments of the burst tyre found on runway 
(Source: BEA Report9) 
 
On the 6th December 2010, a French Court passed its judgment on the crash, 
apportioning part of the blame to Continental Airlines and the engineer who 
performed the maintenance activity on the metal strip. It also passed on the blame to 
the consortium who designed and manufactured the aircraft, now trading under the 
name EADS, for failing to act decisively to find a design solution to the consequences 
of high speed tyre bursts, many of which Concorde experienced during its service life. 
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The issue of runway sweep had not been cited in the final verdict. 
 
A2.4 Case 4 – Old cargo aircraft. Continuing Airworthiness. Inspection Schedules24  
 
Finally another case is narrated here briefly, this one regarding the cargo aircraft El Al 
Flight 1862, Boeing 747-258F 4X-AXG that crashed on to an apartment building at 
Bijlmermeer, Amsterdam on taking off from Schipol airport on 4th October 1992.   
 
The aircraft has just taken off from Schipol airport with a cargo load of 60 tons and 
one passenger, and was climbing through FL 60.  During the climb, Number 3 engine 
got detached from the wing, which in turn hit Number 4 engine and tore that off the 
aircraft. With two engines lost from the same side and, now, the aircraft highly 
unstable, the pilot tried to recover it back to Schipol airport.  But in the process, he 
gradually lost control of the aircraft. It eventually hit a block of flats at a near 90-
degree bank angle and crashed.  All on board (4) and a number of residents (43) died 
and there were many other casualties of varying degrees of seriousness. 
 
 
Figure A2.3 – Simulation of the end of El AL Flight 1862  
(Source: aviationknowledge.wikidot.com) 
 
Investigations revealed the following.  In case of an accidental separation of an engine, 
there was a fuse pin that usually cleanly separates the engine from its pylon.  In this 
case, the fuse pin did not function properly because it was the fuse pin itself that had 
fractured through a fatigue crack that developed in the fuse pin.   
 
The aircraft was 13-years old at the time.  The aircraft had completed 257 flight cycles 
since the mid spar fuse pin, this being the source of the fatigue crack, was last 
inspected under the applicable service bulletins and airworthiness directives.  
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Continuing airworthiness assurance programs for this aircraft, in terms of inspections 
and NDT examinations, had been found to be inadequate to detect the crack.  
 
The investigation boards conclusion24 was that the “design and certification of the 
B747 pylon was found to be inadequate to provide the required level of safety. 
Furthermore the system to ensure structural integrity by inspection had failed.  This 
ultimately caused – probably initiated by fatigue in the inboard mid-spar fuse pin – the 
No 3 pylon and engine to separate from the wing in such a way that the No 4 pylon 
and engine was torn off, part of the leading edge of the wing was damaged, and the 
use of several systems was lost or limited”. 
 
The case of the El Al cargo flight is complex, in that the error of judgment on the 
adequacy of inspection lay in the domain of initial certification, which probably had 
not been revisited to review if the assumption made at the time were still valid in the 
light of experience with the aircraft in operational service as a cargo aircraft.  
 
Therefore, one could argue that this falls into the domain of continuing airworthiness, 
where an aircraft ageing process, susceptibility to fatigue and adequacy of inspection 
procedure to meet the intended purpose ought to be reviewed in a continuing review 
process.  
 
 
Figure A2.4 – Similar location of the engine pylon fuse pin  
(Source: airliners.net) 
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This then is a human failure at a higher, intellectual level where fleet managers 
operate, and where there ought to be continuing dialogue with the Design 
Authorities. 
 
This particular case underscores the vulnerability of older aircraft often used either in 
the cargo role or in some low cost airlines or in countries where airlines are run on 
meager budgets. 
 
The aircraft crashing into a block of flats, and the subsequent fears of it having 
released radioactive materials to the environment was a highly controversial issue at 
the time. It was also claimed that by media that certain toxic chemicals for military use 
might have been carried in the aircraft25.   
 
It has raised fears amongst local authorities in populous conurbations over the specter 
of cargo aircraft operating from their airports, often in silent hours when people are 
asleep in their homes, thus making the environment very vulnerable to aircraft 
crashes.  They feared for the safety of their citizens and fixed assets on the ground, 
and more importantly the long term health and safety issues arising from dangerous 
substances that might be released to the environment. 
 
A2.5 Case 5 – Time pressure, old aircraft, low cost airlines108 
 
On 20 August 2008, a Spanair Boeing MD-82 aircraft, Flight JF5022 to Gran Canaria, 
carrying 172 occupants was taking off from Madrid airport, when it failed to reach 
height, went out of control and crashed just outside the airfield.  Only 18 occupants 
survived the crash. 
 
The final report of the accident investigation by Commission for the Investigation of 
Civil Aviation Incidents (CIAIAC) of Spain was due publication in December 2010.  
Meanwhile, following information from CIAIAC interim report points to possible 
human error, both in flight operations and CAW processes, combined with possible 
equipment failure.  This is an example of a system failure that has brought tragic 
consequences. 
 
Accident investigations so far has revealed that the flap position had not been in the 
correct configuration prior to takeoff, and that the flight crew had missed noticing its 
abnormal position during takeoff. Evidence from Digital Flight Data Recording System 
(DFDRS) confirms that the flaps and slats had been fully retracted; the takeoff warning 
system had not been activated. 
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The reason for the failure of flight crew to detect an abnormal flap configuration is still 
under investigation. One contributory factor to the situation was thought to be the 
failure of flap position warning system to operate.  
 
It has been reported that this flight has had one previous departure attempt 
abandoned, when the pilot returned the aircraft to the gate due to abnormal 
temperature indications from the Ram Air Temperature (RAT) probe.  It is understood 
that in rectifying the problem, an engineer had deactivated the RAT probe’s heating 
circuit by dismantling the Z-29 circuit breaker. 
 
CB Z-29 also supplies power to the Thrust Rating Indicator (TRI) Panel in the cockpit, 
which is part of the Thrust Rating System (TRS).  Without AC power the panel will be 
inoperative and the TRS will not be available; moreover, the auto-throttle will not 
receive signal from TRP, and so, the Engine Power rating (EPR) setting would have to 
be set manually (Section 1.2.5 of the Interim Report).  DDRS data (Section 1.3.2) 
confirm that engine power settings had to be manually set during takeoff. 
 
Dismantled Z-29 alone does not answer the issue of inactive TOWS. This receives 
power from R2-5 Relay that is operated by undercarriage nose strut when on the 
ground. The same relay disconnects power supply to the RAT probe heating element, 
when the aircraft is on ground.  
 
Investigation into past cases of R2-5 failures, some which had been intermittent 
failures, indicate that they have resulted with either TOWS failures or RAT probe 
heating on the ground (Section 1.2.4 and Section 2.2 of the Interim Report). 
 
Although the accident investigation could not find conclusive evidence of R2-5 failure 
in the Relay recovered from the crashed aircraft, other simulated tests done on same 
type of Relay fitted to another aircraft of the same MD family, has confirmed that if 
there was a complete failure of power supply to the R2-5 Relay, or a break in K-33 CB 
that supplies power to some parts of R2-5 Relay, then it is possible for TOWS 
malfunction as well as RAT probe overheating (Section 1.4.4). 
 
There are no indications in the interim report if CB K-33 was removed during 
rectification of defect on RAT probe.  CB K-33 was located in the top panel, behind the 
LH seat in the cockpit, and the Z-29 in the lower panel, behind LH seat, i.e. in close 
proximity. 
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It was also noted that from DFDRS data, that the flap position had indicated 11 
degrees until the time the aircraft returned to the gate for RAT probe defect 
rectification.  However it had been recording Zero (0) degree position from the time it 
left the gate after rectification, until the time the aircraft crashed [Section 1.3.2).   This 
suggests that, either the flap was not reset before leaving the gate the second time.   
There are indications from DFDRS data that the flight crew was anxious of the delay 
caused by the defect, and that check list procedures were not being strictly adhered 
to, i.e. anticipating check list steps, not responding to them mindfully, and being 
distracted by other actions.  
 
In order for TOWS not to work during takeoff, with a wrong configuration, either CB K-
33 should have been dismantled, or there ought to be an internal contact failure 
within the relay, that supplied power to the TOWS.   DFDRS data confirm that there 
had been no sound from TOWS during takeoff run, indicating that there was no power 
supply to TOWS.  This could be due to a faulty internal contact within the relay, or if 
not power supply failure to the relevant contact in the Relay, by way of an open CB K-
33. 
 
The interim report is inconclusive as to why TOWS was inoperative, which could either 
be due to removal of K-33 CB or an internal fault of R2-5 Relay. 
 
Further tests on the equipment and investigation of human factor issues were to be 
undertaken prior to the issue of the final report in December 2010. 
 
It would be interesting to see if working under time pressure had contributed to a 
misdiagnosis of R2-5 Relay during  maintenance, or if K-33 CB was dismantled as part 
of isolating the RAT probe heater circuit or as a diagnostic check, but had forgotten to 
be re-assembled.   The close location of the two CBs also of interest, where a human 
error could be made, and gone unnoticed, when under pressure. 
 
Spanair is a low cost airline; MD-82 is a relatively aged aircraft with older generation 
technology.  
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Appendix 3 
 
Rationale for the high-level influence diagram 
 
A3.1.  Constituents of the Influence Diagram 
 
For analytical purposes, it was necessary to make CAW process stand alone, and that 
had been achieved by assuming that all other regulated processes involved in 
launching and delivering a safe flight, namely, flight operations, air traffic control and 
airfield operations have remained error- free. 
    
Thus the exploratory ID (which incidentally was in a draft form) represented the 
synergy of various groups and organizations, and their activities, in an integrated CAW 
process network in isolation. 
   
All the participants to the CAW process could be pooled as “core groups” and 
“peripheral groups” according to their respective, direct or indirect involvement with 
the end product. 
 
Between Type Certification of an aircraft and its commercial operation, there existed 
an integrated logistic support system (ILS) and a complex organizational and 
management infrastructure, required to uphold the CAW process.  Errors can occur 
anywhere in that entire complex dynamic system. 
 
Part of this infrastructure lay within the core group, but part lay outside the core, 
amongst the peripheral groups. 
 
A3.2   Core group and error contributions 
 
The core groups that directly contributed to the generation of the end product were 
the combined group of “continuing airworthiness management organization of an air 
operator” its “line maintenance organization” (i.e. Part M and Part 145 approved 
organizations) together with their “corporate business management organization”. 
The airworthiness management and maintenance group undertook CAW 
management, engineering operations and flight handling.  The business group took on 
financial and legal responsibilities for the end product as well as benefitting from the 
revenue generated from them, namely the “revenue generating flights”. 
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The objective of the core groups was to deliver a safe non-risk flight.  However, 
despite the best of intentions, that objective might not always be realized because of 
human error or other organizational and system shortfalls in the CAW process.  Thus a 
flight could experience an incident of varying severity or, if not, it might not even be 
launched or delivered on time as scheduled. 
 
A3.3   Peripheral groups and error contributions 
 
Peripheral groups that supported and influenced the core group’s CAW activities were 
other regulated approved organizations (AO), namely: 
• Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul Organizations (MRO), i.e., Part 145 
Approved Organizations (AO). 
• Design Manufacturing and Production Organizations, Part 21 AO.   
• Training organizations, i.e. Part 147 AO. 
 
A3.3.1  Part 145 AO 
 
Part 145 AO, apart from providing line maintenance services also undertook off-line 
base servicing support, deep repairs and component overhaul services. 
 
A3.3.2  Part 21 AO 
 
Parts 21 AO were usually the aircraft and component Design Authorities (DA), Original 
Equipment Manufacturers (OEM) and those who produce parts under parts 
manufacturer approval (PMA).  In CAW, Part 21 AO provided Post Design Services 
(PDS) relating to their products.  Some of the causal factors that directly gave rise to 
unsafe incidents or if not contributed to error at human/.machine interface have had 
their roots in Part 21 organizations, e.g. errors or shortfalls in design, manufacture or 
integrated logistic support (ILS) elements, or their planning and related upstream 
processes. 
  
A3.3.3  Supply chain 
 
In CAW process, supply chain organizations ensured a flow of regulated materiel, e.g. 
components and spare parts, from Part 21 AO to Part 145 AO.  It was known that 
other unregulated supply chains also existed in aviation industry. 
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Although OEM and PMA parts were well regulated, reports had pointed to “rogue 
parts” entering supply chains, which suggested the abuse of supply chains despite 
material entry and exit points of AO were controlled as per regulation. 
 
A3.3.4  Part 147 AO 
 
Part 147 approved training organizations were another peripheral group; they were 
responsible for the formation and qualification of technical personnel employed in 
CAW process.  Despite apparently meticulous compliance with the training and 
qualification processes for personnel, it was the very same engineers that these AO 
turn out who made mistakes at the work place.   
 
Mentioned amongst the many contributory factors at personal level, which related to 
error, were shortfalls in training.  These shortfalls had been recognized as poor quality 
and training standards, and shortfalls in the wider technical knowledge that was 
needed to supplement the ever more increasing focussed training.  
  
There was a general recognition within the industry that the modern training 
environment and techniques, more based on economising in training and minimising 
knowledge transfer, were being run on commercial basis.  That meant, meeting the 
minimum standards acceptable in industry.  In contrast, there is a belief amongst 
experienced and time served engineers and managers in the industry that modern 
training establishments do not produce the same type of high quality practical 
engineer as that used to be produced by traditional apprentice training. Supporting 
this argument, literature had pointed out that shortfall in standards in newly recruited 
engineers, though it is strictly not an error, would lead to individual personnel error 
during the performance of engineering activities or in exercising judgement under 
pressure conditions. 
 
A3.3.5  Rule maker/ Regulator 
 
The exploratory ID recognized the roles of the Rule Maker and/or Regulator. The 
former made and issued the rules and the latter exercised a supervisory role over 
their compliance by approved organizations.  For civil aviation in the UK, EASA was the 
rule making body whereas the UK Civil Aviation Authority was the national competent 
authority or Regulator for short. Both these establishments function in harmony with 
ICAO that guides nations on international air safety standards on behalf of the United 
Nations. 
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The roles and authority alone of these regulatory bodies do not make them immune 
to errors since personnel manning these organizations, are just as fallible as the 
engineers and managers who worked in the aviation industry.  There had been reports 
of either regulation themselves had been faulty or erratic, or if not the officials 
themselves had contributed to human error whilst managing rules.  Such events could 
be considered as failures of the very defences themselves, though mercifully, they do 
not happen often. 
  
Error contribution from such authorities would be relevant to this study, and it was 
envisaged that appropriate high level input in the form of error data would be 
forthcoming. 
 
A3.3.6  Global influences 
 
Global influences had been identified in the ID, and were meant to cover wider issues 
that affected all air operators and supporting approved organizations.  Such wider 
issues included, e.g., global economic fluctuations, fuel prices, technology changes, 
open sky policies, major trends in public behaviour relating to air travel.  This was not 
an exhaustive list. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
A3.3.7  ICAO 
 
ICAO, though an important global player, was not specifically identified in the ID.  
However, any binding agreements, advice or mandates that ICAO had issued could be 
considered as part of the global influences that affected the aviation business.  ICAO 
mandate on Safety Management Systems was a case in point.  It was assumed that 
any mandatory influences originating from ICAO had been passed down to AO through 
Regulator. 
 
A3.3.8  IATA and TIACA 
 
International Air Transport Association (IATA) and The International Air Cargo 
Association (TIACA) respectively were global, commercially centred organizations that 
influenced the way commercial aircraft were utilized for passenger and cargo 
transportation businesses.  They recognize air safety is absolutely crucial to their 
businesses, and they do go to great extent to ensure that their members maintain and 
promote the highest standards of safety.   
 
342
IATA Operational Safety Audit (IOSA) program is an example, as IATA now expects that 
all its members to have undergone this audit to standardize their safety readiness.  
IATA publishes annual reports on the safety performance of the global air transport 
industry that display Key Performance Indicators for the industry.  
 
The International Air cargo Association (TIACA) is actively encouraging safety 
education and promotion amongst its members mindful that most cargo aircraft have 
had high usage and are of advanced age, and if not well maintained and operated, 
they could pose a threat to population centres near airports and those who live 
beneath their flight paths.  Maintaining a holistic approach to business and air safety, 
TIACA positively encourages maintaining very high flight safety standards amongst its 
members, and moreover, generously support relevant research at universities through 
their scholarship schemes. 
 
Given these noble ideals of international trade association, at grass root levels there 
ought to be the right balance between business needs and safety.  Generally 
commercial and business policies of aircraft operators and maintenance providers 
tend to put pressure on funding available for safety improvements, pushing safety to a 
position of a “hygiene factor” as opposed to a “motivator” for investment.  This is one 
of the areas that would come under scrutiny in this research study as a source that 
contributes to human error.  
 
That said, IATA and TIACA were explicitly identified in the ID, but they had been 
considered together with other global issues that affected corporate policies towards 
CAW and safety. 
 
A3.3.9  AAIB 
 
The role of the Aircraft Accident Investigation Branch (AAIB) had been left out, 
because it was not an active participant to the CAW process.  Its role would come into 
prominence only after a significant incident or an accident.  However AAIB was 
mentioned in this document for completeness; some members of UK AAIB including 
its Chief Inspector have made advisory contributions to this research study. 
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A3.4   Factors common to groups 
 
A3.4.1  Individual operatives 
 
The role of the individual too needed to be considered in determining causal factors.  
Regardless of the quality and standards of training, an individual’s inner make up, 
personal profile, age, memory retention, recollecting powers, capacity to handle 
climatic conditions, variations in light and sound, the way he reacted to domestic and 
work environment stresses, all such human factors needed to be considered. 
   
Whereas there were training, qualification and licensing standards, there were no 
standards for the individual characteristics and how the individual should behave in 
response to external or internal conditions that were constantly in a state of 
transition.  In that respect the only areas the industry and the law commonly 
recognized were the health and welfare aspects of employees, and the employer’s 
duty of care to provide adequate support at the work place.  However evidence 
suggested that the levels of support had still much to be desired, and in the current 
economic conditions those as well as personnel standards had been eroded away 
despite their qualification.  That was an ideal basis for the generation of individual 
error at work place. 
 
A3.4.2  Defences 
 
It followed therefore that error contributions from any one of these peripheral groups 
ought to be resolved or eliminated before they caused more damage downstream, 
only if they could be detected in time.  But errors that were undetected and lay 
dormant could eventually find their way into core group activities where they could 
manifest themselves and trigger incidents or accidents. 
 
In mitigation of various hazards that existed in the CAW infrastructure and processes, 
defences had been set up by regulation or by the application of common sense.  
Regulation was legally binding and AO were expected comply with them.  This ID 
represented these defences within both core group and peripheral groups, in the form 
of regulations applicable to the type of AO, e.g. Part 145 regulation.  
  
But errors occurred when existing defences against potential hazards were over-
ridden, when defence mechanisms were not set up due to lack of appreciation, 
foresight or prior knowledge of a consequence, or by simply creating conditions under 
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which CAW process could not be sustained as intended, e.g. withdrawing resources 
such as funding, manpower or time to do the work. 
   
A3.5   Utility node 
 
Thus, as already mentioned, given the existence of these sources of errors and 
shortfalls in the CAW process, either the delivery of a flight ready aircraft or the safety 
of the flight itself could be compromised.  In such case, there could well be a degree of 
risk associated with the end product.  The risk could be either actual or latent.  The 
risk was actual if conditions associated with the error would lead to an incident; 
latent, if the error or its immediate consequences lay dormant as incipient failures, 
and then manifested themselves as actual failures at a later occasion when conditions 
got critical enough to trigger an accident. 
 
Naturally, prior knowledge of this risk, both at critical and non-critical levels, had a 
value to business managers as well as to engineering operations managers.  It was this 
“value” in monetary terms which was represented in the “utility node”. 
 
A3.6   Causal chains 
 
Part of the analytical process was to establish the logic of causal chain between 
various CAW process activities within each participating groups as well as in between 
those groups.  Nodes in the high-level ID, as it was, would not show this relationship 
openly.  Therefore to obtain the necessary transparency, the high-level ID should be 
dissociated down to smaller elements of causal chains. 
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Appendix 4 
Relating CAW elements to BBN 
A4.1 Introduction 
States of Nature embedded in the nodes of a BBN identify if the relevant event is error 
free or has an error, and if it has an error, then to what causal factor it is attributed.  
For this purpose it is necessary to gain knowledge of hazards, root causes, available 
defences if any, and if the defence has failed.    
A4.2 Hazards 
Hazards are the dangers that exist in a system, which obstruct the achievement of the 
intended system’s objective.  Some hazards are more dangerous than others.  Some 
hazards in a system may be blatantly obvious but they nevertheless get ignored by 
managers and operators of the system who may have other priorities, distractions 
related to business or if not due to their attitudes and values.   
Other hazards are more subtle, remain elusive or lay dormant in the system, and then 
surface unexpectedly when combined with other similar latent hazards. Between 
these two extremes lay a whole range of dangers in between of different magnitude. 
Most of these hazards directly or indirectly lead to human error at the human-
machine interface, which in turn could lead to incidents and accidents. 
Analysis of hazards and identification of defences are the usual steps of any risk 
assessment exercise.  However, this study is concerned with the quantification 
process of risk analysis, given hazards and defences within the process; the methods 
of minimizing the risk by either removing or mitigating the effects of hazards is outside 
the study remit.  Therefore, the study has adopted a slightly different technique to 
deal with the analysis of hazards and defences. 
Hazards in CAW are already well understood and much literature is available that 
provides hazard, error and defence taxonomy.  Shappell and Weigmann (2003)63 
provide an excellent analysis of the human factors that lead to aircraft accidents.  
Reason and Hobbs (2003)1 focuses more on the hazards that could occur in a 
maintenance environment.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
A4.3 Defences 
Much regulations and devices have been created to defend against hazards. 
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This study starts from the point that most hazards in CAW are already well 
understood, and that an adequate defences system is already in position to counter 
the hazards.   
Therefore in this work, instead of reanalysing hazard, an assumption is made that, 
where there is a regulation there is a hazard.  The regulation itself has been put in 
place as a defence, and therefore if the regulation is complied with honestly, then the 
risk attributed to the corresponding hazard would not arise. 
This study has not repeated this operation, but it has made use of the data already 
available in the public domain.  Causal factors identified in MEDA will be used. 
A4.4 Strategic Level Hazards 
Roots of some errors lay in higher level strategic policies and the way they are 
implemented. Examples are given in the following list.  Often the hazard is created by 
the change of policy.  This study is not criticizing the change but simply stating a fact 
that a change without adequate preparation to manage the change, as well as any 
resulting impact on resourcing, is a root cause.     
A4.6 Global or Central Government Initiated 
• New legislation on air traffic volumes, timings, pollution, noise, taxation  
• Trade union laws. 
• Open skies policies. 
• Promoting competition. 
• Reduction of oversight or accountability. 
• More accountability without supporting evidence. 
• Devolution of regulatory oversight 
• Undermining regulator authority and capability. 
 
A4.7 Corporate Business 
 
• Reaction to central government policies requiring cut backs from operation. 
• Market losses due to wrong financial decision 
• Competition from business rivals.  
• Response to Open skies policies and to competition  
• Poor change management e.g. with introduction of new aircraft fleets or new 
technologies. 
• Increasing passenger traffic without increasing own fleet 
• Change of key personnel from board level downwards. 
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• Changes to organization infrastructure. 
• Changes to Organizational Exposition for the approved organizations: routes, 
aircraft, airfields. 
• Changes to support services. 
• Change of location 
• Changes to HR policies and pay and conditions. 
• Changes to trade union relationships. 
• Introduction of new business ventures 
• Implementation of outsourcing policy. 
• Weak or inadequately supported interface contracts. 
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Appendix 5 
Consequences 
 
A5.1 UK CAA Classification of consequences 
 
CAP 776 Global Fatal Accident Review 1997-2006109 provides a listing of consequences 
that is used to record the either the accident type or the outcome of accidents.  The 
top ten were: 
 
• Post-crash fire 
• Loss of control in flight following: 
o Technical failure 
o Non-technical failure 
o Icing 
o Unknown reasons 
• Controlled flight into terrain 
• Runway excursion 
• Collision with terrain, water or an obstacle 
• Forced landing on land or water 
• Structural failure 
• Emergency evacuation difficulties 
• Fire, smoke, fumes during evacuation 
 
In this study, that was limited to a controlled group accidents were a rare occurrence 
and it was necessary to device a more gentle scale of consequences, without 
disregarding the possibility that some errors could lead to catastrophic accidents. 
Some of these severe accidents would no doubt lead to monetary and other 
consequences, such as: 
• Loss of prestige and /or loss of passenger confidence, manifested in loss of 
passenger numbers.  
• Loss of business.  
• Bankruptcy. 
 
Since the study would be mostly uploading “bottom of the iceberg” type error. For 
them, consequences would be either “No Consequence” meaning the cost of 
correction was absorbed into routine cost of running the business, or into a larger cost 
of error that affected a scheduled flight.  For completeness, consequences and 
conditionality were categorized as follows even if data were not available. 
351
A5.2 Consequences considered for the study 
 
A5.2.1 No consequence 
 
• Error detected before task completed, corrected. 
• Error detected during inspection, corrected. 
• Error detected during documentation, corrected. 
• Error detected during certification process, corrected. 
 
A5.2.2 Potential or actual flight delay 
 
• Error detected during pre-flight, corrected. 
• Error detected during sign up for pre-flight, corrected. 
• Error detected during walk-round, corrected. 
• Error detected during ground handling, corrected. 
• Error detected during aircrew cockpit checks, corrected. 
 
A5.2.3 Actual flight delay, missed the slot time or flight cancelled 
 
• Error detected during start up, corrected. 
• Error detected during taxi or pre-take off checks, aircraft returns to dock and 
corrected. 
 
A5.2.4 Return to dock 
 
• Error detected during takeoff run, abort take off, risk to aircraft, crew and 
passengers. 
 
A5.2.5 Flight returns to base or diversion 
 
• Error not detected, take off, error detected, dump fuel and return to base. 
• Error not detected, take off, and then manifests itself during the flight, 
diversion to other airport. 
 
A5.2.6 Flight incident but carried risk of escalation 
 
• Error not detected, takes off, manifests itself in flight, no incidence, no 
diversion, completes journey and correct. 
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• Error not detected; take off, error manifests itself as flight incidence, tolerable.  
Completes journey. 
 
A5.2.7 Flight incident and controlled diversion 
 
• Error not detected, take off, error manifests itself as flight incidence, tolerable 
but diverts to the nearest convenient airfield. 
 
 
A5.2.8 Flight incident and emergency diversion 
 
• Error not detected, take off, error manifests itself as flight incidence, 
intolerable and unacceptable.  Emergency diversion to nearest airfield. 
 
A5.2.9 Forced landing 
 
• Error not detected, take off, error manifests itself as flight incidence, 
intolerable and unacceptable, and no time to lose, get the aircraft on ground/ 
water rapidly - crash land. 
 
A5.2.10 Collision 
 
• Error not detected, take off, error does not get detected nor manifests itself, 
and leads to collision with ground, fixed object or another aircraft. 
 
A5.2.11 Structural failure in flight 
 
• Error missed, aircraft departs, error leads to a structural failure in flight. 
Various cost consequences could result from this type of situations: 
•  No casualties, damaged aircraft recovered to the nearest airport. No 
damage at ground level. Recovery costs. 
• No casualties in aircraft, damaged aircraft recovered to the nearest 
airport.  Damage to assets on the ground and/ or ground causalities. 
Recovery costs. 
• Casualties in air and ground. Assets damaged. Aircraft recovered to 
nearest airport. Recovery cost.  
• Aircraft crash lands or breaks up in air. Total loss.  Ground assets 
damaged and casualties.  
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A5.3 Monetary consequences of accident involving hull break up, fire, crew, 
passenger and 3rd party on ground 
 
• Only aircrew and passenger causalities. And aircraft itself and hold contents 
• Aircrew and passenger causalities, aircraft plus hold contents.  Assets on the 
ground and ground causalities. 
• Aircraft, Aircrew and passenger causalities, aircraft plus hold contents.  Assets 
on the ground and ground causalities. 
• Aircraft, Aircrew and passenger causalities and/or cargo   Assets on the ground 
and ground causalities.  Applicable to cargo aircraft. 
 
A5.4 Other potential consequences. 
 
• One or more aircraft of the fleet show incipient problems, affects aircraft 
availability, operation, short terms 
• One or more aircraft of the fleet show incipient problems, affects aircraft 
availability, operation, long term. 
• All aircraft of the fleet show incipient problems, affects aircraft availability, 
operation, short and long term.  No effect on fleet replacement. 
•  All aircraft of the fleet show incipient problems, affects aircraft availability, 
operation, short and long term.  Will affect fleet replacement plans. 
 
It would not be an easy task to estimate the cost of such errors, on a case by case 
basis, even though this was the desired process.  To categorize cost data from various 
possibilities, a cost scale from £10 to £1B (log to base 10) has been devised. 
 
A5.5 Concept of a scale for cost of consequences 
Monetary cost of consequence (£) Log10 Scale = Consequence Scale Remarks 
1 -9 0 
Negligible and may be ignored 10 - 99 1 
100 - 999 2 
1000 - 9999 3 Resolution may be increased in 
any practical application by 
progressively increasing the 
number of sub divisions in each 
medium level group.  This would 
depend on the amount of data 
available. For upper end groups 
there will hardly be any data, 
thus making greater resolution 
impractical in those groups. 
10,000 - 99999 4 
100,000`- 999,999 5 
1, 000,000 – 9, 999,999 6 
10, 000,000 – 99, 999, 999 7 
100, 000,000 – 999, 999,999 8 
1, 000, 000,000 – 9, 999, 999,999 9 
Table 5.5.1 – Cost Groups 
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Appendix 6 
 
Sample data set – Airline A 
 
 
 
• Ten reports were provided. One report was a duplicate copy of the other.   
 
• One reported incident (A07/025) had been repeated on the same aircraft, on 
two different occasions and hence counted as two separate incidents. 
 
• In A07/026 there were in fact 2 unconnected events of similar nature, i.e. 
mishandling of GSE in the vicinity of aircraft. 
 
• The 10 reports generated 11 error incidents. 
Serial No Description 
A08/005 
Aircraft released to fly, with a loose panel on a horizontal stabilator following Check servicing, 
Discovered one-month after releasing aircraft to fly. 
A08/001 Door seal pressurization leading to accumulator explosion. 
A07/027 Aircraft flew with undercarriage ground locks fitted.  Forgotten to remove ground locks. 
A07/026 
Damage to port wing flap tab skin.  Suspected contact with GSE. 
Attempted to drive a forklift truck beneath the wing of an aircraft. 
A07/025 
Engine chip detector inspection cleared on the tech log without first having completed the leak 
check. Two similar entries by different technicians on the same task. 
A07/023 Un-commanded discharge of a fire extinguisher in cargo bay. 
A07/022 Fuel spillage during aircraft refuelling in hangar. 
A07/020 Pair of pliers found in between LH wing trailing edge and wing outboard flap. FOD hazard. 
A07/019 GPU driven away while cable still attached to the aircraft. 
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Appendix 7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Analysis of sample data set from Airline A  
Causal Factors and Causal Chains  
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7.1 Summary of Investigation Reports 
 
Serial No Event Error Causal Factors Regulation/ Defence Remarks 
Management 
Challenge 
A/08/005 
Horizontal stabilator 
panel screws not fitted 
Released to fly with a 
loose access panel 
P - Failed inspection 
Maintenance standard  
Pt M -Sub part D  
 
Maintenance procedures, 
standards and quality 
checks  
Pt 145 - A65  
 
Miscommunication, 
access to the panel and 
poor visual perception 
directly contributed to the 
error. Access to job cards, 
and mechanics not always 
signing for their work 
were side issues, which 
though not relevant to 
this case were dormant 
errors in the system.  
 
What is the Airline A’s 
policy on resourcing, in 
this case sufficient access 
platforms?  
Is there a scale of 
equipment? 
How does organization 
deal with peak demands? 
 
C - Inadequate visual 
perception of surface 
C - Mechanics failing to 
sign for work done. 
C– Mechanics had no 
access to job cards 
C - Miscommunication HF 
A/08/001 
 
Door seal pressurization 
reservoir explosion 
 
Unauthorized procedure 
 
P - Lack of right 
equipment 
Part M-Sub part D 
regarding failure to 
comply with given AMM 
instructions 
 
Part 145-A40 re tools and 
test equipment 
unavailability and failure 
to identify alternative 
tools 
 
Absence of Oracle data at 
the right place and 
consequent use of 
unauthorized practice 
(based on local culture) 
were the primary causes.  
Though not covered by 
the report, it seems that 
QA had missed this 
shortcoming. A routine 
review of scale of 
equipment for tasks 
would have been 
beneficial. Lack of a 
Pressure Relief Valve in 
the design is of concern. 
- Does the company 
review scales of 
equipment and inventory? 
- Is this part of QA checks? 
-  Has the design shortfall 
followed up? 
 
C - Inventory failed to 
identify AMM equipment 
and fails identify 
alternative equipment 
available 
 
C- Carry forward company 
wrong practices, and 
failure to rectify repetitive 
mistakes.  QA issue. 
  
QA missed or poor 
reporting or both. 
Part 145-A65 standards 
and Quality checks 
Notes: 
Causal factors 
P = Primary 
C= Contributory
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 Serial No Event Error Causal Factors 
Regulation/ 
Defence 
Remarks 
Management 
Challenge 
A 07/027 
 
Ac took off with UC ground 
lock fitted 
 
Omission (of technical 
procedure) 
 
P - Failure to record in 
the operator's technical 
log, the disabling of the 
undercarriage by fitting 
of ground lock and calling 
for its removal and post-
ground run PDI 
 
Recording of 
maintenance tasks 
Pt 145 A50 
Forgetting to remove the 
lock was the primary error, 
whereas by not raising a 
log entry, a defence was 
breached. Time pressure, 
local manning level, and 
multi-tasking were the 
main contributory factors. 
Review of the timing of 
PDI had already been 
undertaken.   
What is the Airline A policy 
on documentation on 
running repairs?  Because 
of urgency to get the flight 
underway, are procedures 
for handling running 
repairs different from the 
norm?   
C- Time pressure HF 
C- Resource shortfall in 
Line maintenance, 
engineer undertaking 
other parallel control/ 
communication tasks 
 
Adequate manning 
Pt 145 A30 
C- Regulations that 
seemed to have 
eliminated engineer pre-
dispatch inspection (PDI), 
followed by final aircrew 
walk round. 
 
 
C- Timing of PDI relative 
to rectification work. 
 
A 07/026_1 
 
Damage to port wing flap 
tab skin 
 
Violation of rules 
 
P - Non-segregated 
facility  Inappropriate facilities  
Pt 145 A25 
 
 Conflicting usage of space 
was the primary cause, 
and space appears a 
critical issue. 
What is Airline A policy on 
resourcing for facilities 
when space becomes 
critical? 
C - No free access path to 
GSE  
359
 Serial No Event Error Causal Factors 
Regulation/ 
Defence 
Remarks 
Management 
Challenge 
A 07/026_1 (Error 2) 
 
Attempt to drive forklift 
beneath the wing 
Violation of rules 
 
P - No segregated 
facilities  
 
Inappropriate facilities  
Pt 145 A25 
Near miss damage of an 
aircraft by forklift due to 
conflict in space usage is 
the principal causal factor. 
Contributory human 
factors should be assessed 
against the fitness of the 
individual to work in an 
aircraft environment, as 
he appeared to be 
sensitive and already 
functioning under long 
term stresses. Such people 
tend to be highly 
susceptible to making 
errors.  
What is the Airline A HR 
policy regarding 
employment of personnel, 
needing health and 
welfare attention, in an 
aircraft environment? 
C - No free access path to 
Inappropriate facilities  
Pt 145 A25 
C - Health and welfare 
issues/  
Individual  
HF  
C - Multitasking  
 
Individual  
HF 
C - Communication 
shortfalls at task 
handover  
Group 
HF 
C - Lack of documented 
procedures 
Pt 145 A45 
C - Noise, Distractions 
and interruptions  
 
Group 
HF 
C-  No shift handover, 
Production planning  
Pt 145 A47 
A/07/025_1 
 
Magnetic chip detector 
inspection.  Task certified 
completed before its 
completion 
 
Procedure not followed  
 
NK Pt 145 A50 
This earlier error in the 
certification triggered off 
the incident reported in 
A07.025. Both errors 
considered as 2 similar 
back to back errors 
Is this an indication of an 
unauthorized practice to 
economize on time and 
energy? HR policy forcing 
this situation on 
engineers? 
No shift handover, 
Production planning  
Pt 145 A47 
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  Serial No Event Error Causal Factors 
Regulation/ 
Defence 
Remarks 
Management 
Challenge 
A/07/025_2 
 
Magnetic chip detector 
inspection, certified 
completed before 
completion 
 
Procedure not followed Pt 
145 A50 
 
P- Time pressure or 
convenience or both 
acting together 
(insufficient information 
to discriminate if time 
pressure is actual or 
perceived) 
 
Production Planning,  
Pt 145 A47  
 
Group 
HF 
This is mainly a manning 
issue, but suggests the 
existence of local 
unauthorized procedures 
to economize on time and 
energy by way of 
compensating for the time 
pressures. 
What is Airline A’s 
manning policy, especially 
when dealing with 
geographically separated 
work sites and peak 
demands? 
 
What is the actual 
performance against 
expectation in response to 
authorized manning 
levels? 
C- Inadequate manpower 
- short term  
Manning 
Pt 145 A30 
C- Workplace 
interruptions  
Group 
HF 
C- Multi-tasking  
Group  
HF 
Production planning 
Pt 145 A47 
C- Miscommunication 
between engineer and 
aircrew  
 
Group 
HF 
A/07/025  Other errors 
noted during 
investigation issues  
 
 
Incorrect authorization of 
personnel  
 Pt 145 A35 This is a dormant error 
Why QA checks missed 
this? Policy on non LAE in 
QA role? 
A/07/025  Other errors 
noted during 
investigation issues  
 
 
Incorrect technical 
reference/maintenance 
data  
 Pt 145 A45   This is a dormant error 
Why QA checks missed 
this?  Policy on non LAE in 
QA role? Non LAE QA 
depending on LAE’s whom 
he audits for specialist 
advice? 
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 Serial No Event Error Causal Factors 
Regulation/ 
Defence 
Remarks 
Management 
Challenge 
A/07/025  Other errors 
noted during 
investigation issues  
 
 
Amendment state of Form 
ADA 1001  
 Pt 145 A45 This is a dormant error 
Why QA checks missed 
this?  Policy on non LAE in 
QA role? 
A/07/023 
 
Uncommanded discharge 
of cargo bay fire 
extinguisher 
 
Procedure not followed  
 
P- Overridden 
procedures on account of 
inadequate trade 
knowledge on type  
 
Competency 
Pt 145 A30 
Knowledge shortfalls and 
overconfidence led the 
engineer to make this 
error.  Supervision could 
have avoided the incident.  
But supervision dependent 
on local manning level. 
What is the Airline A policy 
on employing less 
experienced personnel 
without supervision? 
 
How does Airline A 
compensate for shortfalls 
in system knowledge? 
C- Unfamiliarity with this 
cargo bay FE system 
fitted to American 
operated aircraft. 
 
TNA shortfall 
Competency 
Pt 145 A30  
C- Inadequate system 
knowledge  
Competency  
Pt 145 A30 
 
A/07/022 
 
Inability to contain fuel 
spillage in hangar 
Inadequate equipment 
and materiel resources 
Inadequate planning (for 
larger spillages) 
 
Planning limitation and 
poor husbandry re empty 
kit in hangar H21 
Standby fire tender during 
hangar refueling may be 
more relevant? 
Is there a design shortfall?l 
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 Serial No Event Error Causal Factors 
Regulation/ 
Defence 
Remarks 
Management 
Challenge 
A/07/020 
 
Loose pliers found wedged 
between the LH wing 
trailing edge and leading 
edge of LH wing outboard 
flap 
 
Loose article in aircraft 
control system 
 
P-: Failure to complete 
tool check    
Maintenance standards 
Pt M Sub Part D 402 
This case seems to be an 
over-reaction to cover up 
for a simple case of failing 
to check and account for 
all the tools taken to an 
aircraft, given that the 
engineers were competent 
enough to overcome all 
other handicaps placed on 
them.  May be the Airline 
A tool control policy is 
such that an engineer does 
not know how many tools 
he takes to the aircraft and 
how many he takes away 
from the aircraft 
What is the Airline A policy 
on tool control? 
C- Local instructions 
missing  
Maintenance procedures  
Pt 145 A65 
C- Task not properly 
assessed  
Maintenance procedures  
Pt 145 A65 
C-: Deviations from 
procedures  
Maintenance standards 
Pt M Sub Part D 402 
C-: Environmental 
conditions and poor 
lighting. 
 
Pt 145 A25 
C-: Unavailability of 
equipment and specialist 
tools caused interruption  
 
Pt 145 A40 
A/07/019 
 
GPU driven away while it 
was still connected to the 
aircraft 
 
Damaged equipment 
 
P- Complacency 
Individual  
HF 
This appears to be a 
simple case of 
complacency.  Evidence 
does not substantiate 
fatigue or insufficient 
experience. 
Support workers, do they 
have written procedures? 
 
Is 6-month working not 
enough experience? 
 
Why was the worker 
fatigued out 2-hrs into his 
shift.  Was he doing a 
second job when off duty? 
Airline A HR policy? 
 
IC- insufficient 
experience, lack of 
training or competency.  
Competency 
Pt 145 A30 
C- Fatigue.  
Individual 
HF 
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7.2  Tracing causal chains in a system fault   
 
A causal chain is explained here with an example.  An incident 
primarily due to a shortfall in a “work card” could be 
progressively traced to an error in Part 21 organization that 
designed, produced the AMM, as well as to the work card drawn 
up on the basis of the AMM, to shortfalls in supervisory and 
review functions of superiors.  It could also be due to shortfalls 
in quality audits system: for example, the quality audit program 
might have not accommodated this area relating to the review 
of AMM and work cards. If the AMM review requirement is 
already in the quality plan, then it might be possible that the 
plan has not been implemented, or alternatively if it was in the 
plan, then implementation had been unsatisfactory.  Relevant 
Part M and Part 145 regulation might have been breached too, 
and it might be relevant to examine if this area had been audited 
by the Regulator during oversight inspections and what the 
outcome was. 
Causalities of the following incidents have been traced back 
starting from the incident.  Causal chains within the framed 
areas had been undertaken by the operator’s internal 
investigation.  The study found that causal chains could be 
further extended, beyond what is fondly called in the profession 
as “management glass-walls”. Often, such limitations of internal 
investigations are attributed to low cost-effectiveness as a way 
of generalization. But in reality it may be due part to the 
absence of contract cover, fund limitations, local sensitivities or 
management decisions to contain the error and its 
consequences within their span of control.  The causal chain 
extensions in the following case studies have been reviewed by 
the data provider, and agreed as rational, with the reservation 
that their agreement is only for the purposes of academic 
research undertaken by this study program. 
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CostConsequence
Flight
Release
Inspection2
Release1
Inspection1
Eqpt
LocalProcedures Repair
Signatures
Access2TechLog
Resourcing
ID 1 – Loose screws on tail plane A08/005 
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CostConsequenceRepairEquipmentLogSetUp
LocalCultureFiltr
Individual
Personal Skil_Knwldg
OutSourcingTrainingRecruitingEmployment_TndC Health_Welfare
HR_Policy
Part147AO OutSource
Time_Pressure
Defences
QualityAudits
Design_Reviews
Design_Knowledge TimeCost_Constraints
Tech_Spec
DesResourcing1
EquipLocn
Prodcutivity
SafetyPolicy
QualityPolicy
Tech_Information
BusinessPolicy
EngOpsPolicy
FltOpsPolicy
Flight
ILSResourcing2
Design
WorkingEnvrnmnt
LogPlnng
 
ID 2 – A08/001 Door seal pressurisation - Reservoir explosion  
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Individual2 Task2 IncidenceTime_pressure2
Multi_tasking Defences
Busines_policy
Resourcing_policy2
Repair_Decision2
Manning
Engineering_policies2
Operations_policy2
Cost2
AC_state2_vs_Situation
ID3 – A07/027 Aircraft flew with UC locks fitted_2  
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 Cost
Repair_ol_pressure_gauge
UC_ground_lock
Task_closure
Release_UC_Grd_lock
Ground_run
Individual
Operations_policy
Time_pressure
Raise_task
Resourcing_policy Manning_Resources
MultiTasking
Commercial_policy
AC_state
Engineering_policies
Raise_Tech_log_entry
Policy_running_faults
Repair_Decision
Flight_incident
Ac_Release
Tech_log_closure Consequence
ID3 – A07/027 Aircraft flew with UC ground locks fitted 
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 Task Incidence
Defence2_local_rules
Cost
Individual2
Facility
Resourcing_policy
Organization
Health_and_Welfare
Culture_group_behaviour
Manning
Defence1_supervision
Business_policy Funding
HR_Polciies
Multi_tasking
Competence
Continuatin_training_policy
ID4 – A07/026 Damage to port wing flap tab skin 
369
 Task Incidence Cost
Facility
Resourcing_policy
Organization
Business_policy Funding
Defence2_local_rules
ID5 – A07/026 Damage to port wing flap tab skin_2 
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Flight
Consequence
Defence
TaskIndividual
Manning_policy
Corporate_policies
Cost
Operations_policy
Local_Manning
Time_Pressure
Multi_tasking
Tasking_Desicion
Personal_limitations
Competence
Health_Welfare
Resourcing_policy
Business_policy
Engineering_policy
ID6 – A07/025 Incomplete magnetic chip-detector task 
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Individual
Task Consequence Cost
TNA
Cont_and_Type_training
Type_rating
Training
Competency
ID7 – EP07/023 Un-commanded discharge of fire extinguisher  
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Local_mngmnt_review
Hangar_refuelling_policy
Resourcing_policy
Consequence Cost
Absorbent
Fire_tenderOps_policy
Husbandry
PostEmergency_task
Refuelling_task
Emergency_procedure
Emergency_training
Emergency_prep
ID 8 – A07/022 Fuel spillage during hangar refuelling 
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Task
Individual
Consequence
Flight
Equipment
Hand_tools
Procedure_Docs
Facility
Quality_Audit
Task_assessment
Tool_check
Cost
Prev_FOD_history
Tooling_policy
Resourcing_policy
Competency
Training
ID 9 – A07/020 Pliers found in wing/flap interface 
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 CostConsequenceTask
Individual
CompetenceFitness
Training_Qualification
Medication
Training_Policy
Shift_Handover
Resourcing
HR_policy Drugs_alcohol
Off_duty_work
Time_pressure
Manning_level
Safety_policy
ID 10 – GPU towed & power cable damaged A07/019 
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Comparison of three different management approaches to risk containment 
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Comparison of 3 different management approaches to risk containment – Influencing factors on risk 
 
Management 
approach 
Compliance with 
regulation 
Size of operation Vs capability 
Operational 
performance 
Safety & quality defences Change management 
Culture and 
Organizational set up 
Risk contained? 
RAF 
Structural 
integrity 
policy 
Policy on fatigue 
life of critical 
components 
 
Statement of 
Operating Intent 
 
Y-coded items  
Structural 
Integrity 
inspections 
 
Fatigue meter 
fitted or digital 
operational loads 
measurement 
 
Policy compliance 
 
Fleet sizes and marks 
 
Age 
 
Roles 
 
Data collection methods, 
storage, analysis , 
dissemination infrastructure: 
equipment, ground stations 
facilities, personnel, training 
(quantities and spread) 
 
Size of work load from 
regulator (staff officers) 
viewpoint, but also same 
related to aircraft in one RAF 
station relative to local 
commanders assessment of 
workload  
 
Implementing 
fatigue monitoring  
 
Collecting data 
 
Analysis and 
dissemination 
 
Key performance 
indicators 
 
Trends etc 
Fatigue test 
 
Dedicated Structural 
Integrity Working Groups 
for each aircraft type 
manages all structural 
policy and strategy 
 
Review of compliances 
results 
 
Analysis of fatigue outputs 
and SOI reviews 
 
Education 
 
New OLM  programmes 
 
 
Central change 
management by SI WG. 
 
Review of Statement of 
Intent for parametric 
changes 
 
New formations 
 
Defence policy changes 
 
New equipment 
 
Material changes 
SI or Fatigue policy 
changes 
 
Review  of field experience 
 
One owner. 
Highly accountable. 
Doctrinaire. 
Highly regulated by 
policies and rules of 
procedure. 
HR and Personnel 
management policy. 
Recruitment based on 
aptitude. 
High quality training. 
Personnel proactive. 
Organizational 
interfaces well 
controlled. 
 
Yes most of the 
time. 
 
Still failures occur 
due to: 
 
Unreported usage. 
 
Deviation of product 
from design. 
 
Corrosion. 
 
Pilot error, operating 
outside limits. 
 
Historical data 
missed. 
 
Limit of knowledge 
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CAA-NL 
Risk model to 
implement 
RBO concept 
Compliance with 
regulation , 
integrated with 
quality under 
Quality Risk: 
detail 
Size and scope of work from 
regulators work load 
viewpoint. 
 
Number of approved 
organization. 
 
Numbers employed. 
 
Number aircraft. 
 
Number of standard 
inspection required by ICAO 
guideline, 2-yr cycle. 
 
Balance of production volume. 
 
Complexity of processes and 
equipment. 
 
Variable due to 
different 
operators. 
 
Individual 
performance 
assessed from 
evidence  during 
oversights 
Quality risk: detail 
combined with column 2 
NK 
Safety culture 
HR policies 
 
Worker/management 
attitudes to safety, 
incidents and errors 
Communication and 
relationships 
 
Organizational 
behaviour 
 
Complexity 
 
Geographical spread 
 
Policies on 
outsourcing and 
subcontracting 
 
Productivity and 
innovation 
 
Attempts to measure 
 
 
Yes but incidents 
occur. 
 
Unreported usage. 
   
Deviation of product 
from design. 
 
Pilot error, operating 
outside limits. 
 
Historical data 
missed. 
 
Limit of knowledge. 
UK CAA 
ROWI 
Model  
Managing 
task loading 
for inspectors 
Compliance with 
regulation 
 
Safety issues: 
Num Level 1 and 
Level 2 findings 
for previous year 
 
AOC Holder:  
No of aircraft. 
A1, A2, A3 aircraft (our 
interest A1 ac only >5700kg. 
Number of QA staff. 
Tech planning staff. 
Nature of approved 
maintenance programme 
(intensity). 
ETOPs/ RVSM/ AWOPS, MNPS 
approved. 
 
Safety issues: 
 
Numbers and types of ac, FW 
or helicopter. 
Number in each fleet. 
Variable due to 
different 
operators. 
 
Individual 
performance 
assessed from 
evidence  during 
oversights 
Number QA staff (but in 
capability, this column 
deals with defence 
performance) for both AOC 
Part M, Part 145 AO 
 
Under safety issues: 
 
Num of operation’s 
resources variations issued 
over previous year 
Independent 
operators. 
 
Guard their 
independence and 
culture. 
 
Commercial 
competition. 
 
Safety culture 
observed but not 
measurable. 
 
 
 
 
Yes but incidents 
occur. 
 
Unreported usage. 
 
Deviation of product 
from design. 
 
Pilot error, operating 
outside limits. 
 
Historical data 
missed. 
 
Limit of knowledge. 
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Num MOR submitted 
Average age of aircraft 
Average hours flown per 
month 
 
Part 145/Part M Org: 
 
Number of A1 ac > 5700kg. 
Line types approved. 
A1 base types approved. 
Number of B ratings approved. 
Number C ratings approved. 
Number specialized services 
(like NDT). 
Number certifying staff 
employed. 
 Number AOC supported. 
Num QA staffs. 
 
 
Safety Issues: 
 
For C rating companies only, 
the number of Form 1 issued 
previous year. 
Number of aircraft 
maintained. 
Number of Part 145 related 
MOR submitted previous year. 
Number of Level 1 findings 
previous yr. 
Num of Level 2 findings 
previous yr. 
Average age of aircraft 
maintained. 
Num maintenance resource 
.variations issued over 
previous yr. 
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Appendix 9 
Data requirement issued to operators  
A9.1 Way Forward 
This note describes data requirements for the CAW Risk Model Research Study 
Program, as envisaged at present. As experience is gained it might be necessary to 
gather additional information; these will be discussed with data providers as and 
when required. 
A9.2 Data Requirement 
Subject to discussion and further refinement, three groups of data are requested.   
• The first group of data will be used to define the boundaries of the reference 
frame of the controlled group. 
• The second group will be the main bulk of data.  It should consist of incidence 
and investigation reports in hard copy form or if not as digitised data files.  If 
these reports have been already analysed into causal factors and categorised 
into digitised data files, then they may be of interest to the study, subject to 
their transportability and readability. 
• The final data group will be supporting data, to be used for analyzing and 
interpreting main causal factor data.  There is also a need to collect data on 
flights not affected by CAW errors. 
 
A9.3 Boundaries of the controlled group 
Define experimental period: Start date and terminal date.  To maximise data capture, 
start date could be from the time airlines database reached a steady state since its 
formation.  Terminal date is left open for the time being; it will depend on the size of 
data set available. 
A9.4 Error and report types of interest   
For the defined period, Airline A is requested to provide all investigation reports 
related to human error in CAW, regardless of the source, e.g. MEMS, AOR, and GOR 
etc. 
Errors might have occurred at man/machine interface, or traceable back to 
organizational level, to task definition, integrated logistic support planning or 
implementation, approved organization/ regulator interface, or within Part 21 
organization.  
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Regarding errors in Part 21 organizations, the study program is interested in error 
incidences and associated data related to post development services, modifications, 
or integrated logistic support. Errors occurred prior to the initial type certification 
would not be searched in this error trawl.  However, if CAW process revealed prior 
errors, then these errors would be taken into account in this research as contributory 
factors that affected CAW process.   
Internal investigation and closure reports on incidences that had been the subject of 
an MOR would be of special interest to this study.    
Statistics on internal reports of unsatisfactory features in technical documentation, 
tools and test equipment, spares etc will be useful. 
All internally reported incidents that involve the aircraft, passengers, crew or third 
party should be included. 
A9.5 Background data of the incidents 
For authenticity and validation of research work, it is necessary to identify where error 
data is coming from.  Therefore, following information is required for each error 
report. 
• Date 
• Flight Number 
• Aircraft Registration number 
• When and where occurred or discovered, e.g. type of maintenance or audit 
check, oversight etc. 
• Accumulated hours flown/ landings and take off/ sectors flown at the time of 
incidence or error. 
 
Data source, Aircraft ID, Flight Number, Aircraft Registration Number, Location, 
Names of any individuals involved, and such raw data that is considered as sensitive 
information will be removed from any public-domain document that will be published 
at the end of the study program.  Any data intended to be published would be 
desensitized.  Raw data will be securely stored, and will be inaccessible to the public, 
until the end of a prescribed period when they will be destroyed. 
 
A9.6 Supporting Data 
 
• Corresponding to the time frame, error data should be related to 
o Utilization of aircraft in flying hours by type of aircraft. 
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o Alternative utilizations indicators:  Number of sectors (or flights) flown, 
landings and take offs by type. 
o Number of passengers flown. 
o Number of aircraft in the register (owned as well as leased by the 
company for passenger flying)  
o Number of aircraft actually flown in the month (month by month) 
o Number of aircraft in Base servicing in the month. 
o Base or check servicing programme, floor loading data. 
o Number of flight crews per aircraft (by type). 
o Rate of generation of base servicing or check servicing, e.g. servicing 
arising frequencies. 
o Work force strength and profile by each organization: professional 
level, numbers. Month by month 
o Number of flights dispatched, arrival at destination, diversions. 
o Number of flight incidents and accidents related to CAW error, data to 
be linked to reported error. 
 
A9.7 Statistics on "No Incident" "No Error" Flights and Sectors 
 
Just as much as the study is interested in incidences attributed to errors, it is also 
interested in flights or sectors flown, and flying hours flown when there had been no 
incidences. 
   
This information is necessary in order to represent the true state of nature of the 
organization, otherwise error data only would make the organization appear more 
hazardous, and of course at a higher risk when it should not be. 
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Appendix 10 
Nodes and States of Nature – Names and their disposition in the network  
This Appendix lists the names of nodes used in the CAW Risk Model.  Names of the 
states of nature could be read off from the Taxonomy details in Appendix 12. 
This Appendix has been presented as a Look up Table to trace the distribution of 
nodes and states of nature within the model.  
Certain nodes (indicated in italic) are critical nodes that combine the effects of error 
probabilities of upstream nodes.  In this model they are referred to as accumulators.  
In the CAW process, the role of some of these nodes is equivalent to the line manager 
of a section (of engineers) checking and certifying that the output from the group is 
satisfactory.   
There is an implicit defence activity embedded into each node, accumulators and 
others, but not shown. For example in the case of a proactively detected error at any 
node, it is assumed that the detection would lead to a defence so that the error would 
not be carried forward as an error if properly defended.  Similarly an error previously 
generated in an upstream node, but missed there, could get detected at an 
accumulator node downstream. However, if an upstream generated error was missed 
at the accumulator, then the error would be registered at the accumulator too, 
whereas a defended error would not be.   
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Table A10.1 – Nodes and States of Nature 
 
ID Node 
Num of States of 
Nature 
Cum 
Total 
Num of 
Nodes 
Cum Tot - Nodes 
& Accumulators 
 High Level Factors     
1 Global Factors 13    
2 Central Government 7    
3 Local Government 5    
4 Corporate Board 11    
5 Trade Union 9 45 5  
      
 Corporate Policy     
6 CEO AM Decisions 8    
7 Commercial Policies 6    
8 Flight Operations Policies 2    
9 Engineering Operations Policies 7    
10 Logistic Support  Policies 8    
11 HR Policies 9    
12 Corporate and Policy Issues 2 87 7 12/1 
      
 Change Management System     
13 Business Management 5    
14 Operations 7    
15 MOE 6    
16 Engineering and Technology 9    
17 Human Resources  8    
18 Change Management 2 124 6 18/2 
      
 Size and Type of Operation      
19 Aircraft Type Series FW 13    
20 Aircraft Type Series RW  13    
21 Registration No 13-100    
22 AC Age 11    
23 Sectors Flown 11    
24 Full Maintenance Cycles 11    
25 Aircraft 2    
26 Ac Generation Time 4    
27 Operational Role 9    
28 Route 5    
29 Nature of Operation 2    
30 Flight Origin 14    
31 Destination 14    
32 Departure Time 13    
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33 Geographic Location Time 2 261 15 33/5 
      
 Technical Resources Capability     
34 Fleet Size to TR Cat A Staff 4    
35 Fleet Size to TR Cat B1 Staff 4    
36 Fleet Size to TR Cat B2 Staff 4    
37 Fleet Size to TR Cat C Staff 4    
38 Fleet Size to Non Cat Tech Staff 4    
39 Tech Staff 2    
40 Fleet Size to Logs Staff 4    
41 Fleet Size to Tech Managers 4    
42 Other Support Staff 2    
43 Staff Complement 2    
44 Operation Vs Capability 2 297 11 44/9 
      
 Pt M and Part 145 AO Compliance     
45 Part 145 AO Findings L1 18    
46 Part 145 AO Findings L2 18    
47 Compliance 145 2    
48 Pt M Sub Part B Findings L1 3    
49 Pt M Sub Part B Findings L2 3    
50 Part M Sub Part B Compliance 2    
51 Pt M Sub Part C Findings L1 8    
52 Pt M Sub Part C Findings L2 8    
53 Part M Sub Part C Compliance 2    
54 Pt M Sub Part D Findings L1 4    
55 Pt M Sub Part D Findings L2 4    
56 Part M Sub Part D Compliance 2    
57 Pt M Sub Part E Findings L1 5    
58 Pt M Sub Part E Findings L2 5    
59 Part M Sub Part E Compliance 2    
60 Pt M Sub Part G Findings L1 14    
61 Pt M Sub Part G Findings L2 14    
62 Part M Sub Part G Compliance 2    
63 Pt M Sub Part H Findings L1 3    
64 Pt M Sub Part H Findings L2 3    
65 Part M Sub Part H Compliance 2    
66 Pt M Sub Part I Findings L1 6    
67 Pt M Sub Part I Findings L2 6    
68 Part M Sub Part I Compliance 2    
69 Compliance M 2    
70 Part145 Part M Compliance 2 439 26 70/19 
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 Quality Management System     
71 CAW Quality Policy 3    
72 Quality Plan and Program 6    
73 QA Scope 15    
74 Resources and Training Standards 9    
75 Audit Procedure 9    
76 Remedial Action Procedure 6    
77 CAW Management Activity 11    
78 Monitor Effectiveness of AMP 3    
79 Maintenance Contract Monitoring 11    
60 QMS Policy Plans Scope 2    
81 QMS Tasks Processes 2    
82 QMS Organization 2    
83 Pt M Management Activity 12    
84 Pt M Finding Reporting 4    
85 Pt M Corrective Action 4    
86 Part M QA Performance 2    
87 Pt145 Activity Area 15    
88 Pt145 Finding Reporting 4    
89 Pt145 Corrective Action 4    
90 Part 145 QA Performance 2    
91 Sub Contractor Activity Area 2    
92 SC Finding Reporting 4    
93 SC Corrective Action 4    
94 Sub Contractor QA Performance 2    
95 Supplier Activity Area 2    
96 Supplier Finding Reporting 4    
97 Supplier Corrective Action 4    
98 Supplier QA Performance 2    
99 QA Performance 2    
100 Quality Management System 2 593 30 100/28 
      
 
Pt M Pt 145 (and Pt 21) Combined 
Performance 
    
      
 Part 21 Organization     
101 Pt 21 Sub Part A General Provisions 5    
102 Pt 21 Sub Part B Type Certificates 22    
103 Pt 21 Sub Part D Changes To TC 10    
104 Pt 21 Sub Part E Supplemental TC 12    
105 Pt 21 Sub Part F Production without POA 11    
106  Pt 21 Sub Part G POA 17    
107  Pt 21 Sub Pt H Airworthiness Certificate 11    
108 Pt 21 Sub Part I Noise Certificates 8    
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109 Pt 21 Sub Part J DOA 16    
110 Pt 21 Sub Pt K Parts and Appliances 4    
111 Pt 21 Sub Part M Repairs 13    
112 Pt 21 Sub Part O ETSO Authorization 16    
113 Pt 21 Sub Part Q Identification of Products 6    
114 Design and Production 2    
115 Type Certificate 2    
116 Airworthiness Certificate 2    
117 ETSO 2    
118 Pt 21 Regulation 2 754 18 118/33 
      
 Pt 21 Related PDS issues     
119 Ac Design 8    
120 R and M Tests 4    
121 Production 2    
122 Product 4    
123 Maintenance Manuals 8    
124 Product Training 4    
125 OEM Spares 6    
126 Pt 21 Product Support 2    
127 Pt 21 Pt M Interface 2 794 9 127/35 
      
 Pt M AO Performance     
128 Pt M Sub Part B Accountability 3    
129 Pt M Sub Part C CAW 8    
130 Pt M Sub Part D Maintenance Standards 4    
131 Pt M Sub Part E Components 5    
132 Pt M Sub Part G CAMO 14    
133 Pt M Sub Part H CRS 3    
134 Pt M Sub Part I  Airworthiness Review 6    
135 Pt M Pt145 Contract Interface 9 843 8 135/35 
      
 Pt 145 Performance     
136 Pt145 Org Performance 19    
137 Maintenance Data 12    
138 GSE 14    
139 Tools And Test Equipment 14    
140 LRU Spares 10    
141 Facility Environment 17    
142 Logistic Support 2    
143 Task Management Documents 6    
144 Manning 5 942 9 144/36 
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 Individual Performance     
145 Attitude to Task 7    
146 Work-face Stress 7    
147 Task 13    
148 Competence 2    
149 Continuation training 5    
150 Tech Knowledge Skills 8    
151 Certification and Re-certification 5    
152 Physiological limits 6    
153 Physical health 8    
154 Personal Stress 4    
155 Health and Welfare 2    
156 Individual traits 2 1011 12 156/38 
      
 Licensing Authority     
157 Training and Qualification 7    
158 Health Fitness 3    
159 Part 66 Licensing  7 1028 3 159/38 
      
 CAW Consolidation     
160 Pt 145 Performance 2    
161 Part M Org 2    
162 CAW Management 2 1034 3 162/41 
      
 Defences and Consequences     
163 Defences at Pt145 3    
164 Consequences at Pt145 4    
165 Release to Fly 2    
166 Defences at Pt M 3    
167 Consequences at Pt M 4    
168 Handling & Despatch 2    
169 Defences at H & D 3    
170 Consequences at H & D 4    
171 Defences at Pre TO 3    
172 Consequence at Pre TO 5    
173 Take Off 2    
174 Flight and Consequences 7    
175 Combined Cost 11 1087 13 175/44 
      
 Added for validation trial     
176 Pt 21_Pt M Product Support Contract 9    
177 Defence Quality 3    
178 Consequence Quality 5 1104 3 178/44 
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 Air Cargo subset     
179 Cargo 6    
180 Cargo Loading 8    
181 Loading Conditions (Environmental) 11    
182 Cargo and Role Equipment 2    
183 Defence Cargo & Role Equipment 3    
184 Consequence Cargo 4 1138 6 184/45 
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Appendix 11 
MEDA taxonomy versus CAW Risk Model taxonomy  
This appendix provides information on the extent of coverage of MEDA Form 
taxonomy with CAW Risk Model’s taxonomy.   
Serial 
No 
MEDA Parameter CAW Risk Model Equivalent 
1 Section 1. Event Identification 
Operation Vs Capability subsystem, Management 
information nodes 
2 Section 2. Event 
Operational effect of the detected error, accommodated 
under the sub system Consequences 
3 Section 3 – Maintenance Error 
Type of maintenance error or type of damage to equipment 
tools or personal injury error.  These are not CF and so could 
be covered under management information in a future 
development of the risk model but not currently covered.  
 Section 4  
4 A.  Information Work Cards 
Covered under Subsystem Pt 21 Performance/ node 
Maintenance Manuals and Pt 145 Performance Sub System/ 
node Maintenance Data. 
5 B.  Equipment Tools Safety Equipment 
All 3rd tier CFs have been accommodated in Pt 145 
Performance under nodes GSE and node Tools and Test 
Equipment 
 
6 C. Aircraft Design/ Configuration/ Parts 
These have been shared between Pt 21 Performance /under 
node Design and node OEM Spares 
7 D. Job/ Task.   
All five, 3rd tier CF have been accommodated under Pt 145 
Performance/ node Attitude to Task. 
8 E.  Technical Knowledge/ Skills.   
All the 3rd tier CFs have been identified in Pt 145 
Performance/ Personnel Group, Certification and Training, 
nodes for Training and Qualification, and Technical 
Knowledge and Skills 
 
9 F Individual factors.   
F1, 2, 6, 7, 9 (physical health, fatigue, body strength, personal 
event, memory lapse) all these have been taken into account 
under Pt 145 Performance Individual Traits and nodes 
Physiological Limit, Physical health and Personal Stress.  The 
remainder is covered under Pt 145 Work Face Stress and 
Attitude to Task.   
10 G.  Environmental/ Facilities.   
All points covered by Pt 145 Performance Environment/ 
Facilities node. 
 H.  Organizational Factors.   These are covered as follows. 
11 
H1. Quality of support from technical 
organizations, e.g. engineering, 
planning and technical pubs.   
Quality of the organization has been represented in MEDA 
Form as a one line.  Quality is an underpinning issue for the 
technical welfare of the entire organization; it is a complex 
factor and needed a greater resolution as well as a greater 
critical analysis.  Accordingly, quality has been allocated a 
separate QMS subsystem, and the factors have been further 
decomposed into smaller elements.  
 
12 H2.  Company policies.   
MEDA defines this as a one line. It is one of the most 
important factors on which the organization is pivoted on.  In 
CAW risk model a separate subsystem “Corporate Policy” 
and 7 nodes (each decomposed into several 3rd tier causal 
factors) have been provisioned to capture Organization’s 
Corporate Policy related causal factors. 
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13 H3.  Not enough staff.   
This single line item has been covered under Pt 145 
Performance, Manning node. It provides a higher resolution, 
lack of trade cover, supervision etc. 
 
14 H4. Corporate Change/ Restructuring.   
Under the title “Change Management” this single line 3rd tier 
item has been allocated a full stand alone subsystem and 6-
nodes, each with several 3rd tier causal factors.  There is a 
greater resolution enabling more complex situations to be 
recorded. 
 
15 H5. Union Action.   
Trade Union influence as a factor has been accommodated 
as an external input affecting “Corporate policy” and is given 
its own node “Trade Union” with several 3rd tier causal 
factors. 
 
16 H6.  Work process/ Procedure.   
Pt 145 Performance Node Task Management Docs or Pt 21 
Performance Node Maintenance Manuals. CAW risk model 
offers a greater resolution  
 
17 
H7.  Work process/ procedure not 
followed.   
Listed under Task Node, approved data not followed. 
 
18 
H8. Work process/ procedure not 
documented. 
Listed under Task Node, Unrecorded work. 
 
19 
H9.  Work group normal practice 
(norm).   
This item has not been catered in the model.  Perhaps we 
should add that. 
 
20 
H10.  Others 
 
Covered by numerous other nodes and causal factors in CAW 
risk model. 
21 I.  Leadership and Supervision.   
This Human Factors issue is part applicable to Pt M 
responsibility such as planning and organization of tasks, 
prioritization, delegation and unreasonable expectation, all 
of which are applicable to the planning stage of tasks and 
contracting out.  In MEDA it is more relevant to individual 
practical tasks allocated to individuals or groups of people 
(section or team).   
In the case of Pt M Performance, the requirements is 
covered under Pt M Performance, Nodes   Pt M Sub Part D 
Maintenance Standards (MA 402 Maintenance Performance)  
and Part M Sub Part G CAMO (MA 706 (personnel), 707 
(staff) and 708 (CAW management). 
In the case of Pt 145, presently covered under Pt 145 A30- 
Competency of Personnel and Supervisory staff.  Leadership 
and Supervision and the skills of doing management tasks 
should be part of this competency. 
22 J.  Communication.   
This is another Human factors issue that is often breached.  
Communications is one of the very important issues.  There 
should be a separate node for it under Pt 145 performance 
and could be provided in a development model.  
 
23 
Duplication of MEDA 3rd tier causal 
factors.   
Some MEDA 3rd tier causal factors (CF) may have been 
duplicated under different nodes in the CAW Risk Model. 
This is to ensure that multiple errors relating to a single 
incident could be accommodated.   
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Appendix 12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Taxonomy for the CAW Risk Model   
397
This Appendix provides details of the taxonomy used for the 
CAW Risk Model. The names have been coded to match with the 
names used in the model.  They are self-explanatory; names of 
sub divisions (causal factors) indicate the significance of the 
node.  Generic names have been used in some cases, e.g. 
Aircraft Type A1 is generic to be assigned to a Boeing 747 and 
Version, or an Airbus 340 and Version etc, whatever the types 
and versions that an operator may be utilizing.   Individual user 
may select and assign types to names to suit their 
circumstances; unused names should be deleted from the 
model. 
Names are grouped under subsystems or groups of nodes; the 
top row has been colour coded to facilitate tracking. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
398
Operation Vs Capability 
Aircraft_Type_Series_FW Aircraft_Type_Series_RW Registration_No AC_Age Sectors_Flown Maj_Maintenance_Cycles Ac_Generation_Time 
No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error 
Type_A1 Type_H1 Reg_1 Upto_5yr Under_5000 Under_1 Planned_Average 
Type_A2 Type_H2 Reg_2 Over5_to_10yr Over5000_to_10000 Over1_to_2 Shorter_than_Average 
Type_A3 Type_H3 Reg_3 Over10_to_15yr Over10000_to_15000 Over2_to_3 Longer_than_Average 
Type_B1 Type_J1 Reg_4 Over15_to_20yr Over15000_to_20000 Over3_to_4 
 
Type_B2 Type_J2 Reg_5 Over20_to_25yr Over20000_to_25000 Over4_to_5 
 
Type_B3 Type_J3 Reg_6 Over25_to_30yr Over25000_to_30000 Over5_to_6 
 
Type_C1 Type_K1 Reg_7 Over30_to35yr Over30000_to_35000 Over6_to_7 
 
Type_C2 Type_K2 Reg_8 Over35_to_40yr Over35000_to_40000 Over7_to_8 
 
Type_C3 Type_K3 Reg_9 Over40_to_45yr Over40000_to_45000 Over8_to_9 
 
Type_D1 Type_L1 Reg_10 Over45_to_50yr Over45000_to_50000 Over9_to_10 
 
Type_D2 Type_L2 Reg_11 
    
Type_D3 Type_L3 Reg_12 
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Aircraft Operating_Role Route Nature_of_Operation Flight_Origin Destination 
No_Error_Probability No_Error No_Error No_Error_Probability No_Error No_Error 
Error_Probability Pax_legacy Long_haul Error_Probability Western_Europe Western_Europe 
 
Pax_tour_op ETOPS 
 
Eastern_Europe Eastern_Europe 
 
Pax_commuter Medium_range 
 
CIS CIS 
 
Pax_regional_value Short_range 
 
US_Canada US_Canada 
 
Pax_LowCost 
  
Central_South_America Central_South_America 
 
Pax_charter 
  
South_Africa South_Africa 
 
Cargo 
  
North_Africa North_Africa 
 
Combi 
  
Central_Africa Central_Africa 
    
Mid_East Mid_East 
    
South_Asia South_Asia 
    
Asia_Pacific Asia_Pacific 
    
Japan Japan 
    
China_Far_East_Asia China_Far_East_Asia 
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Departure_Time Geo_Location_Time FleetSize_to_TR_Cat_A_Staff FleetSize_to_TR_Cat_B1_Staff FleetSize_to_TR_Cat_B2_Staff 
No_Error No_Error_Probability No_Error No_Error No_Error 
Local_0000_0159H Error_Probability To_Scale To_Scale To_Scale 
Local_0200_0359H 
 
Better_than_Scale Better_than_Scale Better_than_Scale 
Local_0400_0559H 
 
Worse_than_Scale Worse_than_Scale Worse_than_Scale 
Local_0600_0759 
    
Local_0800_0959H 
    
Local_1000_1159H 
    
Local_1200_1359H 
    
Local_1400_1559H 
    
Local_1600_1759H 
    
Local_1800_1959H 
    
Local_2000_2159H 
    
Local_2200_2359H 
    
 
FleetSize_to_TR_Cat_C_Staff FleetSize_to_NonCat_Tech_Staff Tech_Staff FleetSize_to_Logs_Staff FleetSize_to_Tech_Managers 
No_Error No_Error No_Error_Probability No_Error No_Error 
To_Scale To_Scale Error_Probability To_Scale To_Scale 
Better_than_Scale Better_than_Scale 
 
Better_than_Scale Better_than_Scale 
Worse_than_Scale Worse_than_Scale 
 
Worse_than_Scale Worse_than_Scale 
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Other_Support_Staff Staff_Complement Operation_Vs_Capability 
No_Error_Probability No_Error_Probability No_Error_Probability 
Error_Probability Error_Probability Error_Probability 
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Pt 21 Regulation – Regulatory Compliance 
Pt21_SpA_GeneralProvisions Pt21_SpB_TypeCertificates Pt21_SpD_ChangesTo_TC Pt21_SpE_Supplemental_TC Pt21_SpF_ProductionWO_POA 
No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error 
Pt21A2_Undertaking_by_another A13_Eligibility A92_Eligibility A112_Eligibility A122_Eligibility 
Pt21A3_FailureMalfuncDefects A14_Demo_Capability A93_Application A112B_Demo_Capability A124_Application 
Pt21A3B_ADs A15_Application A95_MinorChanges A113_Application_SuppTC A125_LetterOfAgreement 
Pt21A4_Coord_DesgnAndProductn A16A_AW_Codes A97_MajorChanges A114_DemoCompliance A125B_Findings 
  A16B_SpeclConditions A101_DemonstrationCompli A115_Issuing_SuppTC A125C_Duration_ContValidity 
  A17_TC_Basis A103_Approval A116_Transferability A126_ProdInspecSystem 
  A18_EnvProtectionReqmnt A105_RecordKeeping A117_ChangestoProduct_SuppTC A127_TestingAircarft 
  A19_Changes_NewTC A107_CAW_Instructions A118A_Obligations_EPA_Marking A128_TestingEngineAndProp 
  A20_ComplianceWithA17_A18 A109_Obligations_EPA_Marking A118B_Duration_ContValidity A129_ManufacturerObligations 
  A21_Issuing_TC   A119_Manuals A130_ConformityStatement 
  A23_Issue_Restrtd_TC   A120_CAW_Instructions   
  A31_TypeDesign       
  A33_InvestigationAndTests       
  A35_FlightTests       
  A41_TypeCertificate       
  A44_TC_Holder_Obligations       
  A47_Transferability       
  A51_Duration_ContValidity       
  A55_RecordKeeping       
  A57_Manuals       
 
A61_CAW_Instructions 
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Pt21_SpH_AirworthinessCert Pt21_SpI_Noise_Certificates Pt21_SpJ_DOA Pt21_SpK_Parts_and_Appliances Pt21_SpM_Repairs 
No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error No_Error 
A172_Eligibility A203_Eligibility A233_Eligibility A303_Compliance_Requirements A432_Eligibility 
A173_AWC_Classification A204_Application A234_Application A305_ApprvlPartsAppliances A432B_Capability_Demo 
A174_Application A205_Issue_of_Noise Cert A235_IssueDOA A307_ReleasePartsAppl A433_RepairDesign 
A175_Language A207_Amendments_Mods A239_DesignAssuranceSystem   A435_RepairClassification 
A177_Amendments_Mods A209_Transferability_Reissue A243_Exposition_Data   A437_IssueRepairDesignApproval 
A179_Transferability_Reissue A210_InspectionAccess A245_DemoApprovalReqmnt   A439_RepairPartsProduction 
A180_InspectionAccess A211_Duration_ContValidity A247_ChangesToDes_Assu_Sys   A441_RepairEmbodiment 
A181_Duration_ContValidity   A249_Transferability   A443_Limitations 
A182_Ac_Identification   A251_TermsOfApproval   A445_UnrepiredDamage 
A183_Issuing_AW_Cert   A253_ChangesToTOA   A447_RecordKeeping 
A184_Issuing_Restrd_AW_Cert   A257_Investigations   A449_CAW_Instructions 
A185_Issuing_Permit_to_Fly   A258_Findings   A451_Obligations_EPA_Marking 
    A259_Duration_ContValidity     
    A263_Privileges     
    A265_ObligationsOfPOAHolder     
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Pt21_SpO_ETSO_Authoriztn Pt21_SpQ_IdentifictnProducts Design_and_Production Type_Certificate Airworthiness_Certificate 
No_Error No_Error No_Error_Probability No_Error_Probability No_Error_Probability 
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Appendix 13 
 
Analysis of human error incident reports – Operator X 
 
A13.1 Background 
 
This Appendix presents a catalogue of maintenance and CAW-process related human 
error incidents on aircraft operated by Operator X and on visiting aircraft to its main 
base, over a period of 26-months from January 2008 to Feb 2010.  The incidents have 
been reported by either maintenance engineers or flight crews according to the 
circumstances of their discovery, as well as by inspectors who carried out regulatory 
oversight audits and internal quality audits during that period. 
 
Operator X’s aircraft operate in a wide-spread network of routes, where en-route they 
receive outsourced maintenance support from third party maintenance providers. 
Most of the aircraft have had previous owners before they joined Operator X’s fleet.  
The aircraft receive deep maintenance, i.e. C-Checks, at MRO to whom this work has 
been outsourced.   
 
Some of the errors catalogued, though they were human errors, were associated with 
the design or production of the aircraft, or previous owners but now owned by 
Operator X.  Some errors have been either caused or discovered at MROs.  Thus, 
detected errors might have been caused by Operator X’s own staff, or by other 
personnel elsewhere during the life of these aircraft, which had remained dormant, to 
be surfaced during this time-period.   
 
Incident reports have, as far as possible, ascertained where and who caused the error, 
and assigned the cause to the relevant source; but some had remained unanswered.  
Nevertheless, under the Regulation it is the current operator who is responsible for 
the airworthiness of their aircraft and therefore the management of continuing 
airworthiness process is ultimately their responsibility.  All these errors have been 
used to determine the risk contribution to airworthiness from its CAW processes and 
associated organizational factors.  This was the principal, more complex calculation 
demonstrated in the validation trial, as applicable to an AOC Holder operation. 
 
A number of errors that were either detected or caused at the Operator X’s main base 
facility are in this catalogue.  They were maintenance and CAW related error incidents 
encountered at the main base on those aircraft that they had handled, and errors that 
were either detected or reported.  
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Errors discovered during quality or regulatory audits have been added to make up the 
full complement that was used to determine the risk contribution from each group, 
i.e. Operator X’s main base organization or the Operator’s fleet maintenance 
organization, to the airworthiness of aircraft that they had handled.  
 
More about the analysis of error incidents has been explained in Chapter Eight – 
Validation of the Model. 
 
A13.2 Analysis and presentation of data 
 
In this catalogue, errors are presented in a chronological order of detection. They have 
been investigated and their reports closed at different dates, but not necessarily in 
any particular order. Serial numbers used in the catalogue are there for the 
researcher’s reference purposes as they are linked to the original source data.  Report 
numbers, aircraft types, registration numbers and location and individual names have 
been either scrambled or removed from records in order to desensitize the 
information for public domain use. 
 
The catalogue presented here contains only those errors detected by operating staffs.   
Each error investigation report was summarised, and analyzed using a pro-forma 
designed for this study.  In the following pages, detailed analysis of errors has been 
demonstrated for seven errors, Serial No:  41, 28, 18, 19, 23, 27 and 4, in that order, 
by providing a full set of specimen results.  A presentation of all the analyzed errors in 
this form would be highly voluminous (estimated 7720 rows in the Tables to cover all 
error lines).  Therefore details of the analysis of the remaining errors have been 
excluded from the presentation catalogue, but they can be seen in the spreadsheet in 
digital form, See CD/DVD – Ops X Validation Excel files.  
 
Summaries of narrative investigation reports are included in the catalogue.  Narratives 
of the Quality Management System Audit Findings and the Regulator Oversight 
Inspection Findings have been excluded from the catalogue as part of desensitizing 
and part to reduce the volume of this catalogue.  However Findings are listed in 
Chapter Eight and relevant details in an analysed-form are in the database/ 
spreadsheet.  A specimen Finding Report form (less the narrative) is included in the 
catalogue.
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 EASA Part 145 Approval Surveillance Record (Page 1 of 8) 
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EASA Part 145 Approval Surveillance Record (Page 2 of 8) 
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Serial No Report No Aircraft Date 
41 X224/**/**/*** Type_A2 G-**** 1 Feb 08 
Refuel valve failed to open due to a faulty relay fitted during an earlier maintenance operation. 
 
During a refuelling operation, a fuel valve failed to open automatically; a manual reset button on the fuel panel 
had to be operated instead. Investigation revealed that during an earlier maintenance operation, a wrong type 
relay (K181 – rated for 1-sec) had been installed instead of the correct relay (rated for 5-sec). Once the correct 
type of relay was installed and fuel level sensor card replaced, the system tested satisfactorily. 
 
The engineer who performed the initial relay replacement had been traced and interviewed after some 
considerable lapse of time.  Unfortunately he was unable to elaborate on the circumstances of the previous 
installation except a statement to the effect that he would not have installed the old relay back, and that he 
would always check the received spares against the requirement/ demand to ensure that what was ordered had 
in fact arrived.  In the absence of any further information from the engineer the report was closed. 
 
 
Comments: This safety report had been raised in February 2008 but not closed until July 2009. For reasons 
unrecorded, there has been a long time lapse before the engineer was interviewed, but he yielded no useful 
information on causation. Regardless of the engineer’s comments, which appear to be a statement of expected 
standards, the circumstances and conditions that lead to the error had been left either concealed or forgotten.  
 
Nevertheless, the fact remains that a relay had been changed; the relevant system had malfunctioned due to the 
presence of a wrong type of relay in the circuit. For the purpose of modelling, the TRAX system that identified 
and supplied the component, as well as the engineer who placed the demand, received, checked and fitted the 
component remains as suspect potential source of error. 
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41 X224/**/**/*** Type_A2 G-**** 1 Feb 08 
Index Node Name _ Secondary Level Tertiary Level CF Remarks 
1 Operation and Capability   
1.1 Aircraft Type and Series Fixed Wing Type A2  
1.3 Registration Number Reg 6  
1.4 Aircraft Age Over 20 to 25yr  
1.5 Number of Sectors Flown X  
1.6 Number of Major Maintenance Cycles X  
1.7 Aircraft Error Probability 
Combines error probability from nodes  
1.1-1.6 
1.9  Operating Role Cargo  
1.11 Nature of Operation Error Probability 
Combining error probability from nodes  
1.8-1.10 
1.12 Flight Origin ****  
1.15 Geographical Location & Time Error Probability 
Combining error probability from nodes  
1.12-1.14 
1.26 Operation V Capability Error Probability 
Combining error probability from nodes  
1.7, 1.11, 1.15, 1.21, 1.24, 1.25 
6 
Pt 145 AO Error Performance (Active 
or Dormant) 
  
6.5 Line Replacement Units and Spares Other  
6.7 Logistic Support Error Probability 
Combining error probability from nodes  
6.2 – 6.6 
6.12 Task Installation error 
Combining error probability from nodes  
6.7, 6.8, 6.11 
6.13 Pt 145 Performance Error Probability 
Combining error probability from nodes  
5.9, 6.12 
11 
Error Probability  Defences and 
Consequences 
  
11.1 CAW Management Error Probability 
Combining error probability from nodes 
4.4, 5.8, 6.13, 11.2 
11.2 Defence Pt 145 Error Detected  
11.3 Consequences Pt 145 
No Effect  Error 
Investigated and 
Rectified 
 
11.14 Combined Cost Cost group 3 
Combining error probability from nodes 
11.3, 11.6, 11.9, 11.13, 11.14 
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Serial No Report No Aircraft Date 
28 X91/**/**/*** Type_B1 OO-*** 30 Sep 08 
LRU incorrect part number on operator’s tag (i.e. on the serviceable label attached to the component) 
 
An LRU that had been sent away to the depot for repair had been upgraded during repair.  A new part number 
had been stamped and reissued with a label stating the new part number.  However on the return of LRU back to 
sender, it had been booked into the store quite unknowingly under the old part number, and then reissued 
against the aircraft OO-*** as an old part number item.   
 
The engineer who was to fit the LRU had mindfully checked the part number against the voucher when he had 
discovered the error which the stores personnel who handled the component up to that pint had failed to detect.  
 
If the LRU got installed without checking, configuration of the aircraft would have been compromised. 
 
MEDA investigation had revealed that the depot had correctly identified the product with the new part number 
stamped on the component and on the documentation.   
 
The error was committed when the LRU was booked into the store on its return from the repair depot. 
 
 
Comments:  This pro-active case demonstrates how one person’s error could be negated by another person’s 
vigilance and defence at the workface, thereby eliminating a potential flight safety risk. 
 
As part of preventive measure for future, Supply Manager had sent out a reminder and verbally briefed all stores 
personnel.  Individual stores personnel who handled the receipt and dispatch of this LRU had been interviewed. 
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28 X91/**/**/*** Type_B1 OO-*** 30 Sep 08 
Index Node Name _ Secondary Level Tertiary Level CF  Remarks 
1 Operation and Capability   
    
1.1 Aircraft Type and Series Fixed Wing Type_B1  
1.2 Aircraft Type and Series Rotary Wing   
1.3 Registration Number Reg_25  
1.7 Aircraft Error Probability 
Combines error probability from 
nodes  1.1-1.6 
1.9  Operating Role Cargo  
1.11 Nature of Operation Error Probability 
Combining error probability from 
nodes  1.8-1.10 
1.12 Flight Origin *****  
1.15 Geographical Location & Time Error Probability 
Combining error probability from 
nodes  1.12-1.14 
1.26 Operation V Capability Error Probability 
Combining error probability from 
nodes  1.7, 1.11, 1.15, 1.21, 1.24, 
1.25 
6 
Pt 145 AO Error Performance (Active or 
Dormant) 
  
6.5 Line Replacement Units and Spares Parts incorrect label  
6.7 Logistic Support Error Probability 
Combining error probability from 
nodes  6.2 – 6.6 
11 
Error Probability  Defences and 
Consequences 
  
11.2 Defence Pt 145 Error Detected  
11.3 Consequences Pt 145 
No Effect  Error 
Investigated and Rectified 
 
11.14 Combined Cost Cost group 3 
Combining probability of 
consequences  from nodes 11.3, 
11.6, 11.9, 11.13, 11.14 
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Serial No Report No Aircraft Date 
18 X410/**/**/*** Type_B1.  Reg No: NA 28 Nov 08 
Unauthorized speed tape had been used to secure a blow out panel due to lack of a replacement spare. 
 
Speed tape had been used to secure a blow out panel due to lack of spare panel to replace the worn out panel. 
The method of securing was inappropriate as the panel was left standing proud the surrounding surface and 
insecure.  
 
On this converted Type_B1 aircraft the blow out panel was redundant because of a change of the system.  Armed 
with some prior knowledge that there was a planned modification to permanently secure blow out panels by 
riveting, an experienced, senior engineer had taken a unilateral personal decision to undertake a speed tape 
repair without prior authorization. The repair undertaken was a diversion from the authorized maintenance 
procedure. 
 
At the time the error was detected, the aircraft had already flown 2 sectors carrying this unauthorized repair. An 
authorized repair was carried out before the aircraft flew the next sector. 
 
 
Comments:  In this case no damage had been caused although the panel, facing high speed airflow, could have 
got detached in flight and caused co-lateral damage. The engineer had failed to exercise lateral thinking expected 
from a person of his seniority and deviated from best practice. The quality and standard of maintenance 
practised by the third party contractor, as well as the standards adopted by the senior engineer, is questionable. 
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 For Error 18 and 18a – Two different sectors flown with error present 
Index Node Name _ Secondary Level Tertiary Level CF Remarks 
1 Operation and Capability   
1.1 Aircraft Type and Series Fixed Wing Type B1  
1.3 Registration Number ****  
1.4 Aircraft Age **  
1.5 Number of Sectors Flown ****  
1.6 
Number of Major Maintenance 
Cycles 
*  
1.7 Aircraft Error probability 
Combines error probability from 
nodes  1.1-1.6 
1.9  Operating Role Cargo  
1.11 Nature of Operation Error probability 
Combining error probability from 
nodes  1.8-1.10 
1.12 Flight Origin ******  
1.13 Destination ******  
1.15 Geographical Location & Time Error Probability 
Combining error probability from 
nodes  1.12-1.14 
1.26 Operation V Capability Error Probability 
Combining error probability from 
nodes  1.7, 1.11, 1.15, 1.21, 1.24, 
1.25 
5 
Pt M AO Error Performance (Active 
or Dormant) 
  
5.3 
Pt M Sub Pt D Maintenance 
Standards 
MA402 Maintenance Performance  
5.9 Pt M and Pt 145 Contract Interface Quality control  
5.10 Pt M and Pt 145 Interface Error Probability 
Combining error probability from 
nodes  5.8 – 5.9 
6 
Pt 145 AO Error Performance 
(Active or Dormant) 
  
6.1 Pt 145 Organizational Performance A65 Safety and Quality 
Combining error probability from 
nodes  5.10, 9.12 
6.5 Line Replacement Units and Spares Parts unavailable  
6.7 Logistic Support Error Probability 
Combining error probability from 
nodes  6.2 – 6.6 
6.12 Task Poor maintenance practice 
Combining error probability from 
nodes  6.7, 6.8, 6.11 
6.13 Pt 145 Performance Error Probability 
Combining error probability from 
nodes  5.9, 6.12 
9 
Corporate Policy and Global 
Factors 
  
9.6 CEO AM Decisions Funding  
9.9 Engineering Operations Policies Logistic support  
440
9.10 Logistic Support Policies Spares provisioning  
9.12 Corporate and Policy Issues Error probability 
Combining error probability from 
nodes  9.7 – 9.11, 10.6 
11 
Error Probability  Defences and 
Consequences 
  
11.1 CAW Management Error Probability 
Combining error probability from 
nodes 4.4, 5.8, 6.13, 11.2 
11.2 Defence Pt 145 Error Missed  
11.3 Consequences Pt 145 No  Effect Error  CF  
11.4 Release to Fly Error probability 
Combining error probability from 
nodes 11.1, 11.5 
11.5 Defence Pt M Error Missed  
11.6 Consequences Pt M No Effect Error CF  
11.7 Handling and Despatch Error probability 
Combining error probability from 
nodes 3.26, 8.30, 9.12, 11.4, 11.8, 
11.8 Defence H and D Error Missed  
11.9 Consequence  H and D No Effect Error CF  
11.10 Defence Pre Take Off Error Missed  
11.11 Take Off Error probability 
Combining error probability from 
nodes 11.7, 11.10 
11.12 Consequence Pre Take Off Error CF  
11.13 Flight and Consequences Flt Completed Error CF No Cost  
11.14 Combined Cost No cost 
Combining error probability from 
nodes 11.3, 11.6, 11.9, 11.13, 
11.14 
For Error 18b – Error detected and repaired before this sector was flown 
Index Node Name _ Secondary Level State Tertiary Level CF 
1 Operation and Capability   
1.1 Aircraft Type and Series Fixed Wing Type B1  
1.3 Registration Number *****  
1.4 Aircraft Age **  
1.5 Number of Sectors Flown ****  
1.6 
Number of Major Maintenance 
Cycles 
*  
1.7 Aircraft Error probability 
Combines error probability from 
nodes  1.1-1.6 
1.9  Operating Role Cargo  
1.11 Nature of Operation Error probability 
Combining error probability from 
nodes  1.8-1.10 
1.12 Flight Origin *****  
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1.15 Geographical Location & Time Error Probability 
Combining error probability from 
nodes  1.12-1.14 
1.26 Operation V Capability Error Probability 
Combining error probability from 
nodes  1.7, 1.11, 1.15, 1.21, 1.24, 
1.25 
5 
Pt M AO Error Performance (Active 
or Dormant) 
  
5.3 
Pt M Sub Pt D Maintenance 
Standards 
MA402 Maintenance Performance  
5.9 Pt M and Pt 145 Contract Interface Quality control  
5.10 Pt M and Pt 145 Interface Error Probability 
Combining error probability from 
nodes  5.8 – 5.9 
6 
Pt 145 AO Error Performance 
(Active or Dormant) 
  
6.1 Pt 145 Organizational Performance A65 Safety and Quality 
Combining error probability from 
nodes  5.10, 9.12 
6.5 Line Replacement Units and Spares Parts unavailable  
6.7 Logistic Support Error Probability 
Combining error probability from 
nodes  6.2 – 6.6 
6.12 Task Poor maintenance practice 
Combining error probability from 
nodes  6.7, 6.8, 6.11 
6.13 Pt 145 Performance Error Probability 
Combining error probability from 
nodes  5.9, 6.12 
9 
Corporate Policy and Global 
Factors 
  
9.6 CEO AM Decisions Funding  
9.9 Engineering Operations Policies Logistic support  
9.10 Logistic Support Policies Spares provisioning  
9.12 Corporate and Policy Issues Error probability 
Combining error probability from 
nodes  9.7 – 9.11, 10.6 
11 
Error Probability  Defences and 
Consequences 
  
11.1 CAW Management Error Probability 
Combining error probability from 
nodes 4.4, 5.8, 6.13, 11.2 
11.2 Defence Pt 145 Error Detected  
11.3 Consequences Pt 145 
No Effect Error Investigated and 
Rectified 
 
11.14 Combined Cost Cost_group_3 
Combining error probability from 
nodes 11.3, 11.6, 11.9, 11.13, 
11.14 
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Serial No Report No Aircraft Date 
19 X423/**/**/**** Type_A2 G-**** 13 Dec 08 
Loose article in pneumatic couplings.  
 
25 Hi-Lock fasteners were found resting in 2 pneumatic connectors on the aircraft used for ground services 
pneumatic supply. They were found by an engineer who opened up the connectors to carry out a maintenance 
task. 
 
 Investigations revealed that the fasteners used by another engineer on a task in the nearby freight bay structure 
had migrated to the pneumatic pipes because he had omitted to blank off the connectors and pipes before 
starting work. This is a poor husbandry issue as well as poor quality control of the maintenance task as he has not 
paid sufficient attention.  He had no situational awareness and not mindful of the consequences of his lack of 
attention. Publicity has been given to the case to raise awareness amongst fellow workers.  
 
 
Comments:  This case primarily revolves around individual standards on husbandry and quality control of 
maintenance tasks.  Because of the timely discovery of loose articles, there had been no flight safety 
consequences. Nevertheless, it brings to question the quality and safety standards practised and maintained by 
the third party contractor. 
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19 X423/**/**/**** Type_A2 G-**** 13 Dec 08 
Index Node Name _ Secondary Level Tertiary Level CF Remarks 
1 Operation and Capability   
1.1 Aircraft Type and Series Fixed Wing Type A2  
1.3 Registration Number Reg 7  
1.4 Aircraft Age Over25_to_30yr  
1.5 Number of Sectors Flown ****  
1.6 Number of Major Maintenance Cycles *  
1.7 Aircraft Error probability 
Combines error probability 
from nodes  1.1-1.6 
1.9 Operating Role Cargo  
1.11 Nature of Operation Error probability 
Combining error probability 
from nodes  1.8-1.10 
1.12 Flight Origin ******  
1.15 Geographical Location & Time Error probability 
Combining error probability 
from nodes  1.12-1.14 
1.26 Operation V Capability Error probability 
Combining error probability 
from nodes  1.7, 1.11, 1.15, 
1.21, 1.24, 1.25 
6 
Pt 145 AO Error Performance (Active or 
Dormant) 
  
6.1 Pt 145 Organizational Performance A65 Safety and Quality 
Combining error probability 
from nodes  5.10, 9.12 
6.6 Facility and Environment Husbandry  
6.7 Logistic Support Error Probability 
Combining error probability 
from nodes  6.2 – 6.6 
6.12 Task Poor maintenance practice 
Combining error probability 
from nodes  6.7, 6.8, 6.11 
6.13 Pt 145 Performance Error probability 
Combining error probability 
from nodes  5.9, 6.12 
11 
Error Probability  Defences and 
Consequences 
  
11.2 Defence Pt 145 Error Detected  
11.3 Consequences Pt 145 
No Effect  Error Investigated and 
Rectified 
 
11.14 Combined Cost Cost group 2 
Combining error probability 
from nodes 11.3, 11.6, 11.9, 
11.13, 11.14 
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Serial No Report No Aircraft Date 
23 X28/**/**/**** Type_A2 G-**** 4 Feb 09 
Loose article left in the engine nacelle.  
 
During C4 Check at the authorized MRO, when panel 611 KT, on RH (No: 2) engine pylon leading edge was 
opened, an aerosol lubricant can was found lodged between engine control pulley and slat drive torque tube.  
Markings on the can indicated that the item might have come from the stores of a satellite station (****).  They 
were instructed to conduct a MEDA investigation. 
 
Quality audits at the station identified the work done in the area by a mechanic of 3rd party contractor (*** 
Engineering) during the previous Christmas holiday period. Having completed his work in the area, the mechanic 
had closed the panels but failed to observe the aerosol can and to remove it during tools clearance stage.  He had 
signed up for work as area cleared and the countersigning engineer in turn had not bothered to look over the 
area, on the basis of trust and confidence that he had on the mechanic. 
 
Abnormal and adverse working conditions during Christmas holiday season had been cited as causal factors. 
These were: high workload and insufficient workers, poor planning of holiday work, inadequate supervision, 
engineer placing trust on mechanic and not taking on own responsibility to inspect the area for loose articles.   
 
Warning letters had been issued to the mechanic and supervisor involved. 
 
 
Comments:  The aircraft had flown nearly 30 sectors during the period that the aerosol can remained lodged in 
the engine nacelle, until it was found.  By chance, the can did not get dislodged by engine vibration where it 
could have migrated to a point where it could have fouled the adjacent cables and torque tube.  There was a 
potential flight safety risk which, in this case, failed to materialize.   
 
For the purpose of modelling, all sectors flown carrying the loose article hazard were input. However Flight 
Consequences were input as “Flight Completed_Error CF”. This was a lower end rating, whereas ICAO Definition 
of Risk required situations to be assessed with worst foreseeable situation.  Less severe categorization was used 
because an assumption in categorization for this CAW Risk Model was that actual experience would be used 
rather than the speculation. 
 
445
 Error 23 
23 X28/**/**/**** Type_A2 G-**** 4 Feb 09 
Index Node Name _ Secondary Level Tertiary Level CF Remarks 
1 Operation and Capability   
1.1 Aircraft Type and Series Fixed Wing Type A2  
1.3 Registration Number Reg 9  
1.4 Aircraft Age Over25 to 30yr  
1.5 Number of Sectors Flown ****  
1.6 Number of Major Maintenance Cycles *  
1.7 Aircraft Error_Probability 
Combines error probability from 
nodes  1.1-1.6 
1.9  Operating Role Cargo  
1.11 Nature of Operation Error_Probability 
Combining error probability from 
nodes  1.8-1.10 
1.12 Flight Origin ***** L 
1.15 Geographical Location & Time Error_Probability 
Combining error probability from 
nodes  1.12-1.14 
1.16 Fleet Size to Num Cat A Staff Worse than Scale  
1.17 Fleet Size to Num Cat B1 Staff Worse than Scale  
1.21 Technical Staff Error probability 
Combining error probability from 
nodes  1.16-1.20 
1.25 Staff Complement Error probability 
Combining error probability from 
nodes  1.121-1.24 
1.26 Operation V Capability Error_Probability 
Combining error probability from 
nodes  1.7, 1.11, 1.15, 1.21, 1.24, 
1.25 
6 
Pt 145 AO Error Performance (Active 
or Dormant) 
  
6.1 Pt 145 Organizational Performance A65 Safety and Quality 
Combining error probability from 
nodes  5.10, 9.12 
6.9 Manning Supervision  
6.11 Workface Stress Time constraint  
Combining error probability from 
nodes  6.9, 7.12 
6.12 Task Poor maintenance practice 
Combining error probability from 
nodes  6.7, 6.8, 6.11 
6.13 Pt 145 Performance Error Probability 
Combining error probability from 
nodes  5.9, 6.12 
8 QMS Organization and Performance   
8.17 Pt 145 Activity Area Line Stations  
8.20 Pt 145 Quality Audit Performance Error probability 
Combining error probability from 
nodes  8.17 – 8.19 
446
11 
Error Probability  Defences and 
Consequences 
  
11.1 CAW Management Error probability 
Combining error probability from 
nodes 4.4, 5.8, 6.13, 11.2 
11.2 Defence Pt 145 Error Missed  
11.3 Consequences Pt 145 No Effect Error CF   
11.4 Release to Fly Error Probability 
Combining error probability from 
nodes 11.1, 11.5 
11.7 Handling and Despatch Error Probability 
Combining error probability from 
nodes 3.26, 8.30, 9.12, 11.4, 11.8, 
11.11 Take Off Error Probability 
Combining error probability from 
nodes 11.7, 11.10 
11.14 Combined Cost No cost 
Combining error probability from 
nodes 11.3, 11.6, 11.9, 11.13, 
11.14 
Error 23a 
Index Node Name _ Secondary Level Tertiary Level CF Remarks 
1 Operation and Capability   
    
1.1 Aircraft Type and Series Fixed Wing Type A2  
1.3 Registration Number Reg 9  
1.4 Aircraft Age Over 25 to 30yr  
1.5 Number of Sectors Flown ****  
1.6 Number of Major Maintenance Cycles *  
1.7 Aircraft Error probability 
Combines error probability from 
nodes  1.1-1.6 
1.9  Operating Role Cargo  
1.11 Nature of Operation Error probability 
Combining error probability from 
nodes  1.8-1.10 
1.12 Flight Origin ****** L 
1.15 Geographical Location & Time Error probability 
Combining error probability from 
nodes  1.12-1.14 
1.16 Fleet Size to Num Cat A Staff Worse than Scale  
1.17 Fleet Size to Num Cat B1 Staff Worse than Scale  
1.21 Technical Staff Error probability 
Combining error probability from 
nodes  1.16-1.20 
1.25 Staff Complement Error probability 
Combining error probability from 
nodes  1.121-1.24 
1.26 Operation V Capability Error probability 
Combining error probability from 
nodes  1.7, 1.11, 1.15, 1.21, 1.24, 
1.25 
6 
Pt 145 AO Error Performance (Active 
or Dormant) 
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6.1 Pt 145 Organizational Performance A65 Safety and Quality 
Combining error probability from 
nodes  5.10, 9.12 
6.9 Manning Supervision  
6.11 Workface Stress Time constraint  
Combining error probability from 
nodes  6.9, 7.12 
6.12 Task Poor maintenance practice 
Combining error probability from 
nodes  6.7, 6.8, 6.11 
6.13 Pt 145 Performance Error Probability 
Combining error probability from 
nodes  5.9, 6.12 
8 QMS Organization and Performance   
8.17 Pt 145 Activity Area Line Stations  
8.20 Pt 145 Quality Audit Performance Error probability 
Combining error probability from 
nodes  8.17 – 8.19 
11 
Error Probability  Defences and 
Consequences 
  
11.1 CAW Management Error probability 
Combining error probability from 
nodes 4.4, 5.8, 6.13, 11.2 
11.2 Defence Pt 145 Error Detected  
11.3 Consequences Pt 145 No Effect Error CF   
11.4 Release to Fly Error Probability 
Combining error probability from 
nodes 11.1, 11.5 
11.14 Combined Cost Cost group 3 
Combining error probability from 
nodes 11.3, 11.6, 11.9, 11.13, 
11.14 
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 Serial No Report No Aircraft Date 
27 X80/**/**/**** Type_A2 G-**** 15 Mar 09 
Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System (EGPWS) spurious warnings. 
 
Spurious warnings from the Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System had been reported by flight crew, 
which had been the subject of 9-separate flight operations safety reports. This maintenance safety report has 
been raised to cover the maintenance and airworthiness aspects of the same incidences. 
 
Investigations have traced the source of spurious warnings to 6-loose connectors on the Radio Altimeter 
Trans/Receiver attributed to faulty workmanship by third party contractors’ maintenance work undertaken 
during a period immediately before the incidence of spurious warnings. It had been revealed that the contractor 
had been tasked with the replacement of insulation blankets, for which the schedule of work called for the 
removal and reinstallation of equipment racks. The Rad Alt TR/RX is installed in one these racks and it would 
appear that during the reinstallation phase, the engineer responsible for that work had failed to properly connect 
up the 6-cables to the component, thereby giving rise to faulty warning indications. 
 
MEDA investigation conducted by the Quality Audit Department of the contractor had attributed this human 
error in maintenance to a number of causal factors. Lack of awareness, and poor communications were the 
primary causes.  Distractions and interruptions, lack of clarity thorough the absence of stage checks, inadequate 
job card layout, and certification issues have been quoted as secondary causes. 
 
As a result, the third party contractors have put in place preventative measures to ensure that further incidents 
of this kind would not recur. 
 
The operator too has made a change to the job card procedure. Removal and installation tasks for each of the 5 
equipment racks have now been divided into separate stages. This provided a clearer step-by-step process, which 
would simplify the certification of each task and allow the work to be completed in stages if required 
 
 
Comments:   
1. This investigation and its outcome demonstrate the way the weaknesses of an interfacing contract 
could be exploited by a third party contractor, when its own maintenance standards fail.  In this 
particular case the third part contractor had claimed that the job card layout was inadequate to micro 
manage a complex task, whereas the client operator assumed and expected the contractor to be 
knowledgeable enough of the task and competent to perform the task properly without having a 
detailed checklist.  
 
2. All 9-sectors were recorded as carrying an error that missed detection, due to misdiagnosis. The risk 
was not realised by sheer chance, and the presence of alternative equipment to provide altitude 
information. This is of course a feature of a defended system. 
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 27 X80/**/**/**** Type_A2 G-**** 15 Mar 09 
Index Node Name   Secondary Level Tertiary Level CF Remarks 
1 Operation and Capability   
1.1 Aircraft Type and Series Fixed Wing Type A2  
1.3 Registration Number Reg 9  
1.4 Aircraft Age Over 25 to 30yr  
1.5 Number of Sectors Flown ****  
1.6 Number of Major Maintenance Cycles *  
1.7 Aircraft Error Probability 
Combines error probability from 
nodes  1.1-1.6 
1.9  Operating Role Cargo  
1.11 Nature of Operation Error Probability 
Combining error probability from 
nodes  1.8-1.10 
1.12 Flight Origin *****  
1.15 Geographical Location & Time Error Probability 
Combining error probability from 
nodes  1.12-1.14 
1.26 Operation V Capability Error Probability 
Combining error probability from 
nodes  1.7, 1.11, 1.15, 1.21, 1.24, 
1.25 
5 
Pt M AO Error Performance (Active 
or Dormant) 
  
5.9 Pt M and Pt 145 Contract Interface Quality control  
5.10 Pt M and Pt 145 Interface Error Probability 
Combining error probability from 
nodes  5.8 – 5.9 
6 
Pt 145 AO Error Performance (Active 
or Dormant) 
  
6.1 Pt 145 Organizational Performance 
A50 Certification of 
maintenance   
Combining error probability from 
nodes  5.10, 9.12 
6.8 Task Management Documents Definition  
6.9 Manning Coordination  
6.10 Attitude to Task  
Combining error probability from 
nodes  6.8 and 6.11 
6.11 Workface Stress Distraction 
Combining error probability from 
nodes  6.9, 7.12 
6.12 Task Installation error 
Combining error probability from 
nodes  6.7, 6.8, 6.11 
6.13 Pt 145 Performance Error Probability 
Combining error probability from 
nodes  5.9, 6.12 
7 
Individual Factors (Active or 
Dormant) 
  
7.6 Technical Knowledge and Skills Task planning 
Combining error probability from 
nodes  7.4, 7.5 
7.12 Individual Traits Error Probability 
Combining error probability from 
nodes  7.7, 7.8, 7.11 
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11 
Error Probability  Defences and 
Consequences 
  
11.1 CAW Management Error probability 
Combining error probability from 
nodes 4.4, 5.8, 6.13, 11.2 
11.2 Defence Pt 145 Error Missed  
11.3 Consequences Pt 145 No Effect Error CF   
11.4 Release to Fly Error Probability 
Combining error probability from 
nodes 11.1, 11.5 
11.5 Defence Pt M Error Missed  
11.6 Consequences Pt M No Effect Error CF  
11.7 Handling and Despatch Error Probability 
Combining error probability from 
nodes 3.26, 8.30, 9.12, 11.4, 11.8, 
11.8 Defence H and D Error Missed  
11.9 Consequence  H and D No Effect Error CF  
11.10 Defence Pre Take Off Error Missed  
11.11 Take Off Error Probability 
Combining error probability from 
nodes 11.7, 11.10 
11.12 Consequence Pre Take Off No Effect Error CF  
11.13 Flight and Consequences Flt Completed Error CF No Cost  
11.14 Combined Cost Cost group 5 
Combining error probability from 
nodes 11.3, 11.6, 11.9, 11.13, 
11.14 
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Serial No 
 
Report No 
 
Aircraft 
 
Date 
4 X101/**/**/**** Type_A2 G-**** 30 Mar 09 
Inoperative cargo deck rollers. 
 
On 29 Mar 08 a satellite station (*******) had reported problems encountered with inoperative rollers in the 
cargo deck of an aircraft. On 2 Apr 08 inspection and repair of the cargo deck rollers had been undertaken at the 
main base (*****) during which it was expected that the defectives rollers would have been replaced. On 3 Apr 
08, Senior Line Maintenance Manger was following up the progress of the previously reported defect, when he 
had the opportunity of inspecting the state of rollers and reviewing the work done on the aircraft on 2 Apr 08, i.e. 
2-sectors ago.  
 
The job card reported that the rollers inspected and greased and several roller bearings were replaced where 
required. 
 
However physical evidence offered quite a different story suggesting that the work had not been properly carried 
out.  The task involved 210 bearings but only one engineer had placed his stamp for the work done even though 
3-engineers were on duty during the shift. Part numbers of the bearings and components, claimed to have been 
replaced, had not been recorded on the job card, even though the local store records confirmed some items had 
been issued against this aircraft at the time. The task had logged 10.5 man-hours. 
 
In view of the poor workmanship, the job card was reworked on 3 Apr 08 to a higher standard that needed the 
removal of bearing trays, disassembly, cleaning, inspection, greasing and reassembly of the bearings and trays. In 
the process the engineers found that grease injected during the previous maintenance operation on 2nd Apr 08 
had not penetrated the bearing properly. 28 bearing assemblies at the entrance area of the cargo bay was not 
repairable; these were replaced. Six engineers were employed on rework that took 18-mon hours. 
 
Quality audit who carried out the investigation had concluded that even though the first maintenance activity 
just met the task specification, it had not been effective in meeting the purpose. The second was a more 
thorough process that went beyond the task specification but met the intended purpose. The report 
recommended that the task requirement and relevant job card be reviewed and revised by Technical Services 
with the objective of the task achieving its intended purpose. 
 
 
Comments:  Subject bearings, being part of aircraft role equipment, offered no direct airworthiness implications, 
although one could surmise that if a heavy container went out of control due to failed bearings could cause 
structural damage to the cargo bay or injury to personnel in the vicinity. The direct effect of poor maintenance 
standard was inoperative rollers that could affect loading and unloading, and hence turn round times.  Certainly 
it could affect the main operational role of this aircraft and of course, and if the problem is widespread, then it 
would affect company’s line of revenue. 
 
Although the SR did not dwell on it, evidence suggests that there is a need to review the documentation 
standards as well as workplace practices. 
 
It was stated that the aircraft had flown 2-sectors following the first maintenance operation.  In retrospect, it can 
be assumed that errors were present and therefore they were taken into account in the risk model as sectors 
flown with an error present but undetected. 
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 4 X101/**/**/**** Type_A2 G-**** 30 Mar 09 
Error 4a – Four sectors flown 4a – 4d 
Index Node Name   Secondary Level Tertiary Level CF Remarks 
1 Operation and Capability   
1.1 Aircraft Type and Series Fixed Wing Type A2  
1.3 Registration Number Reg 6  
1.4 Aircraft Age Over 25 to 30yr  
1.5 Number of Sectors Flown ****  
1.6 Number of Major Maintenance Cycles *  
1.7 Aircraft Error Probability 
Combines error probability 
from nodes  1.1-1.6 
1.9  Operating Role Cargo  
1.11 Nature of Operation Error Probability 
Combining error probability 
from nodes  1.8-1.10 
1.12 Flight Origin ****  
1.15 Geographical Location & Time Error Probability 
Combining error probability 
from nodes  1.12-1.14 
1.26 Operation V Capability Error Probability 
Combining error probability 
from nodes  1.7, 1.11, 1.15, 
1.21, 1.24, 1.25 
5 
Pt M AO Error Performance (Active or 
Dormant) 
  
5.3 Pt M Sub Pt D Maintenance Standards 
MA402 Maintenance 
Performance 
 
5.9 Pt M and Pt 145 Contract Interface Quality control  
5.10 Pt M and Pt 145 Interface Error Probability 
Combining error probability 
from nodes  5.8 – 5.9 
6 
Pt 145 AO Error Performance (Active or 
Dormant) 
  
6.1 Pt 145 Organizational Performance 
A50 Certification of 
maintenance   
Combining error probability 
from nodes  5.10, 9.12 
6.10 Attitude to Task Others 
Combining error probability 
from nodes  6.8 and 6.11 
6.11 Workface Stress Time constraint 
Combining error probability 
from nodes  6.9, 7.12 
6.12 Task Poor maintenance practice 
Combining error probability 
from nodes  6.7, 6.8, 6.11 
6.13 Pt 145 Performance Error Probability 
Combining error probability 
from nodes  5.9, 6.12 
8 QMS Organization and Performance   
8.17 Pt 145 Activity Area Line Stations  
8.20 Pt 145 Quality Audit Performance Error Probability 
Combining error probability 
from nodes  8.17 – 8.19 
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11 
Error Probability  Defences and 
Consequences 
  
11.1 CAW Management Error probability 
Combining error probability 
from nodes 4.4, 5.8, 6.13, 11.2 
11.2 Defence Pt 145 Error Detected  
11.3 Consequences Pt 145 No Effect Error CF   
11.4 Release to Fly Error Probability 
Combining error probability 
from nodes 11.1, 11.5 
11.5 Defence Pt M Error Detected  
11.6 Consequences Pt M No Effect Error CF  
11.7 Handling and Despatch Error Probability 
Combining error probability 
from nodes 3.26, 8.30, 9.12, 
11.4, 11.8, 
11.8 Defence H and D Error Detected  
11.9 Consequence  H and D No Effect Error CF  
11.10 Defence Pre Take Off Error Detected  
11.11 Take Off Error Probability 
Combining error probability 
from nodes 11.7, 11.10 
11.12 Consequence Pre Take Off No Effect Error CF  
11.13 Flight and Consequences 
Flt Completed Error CF No 
Cost 
 
11.14 Combined Cost No Cost 
Combining error probability 
from nodes 11.3, 11.6, 11.9, 
11.13, 11.14 
Error 4b-4c 
Index Node Name   Secondary Level Tertiary Level CF Remarks 
1 Operation and Capability   
1.1 Aircraft Type and Series Fixed Wing Type A2  
1.3 Registration Number Reg 6  
1.4 Aircraft Age Over 25 to 30yr  
1.5 Number of Sectors Flown ****  
1.6 Number of Major Maintenance Cycles *  
1.7 Aircraft Error Probability 
Combines error probability 
from nodes  1.1-1.6 
1.9  Operating Role Cargo  
1.11 Nature of Operation Error Probability 
Combining error probability 
from nodes  1.8-1.10 
1.12 Flight Origin *****  
1.15 Geographical Location & Time Error Probability 
Combining error probability 
from nodes  1.12-1.14 
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1.26 Operation V Capability Error Probability 
Combining error probability 
from nodes  1.7, 1.11, 1.15, 
1.21, 1.24, 1.25 
5 
Pt M AO Error Performance (Active or 
Dormant) 
  
5.3 Pt M Sub Pt D Maintenance Standards 
MA402 Maintenance 
Performance 
 
5.9 Pt M and Pt 145 Contract Interface Quality control  
5.10 Pt M and Pt 145 Interface Error Probability 
Combining error probability 
from nodes  5.8 – 5.9 
6 
Pt 145 AO Error Performance (Active or 
Dormant) 
  
6.1 Pt 145 Organizational Performance 
A50 Certification of 
maintenance   
Combining error probability 
from nodes  5.10, 9.12 
6.10 Attitude to Task Others 
Combining error probability 
from nodes  6.8 and 6.11 
6.11 Workface Stress Time constraint 
Combining error probability 
from nodes  6.9, 7.12 
6.12 Task Poor maintenance practice 
Combining error probability 
from nodes  6.7, 6.8, 6.11 
6.13 Pt 145 Performance Error Probability 
Combining error probability 
from nodes  5.9, 6.12 
8 QMS Organization and Performance   
8.17 Pt 145 Activity Area Line Stations  
8.20 Pt 145 Quality Audit Performance Error Probability 
Combining error probability 
from nodes  8.17 – 8.19 
11 
Error Probability  Defences and 
Consequences 
  
11.1 CAW Management Error probability 
Combining error probability 
from nodes 4.4, 5.8, 6.13, 11.2 
11.2 Defence Pt 145 Error Missed  
11.3 Consequences Pt 145 No Effect Error CF   
11.4 Release to Fly Error Probability 
Combining error probability 
from nodes 11.1, 11.5 
11.5 Defence Pt M Error Missed  
11.6 Consequences Pt M No Effect Error CF  
11.7 Handling and Despatch Error Probability 
Combining error probability 
from nodes 3.26, 8.30, 9.12, 
11.4, 11.8, 
11.8 Defence H and D Error Missed  
11.9 Consequence  H and D No Effect Error CF  
11.10 Defence Pre Take Off Error Missed  
11.11 Take Off Error Probability 
Combining error probability 
from nodes 11.7, 11.10 
11.12 Consequence Pre Take Off No Effect Error CF  
11.13 Flight and Consequences 
Flt Completed Error CF No 
Cost 
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11.14 Combined Cost No Cost 
Combining error probability 
from nodes 11.3, 11.6, 11.9, 
11.13, 11.14 
Error 4d 
Index Node Name   Secondary Level Tertiary Level CF Remarks 
1 Operation and Capability   
1.1 Aircraft Type and Series Fixed Wing Type A2  
1.3 Registration Number Reg 6  
1.4 Aircraft Age Over 25 to 30yr  
1.5 Number of Sectors Flown ****  
1.6 Number of Major Maintenance Cycles *  
1.7 Aircraft Error Probability 
Combines error probability 
from nodes  1.1-1.6 
1.9  Operating Role Cargo  
1.11 Nature of Operation Error Probability 
Combining error probability 
from nodes  1.8-1.10 
1.12 Flight Origin *****  
1.15 Geographical Location & Time Error Probability 
Combining error probability 
from nodes  1.12-1.14 
1.26 Operation V Capability Error Probability 
Combining error probability 
from nodes  1.7, 1.11, 1.15, 
1.21, 1.24, 1.25 
5 
Pt M AO Error Performance (Active or 
Dormant) 
  
5.3 Pt M Sub Pt D Maintenance Standards 
MA402 Maintenance 
Performance 
 
5.9 Pt M and Pt 145 Contract Interface Quality control  
5.10 Pt M and Pt 145 Interface Error Probability 
Combining error probability 
from nodes  5.8 – 5.9 
6 
Pt 145 AO Error Performance (Active or 
Dormant) 
  
6.1 Pt 145 Organizational Performance 
A50 Certification of 
maintenance   
Combining error probability 
from nodes  5.10, 9.12 
6.10 Attitude to Task Others 
Combining error probability 
from nodes  6.8 and 6.11 
6.11 Workface Stress Time constraint 
Combining error probability 
from nodes  6.9, 7.12 
6.12 Task Poor maintenance practice 
Combining error probability 
from nodes  6.7, 6.8, 6.11 
6.13 Pt 145 Performance Error Probability 
Combining error probability 
from nodes  5.9, 6.12 
8 QMS Organization and Performance   
8.17 Pt 145 Activity Area Line Stations  
8.20 Pt 145 Quality Audit Performance Error Probability 
Combining error probability 
from nodes  8.17 – 8.19 
456
11 
Error Probability  Defences and 
Consequences 
  
11.1 CAW Management Error probability 
Combining error probability 
from nodes 4.4, 5.8, 6.13, 11.2 
11.2 Defence Pt 145 Error Missed  
11.3 Consequences Pt 145 No Effect Error CF   
11.4 Release to Fly Error Probability 
Combining error probability 
from nodes 11.1, 11.5 
11.5 Defence Pt M Error Detected  
11.6 Consequences Pt M Flt Delay Error Inv Rectified  
11.14 Combined Cost Cost group 5 
Combining error probability 
from nodes 11.3, 11.6, 11.9, 
11.13, 11.14 
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Serial No 
 
Report No 
 
Aircraft 
 
Date 
35 X124/**/**/**** Type_A2 G-**** 21 Apr 09 
Post C-Check acceptance checks. Flight crew oxygen system, low pressure side, leaking. 
 
The post C-check acceptance test had been carried out at the receiving base where the accumulator pressure had 
been monitored, because the accumulator pressure had dropped to less than half the charged pressure.  
 
Investigations had revealed that there was a leak from the low pressure side of the manifold to the captain’s 
flexible pipe. The connection was re-seated, re-torqued and leak tested. Defect did not recur.  
 
MEDA investigation failed to reveal a definite cause. However it was revealed that during C- Check at ******, 
insulation blanket replacement had been carried out, for which oxygen supply system had been disturbed and 
reinstalled later.  
 
The certifying engineer for the task of oxygen system reinstallation had been interviewed, but had claimed that 
he could not remember working on it, and no one else had owned up to having done the work.  
 
Causal factor was attributed to lack of stage checking records.  These have been introduced since then as a 
preventive measure. 
 
 
Comments:  This is the second case (out of the 41 miscellaneous errors) where this specific Pt 145 MRO 
attributed an HF error to lack of stage checking, suggesting that its task management procedures are below 
acceptable standards.  Hopefully stage checking records would alleviate future arising. 
 
As to the individual engineer, it is bizarre that an engineer employed by a licensed Part 145 Approved 
Organization could disclaim responsibility for his signed up work on the grounds of absent mindedness.  One 
implication is that someone else had fraudulently used his rubber stamp to certify a task that he had not 
performed or supervised.  This would have more serious implications as it would undermine the integrity of 
engineers employed by that AO as well as the integrity of AO itself as a reliable organization trusted to undertake 
aircraft work. 
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 Serial No Report No Aircraft Date 
37 X173/**/**/**** Type_A2 G-**** 30 May 09 
Erratic tech log entry on the ADD log. 
 
Despite the failure of a stand-by power system check noted during A-Check, the Tech Log line was cleared on the 
ADD Deferred Defect log, enabling the aircraft to fly, whereas in reality, standby power was a No-Go item.  The 
error was discovered in time by another engineer, before the next flight, placing the aircraft AOG for further 
investigation. 
 
The aircraft was released to service the following day after replacing one of the relays and checking the 
serviceability state of the aircraft. The individual was interviewed and placed on, “return to continuation 
training”. Continuation Training program was amended to include this new item. 
 
 
Comments:  A straightforward case of individual error due to limited experience and most likely limited 
knowledge on the stand-by power system. 
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 Serial No Report No Aircraft Date 
39 X206/**/**/**** TYPE_A2 G-**** 24 Jun 09 
RH Fuel Shut Off Valve (SOV) connector Pin 6 had no 28V DC power. 
 
During embodiment of a Service Bulletin concurrently with a C-Check at contracted MRO (******) it was found 
that the right-hand fuel shut off valve (SOV) connector Pin 6 had no 28 V DC power.  Investigation revealed that 
there was a break in the power supply cable in the RH engine strut, where there was sign of a “splice assembly”.  
On opening up the assembly, it was found that the cable was severed inside and not properly spliced.   
 
There has been no previous repair of this line by the current operator, and therefore it was assumed that the 
broken cable was the result of a previous repair done whilst the aircraft was in the custody of the previous 
operator.   
 
 
Comments:  This is a good example of a dormant human error that could have lead to serious consequences if 
and when adverse conditions lined up. On transfer of aircraft to subsequent owners, not all technical documents 
get transferred, and therefore it is up to the new owner (or their surveyors) to demand a comprehensive pack of 
historical records, and to undertake necessary reviews. Naturally, in commercial situations, it might not be 
practical or even feasible to insist on the full historical document suite, thus the new owner accepting a degree of 
risk with second hand aircraft.  It is highly likely that older aircraft that had undergone maintenance carry 
dormant errors; greater the amount of maintenance, greater the amount of human errors they might be 
carrying.  To anticipate this type of dormant hazard, the CAW Risk Model tries to build up a reference baseline by 
requesting information on the age of the aircraft, usage and the number of major maintenance cycles that it had 
undergone. 
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 Serial No Report No Aircraft Date 
40 X222/**/**/**** TYPE_A2 G-**** 3 Jul 09 
Forgotten APU Battery Charger CB caused batteries to overheat and spill chemicals 
 
This error, committed at one satellite station (*******) was discovered two-days later at another satellite station 
(probably ***** in *******) where it was rectified, 
  
An engineer, who was called out to clear an APU Battery Charger status error-message, could not clear the error/ 
defect because a spare was not available.  However being a non-safety critical item, he cleared the tech log entry 
with an ADD thus allowing the aircraft to depart, but forgot to remove the circuit breakers to deactivate the 
charger.   
 
The charger continued to charge, overheating the battery and spilling fluids, which was discovered 2-days later 
by another engineer based at another satellite station. 
  
MEDA investigation was carried out by ****** who employed the first engineer at the station where the work 
was undertaken. The engineer admitted failing to remove CB.  He had overlooked the need to complete the 
maintenance action, having simply assumed that the APU Battery Charger was not an airworthiness item. 
Focussing on getting the aircraft airborne as it had already been delayed, he had cleared the error message with 
an ADD, and immediately moved on to do another task, to which he had already been assigned by his controller. 
 
Investigation revealed that the engineer had been under abnormal pressure, having pulled out from another 
defect rectification job to attend to the APU Battery Charger and then immediately afterwards to attend to a 3rd 
aircraft that was waiting for his attention.   
 
The engineer was highly experienced (26-years service) with many type ratings. He has had a spotless record in 
the employer’s books. That, together with his prompt coming forward to acknowledge his error and his 
explanation of the circumstances, had been helpful to draw a conclusion that this was a case of distraction due to 
unusual pressures put on the engineer. 
 
 
Comments:  An example where manpower is below adequate to meet peak demands.  Although everyone has 
the good intention of serving management objectives, in this case it has been done at the expense of safety. The 
consequences could have been worse.  HF teaching call for the engineer to inform control that he was getting 
stressed, but it was equally likely that the engineer was either thinking that he was coping under stress or, if he 
was not coping, then he did not want to raise an issue in case it was taken against him. 
 
The model included information on the sector where the error was first introduced, the sector that 
demonstrated the presence of an error, as well as the sectors flown during the 2-days that the aircraft was 
carrying the error. 
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 Serial No Report No Aircraft Date 
43 X246/**/**/**** Type_A2 G-**** 2 Aug 09 
Circuit breakers left, “pulled,” post maintenance. 
 
On crewing in, the flight crew found Main and Auxiliary Left & Right Pitot Heater circuit CB's pulled; Left & Right 
AOA CBs pulled; Temp Probe CBs pulled; Battery Switch was ON and position lights OFF. There was no reference 
to the above in the tech log, nor placards placed on the CB panel.  
 
A mechanic had worked on a side window heating problem. On interview the mechanic had claimed that he did 
not need to pull these CBs and had confirmed that he had followed the rules and procedures iaw the FIM (Flight 
Information Manual).  He had also said that at the time he finished his work, he did not notice any pulled CBs at 
all. 
 
A continuation training letter had been raised to remind engineers on the correct procedures and disciplines to 
be adhered to when pulling CBs. 
 
 
Comments: The investigation had not been taken to its natural conclusion and seemed to have been truncated 
after the mechanics statement, presumably on the ground that the error had been found before it caused any 
damage and that it was not cost effective to follow through. The possibilities were: 
 
1. Someone must have pulled them out erroneously and then got distracted, or  
2. Someone deliberately pulled them to do another task and then got forgotten during trying to finish the 
job fast 
3. Left forgotten by flight crew from the previous sector 
4. Pulled by a mischief maker with intent. 
 
It was noted that other ground crew who went to assist prepare aircraft, ahead of the flight crew did not notice 
pulled CBs, because the pulled CBs were concealed by other furniture in cockpit and there were no tell-tale 
placards placed on pulled CBs. 
  
If tech log did not reflect any work on the Pitot System, or AOA, or anything associated with it since the end of 
the last sector, then suspicion falls on the mechanic who worked on window heating, unless flight crew had 
pulled them out for some other reason. 
 
It was noted during this survey of errors, that on the same date, a CB panel had been robbed from another 
aircraft by another engineer without strictly adhering to correct procedures. In that situation, there had been 
verbal agreement between the parties involved, but timely documentation had not taken place. Investigator had 
not mentioned this fact in the investigation report to establish if there had been any connection between the 2 
events or, if not, to separate them as independent events. See Serial No: 44. 
 
Limitation of getting to the bottom of the truth could be due to local constraints such as cost-effectiveness or 
impact on labour relations.  The investigator’s recommendation to improve Continuation Training might be the 
optimum solution, even though it might not have addressed the real causal factor.    
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 Serial No Report No Aircraft Date 
44 X249/**/**/**** Type_A2 G-**** 2 Aug 09 
CB robbed without formal approval and following improper documentation procedure. 
 
A CB assembly had been robbed from G-**** undergoing A-check, to service another aircraft OO-*** required 
for flying. The robbing was verbally approved by *** MOC Duty Controller but he failed to follow up with an 
approval number and paperwork that was promised to be dispatched.  
 
The Duty Line Manager at the satellite station (*******) verbally authorized the engineer to carry out the 
robbing, assuming that paperwork had arrived and that they were in engineer’s hands.  
  
In any event, the engineer who carried out the work failed to make proper entries in G-**** Tech Log.  
Subsequent to the completion of robbing, ****** he raised the form for robbing, filled in the known information 
and faxed it to **** MOC. 
 
 
Comments: The situation described is typical for a team working together to achieve an objective with good 
intention but in the process the parties involved had infringed the rules by trying to short circuit the correct 
procedure. Verbal agreements are usually made between the parties to get a job done on the promise that 
paperwork would be followed up; it is a typical industrial situation, but in this case the promise had not been 
followed up in a timely fashion.  Senior managers had made important decisions based on assumptions and 
without asking the right question. Ironically, the team had broken the very same rules that was intended to 
prevent this type of error occurring. The situation was compounded by the engineer failing to finalise the Tech 
Log entries correctly. 
 
Lack of comprehension of the procedures and miscommunication had been identified as the root causes. These 
are both organizational and individual errors.  
 
Action taken to introduce relevant subject and procedures to continuation training program would hopefully 
alleviate future occurrences, but it is a topic worth repeating. 
  
Unavailability of parts is a further contributory causal factor, and this should reflect on funding and resourcing at 
corporate level; it is their responsibility to ensure and fund the activities of Heads of Engineering and Logistic, so 
that they are effective in getting spares assets to where they are urgently required. 
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 Serial No Report No Aircraft Date 
47 X258/**/**/**** Type_A2 G-**** 10 Aug 09 
APU oil empty due to incorrectly installed filler cap. 
 
Flight crew on completion of ****-**** sector had reported APU oil empty despite last replenished on the 10 
Aug 09.  On the 10 Aug 09, at ******, the aircraft APU had been replenished by a mechanic and fastened the 
filler cap. Another mechanic has checked the oil level, and ascertained that it was full, had checked the security 
of the filler cap and signed for the work. The person who signed for the task was called to account for the error 
but could not explain how the error could have happened. He was reminded that a Cat-A mechanic could only 
sign for his own work and not others. 
 
 
Comments:  Two errors had been committed, one procedural error on signing up for the work done, and the 
other faulty installation of the filler cap.  The second error has been unaccounted for except, one can surmise 
that it was cross-threaded and was not properly sealing the filler neck. Investigation incomplete in so far as 
follow up actions to prevent recurrence. 
  
 
464
 Serial No Report No Aircraft Date 
48 X260/**/**/**** Type_A2 G-**** 24 Aug 09 
Incorrect Decal markings at fuel drip-stick locations on both wings 
 
An aircraft had been returned from post-Scribe line inspection,  with the “Fuel Drip-Stick” locations’ decal 
markings placed in reverse order, i.e. 1-7 (inboard to outboard locations) instead of the original No: 6-1 (inboard 
to outboard) with No: 7 furthest outboard.   
 
By way of a solution, except the positions No 2 left wing and No: 6 both wings, decals were reverted to the 
original positions.  The exceptions were entered on White ADD, pending availability of spare decals.    
 
The aircraft manufacturer, on seeking their advice, had suggested that decals could be positioned either way, and 
a ruling has yet to be issued by the manufacturer.   
 
 
Comments:  This report has been posted as a maintenance error.  It appears to be a production issue, because 
according the manufacturer there are 2-correct versions for decal positions.  Await further advice from the 
manufacturer. 
  
 
465
 Serial No Report No Aircraft Date 
51 X278/**/**/**** Type_A2 G-**** 26 Aug 09 
Gear pin stowage missing. 
 
Flight crew noted that undercarriage lock pins were not in their usual stowage on the rear cockpit wall, and that 
the stowage box was missing, but there was no Tech Log entry to indicate the status.  Pins were found in the 
vestibule cupboard adjacent flight crew location.  Since then engineers had raised a WADD and subsequently 
replaced the stowage and cleared the WADD. 
 
 
Comments:  The error was in documentation and failure to report the status of the aircraft through Tech Log 
entry and the raising of the WADD to clear it temporarily 
 
466
 Serial No Report No Aircraft Date 
55 X285/**/**/**** Type_A2 G-**** 28 Aug 09 
Remove before Flight Tape left onboard and found during post-flight walk round. 
 
During the post-flight walk round after a sector ****** to *******, the captain noted a “Remove Before Flight” 
tape hanging underneath the RH wing of the aircraft.  
 
An engineer working in a night shift and diagnosing a hydraulic leak, had left a warning flag for the benefit of his 
colleagues to indicate the likely source of leak.  He had left a written note about the warning flag on the 
Supervisor’s Diary. Unfortunately the day-shift who provided continuity with the diagnosis had started to work 
from another location of the aircraft, from where the tape was not visible.   
 
Meanwhile an entirely separate task on the same aircraft to diagnose “RH wing low” defect had necessitated the 
lowering of the flap and rigging the aileron flush. In this process, the tape got put aside; at the end of the second 
task the flap was left at the retracted position, trapping the now folded and stowed away tape out of view.   
 
Since neither a separate task card nor a Tech Log entry for the removal of the tape had been raised, the hidden 
tape got unaccounted for, until it got unfolded and became visible when the flap was extended during the 
subsequent flight.  The following human errors had occurred: 
 
• Engineer No: 1 failed to raise a supplementary card, or an entry in the Tech Log. 
 
• The night shift Supervisor who put the information in the Handover Diary to tell his engineer to raise a 
supplementary card or tech log entry, or to raise them himself. But he failed to act on it.  This is an 
error at the defence level. 
 
• The day shift Supervisor who took over the diary failed to act on the diary entry regarding the tape. He 
continued to work his normal routine, oblivious to the danger. 
 
• Engineer No: 2 of the day shift did not trace back and clear the work areas, concentrating his effort only 
in the area that he worked. It might be possible that he did not see the presence of the tape, because 
by then it was already been stowed inside the wing, to provide a clear space for the extended flap. 
 
 
Comments:  This is yet another error committed due to lack of discipline in raising a supplementary job card or a 
Tech Log entry to cover new maintenance tasks or where they are not part of the normal task schedule. 
 
467
 Serial No Report No Aircraft Date 
50 X273/**/**/*** Type_A2 G-**** 31 Aug 09 
MEL not followed, initially, to clear status message (“R ELEV PCU”). 
 
This relates to an attempt by third party contracted engineers at a satellite station to clear an EICAS message on 
the hydraulic system.  Ground engineers worked to their local MEL which was different from the operator’s MEL 
and put the aircraft unserviceable.  Eventually the problem was resolved by the operator’s engineers that 
enabled the flight crew to have enough confidence to fly the aircraft back to the main base where the defect was 
rectified.   
 
Eventually the hydraulic system’s faulty components were replaced, and the system tested and proved to work 
satisfactorily. Since then the aircraft had flown 76 or more sectors, satisfactorily. 
 
 
Comments: The key issue involved is the disparity between the two MELs: one used by operator and the other 
used by the third party contractor. It was the responsibility of the Part M organization undertaking contracting-
out to ensure that standards and specifications are defined.  
 
Another related issue is the failure of Quality Audit system to pick up this disparity. 
 
Neither the MEDA report nor SR fails to state what action was proposed to prevent a recurrence. It might be 
necessary for the operator’s quality management system should review the MEL requirements and agree on the 
MEL to be used against operator’s aircraft. 
 
  
 
468
 Serial No Report No Aircraft Date 
53 X280/**/**/**** Type_A2 G-**** 31 Aug 09 
R1 door opened without deactivating the power assist 
  
Five minutes before takeoff, the captain called an engineer to check out an EICAS message on speed brakes. 
During functional test, the Front right (R1) Door was opened for the engineer to physically observe the spoiler 
panels operating. During door opening, the Power Assist Bottle was activated accidentally. 
 
The engineer stated during the interview that he might not have moved the selector lever correctly, because 
under time-pressures consistent with the high morning work load, he was in a hurry. 
  
SR does not discuss recovery action or if any disciplinary action was taken. 
 
 
Comments:  This is an example of engineers working under acute time-pressures making mistakes, as their 
alertness and mindfulness for the job at hand is lacking. Whilst the engineer is physically on the current job, his 
mind seemed to be working on the jobs on his list and how he is going to manage his time to fit all the tasks, or 
even mentally working on the next job to do. 
 
There was no investigation into the reasons why this engineer as over stressed at work, why he was tasked with 
so much work, or if there was shortfall of staff as well as line managers.  Was the organization at fault to expect 
too much from their engineers? Could the limited trade cover provided cope with peak demands, and if not what 
alleviation is allowed to engineers working under pressure to ensure sufficient safety level is achieved and 
maintained? Are engineers allowed to state their opinion on the workload without getting marked-down for 
stating their concerns?  These are some of the management challenges that managers must face constructively 
so that they could be resolved without detriment to flight safety. 
 
If organizations do not have standard times for tasks, then this is a good example to demonstrate that there 
should be standard timescales for work stints, and manpower should be provided to meet peak demands.  If 
standard times are available, then it is possible to rate the jobs, and manning accordingly or if not set up other 
defences. 
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 Serial No Report No Aircraft Date 
46 X256/**/**/**** Type_A2 G-**** 9 Aug 09 
No 2 Engine thrust reverser sensor loose and out of adjustment.  
 
An aircraft was due to be flown back to the base from a satellite station to have its defective No: 2 engine thrust 
reversers (TR) repaired. During the previous night an engineer at the satellite station had worked on the TR, 
leaving the task to be completed by the engineer working the day-shift. 
 
Assuming that all the work up to that point had been satisfactorily completed, the LAE, working the day-shift, had 
then signed off the work done on the thrust reverser, without first having properly checked if the previous stint 
of work had been satisfactorily completed.  
 
Because of this omission to check, he was not aware of the true state of the TR.  In consequence, his 
documentation and certification on the Tech Log was faulty, and moreover he failed to notify the flight crew 
about a problem relating to TR stowage. 
 
The aircraft had been released to service in this state for the ferry flight to base.  The outcome was that the flight 
crew using the thrust reverser after landing was getting intermittent warning messages on the EICAS and also 
while attempting to stow the TR..  
 
During the investigation that followed, it was found that the thrust reverser had not been correctly rigged, that it 
could not be properly stowed, and that the (stowage position) sensor was loose and out of adjustment. This was 
the reason for intermittent warnings. In fact, because of incorrect rigging, the TR could not be even manually 
stowed and locked. 
 
Investigation had also revealed that the engineer involved had violated a number of procedural steps, in that he 
was culpable for: 
 
• The failure to correctly assess the worksheets and the status of the reverser being worked.  
 
• Entering the defect incorrectly into the sector record page and under incorrect deferred defect 
category, i.e. “White” ADD, instead of a “Pink” ADD.  The Pink ADD warns of operational limitations, as 
it was in this case.  
 
Disciplinary action against the engineer was being considered.  The MEDA findings were to be disseminated to 
the organization’s workforce through Continuation Training program.  
 
Comments:  No further comments. 
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Serial No Report No Aircraft Date 
11 X390/**/**/**** Type_A1 G-**** 11 Sep 09 
3-Day over run of fuel sump draining task  
 
An aircraft that has undergone base servicing at an MRO (*******) was about to be handed over to the operator 
on the due date, when the MRO management suddenly declared an outstanding missed task.   There had been 6 
previous pre-handover conferences about outstanding tasks, but this task had not been flagged up. It appeared 
that during the course of the base servicing there had been an omission in the management of and accountability 
for the tasks set on the MRO due to human error. This Safety Report had been raised to document this human 
error. 
 
 
Comments: There was no clear explanation of the background to this incident or to causal factors for the 
omission to account for the misplaced/ untracked task.  On the face of the information presented, there appears 
to be a contractual issue involved between the operator and the MRO.  Clearly terms of the interface contract, 
and the way task specification and standards must be audited by operator’s quality department as per EASA 
regulations. 
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 Serial No Report No Aircraft Date 
1 X299/**/**/**** Type_A1 G-**** 15 Sep 09 
During walk round, No.12 slat leading edge found not faired with winglet and top wing panel not flush. 
 
Two separate aircraft defects attributed to human errors had been reported. 
 
1. RH Leading edge slat wedge interfering with No: 12 slat. 
2. R/H outboard aileron contacting the winglet, upper seal-retainer during aileron full up position. 
 
The second defect was found whilst investigating the first error. This aircraft had undergone conversion in the 
US, by an approved organization contracted by the original equipment manufacturer.  
 
The root cause of the R/H leading edge slat wedge interference with the No.12 slat had been attributed to poor 
installation by individuals employed by the approved organization and subsequent failing by quality checkers.  
 
The root cause of the R/H winglet aileron clearance problem can be attributed to either errors or lack of clarity in 
technical documents/instructions.  
 
Similar problems had been encountered during the conversion of the operator’s two other aircraft of this type. 
As a result of this error, another technical instruction has been issued to check the gap between the bulb seal 
retainer and the upper outboard forward edge of the outboard aileron on all similar aircraft modified by the 
winglet installation STC.  
As part of a long term solution, the design specification of the winglet STC installation was being reviewed by the 
Design Authority in conjunction with FAA, EASA and UK CAA. 
 
Comments: These errors were spotted at the flight line of the operator only after a new aircraft had been 
delivered. The primary error was committed during the embodiment of the winglet installation modification 
where the fouling of the structure should have been spotted and reported.  
Causal chain investigation would have pointed to errors in Part 21 AO’s internal quality control system, errors in 
the detail design of the winglet installation and its clearance by airworthiness authorities as contributory factors; 
these areas were not open to MEDA investigator. 
 
It is not uncommon for some employees of airworthiness authorities to claim that their role is only procedural 
and is driven by written information provided by the designer. 
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 Serial No Report No Aircraft Date 
57 X300/**/**/**** Type_A1 G- **** 15 Sep 09 
Engineer slipped, sprained ankle and damaged skin of the outboard aileron. 
 
Whilst preparing the aircraft for a RH wing outboard aileron rigging check during morning of 15 Sep 09, the 
engineer slipped on condensation that had formed on the safety raiser platform. As a consequence he 
accidentally dropped the rigging bar on the aileron puncturing the upper skin made of composite structural 
material.  
 
The puncture was initially repaired with aluminium-foil tape. Two White-ADDs were placed in the Tech Log, one 
to inspect the tape at every 50 cycles and the other to repair the puncture within 300 cycles.  On the 17th Sep 09, 
the aileron was given a permanent repair and the 2 ADD entries were cleared. 
 
The individual suffered a sprained ankle. An accident/personal injury report was raised, but he did not require 
any further medical treatment nor wanted time off to recover. 
 
 
Comments: This is mainly a Health and Safety issue that lead to a human factors related damage to an expensive 
aircraft structural component.  
 
It does raise the question of the type and suitability of safety raiser, their husbandry and preparation before use. 
A man has been injured and an aircraft damage.  If condensation is a causal factor, then foot grip on safety raiser 
platforms and walkways should be improved to prevent recurrence of similar events or even death by falling off a 
platform or a wing surface. Individuals and management have a duty of care and part of that would be using the 
right type of clothing and footwear, as well as good husbandry and preparation of equipment before use. 
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 Serial No Report No Aircraft Date 
5 X317/**/**/**** Type_A2 G-**** 24 Sep 09 
Aircraft was felt “light” on take-off rotation. Incorrect assembly of elevator feel unit. 
 
Following a captain’s report that the aircraft was felt “light” on rotation during take-off and that nose oleo 
appeared higher than normal, a nose oleo leg shock strut servicing was initially carried out.  The aircraft flew 3 
more sectors without complaint from flight crew and on the 4th sector the abnormal feel was again reported. 
Detailed investigation of the elevator feel and centring unit followed, when a “cracked” upper forward spring 
roller bearing in the elevator neutral shift support bracket was found.  In addition, incorrect assembly of 2 springs 
on the elevator feel and centring assembly and of adjuster shims were also found.   
 
Incorrect orientation of springs had been attributed to ambiguity of AMM drawings.  Once the damaged 
components were replaced, mis-assembly was put right, and system functionally tested, the aircraft handled as 
expected with no further complaints from flight crew.  
 
Maintenance record had confirmed that between Nov 04 and Dec 06, some of the subject components had been 
either defect investigated, serviced or replaced 3-times.  The roller bearings were also subjected to routine 
inspection and, repair as required, at every 2C-Check by MRO. 
 
It was not known exactly when or where mis-assembly had taken place.  However the aircraft manufacturer, 
OEM, had reported that the wrong orientation of the spring had no effect on the feel unless the spring was 
twisted. Nevertheless, OEM had agreed to amend drawings to remove any ambiguity.  
 
Additionally, as an MOR had been raised and closed with a recommendation to amend the AMM and to review 
the need for bearing replacement during C-Check, when it is susceptible to human error,  
 
Comments: As the origin of the defect was unknown this would have to be categorized as a dormant error.  
However it might be prudent to check when the last C-Check was completed before 24 Sep 09, because the 
“light” feel was a new report in September.  There could have been a C-Check done after Dec 06, the last time 
the elevator computer was replaced, or 5 Nov 06 when Line repair was done on the elevator feel and centring 
unit. 
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 Serial No Report No Aircraft Date 
59 X326/**/**/**** Type_A2 G-**** 30 Sep 09 
Aircraft arrived with reported Oil Smell In Cabin on both engines.  
 
On 6th Oct 09, following reported Oil Smell in Cabin (OSIC), engineers at the base station, investigating the source 
of an oil leak in accordance with AMM (standard procedure) had to remove the engine spinner cap to see if there 
were signs of oil stains.  
 
Although no oil was found, they found damage and distortion to the spinner and spinner cap locating area, signs 
of them being forced into position by an external force. The damaged items (front and aft sections of the spinner 
and the anti-icing duct) were replaced at a cost of USD 80,682. 
 
Prior to this date, there had been several other attempts to locate the source of OSIC.  Following up a previous 
report from one satellite station, line engineers at another station had already removed and reinstalled the 
spinner cap on 2 Oct 09 as part of their investigation into LH AC pack.  Again, on 4th Oct 09, RH AC pack was 
investigated by the first satellite station, when the spinner was removed and reinstalled. Both these 
investigations proved negative. 
 
It was during this third attempt at the main base when damage to the spinner was discovered and reported. 
 
This damage was referred to the first satellite station where the previous defect investigation was conducted.  
Whilst engineers there acknowledged that damage was possible, they did not accept liability for it, pointing out 
that this sort of investigation had been repeated several times before, and that there was no way of identifying 
exactly when or where the damage had occurred. 
 
Further investigations had revealed that the design of the anti icing duct was not conducive to ease of assembly 
in situ. It has been mentioned that one had to let go of the tube before offering up the spinner cap, when the 
former drops and gets out of alignment.  This could be the main reason that fouling occurs, and out of alignment 
causing many problems including forceful application of percussion that causes distortion.  Clearly this aspects 
should be investigated as part of finding a more lasting solution 
 
In addition to the completion of repair to the damaged spinner, retraining of personnel has been introduced.  A 
proposal to amend the AMM has been submitted as well as the opening up of further discussion with the aircraft 
manufacturer to determine a way of mitigating such circumstances. 
 
 
Comments: In view of the difficulties experienced in re-assembling the spinner, one could presume that the 
damage was unintentional.  Whereas this configuration might be more acceptable for a vertical position found in 
a depot type assembly line, in the horizontal position found at an operational base, locating the oil tube could be 
a real problem. 
 
 Considering the cost and frequency of replacing damage prone components, the operator should consider 
possible design changes as follows: 
 
1.  To provide an endoprobe-type inspection hole to inspect the presence of oil in the spinner assembly. 
 
2. To provide a means of stabilizing the anti-ice duct in a horizontal position, this may be like a keyway 
and spline, so that it would not drop when the spinner cap is being offered up. 
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6 X348/**/**/**** Type_A2 G-**** 6 Oct 09 
Components robbed from an uninstalled engine without following correct documentation procedures. 
 
Three items were removed from an uninstalled engine to repair an installed engine on an in-use aircraft. At a 
later date when the required spares arrived, engineers found that there were no open servicing documents 
identifying where they were to be fitted. Subsequent investigations revealed that a number of errors had been 
committed at work face, coordination, higher level of management, as well as other shortfalls in the quality 
management system.  
 
Documentation at the point of operation was faulty. 
• Lead engineer who removed components did not check the rules and documentation procedures for 
“uninstalled to installed engine” component robbing. He had assumed that the procedure was same as 
“installed engine to installed engine” robbing, and acted accordingly, thereby omitted raising a Non 
Routine Work Card. 
• His helper, another licensed engineer acted as a mechanic removing the components without taking 
responsibility for paperwork, which he assumed was the domain of the lead engineer. He also failed to 
read the relevant procedures, and was content to provide labour only. 
• In the absence of a Non Routine Work card, no instructions had been left concerning the repair of the 
“robbed” uninstalled engine when spares arrived. 
 
Authorization process for robbing and documentation was faulty. 
• Robbing approval could be given only by Tech Director (TD) who should sign the authorization form 
held by Maintenance Operations Centre (MOC), but in this case a Deputy Line Maintenance Manager 
(DLMM) provided verbal authorization to MOC who in turn signed the form on behalf of TD. This 
variation was contrary to authorized procedure. 
• DLMM had claimed he spoke to TD and got his approval, but TD could not recall the conversation.  
• TD had been under the impression that the rules of authorizations had been relaxed, but had not 
followed through to align intended policy change. In fact TD was vague on the policy and reality. 
 
Quality Audit System that was in place to oversee if the procedures were proper and effective missed this 
particular process 
 
• Finally, the quality audit system had failed to provide sufficient oversight in this area, thus missing to 
spot the prevailing abnormalities and correct them. 
 
Overall, there has been a system failure: i.e. the defence mechanism that had been put in position to oversee and 
prevent the occurrence of error, had itself failed due to organizational or individual errors, thereby negating the 
defences. Although in this particular case the risk was categorized by the organization as “moderate” failure of 
the system was more serious because under a different set of circumstances that could lead to a catastrophic 
failure. 
 
The following actions have been recommended to prevent a recurrence: 
• Publish a revised policy and procedures. 
• Educate the work force about the changes by amending the Continuation Training program 
• QMS were to improve the Quality Audit requirements and processes. 
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Comments: This relates to an improper robbing procedure followed when robbing from an uninstalled engine to 
service an operational aircraft. Human error occurred at the workface relating to correct documentation, and at 
senior manager and coordinator levels that authorised and recorded the authorizations, and at QMS level where 
there ought to have been an adequate oversight of the robbing procedures.  
 
In this case all 3 tiers failed, indicating a system failure where not only the error at work face got hidden but also 
the defence mechanisms that was supposed to detect the error and provide the defence mechanism. This is a 
good example of total system failure.  
 
Fortunately the error was detected in time, and no serious consequences. Although the operational aircraft was 
not at risk, state of airworthiness of the uninstalled (a high-value asset) could have been left in doubt.   
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 Serial No Report No Aircraft Date 
9 X335/**/**/**** Type_A2 G-**** 6 Oct 09 
Un-demanded operation of the left centre tank override pump. 
 
Prior to the start of engines for ground running, fuel pumps were switched ON in an aircraft that was on a C-
Check. Then it was noticed that the left centre tank override pump was operating voluntarily.  This pump should 
only operate if the fuelling door is open or if the left engine is running, but in this case, the fuel door was closed 
and the engine had not yet started.  
 
Investigations followed and the defect was traced to an electrical cable that has been capped and stowed 
incorrectly.  The defect was rectified, after which the pump operated as expected. 
 
The engineer reported that similar cases had been experienced by this MRO previously on two of the operator’s 
aircraft. Further investigations confirmed that the two aircraft no longer had the wiring errors.  But there were 
no records of rectification suggesting that they had not been formally reported, nor formally rectified.  All the 
people and supervisors interviewed reported no knowledge of the past events, if there were any.  
 
Fleet wide inspection of the operator’s remaining aircraft revealed that 13 other aircraft had dormant wiring 
faults, although they were not identical to the first one that triggered off this investigation. All defective wiring 
was rectified before the next flight of the affected aircraft.   
 
Comments: The report failed to identify the circumstances of the onset of error, when and where they that might 
have had occurred or the causal factors.  It might be interesting to determine if all these 13 aircraft had recently 
undergone C-Check servicing at the same MRO; this had not been done.  
 
One person volunteered information of the previous occurrences in good faith, but others denied any knowledge 
of it.  MEDA investigation had been completed at the MRO itself but it had been inconclusive as to the root 
causes.  The 13 aircraft have been separately identified in the spreadsheet. 
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 Serial No Report No Aircraft Date 
60 333/**/**/**** Type_A2 G-**** 6 Oct 09 
Tech Log Open Defect. 
 
This SR had been raised by a captain signing up for the pre-flight prior to flying a sector between 2 satellite 
stations (***** to ***** sector). 
 
On the 6th Oct 09, a captain flying the *****  to **** sector had entered a defect on the main cargo door 
indication on the white page of the Tech Log against which two Pink ADDS 38/09 and 39/09 had been raised. The 
Tech Log entry had not been raised iaw the Ops Manual Part A 8.1.11.1.3.that applied to Flight Crew; he should 
have entered such defects in SRP, i.e. Sector Record Pages. He had signed the entry in the Tech Log but not in the 
Pink ADD, where he was allowed to sign as per Ops Manual. 
 
On 6th Oct 09, ground engineers at **** tested the cargo door sensor several times, and as there were no 
unsatisfactory indications, PADD 39/09 was cleared leaving 38/09 open for further diagnosis. 
 
Six sectors later, a captain operating **** to **** sector had noted the open PADD and reported the matter; this 
was the subject of this SR.  
 
On 8th October a flight crew reported that they had EICAS messages about the door 3 times out of the previous 8 
sectors flown. 
 
On the 10th Oct 09, at **** engineers lubricated and exercised the main cargo door four interlock switch 
plungers. Two sectors later, as there had been no further error messages on EICAS, PADD 38/09 was cleared. 
 
Furthermore on the 10th Oct 09, because of the history of defects on this door, base station engineers checked 
the wiring for the interlocking switch, but no faults found. The plungers were checked to see if any of them were 
on unlock position, with negative result.  The plunger adjustments and tolerant were checked.  After an 
operational check that was satisfactory, the aircraft was returned to service. 
 
 
Comments: The issue here was a procedural error made by a flight crew member.  The defect concerned was 
under investigation, and because of its intermittent nature, the relevant PADD had been left open.  Defect in the 
main cargo door, indication system, was due to wear and tear. That is a reliability issue and not maintenance 
error.  
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 Serial No Report No Aircraft Date 
62 X377/**/**/**** Type_B1 OO-*** 24 Sep 09 
Nose heavy at take off due rigging incorrect. 
 
 Flight crew had reported that the aircraft was nose heavy on previous take off and needed unusually long take 
off run. He was suspicious of the cargo loading but on checking this was found to be the not the cause. Fuel 
loading and instrumentation was also suspect and engineers were asked to look into contents gauges and dip 
stick figures or correlation, as well as the state of the stabilator trim positions. 
 
However on walk round engineers (at *******) noted that the external markings of the Horizontal Stabilizer 
(THS) that can be trimmed were showing 1-unit nose down. On checking the cockpit stab trim wheel, it was 
indicating Zero (0) trim, which was a conflict.  Engineers further found that the trim wheel did not travel full 
range in either direction.  
 
This led to engineers undertaking a stab-trim rigging procedure iaw AMM. When the trim was set to X dimension, 
the cockpit trim control was -1.4 degree nose down, and when -0.3 was added to this the figure was -1.7 degree 
nose down which was clearly an error in the system.  Therefore adjustments were made iaw AMM, and after 
further independent checks the aircraft was returned to service. 
 
As the aircraft had been previously worked on by ****’s 3rd party contractor, and had Belgian Registration OO 
markings, further investigation was passed on to ******.  
 
At the time of documenting, ***** had not responded, although 4 months had passed.  Therefore the operator 
had decided to close this SR.  
 
 
Comments: This is human error by those who undertook previous stab-trim control maintenance; clearly an error 
has been made during rigging check. 
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 Serial No Report No Aircraft Date 
61 X371/**/**/**** Type_A2 G-**** 27 Oct 09 
MEL incorrect in identifying CBs to be pulled in case of Cargo Aft defect message. 
 
Flight crew reported an error message relating to Cargo Aft Fan. Engineers tried to pull CBs as per MEL data, but 
found that only 2 MEL specified actually exist on the panel.  AMM confirmed this, and so the engineer acted iaw 
AMM and released the aircraft as he had no more ground time (as the aircraft was to depart). The related PADD 
entry was left unclear.   
 
On arrival at *******, the flight crew reported that he had no further messages during flight.  Engineers at 
******** reset the CBs, tested the cargo aft fan and heater satisfactorily and cleared the Pink ADD. 
 
Further investigation by Tech Manager confirmed that the relevant part of the MEL, which was originally written 
for passenger aircraft, was incorrect for cargo aircraft. Consequently, a “pink-sheet” alert has been sent out to air 
and ground crews.  MEL would be amended at the next cycle (C-Check?) in March 2010. 
   
 
Comments: This is a maintenance/aircrew data error attributable to Part 21 AO Product Support (continuing 
airworthiness maintenance information for variants, vide Part 21 A.120) as well as Part M Sub Part D, 401, 
Maintenance Data. 
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 Serial No Report No Aircraft Date 
7 X376/**/**/**** Type_B1. Reg No: NA 31 Oct 09 
Aircraft released to fly with 2 worn tyres and brake-unit worn close to limit. 
 
Post flight inspection of an aircraft arrived from **** to ***** revealed that the treads of No: 2 and No: 7 main 
wheels covers were worn all round the circumference, and at places the canvas was exposed. The aircraft had 
the weekly inspection completed at *****.  ***** did not have spare covers, and having discussed the situation 
with MOC at *****, the aircraft was cleared for 2 more sectors and allowed to fly to *******. Wheels were sent 
from ***** to *******, where the wheels were replaced. 
 
Safety report had yet to be completed, and was anticipating a report on the circumstances leading to the release 
of the aircraft from *****. 
 
 
Comments: In this instance, there had been no adverse consequences such as runway excursion, tyre burst, 
damage to wheels or undercarriage struts, or wheel brake fire during landing. This may be more due to luck and 
design safety features, rather than to subtle maintenance practices. 
 
It would appear that the 2-wheels were in different bogies.  Most likely the other wheels were available and 
serviceable to carry the load. Engineers at ***** might have been relying on the fact that the aircraft was lightly 
loaded and that the load could be spread onto other wheels.  However it is not clear if the aircraft would have 
passed a regulatory compliance test or an internal quality audit check.  
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 Serial No Report No Aircraft Date 
2 X386/**/**/**** Type_A2 G-**** 2 Nov 09 
Service Check overdue by 12 days 20.3 hr. 
 
Planning and scheduling support for this operator’s aircraft is usually provided by ***** in ******** operating 
under the name *****.  
 
On Monday 2nd Nov 2009 the ****** Planning Department noticed that the service check on this aircraft -**** 
was overdue by 12 days and 20.3 flight hours. At that time the aircraft was at a satellite station (*****).  The 
aircraft was immediately grounded and a service check carried out.   There were no findings.   
 
Investigation revealed that the service check was last performed on 9 Sep 09 during C-Check at an MRO. TRAX 
was updated at the time and the next due date was correctly recorded as 21 Oct 09, provided the aircraft was 
released to service immediately. However, in this instance, there was delay from releasing the aircraft as it was 
undergoing C-Check. That means the actual date for implementing the C-Check would have to be adjusted and 
monitored manually, because during the C-Check the aircraft was not flying and the routine average daily 
utilization rate did not apply. The oversight in monitoring the due date was due to this manual estimation, which 
had gone wrong due to human error 
 
Furthermore, an independent study had indicated that the actual daily utilization figures applicable to Service 
Checks were erratic, because the actual utilization figures were higher than the estimates.  The TRAX system used 
for estimating due dates use these utilization figures.  Because the system was prone to errors, the TRAX 
estimates have been increased to reflect more realistic values. 
 
 
Comments: This report highlights a typical “Organizational Level” error.  In this case the error was realized in 
good time and prompt recovery action was taken.  However the issue raises some additional questions: Was it 
possible for the system to have made similar errors on other aircraft that had gone C-Checks before? 
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 Serial No Report No Aircraft Date 
8 X380/**/**/**** Type_A2 G-**** 2 Nov 09 
800 kg discrepancy between required and uplifted fuel. 
 
An aircraft was defueled for repairs to centre tank during a weekend shift of 3rd party contractor, at the end of 
which it needed refuelling. The Tech Log had been signed up for the repair work, but it did not show up the 
amount of fuel taken out to facilitate the repair nor the amount of uplift required to make up for the amount 
defueled. The Tech Log showed only the arrival fuel state from the previous sector.  The aircraft was filled up to 
the required amount, but it needed 800 Kg more than the estimated amount calculated using the arrival fuel 
state as the baseline. 
 
 
Comments: Clearly the 800 kg was the amount that had been taken out from the arrival fuel state to enable 
repair to take place. The error was that proper records were not placed on the Tech log for the amount of fuel 
taken out, and the amount of fuel either put back (or needed) to make up for the defueled amount.  There were 
the elements of a system failure here with potentially serious consequence, if the situation got overlooked by 
other pressures and an aircraft got released with a smaller fuel load than what one assumed it to contain. 
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63 X398/**/**/**** Type_A2 G-**** 13 Nov 09 
Rumbling noise coming from nose wheel increasing with speed. 
 
Aircraft was on ****** to ****** sector. Flight crew reported a rumbling noise coming from nose wheel, which 
increased as the speed increased.  
 
The aircraft was inspected at ******** and it was found that the nose wheel retaining nut spacer was missing. 
The nut, nose wheel axle and sleeve were found undamaged.  
 
A spacer was robbed from another company aircraft to repair this one, and then the aircraft was declared 
serviceable. 
 
The mechanic who certified the last nose wheel change during "A" Check was interviewed, and reassured that he 
had completed the work exactly as per the AMM. He had no idea how the spacer came to be missing, and could 
offer “fretting fatigue” of the shim/spacer as one explanation. 
 
 
Comments: There was no information on the date when the previous wheel change was done or the state of the 
condition of the spacer at that time. Therefore, there was no way of cross checking his explanation.  If fretting 
was the main causal factor, then one would assume that the mechanic would have checked the state of the 
spacer and reported. Periodicity of A-Check is normally 14-day, so it might be possible that the checker had not 
noticed early signs of the spacer breaking up 
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 Serial No Report No Aircraft Date 
64 X5/**/**/**** Type_A1 G-**** 01 Jan 10 
Aircraft slipped off axle jack during wheel change. 
 
Engineers from the 3rd party contractors, **** *******, were maintaining the aircraft.  At 04:30 AM, they were 
working outside on the aircraft parking bay under extremely severe weather conditions (-3 deg C, with ice and 
snow on the parking bay). The main wheel bogie was jacked up using a bottle jack to replace a worn No: 5 Main 
Wheel. The parking brakes had been released to enable the wheel retaining nut to be torque loaded.  
Concurrently aircraft was being unloaded.  
 
Suddenly, the aircraft was jolted by a heavy container reaching the end of its travel, which made the aircraft to 
jump off the bottle jack. 
 
On inspection it was found that the stone guard was cracked and the main wheel bogie paintwork got damaged. 
As a precautionary measure, the bogie area that rested on the bottle jack was examined using eddy current 
technique; no cracking damage was detected. A  White ADD was entered to ensure that the cracked stone guard 
was replaced when a spare was available. 
 
A MEDA investigation followed. It was revealed that changing the wheels under loading conditions had been an 
on-going accepted mode of operation.  On this occasion the situation was compounded by the severe inclement 
weather and the need to release the aircraft stand ASAP. The team was working under time-pressure.  
Irrespective of that, the engineer had claimed that it was not possible to predict the occurrence of a sudden jolt 
by a heavy container. 
 
However the investigator acknowledged that contractors need to take extra precautions during inclement 
weather, and a circular has been issued to draw attention the need for extra precautions. 
 
An MOR has been sent to UK CAA. 
 
 
Comments: Wheel changing with bottle jacks in position in concurrent with loading and unloading appears to be 
a set recipe for an accident. If this routine has been accepted as a standard mode of operation may be a moot 
point. Clearly this is an area of conflict between commercial policies (where rapid loading and unloading of 
revenue earning payloads is a critical factor) and safety policies.  It might be possible that engineers were not 
exercising lateral thinking before bottle jacking aircraft when it is obvious that loading and unloading could sway 
the aircraft and extend or retract the shock absorbers, as cargo bay contents changed. Severe weather in this 
situation only aggravated the likelihood of an accident.  Furthermore, releasing the brake in anticipation of 
torque loading was probably premature, that puts the aircraft at risk. A sloping bay could make the aircraft roll, 
and under icy conditions the situation could lead to a fatal accident.  The closing action appeared to be glossing 
over the serious nature of this accident attributed to human error. 
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 Serial No Report No Aircraft Date 
3 X32/**/**/**** Type_A3 G-**** 15 Jan 10 
APU bleed tube not connected after maintenance. 
 
On 15 Jan 10, an engineer from a 3rd party contractor (******) on night shift was tasked to replace the APU 
Surge Valve Filter of a Type_A3 that was being prepared for a revenue flight to *******. Extreme cold weather 
conditions prevailed. In the middle of his, the engineer took a break by going into the warmer environment of the 
cockpit. On his return after the break, he overlooked the need to reconnect the APU bleed valve tube which he 
had previously disconnected as part of the AMM procedure. On completion of his somewhat “incomplete 
installation” he had conducted the required functional checks on the system, signed up for the work, certified for 
its integrity and released the aircraft to service. 
 
During the subsequent handling and despatch phase, engines failed to start up on push back for which APU is 
used usually.  Misidentifying the reasons for failure to start, the captain opted for a ground power assisted start; 
when the engineer arrived at the gate the engine was already running.  This chain of event might have distracted 
the engineer from considering if his previous work had anything to do with the engine starting problem.   
 
Eventually, there was a small technical delay, but the captain anxious to get away due to time pressures departed 
for *******. 
 
After the aircraft departed, the engineer, realizing his mistake and its connection to the engine start up failure, 
reported making an error when wrapping up the task he handled. 
 
The matter was passed on to ******.  On inspecting the aircraft that arrived, investigators found that the bleed 
tube was indeed disconnected. This was reconnected and the system functionally tested and found satisfactory.  
The aircraft was released to service. 
 
Investigations that followed had identified “distraction” as the primary cause of the omission leading to 
incomplete maintenance, and the time pressures and the involvement of ground power unit as contributory 
causes that eclipsed the error coming to the surface, 
 
Considering the seriousness of potential consequences, actual damage was light.  Only up to 30 – 60 min delay 
occurred at the departing station and thanks to information conveyed there was no delay at *****. 
 
However it should be noted that the outward flight carried a fault that could have undermined ETOPS 180 
clearance. Inability to start the engines in the event of a double flame out would have been disastrous.  
 
 
 
Comments: The report does not offer recommendations to alleviate or prevent recurrence of such situations. 
Distraction of the individual due to extreme cold weather was the main causal factor, and time pressure as 
secondary factor that prevented a proper diagnosis for the failure to start engines.   
 
487
 Serial No Report No Aircraft Date 
16 X35/**/**/**** Type_A2 G-**** 16 Jan 10 
Smouldering fire in electrical wiring. 
 
Thursday 14th January the aircraft was AOG in ********* due to a “FWD CABIN TEMP” EICAS message. The 
aircraft was released IAW MEL 21-61-1 and PADD 03/10 was raised. Saturday 16th January, the aircraft was on 
weekend maintenance and the engineers in ***** were tasked with investigating the "FWD CABIN TEMP" EICAS 
message. During the investigation, evidence of a fire was found in the mix manifold area. There were marks of a 
smouldering fire and burnt wires in wire bundles 4106 and 2447. Further investigation revealed metal chips 
inside a wire bundle.  
 
Burnt wires in both bundles were repaired. Several burnt isolation blankets were removed and due to no spares 
being available WADD 01/10 was raised. The forward cabin trim air valve was found to be unserviceable and this 
was replaced IAW AMM.  
 
An operational and system check of the primary temperature control system was carried out satisfactorily. A leak 
check of the forward cabin trim air duct and the right hand pack to mix manifold supply duct were carried out 
satisfactorily. A continuity check of wire bundles 4106 and 2447 was carried out satisfactorily.  
 
It has been suggested that “the phenomenon of ageing aircraft be considered” in case fire was caused by loss of 
insulation that in turn could be attributed to hardness and brittleness of insulation material with age.  
 
Comments: If aging wiring is the source of fire in this case, this event falls into the realm of “design and 
reliability” rather than human error.  However if the issue concerns a failure to detect hardening insulation 
material in cables during the conversion process and associated structural and system survey, then human error 
at Part 21 (equivalent) Production Organization was possible. 
 
Alternatively, if cable fraying due to metallic chips was the causal factor, then there should be an explanation for 
the origin or source of metallic chips. The report does not cover that point.  One could speculate that they could 
be left-over residue from a previous structural repair (See similar incident, Case No: 13, 22 Jan 10, which 
described a burnt loom just below where structural repairs had been carried out). 
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 Serial No Report No Aircraft Date 
15 X34/**/*/**** Type_B1 OO-**** 19 Jan 10 
Incomplete APU Bleed Valve Assembly fitted and incomplete installation. 
 
On replacement of the APU bleed valve it was noticed that the valve fitted to the aircraft was incomplete in 
assembly. There should be two connectors fitted to the valve, one for the operating solenoid and one for the 
position indicating. There was only one connector fitted and this was to the solenoid.  
 
On investigation in the AMM and IPC and checking the layout of the new replacement valve, it was found that 
the fitted valve had no switching unit or electrical receptacle fitted which is used for indicating the correct valve 
position in the cockpit. Further investigation revealed that the connector for the position indicator had been 
jammed behind the fire wire on the right hand wall of the APU bay with no protection.  
 
A full assembly replacement was fitted and connector installed, functionally tested and the aircraft returned to 
serviceable state. 
 
 
Comments: Clearly this is a case of an unsatisfactory spare infiltrating into the system, and the failure by the 
engineer who originally fitted the components to spot the faults. Detailed investigation of historical details has 
yet to be completed. 
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 Serial No Report No Aircraft Date 
13 X21/**/**/**** Type_A2 G-**** 22 Jan 10 
Burnt and separated wiring in a loom. 
 
On aircraft power up for departure, the RAT Pressure Light and the No.1 Engine Start Lights were both on 
indicating a fault. L ENG OVHT loop 2 & L ENG fire loop 2 EICAS status messages were displayed and the standby 
ignition 2L had tripped. During troubleshooting the No.1 Engine Start Valve and the APU Fuel Shut Off Valve CBs 
had tripped.  
 
The fault was traced to a burnt loom which had caused 13 wires to short and then separate. The damaged loom 
was below the floor forward of the P50 card file on the right side of the aircraft. There was evidence of floor 
beam repair above the damaged loom. 
 
The aircraft had undergone conversion at a Part 21 Production Organization in the US, where extensive structural 
repairs had been carried out.  
 
Although there was no direct attribution, but it would suggest that the loom might have been either accidentally 
damaged during repairs to the floor beam, or if not loom damaged by corrosive substances coming from 
payloads carried in the past or cabin services that might have caused the floor beam to be corrode. 
 
 
Comments: This incident could be attributed to human error but the origin is uncertain and further search might 
not be cost effective. It has remained as a dormant error, but the potential risk due to fire hazard should be 
taken as serious.  Even if the original fault was due to corrosive fluid carried by a previous operator or from cabin 
services, it was the responsibility of the production organization tasked with the conversion to properly inspect 
and rectify corrosion defects or any other co-lateral damage to wiring.  In this case, on the face of it, PO seemed 
to have failed in that responsibility 
 
History of the aircraft, role, age, sectors flown and number of C-Check cycles may be relevant to this error 
finding.  These parameters are included in the CAW Risk Model for future benefit. 
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 Serial No Report No Aircraft Date 
17 X68/**/**/**** Type_A2 G-**** 11 Feb 10 
Insufficient bleeding of hydraulic system after leg replacement. 
 
On arrival of the aircraft a daily inspection was carried out, during which it was found that the hydraulic contents 
were low on all three systems. EICAS contents were confirmed with reservoir sight-glass and replenishment point 
remote gauge. The hydraulics was replenished and leak checks of all systems were carried out. No leaks were 
evident, and full range functions of the flying controls were carried out several times and the contents remained 
stable. The maintenance history of the hydraulic system was reviewed and it was noted that the left main gear 
had been replaced at the previous station. Engineers had diagnosed that the hydraulic system had not been 
"bled" sufficiently after triple leg replacement prior to the last flight. 
Investigation of the safety report is in progress. Causal factors would be determined in the course of this 
investigation. 
 
 
Comments: No further comments as investigation has yet to be completed. 
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Proforma used for analyzing narrative error reports 
 
Index Node Name _ Secondary Level Tertiary Level CF State 
1 Operation and Capability   
1.1 Aircraft Type and Series Fixed Wing   
1.2 Aircraft Type and Series Rotary Wing   
1.3 Registration Number   
1.4 Aircraft Age   
1.5 Number of Sectors Flown   
1.6 Number of Major Maintenance Cycles   
1.7 Aircraft  
Combines error probability from 
nodes  1.1-1.6 
1.8 Aircraft Generation Time  TR Time 
1.9  Operating Role   
1.10 Route   
1.11 Nature of Operation  
Combining error probability from 
nodes  1.8-1.10 
1.12 Flight Origin   
1.13 Destination   
1.14 Departure Time  
Intended for correlating shift hours 
and error. 
1.15 Geographical Location & Time  
Combining error probability from 
nodes  1.12-1.14 
1.16 Fleet Size to Num Cat A Staff   
1.17 Fleet Size to Num Cat B1 Staff   
1.18 Fleet Size to Num Cat B2 Staff   
1.19 Fleet Size to Num Cat C Staff   
1.20 Fleet Size to Non Cat Tech Staff   
1.21 Technical Staff  
Combining error probability from 
nodes  1.16-1.20 
1.22 Fleet Size to Logistic  Staff   
1.23 Fleet Size to Tech Managers   
1.24 Other Support Staff  
Combining error probability from 
nodes  1.122-1.23 
1.25 Staff Complement  
Combining error probability from 
nodes  1.121-1.24 
1.26 Operation V Capability  
Combining error probability from 
nodes  1.7, 1.11, 1.15, 1.21, 1.24, 
1.25 
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2 Part 21 AO Regulation Compliance   
2.1 Pt 21 Sub Part A General Provisions   
2.2 
Pt 21 Sub Part J Design Organization 
Approval 
  
2.3 
Pt 21 Sub Part G Production 
Organization Approval 
  
2.4 
Pt 21 Sub Part F Production without 
POA 
  
2.5 Design and Production  
Combining error probability from 
nodes  2.2-2.4 
2.6 Pt 21 Sub Part B Type Certificates   
2.7 
Pt 21 Sub Part D Changes to Type 
Certificate   
  
2.8 
Pt 21 Sub Part E Supplemental Type 
Certificate 
  
2.9 Type Certificate  
Combining error probability from 
nodes  2.6-2.8 
2.10 
Pt 21 Sub Part H Airworthiness 
Certificate 
  
2.11 Pt 21 Sub Part I Noise Certificate   
2.12 Certificates  
Combining error probability from 
nodes  2.9-2.11 
2.13 Pt 21 Sub Part K Parts and Appliances    
2.14 Pt 21 Sub Part M Repairs   
2.15 Pt 21 Sub Part O ETSO Authorization   
2.16 
Pt 21 Sub Part Q Identification of 
Products 
  
2.17 ETSO  
Combining error probability from 
nodes  2.15 - 2.16 
2.18 Pt 21 Compliance  
Combining error probability from 
nodes  2.5, 2.9, 2.12, 2.14, 2.15, 
2.17 
    
3 
Part M AO and Pt 145 AO Regulation 
Compliance 
  
3.1 Part 145 AO Findings Level 1   
3.2 Part 145 AO Findings Level 2   
3.3 Compliance 145  
Combining error probability from 
nodes  3.1 – 3.2 
3.4 Pt M Sub Pt B Findings Level 1   
3.5 Pt M Sub Pt B Findings Level 2   
3.6 Pt M Sub Pt B Compliance  
Combining error probability from 
nodes  3.4 – 3.5 
3.7 Pt M Sub Pt C Findings Level 1   
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3.8 Pt M Sub Pt C Findings Level 2   
3.9 Pt M Sub Pt C Compliance  
Combining error probability from 
nodes  3.7 – 3.8 
3.10 Pt M Sub Pt D Findings Level 1   
3.11 Pt M Sub Pt D Findings Level 2   
3.12 Pt M Sub Pt D Compliance  
Combining error probability from 
nodes  3.10 – 3.11 
3.13. Pt M Sub Pt E Findings Level 1   
3.14 Pt M Sub Pt E Findings Level 2   
3.15 Pt M Sub Pt E Compliance  
Combining error probability from 
nodes  3.13 – 3.14 
3.16 Pt M Sub Pt G Findings Level 1   
3.17 Pt M Sub Pt G Findings Level 2   
3.18 Pt M Sub Pt G Compliance  
Combining error probability from 
nodes  3.16 – 3.17 
3.19 Pt M Sub Pt H Findings Level 1   
3.20 Pt M Sub Pt H Findings Level 2   
3.21 Pt M Sub Pt H Compliance  
Combining error probability from 
nodes  3.19  – 3.20 
3.22 Pt M Sub Pt I Findings Level 1   
3.23 Pt M Sub Pt I Findings Level 2   
3.24 Pt M Sub Pt I Compliance  
Combining error probability from 
nodes  3.22 – 3.23 
3.25 Compliance M  
Combining error probability from 
nodes  3.6, 3.9, 3.12, 3.15, 3.18, 
3.21, 3.24 
3.26 Pt 145 and Pt M Compliance  
Combining error probability from 
nodes  3.3, 3.25, 9.12 
    
4 
Pt 21 AO Error Performance (Active or 
Dormant) 
  
4.1 Aircraft Design   
4.2 Reliability and Maintainability Tests   
4.3 Production   
4.4 Product  
Combining error probability from 
nodes  4.1 – 4.3 
4.5 Maintenance Manuals   
4.6 Product Training   
4.7 OEM Spares   
4.8 Pt 21 AO Product Support  
Combining error probability from 
nodes  4.5 – 4.7 
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4.9 
Pt 21  AO / Pt M  AO Product Support 
Contract 
  
4.10 Pt 21 and Pt M Interface  
Combining error probability from 
nodes  4.8 – 4.9 
    
5 
Pt M AO Error Performance (Active or 
Dormant) 
  
5.1 Pt M Sub Pt B Accountability   
5.2 Pt M Sub Pt C Continuing Airworthiness   
5.3 Pt M Sub Pt D Maintenance Standards   
5.4 Pt M Sub Pt E Components   
5.5 Pt M Sub Pt G CAMO   
5.6 Pt M Sub Pt H CRS   
5.7 Pt M Sub Pt I Airworthiness Review   
5.8 Pt M Organization  
Combining error probability from 
nodes  5.1 – 5.7, 9.12 
5.9 Pt M and Pt 145 Contract Interface   
5.10 Pt M and Pt 145 Interface  
Combining error probability from 
nodes  5.8 – 5.9 
    
6 
Pt 145 AO Error Performance (Active 
or Dormant) 
  
6.1 Pt 145 Organizational Performance  
Combining error probability from 
nodes  5.10, 9.12 
6.2 Maintenance Data   
6.3 Ground Support Equipment   
6.4 Tools and Test Equipment   
6.5 Line Replacement Units and Spares   
6.6 Facility and Environment   
6.7 Logistic Support  
Combining error probability from 
nodes  6.2 – 6.6 
6.8 Task Management Documents   
6.9 Manning   
6.10 Attitude to Task  
Combining error probability from 
nodes  6.8 and 6.11 
6.11 Workface Stress  
Combining error probability from 
nodes  6.9, 7.12 
6.12 Task  
Combining error probability from 
nodes  6.7, 6.8, 6.11 
6.13 Pt 145 Performance  
Combining error probability from 
nodes  5.9, 6.12 
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7 Individual Factors (Active or Dormant)   
7.1 Training and Qualification   
7.2 Health and Fitness   
7.3 Pt 66 Licensing  
Combining error probability from 
nodes  7.1, 7.2 
7.4 Competence   
7.5 Continuation Training   
7.6 Technical Knowledge and Skills  
Combining error probability from 
nodes  7.4, 7.5 
7.7 Certification and Recertification   
7.8 Physiological Limits   
7.9 Physical Health   
7.10 Personal Stress   
7.11 Health and Welfare  
Combining error probability from 
nodes  7.9, 7.10 
7.12 Individual Traits  
Combining error probability from 
nodes  7.7, 7.8, 7.11 
    
8 QMS Organization and Performance   
8.1 CAW Quality Policy   
8.2 Quality Plan and Programs   
8.3 Quality Audit Scope   
8.4 Resources and Training Standards   
8.5 Audit Procedure   
8.6 Remedial Action Procedure   
8.7 CAW Management Activity   
8.8 
Monitor Effectiveness of Aircraft 
Maintenance Program 
  
8.9 Maintenance Contract Monitoring   
8.10 QMS Policy and Plans Scope  
Combining error probability from 
nodes  8.1-8.4 
8.11 QMS Tasks and Processes  
Combining error probability from 
nodes  8.5 – 8.9 
8.12 QMS Organization  
Combining error probability from 
nodes  8.10, 8.11 
8.13 Pt M Management Activity   
8.14 Pt M Finding Reporting   
8.15 Pt M Corrective Action   
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8.16 Pt M Quality Audit Performance  
Combining error probability from 
nodes  8.13 – 8.15 
8.17 Pt 145 Activity Area   
8.18 Pt 145 Finding Reporting   
8.19 Pt 145 Corrective Action   
8.20 Pt 145 Quality Audit Performance  
Combining error probability from 
nodes  8.17 – 8.19 
8.21 Sub Contractor Activity Area   
8.22 Sub Contractor Finding Reporting   
8.23 Sub Contractor Corrective Action   
8.24 
Sub Contractor Quality Audit 
Performance 
 
Combining error probability from 
nodes  8.21 – 8.23 
8.25 Supplier Activity Area   
8.26 Supplier Finding Reporting   
8.27 Supplier Corrective Action   
8.28 Supplier Quality Audit Performance  
Combining error probability from 
nodes  8.25 – 8.27 
8.29 Quality Audit Performance  
Combining error probability from 
nodes 8.16, 8.20, 8.24, 8.28 
8.30 Quality Management System  
Combining error probability from 
nodes  8.12, 8.29, 10.6 
    
9 Corporate Policy and Global Factors   
9.1 Global factors   
9.2 Central Government   
9.3 Local Government   
9.4 Corporate Board   
9.5 Trade Union   
9.6 CEO AM Decisions  
Combining error probability from 
nodes  9.1 – 9.5 
9.7 Commercial Policies   
9.8 Flight Operations Policies   
9.9 Engineering Operations Policies   
9.10 Logistic Support Policies   
9.11 Human Resources Policies   
9.12 Corporate and Policy Issues  
Combining error probability from 
nodes  9.7 – 9.11, 10.6 
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10 Change Management   
10.1 Business Management   
10.2 Flight Operations   
10.3 Maintenance Organization Exposure    
10.4 Engineering and Technology   
10.5 Human Resources   
10.6 Change Management  
Combining error probability from 
nodes  10.1 – 10.5, 9.6 
    
11 
Error Probability  Defences and 
Consequences 
  
11.1 CAW Management  
Combining error probability from 
nodes 4.4, 5.8, 6.13, 11.2 
11.2 Defence Pt 145   
11.3 Consequences Pt 145   
11.4 Release to Fly  
Combining error probability from 
nodes 11.1, 11.5 
11.5 Defence Pt M   
11.6 Consequences Pt M   
11.7 Handling and Despatch  
Combining error probability from 
nodes 3.26, 8.30, 9.12, 11.4, 11.8, 
11.8 Defence H and D   
11.9 Consequence  H and D   
11.10 Defence Pre Take Off   
11.11 Take Off  
Combining error probability from 
nodes 11.7, 11.10 
11.12 Consequence Pre Take Off   
11.13 Flight and Consequences   
11.14 Combined Cost  
Combining error probability from 
nodes 11.3, 11.6, 11.9, 11.13, 
11.14, 11.5, 11.6 
11.15 Defence Quality  Late additions for validation 
11.16 Consequence Quality  Late additions for validation 
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